

To Be Decided*

Journal of Interdisciplinary Theory

A sculpture of a person, possibly a classical figure, with their hands covering their face in a gesture of distress, grief, or deep thought. The sculpture is made of a light-colored material, possibly marble or plaster, and shows signs of weathering or age. The background is a bright blue sky with scattered white clouds.

Volume 3
Error

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Journal of Interdisciplinary Theory

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Cover art: Photo of Cain by Henri Vidal

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To Be Decided*

Journal of Interdisciplinary Theory

Volume 3: Error
“We’ve made a mistake...”

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Acknowledgements

As we emerge from the mire of contending with error from all directions, it is essential to acknowledge and thank those who ensured that we stayed the course and did not blunder this year's issue.

First and foremost, we need to acknowledge the hard work and dedication of the authors who provided content for this year's publication. Thank you for embarking on this journey with us, for your commitment to the review process, and your willingness to share your work with us. We also need to thank all those who volunteered to review, who offered constructive and honest feedback in their efforts to cultivate academic excellence.

We are also greatly indebted to the faculty, as well as our cohorts, at Acadia's Social and Political Thought program. Their mentorship and constant encouragement proved invaluable. We specifically need to thank our program coordinator, Dr. Geoffrey Whitehall, who made this journal a reality and whose continued support makes this process possible. We would additionally like to acknowledge our editorial predecessors whose work at TBD* provided us with a pathway towards publication. Without their efforts, this issue would not be possible.

Finally, with great sorrow, we would like to acknowledge the passing of one of this year's authors, Mark Grosjean. We were impressed by Mark's initiative and enthusiasm in submitting to the journal, despite only being an undergraduate student at the time. Mark's contribution to this year's issue of TBD* marked the beginning of what looked to be a long and promising career. The quality of his work speaks for itself. For this, we present this issue of TBD* in his memory.

Editors' Introduction

Error is an unavoidable aspect of human lived experience. Nothing is perfect, mistakes happen, things always manage to slip through the cracks, missteps result in oversights which go by unnoticed. If errors are inevitable, how should we contend with such blunders when they become apparent? This is the question at the heart of this volume of *To Be Decided**. The submissions from our talented authors grappled with the question of error in a variety of creative, insightful and thought-provoking ways.

Our first piece is a creative submission, "Book of Judges," from Madelaine Longman. Through poetry, Longman juxtaposes the phenomenon of obsessive-compulsive disorder with religious moralism; experimenting with what happens when the two are mixed and meshed together. How does a human, prone to errors, live a moral life? By paralleling a discussion of religious piety though Judaism alongside the 'errors' and irrationality of thinking that is manifest in OCD, Longman attempts to contend with how one can reconcile idealism with the certainty of human error.

In his article "Can Immigration be Truly Liberal? Rawlsian Principles on the Cultural Frontier," Mark Grosjean situates immigration within Rawls' philosophical project of justice as fairness. For Grosjean, this creates questions concerning the role that borders play in protecting culture, thus creating a cultural frontier. He goes on to interrogate the limits of immigration in democratic societies that claim to be truly liberal. Through a Rawlsian analysis of liberal democracy, Grosjean is able to ask a central question of error: Can immigration be truly liberal? By theorizing how borders, as institutions, complicate the creation of a just society, Grosjean applies Rawlsian theory to the cultural frontier, questioning the possibility of a just society despite cultural difference.

Melanie Proulx, in her article "Deporting the Truth: Tracking the Impact of Longfellow and Deportation Literature in Quebec," discusses the impact of 'deportation discourse' on how the Acadian deportation has been discussed throughout history and how it has been portrayed with judgment. Through an analysis of Henry Longfellow's 1847 poem

Evangeline, Proulx demonstrates how an exaggerated narrative has been created concerning the Acadian deportation. Using a variety of techniques informed by deportation discourse, Proulx's theory presents how particular techniques employed in the writing of history can create exaggerated truths or errors in understanding history. For Proulx, this is particularly clear in how the Acadian deportation has been portrayed in Quebec's history texts.

"Meshed Frameworks: Liberal Democracy, Multiculturalism, and Settler-Colonial Reconciliation" by Dylan Thiessen focuses on the tensions that exist between liberal democracy, reconciliation, and multiculturalism in Canada. Thiessen conceptualizes that multiculturalism is problematic and incompatible with the goal of settler-colonial reconciliation. In this way, he contends with the question of how ignoring the problematic nature of multiculturalism could impact efforts to achieve reconciliation between Indigenous people and the state.

In his article "Specters of The Black Lodge: An Engagement with Hauntology and Specters Through *Twin Peaks*," Justin MacLeod discusses intentional errors in filming found in the television show, *Twin Peaks*. He encourages facing the unknown and uses Derrida's conception of hauntology and spectres to analyze the way that story is constructed throughout *Twin Peaks*. This work contends with the struggle of encountering errors and unknowns; are we asking the wrong kind of questions in the search for the truth, living in the assumption that all mysteries can and should be solved?

Finally, Adam Christianson's article "Errors in Judgment? Lessons in Slipping-up, Solidarity and Technology from MSM Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP) Users and Non-Users in Ontario" examines the notion of error in the context of everyday technologies. Using the phrase 'slipping-up' in relation to notions of responsibility and stigma, Christianson provides this issue of TBD* with an empirical study of error. His work showcases the dilemma men who have sex with men are faced with when they are provided with new technologies meant to improve their quality of life. Christianson politicizes what it means to be 'safe' when preferred methods of protection are replaced and/or improved upon by the use of newer technologies. In essence, his study

questions whether safety resides in new technologies or an error has been made in how heteronormative understandings of sex have responded to the use of technologies such as PrEp.

*To Be Decided** Journal of Interdisciplinary Theory
Managing Editors
Laura Townend and Jason Penney

Book of Judges

Madelaine Longman
M.A. in English at
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*"From so much self-thinking, I'm now my thoughts and not I."
- Bernardo Soares, Disquietude*

*"We are all just trying to be holy."
-Richard Siken, "Snow and Dirty Rain"*

i.

A vow is a promise to G-d, and, if spoken, becomes binding.

Judaism forbids wasting time. Therefore, one must always be thinking.

Judaism encourages the act of questioning. For example:

If G-d is omniscient, what is the difference between a thought and an action?

If a vow is inevitable, why does G-d not simply possess our bodies and make us carry out his will?

If G-d is omnipotent and omnipresent, is there no divide between G-d and our thoughts?

If G-d is thinking us, are our actions his thoughts? Can we ever belong to ourselves?

Judaism forbids wasting time. Therefore, one must always be thinking or allowing oneself to be thought.

ii.

Intrusive thoughts are thoughts that become trapped in a mind,
circling like flies. They bite, repeat, contradict
what a person wants to be or believe.

(Scrupulosity: an obsessive moral guilt,
from the Latin word
for a small, sharp stone.)

Intrusive thoughts are violent, sexual, sacrilegious,
an annulment
of oneself.

Priests shake with thoughts
of worshipping the devil.
Pacifists dream their hands marked with blood.

These thoughts are not a problem
unless one becomes distressed by them.
Thinking about thinking the thoughts
causes them to multiply.

iii.

Before the world, G-d was called EinS of:
the absence of an ending.
Or he would have been called that
had there been anyone
to call him anything.

Before the world, the universe
was a bowl of infinite light.
Being made by an omnipotent Being, the light was limitless.
Its particles vibrated with infinite speed.
Its brightness would have burned away the senses
had anyone existed to perceive it.

With no end, the light left no space
for the world to exist.

So G-d created the void,

using his omnipotence
to dim his omnipotence.

This was called tsimtsum, reduction.
Or more accurately: tsimtsumim,
these reductions being plural.

Through tsimtsumim,
G-d quieted his divine energy
until it was almost imperceptible.
The infinite world
cooled into something
our human minds could touch.

One tsimtsum more
and nothing at all could exist.

iv.

Those with obsessive-compulsive disorder
cannot distinguish between thought and action:
an image-flash of harm violences the mind, identical
to memory of murder.

How does one stopper a thought?
And how to silence a fear
of one's own possibilities?
The misaimed knife, the unsnuffed candle;

certainty a room
already burning.

The disorder appears to correlate
with abnormalities in the medulla oblongata,
the brain region which signals the call
for shame, danger, fear, guilt, dread, and panic.
If the medulla oblongata ceases to regulate itself,
when an action is taken to alleviate distress,
stress hormones will continue to flow.

Unable to find relief, a person becomes trapped
repeating actions that promise safety
or closure. They pray obsessively.
They sanitize their hands until they crack.
They avoid crossing streets. They avoid speaking.
They go to their homes and lock themselves in
again. Again. Again.

They withdraw from the world
until they are almost imperceptible.

The disorder is not in action but in thought.
Or not in the thought, but in thinking
about the thought, allowing the thought,
or avoidance of the thought,
to control one's actions,
unable to tolerate life
with uncertainty.

Likewise, agoraphobia is not the fear of open spaces,
but the fear of losing control
in front of people in these spaces. Of spilling out
of routine, and being seen
for what one is.

v.

The right-wing Rabbi Wein says shame is essential
to Jewish identity. "The only question that truly arises
is what one should be ashamed about."

He cites the need for humility, Jewish prayers for forgiveness,
David's desperate repentance before G-d.
The Jewish philosopher Howard Adelman argues

that guilt and shame are opposites.
That guilt calls for change, and shame
for avoidance.

While guilt is attached to an action,
shame affixes to the essence of a person:
being rather than doing wrong.

In the garden of Eden, Adam named the animals,
his ambitions G-d like: through speech he shaped the world
through what could be thought.

Yet he could not name
what went on inside him,
nor look upon his wife, Chavah,
as a complete being,
another consciousness.
Unaware of himself as discrete entity,
he could not voice his loneliness.

When he bit into the fruit, he recognized
the ache that had always existed:
his position as fallible, embodied, separate,
his inner world his alone.
Chavah's world hers.

None of this is sin, says Adelman.
Chavah and Adam were not punished for their acts
but for hiding them.

In Adelman's view, sin is like shame: a negation
of oneself.

vi.

In the Book of Judges, Yiptah vows to sacrifice his daughter.

In English, Yiptah is called Jephthah, though Hebrew has no sound for
“j”
and no sound for “th.”

Yiptah was a military leader from the tribe of Menasseh,
a tribe whose descendants have since vanished
into the diaspora.

Somewhere there are people related to him, though they do not know
it.

Yiptah vowed to lead the Children of Israel in battle against the
Children of Ammon.

He vowed that, if he returned victorious, he would sacrifice
the first living thing to emerge from his house.

He led the Children of Israel in battle against the Children of Ammon.
He returned victorious.

As he approached his home, his daughter ran out to greet him.

Yiptah tore his clothes and cried.

vii.

Judaism teaches that it is impossible
for the devil to be G-d's enemy.
After all, G-d is omnipotent.
Therefore, the devil must be working for G-d.

viii.

Statistics about obsessive-compulsive disorder
are filled with voids and contradictions.

There is no brain scan capable of diagnosing mental illness.
Therefore, diagnosis can only be based
on self-reported thoughts and behaviors.

No person can fully enter the mind of another,
so diagnosis is an act of faith.
Doctors must trust that patients mean what they say
and are able to communicate it.

It does not account
for how shame
silences shame.

ix.

In battle, we are told G-d went before Yiptah,
an invisible fire, obliterating
all who rose before him.

If G-d did not approve of Yiptah's sacrifice,
why did he lead him to victory?
Why did he not immobilize his daughter in the doorway?
Why did he not speak out, or speak out in a way

we could understand?

According to the Book of Judges, Yiptah's daughter does not protest.
She asks for two months to spend with her friends and in nature.
She is a good daughter. She does not argue with her father
or with the G-d who does not speak in this story.

The Book of Judges never gives her name.

x.

Some doctors hypothesize that obsessive-compulsive disorder
is no single condition, but a spectrum of illnesses
involving fixation: on body image, morality,
rules, goodness, safety, hygiene, achievement,
exercise, organization—in short, any psychic distress
that results from a thought
that will not leave.

Where does the line lie
between idea and obsession

faith and scrupulosity
fixation and delusion
our minds and ourselves?

At what point does a thought
become an illness?

Diagnosis is made by the extent of distress
as reported by the patient. Not the thought itself
but its persistence.

Within the knots of a mind
which threads can be pried away as disorder
and which knot the core we call soul
or self or consciousness?

Without the thoughts we build our lives around
what are we left with?
xi.

The binding of Isaac is central to Jewish identity.
The refusal to sacrifice a human life for divine honor.
The message that giving up human life
is not something that is asked of us.

A defining characteristic of Judaism
is to value human life
above unyielding moral code.

Human life is more holy than laws.
This is why blood transfusions and surgeries are permitted,
although it is forbidden to wound one's body.

In the story of Yiptah, G-d's voice does not roar.
He does not turn the air stony
or freeze Yiptah's raised hand.

G-d does not appear at all
except in Yiptah's words, his daughter's loyalty.

In the story of Yiptah, G-d is both an absence
and a thought that will not leave.

xii.

We do not know how Yiptah's daughter spent her last free days,
why she asked for exactly two months,
or who she spent them with.

We are told she was remembered in annual ceremonies
but do not know the rituals
or why they stopped.

We are told only she was a willing martyr.
Centuries later, Christian scholars applaud her
as a role model for nuns,
praise her unflinching fidelity
how she willingly extracted herself from the world

though it is Yiptah they bestow with sainthood.

xiii.

In experiences of obsessive-compulsive disorder,
one fears that their fears are actually their fantasies.
That one thinks of committing harm
because of desire rather than anxiety.

One fear is that a person will act
out the worst-case scenario
to finally bring an end to the fear
of the worst-case scenario.
For example: hurting oneself
to alleviate fear of hurting oneself.

The mind runs over and over
its own sharp stones.

Punishing oneself
is morally consistent
with a fear of oneself:
the danger contained
by force if necessary.

To avoid contaminating others,
people who fear themselves may cease
to leave their homes.
They may cease speaking, touching
or allowing themselves to be touched.
They quarantine themselves
inside their thoughts.

They stop crossing the street.
They stop holding their children.

It is a gradual narrowing of the world.

xiv.

In the beginning, G-d created the void
to make space for the world.
In the beginning, G-d gave us his absence.

To those who believe in tsimtsum,
an absence of apparent miracles
is itself evidence

of G-d's greatest gift.

xv.

The Book of Judges tells the story of Yiptah's unnamed daughter
in a strangely neutral tone:

*And it came to pass at the end of two months
that she returned to her father, who did with her according
to his vow which he had vowed*

The words so clear
they bleach out detail:

a face turned directly
into limitless light,

features obliterated.

xvi.

"Israel" means "those who wrestle with G-d."
Did anyone fight for the life of Yiptah's daughter?
The author remains taciturn.

Some scholars say G-d refused to stop Yiptah,
so that Yiptah could be made an example
against rash vows.

Some say this story is intended to depict
the moral decline of the Israelites.
To show they had lost their identity.

Some say he did not sacrifice his daughter.
That the particle "ו" (*veh*) does not mean "and," as in modern Hebrew,
but "or." That Yiptah had declared that whatever came to greet him
would be either burnt as an offering *or* dedicated to G-d.

Today, Jewish scholars mostly agree
that Yiptah's daughter was permitted to live,
though forbidden to marry,
and that she was kept
in solitary and perpetual confinement.
This is agreed to be adequate loss of a life.

Rashi believes Yiptah was punished,
afflicted with an illness which caused his limbs to rot
and fall to the earth. No one knows
where the pieces of him are buried

or when we walk over him.

xvii.

It is impossible to know the fatality rate of obsessive-compulsive disorder.

Not only do many cases go un- or mis-diagnosed, it is usually comorbid with other mental health conditions.

One cannot ask the reasoning of a person who has ceased to exist.

According to some mental health advocates, it is unethical to refer to a person as having “committed” suicide, as this language implies both crime and choice. Instead, one is supposed to say, “died by.”

xviii.

KolNidre is an Aramaic legal document spoken once a year as a prayer.

KolNidre means “all vows.” It opens Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement, which begins at night as Jewish days do.

KolNidre states: we renounce all vows we make between this and the next Yom Kippur. Let them all be relinquished and abandoned, null and void.

Rabbis have gone on to clarify that this invalidation of vows only applies if one makes the vow without thinking of KolNidre. If one makes a vow insincerely, the vow is considered genuine.

In the 12th century, Rabbi Meir ben Samuel added the words, “We do repent of them all.” Both the vow and repentance must be intentional.

KolNidre has been protested by both Jews and gentiles.

It has been held as evidence that Jews are untrustworthy.
It has been viewed as a catalyst for reckless vows
and impending corruption.

It continues to be sung.

KolNidre is sung three times, first almost a whisper. Then louder. Then louder.

Some sing it more than three times.

The congregation sings it over and over, again and again, to include anyone
who arrives late.

xix.

According to Rabbi Moshe Leiv of Sassov
disbelief can itself shape virtue;
if we cannot turn to G-d for aid
we become responsible for each other.

xx.

In religious communities, obsessive-compulsive disorder
may present as perfectionism in prayer.
Worshippers labour over hymns for hours,
out of fear they have added, subtracted, or misspoken a word,
fear they have slipped into indecent thoughts,
fear they have lapsed into silence,
fear they have ceased to concentrate,
fear at that moment they do not believe in G-d.

Even in a group setting, prayer is private,
less spoken than thought.
Locked in a person, this compulsion
is extremely difficult to treat.

Asked about this problem,

the ultra-orthodox Rabbi Kanievski
says one should simply read the prayer
continuing on through possible errors.
That this act is sufficient. Imperfection

a form of faith.

xxi.

Yiptah's daughter may have been named Seila or she may have been
named Adah.

She may have been named something else entirely.

We do not know where she is buried, either.

xxii.

Judaism promises neither heaven nor hell.
Biblical Jews spoke sometimes of Sheol,
a holding realm for the dead,
in which souls lose identity
deep in the ground, regardless

of how they lived on earth.
Through witchcraft, the dead
can converse with the living

but this practice is forbidden.

Modern Jews reject these views.
Some believe at the end of days
eternal life will fill our bodies:

muscle and flesh will awaken our bones,
and our veins will twine like vines
to bind us back to our lifeblood.

The earth will open,

and our loved ones pour forth
back into our arms.

The ancient temple priests denied this.

The Kabbala speaks of reincarnation,
Maimonides of souls as particles of G-d.
After thousands of years, scholars continue
to argue over heaven, hell, and nonexistence,

but Jews rarely prioritize these discussions.
Ethical debates center on action over belief,
this life over the next. The questions of how

we can live in this world
as though it is enough.

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Can Immigration be Truly Liberal?

Rawlsian Principles on the Cultural Frontier

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After the Council of the European Union voted to go forward with a controversial refugee settlement plan in the autumn of 2015, Central Europe pushed back to defend their national cultures. “We will wake up one day and have 100,000 people from the Arab world and that is a problem I would not like Slovakia to have,” said Robert Fico, the Slovak prime minister.¹ The Czech president, Milos Zeman, took a similar line, referring to Islam as “the enemy of euro-Atlantic civilisation.”² On the surface, these statements seem to convey an intolerance that goes against the liberal commitments of the European Union.

Is it always illiberal to defend national culture at the cost of keeping refugees and would-be immigrants out? As John Rawls understood it, societies can only fulfill liberal commitments when their sense of justice is *completely unbiased*, when their sense of justice rests on an appropriate understanding of *what citizens are morally capable of*, and when their sense of justice is supported by citizens’ *overlapping conviction that their institutions are just*. The problem is, when these commitments are applied to immigration and asylum, a tension emerges on the question of whether national cultures matter.

In the first section of this article, I will explain how immigration fits within Rawls’ philosophical project and then, in the sections that follow, I will set up the tension that emerges within the cultural dimension of immigration. The second section develops the idea that using borders to protect culture is just another way of protecting unfair privilege, which is inconsistent with the liberal commitment to being *completely unbiased*. In conflict with this, the third section develops the idea that, in order for individuals to do *what citizens are morally capable of*, democratic societies must maintain their cultural integrity by

¹ Rob Cameron, “Migrant Crisis: Why Central Europe resists refugee quota,” *BBC News*, September 22, 2015, accessed April 23, 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34313478>.

² Cameron, “Migrant Crisis.”

imposing some limit on immigrants and refugees. There is, then, this tension in applying Rawls' liberal justice to immigration: borders are always biased against would-be immigrants and refugees but borders protect the cultural ground needed for citizens to participate in liberal societies. This contradiction strains Rawls' political theory and, more than this, it strains the possibility that democratic nations can ever take a fair stance on immigration.

The final section offers a resolution. It draws on Rawls' insight that justice in liberal societies only becomes possible when it rests on citizens' *overlapping conviction that their institutions are just*. In his words, "an overlapping consensus" between individual interests determines the limit of what justice can ask of us. By considering the interests of locals, refugees, and voluntary migrants, it is possible to attain an overlapping consensus on the right to asylum while it is *not* possible to arrive at such a consensus on the right to voluntary migration. This means that all justice requires of democracies and their immigration policies is the right to asylum—that is, the right for individuals to take refuge when they are threatened in their country of origin and the obligation on the part of safe countries to grant this protection.³

Rawls in the Context of Immigration

The fundamental element of Rawls' theory is predicated on the idea that the most reasonable principles of justice could be arrived at through fair and mutual agreement.⁴ To be sure, this refers to hypothetical rather than real-world, literal agreement. Admittedly, Rawls never intended this idea be applied to immigration and asylum, his intentions were to apply the idea to local citizens.⁵ For Rawls, fair and mutual agreement matters to justice because it allows us to uncover the terms of

³ No international legal definition of this right can be provided because the right to asylum does not currently exist under international law or in treaties. For a short discussion, see Ionel Zamfir. "Refugee Status Under International Law." *European Parliament Think Tank*, October 27, 2015, <https://epthinktank.eu/2015/10/27/refugee-status-under-international-law/>.

⁴ John Rawls, *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement*, edited by Erin Kelly (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001), xi.

⁵ For Rawls' own ideas about immigration, and why justice as fairness would eliminate immigration as a problem, see John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples, with "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited"*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 9.

“a fair system of cooperation over time from one generation to the next, where those engaged in cooperation are viewed as free and equal citizens and normal cooperating members of society over a complete life.”⁶ The idea is that because all citizens have to live under the same institutions, their fates are tied together, therefore their institutions can only be just if all citizens could conceivably agree that their shared institutions are fair.

With immigration, the situation seems to be entirely different. Unlike the relationship that exists between citizens of the same country, locals do not live under the same political institutions as the would-be immigrants and refugees at their border. Yet there is still an important similarity: locals, would-be immigrants, and refugees alike are on the *verge* of living under the same institutions and so the decision to permit or prohibit the right to cross the border will nonetheless have profound and lasting effects for everyone on both sides. Here, if would-be immigrants and refugees are allowed in, it permits them to live a life they want or need while it imposes an obligation on locals to include these newcomers into their society and its system of cooperation. If they are denied entry, however, it permits locals to coerce would-be immigrants and refugees at the border, forcing them to accept that a life they want or need is forbidden for them. So, just as citizens of the same country must all live under the same constitution, locals on one side of the border and prospective newcomers on the other must all endure a common institution: the openness or firmness of the border. Obviously, the reality of sovereignty is that locals and their governments decide on their own terms what happens with immigration and asylum seekers. But under this expanded take on Rawls’ idea—where the underlying principle is that for everyone affected by the same political institution, justice requires that those same people could conceivably agree on the form it should take—it follows that borders should be enforced in a way that locals and prospective newcomers alike could agree on as fair.

To put it another way, if we think of would-be immigrants and refugees as seeking to join society as a fair system of cooperation—as individuals looking to take part in the social contract and respect its terms—it would require an explanation of why life in democratic societies is usually reserved for naturally born citizens. After all, democracies take their citizens to be morally equal and equally deserving

⁶ Rawls, *Justice as Fairness*, xi.

of their place in society. What makes prospective newcomers unworthy of playing this same part? In order to justly deny would-be immigrants and refugees their place in local society, there would have to be a convincing reason explaining why prospective newcomers are meaningfully different from locals. This reason would only be just if locals, would-be immigrants, and refugees alike could agree it is fair.

National culture—thought of here as the locals’ language and standards of behaviour—seems to be an effective way of distinguishing who has the right to live in a territory. It seemingly explains why would-be immigrants and refugees, who must usually learn the culture of the host nation in order to act within it, cannot easily become citizens; and why locals, who grow up within that culture and can act easily within it, are entitled to citizenship. But if we follow Rawls and argue that justice in immigration should emerge from principles that could be fairly and mutually agreed on, it does not seem promising that locals and prospective newcomers could agree fairly and mutually on justice in immigration because they are divided on the relevance of culture. On the part of prospective newcomers, an attempt to protect national culture through exclusive immigration policies seems to be an arbitrary bias in favor of local values and beliefs. On the locals’ part, this same stance is an effort to protect the important sharing of cultural features that allow citizens to pursue value in their private lives and uphold liberal commitments as a society. The next two sections will consider this tension—a tension that seems to be the most obvious way of explaining why would-be immigrants and refugees could not simply take their place beside locals as members of Rawls’ “fair system of cooperation.”

Culture and Biased Ideal

Rawls understood the “veil of ignorance” as a “device of representation” in that it removes the effects of biases in order to ground justice in fair and mutual agreement.⁷ Behind this veil, Rawls argues, we should contemplate and agree to the requirements of justice as if we did not know our social position, our moral and religious beliefs, our ethnic group, our gender, or our natural abilities. Following Joseph Carens, I will add culture of origin to this list. That way, we can consider the demands of justice in immigration without the distractions

⁷ Rawls, *Justice as Fairness*, 18.

of difference.⁸ While Rawls assumed a closed domestic society, I see this as an appropriate addition. The role of the veil of ignorance is to set aside those features of our lives that are contingent and ground the demands of justice on what we see as necessary in democracies: the freedom and equality of the individual.

Rawls understood the veil of ignorance as modeling two things: “fair conditions” for agreement and “acceptable restrictions on the reasons for agreeing.”⁹ Behind the veil of ignorance, conditions are fair because it removes the effects of biases and privileges. Simply, from this position, we can consider the terms of society without trying to protect the privileges of our own circumstances because we are feigning that we are not aware of them. This allows the veil of ignorance to restrict the reasons for agreeing: we do not agree because it favors our place in society, or because it disfavors others, but out of pure concern for the formal equality and freedom of individuals.

Using a global view of the veil of ignorance, Joseph Carens has argued that it is unfair for democratic societies to deny foreigners the freedom to immigrate. “Behind the veil of ignorance,” Carens writes, “in considering possible restrictions on freedom, one adopts the perspective of the one who would be most disadvantaged by the restrictions.”¹⁰ For Carens, borders are harmful because they interfere with a move that “might prove essential to one’s plan of life.”¹¹ By this logic, the individual’s “plan of life” is central and liberties are inadequate insofar as they unjustly interfere with these plans. Carens gives examples of a migrant pursuing work and a better life in another country, of a migrant pursuing a religious community established abroad, and of a migrant pursuing cultural opportunities in a distinctive foreign society to illustrate his point.¹² If the citizens and politicians of democratic states set aside their biases and consider what their borders look like for would-be immigrants with these plans of life, they can come to appreciate borders as biased institutions.

Further, the veil of ignorance restricts the kind of reasons that democracies can use to support or reject the freedom to immigrate. For

⁸Joseph H. Carens, “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders,” *Review of Politics* 49 no. 2 (1987): 262.

⁹ Rawls, *Justice as Fairness*, 17.

¹⁰ Carens, “Aliens and Citizens,” 258.

¹¹ Carens, “Aliens and Citizens,” 258.

¹² Carens, “Aliens and Citizens,” 258.

instance, Carens offers a broad category of cases in which democracies can permissibly restrict this freedom: in situations of heavy immigration where the local economy is struggling and local state apparatuses are unable to maintain order, society could experience security threats. Carens argues that in institutions like these, democracies can rightly limit immigration on the grounds of a “public order restriction” because even behind the veil of ignorance everyone could agree to save order from chaos.¹³ But unlike security threats, the impulse to preserve a cultural ideal is not usable behind the veil of ignorance. This is because appeals to culture are the sort of considerations that are secondary and contingent—they rest on the distractions of difference, rather than on a fairly agreed upon respect for individual freedom. Here, Carens evokes Rawls’ discussion of perfectionism. From behind the veil of ignorance, Carens writes, “no one would accept any perfectionist standard because no one would be willing to risk the possibility of being required to forego some important right or freedom for the sake of an ideal that might prove irrelevant to one’s own concerns.”¹⁴ In his view, it would be an unfair bias to exclude immigrants from other cultures in the interest of protecting the local language and ways. This means that because democratic commitments require the complete removal of bias, borders are always in tension with democratic commitments.

Culture as Ground for Freedom

While eliminating bias is an important part of Rawls’ understanding of justice in a liberal society, it is only one component. In his view, an understanding of what we can do as citizens must also feature into a democratic understanding of justice. In this section, I will look past the interpretation that borders are a biased obstacle to individual freedom and, instead, consider freedom in terms of an individual’s capacity to pursue meaningful practices in democratic society. With this view, freedom is not just the absence of obstacles. Instead, it relies on the cultural context through which individuals find their place and contribute to the broader order.

This view comes as a consequence of what Rawls called “the moral powers” of citizens. By his account, citizens are free and equal members of society in virtue of their power “for a conception of the good” and

¹³ Carens, “Aliens and Citizens,” 259.

¹⁴ Carens, “Aliens and Citizens,” 262.

their power “for a sense of justice.”¹⁵ This understanding of the person is a product of the way individuals are thought of in democratic society. In Rawls’ words, it “is worked up from the way citizens are regarded in the public political culture of democratic society.”¹⁶ I argue that culture is a medium for moral individuals to define themselves within and, sometimes, to even define themselves against. In this way, it allows individuals to meaningfully exert their moral powers and, through this exertion, it allows them to confirm their place as free and equal persons in a democratic society. In other words, culture is a moral ground to stand on and borders—insofar as they contain a coherent culture—have some role to play in protecting and preserving that moral ground.

Culture and a Capacity for a Conception of the Good

In Rawls’ own words, free and equal persons have the power “[to hold,] to revise, and to rationally pursue a conception of the good.”¹⁷ This places the individual in a position where they can go out and find meaning in their lives by embracing the value systems they were brought up with or by looking for new ones. It is an effectively self-regarding moral power that individuals use in the expression of their own conscience and in their association with other like-minded individuals. Further, Rawls describes the conception of the good as endowing the individual with a “moral identity.”¹⁸ In this way, an individual’s conception of the good not only shapes his self-regarding affairs and his understanding of a worthwhile life but also becomes a constitutive part of himself. In Rawls’ words, an individual’s conception of the good produces “affections, devotions, and loyalties that they believe they would not, indeed could and should not, stand apart from and evaluate objectively.”¹⁹

This is where the principles of justice enter. It is also where the ethics of immigration enters. Once we understand individuals as having conceptions of the good because of their intimate link with their own moral personality and place demands on institutions, borders come into consideration. Borders deny a world of choice in favor of the choices that are locally available. The question, then, becomes whether

¹⁵ Rawls, *Justice as Fairness*, 18-19.

¹⁶ Rawls, *Justice as Fairness*, 19.

¹⁷ Rawls, *Justice as Fairness*, 19.

¹⁸ Rawls, *Justice as Fairness*, 19.

¹⁹ Rawls, *Justice as Fairness*, 22.

dismantling borders is reconcilable with an individual's power to have and to revise a conception of the good.

I suggest this requires that we think of borders not only as political frontiers but also as cultural frontiers. That is to say, borders are not only the outer edge of sovereignty but the outer edge of a society, and importantly, the outer edge of the shared cultural features that allow society to work. In my view, there is reason to think that borders—thought of as the edge of a cultural space—actually ground the individual's conception of the good rather than restricting it.

Will Kymlicka argues that “freedom is meaningfully linked with, and dependent, on culture.”²⁰ This begins from his understanding of “societal cultures,” which he describes as providing “meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities.” This includes a range of activities across social, educational, religious, and economic spheres. Importantly, Kymlicka maintains, societal cultures “tend to be territorially concentrated, and based on a shared language.”²¹

Kymlicka writes that “it is only through having access to a societal culture that people have access to a range of meaningful options.”²² I see Kymlicka's account of culture as too limiting. I argue that culture is not just a range of choices: it is the possibility of choice. It is not just about claiming a value among the cultural values already there, but about using language and customs to take up, revise, question, and reject values. The capacity to latch onto, reject, reevaluate—even create—a conception of the good works with culture as a medium. I argue that culture can be the ground from which conceptions of the good emerge from or find a footing. These conceptions of the good—these systems of value residing in culture and produced out of culture—in turn, lend meaning to the lives of individuals in democratic society.

This means that culture is not valuable in and of itself. Instead, culture is merely a formal condition that individuals use to develop, pursue, and revise values. This means that the state's role is not to protect culture in a conservative sense. Instead, the place of culture in individual freedom puts the state in a delicate place. As Rawls acknowledges in his work on the topic, individuals value their place within a society and within a culture because “we use [its language] in

²⁰ Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 76.

²¹ Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, 77.

²² Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, 84.

speech and thought to express and understand ourselves, our aims, goals, and values” and that we rely on its “history, customs and conventions [...] to find our place in our social world.”²³ As a correlative, the state is responsible for protecting culture as the ground of freedom because it monopolizes the territory where that culture exists. For the individual, it is limiting—and even debilitating—to exert their capacity for the good anywhere else and within any other culture.

Culture and a Sense of Justice

In Rawls’ own words, the other moral power is a capacity “to understand, to apply, and to act from [...] the principles of political justice.”²⁴ This is an other-regarding moral power that citizens use in the way they understand and interact with fellow citizens. This means that while this power is intimately attached to citizens’ individual conceptions of the good and their private lives, it also contributes to the social good. “Establishing and successfully maintaining reasonably just [...] democratic institutions over a long period of time,” Rawls writes, “perhaps gradually reforming them over generations, though not, to be sure, without lapses, is a great social good and appreciated as such.”²⁵ In this way, a sense of justice and the good it brings to society are to be understood as an intergenerational good—not just cooperation here and now, but the combined accomplishment of succeeding generations occupying their place under the same institutions.

I argue that just institutions are considered the same because the same culture occupies them over time. They are not the same in their liberal character, because this can advance and lapse. Nor are they the same in virtue of their population, because this undergoes steady change. In order to link together Rawls’ “fair system of cooperation over time from one generation to the next,” I argue that the attention must shift to a society’s political culture and the way in which this provides a medium for a sense of justice to develop and find meaningful expression. In this way, borders and culture are the institutions that make possible the ends of political society and the sense of justice that shapes it. In the political sense, this seems to be what is inviolable about a culture: because other factors cannot sustain the momentum of justice

²³ Rawls, *Justice as Fairness*, 93-94.

²⁴ Rawls, *Justice as Fairness*, 19.

²⁵ Rawls, *Justice as Fairness*, 201.

in society—institutions only respond to it and individual lives are too short—justice relies on the overlapping and succeeding generations that carry it forward, using culture as a medium.

Where a sense of justice consists of an individual's capacity to understand, apply, and act from the principles of political justice, the culture of a democratic society introduces each generation to this understanding, makes each generation aware of its application, and allows each generation to act from it. Justice is not embedded in culture—because we cannot speak of cultures that have always been or will never be just—but, instead, justice is communicated to individuals, with each succeeding generation, through the cultural medium. I am suggesting, then, that bordered culture is not an arbitrary separation but the confines of a formative social experience that conveys justice to each succeeding generation. Citizens are brought up with, as Rawls writes, an “intimate and inexpressible knowledge” of their culture and I argue that this carries with it understandings of justice.²⁶

At this point, the cultural tension in applying liberal commitments to immigration and asylum has become explicit. By Rawls' account, a truly liberal society must be unbiased while simultaneously maintaining a concern for the moral capacities of individuals. But, as I have shown, these requirements have conflicting implications for immigration and asylum. In order to be unbiased, democratic states must develop an immigration policy that the most disadvantaged would-be immigrants and refugees could agree to. This would require that locals set aside concerns for their national culture as a biased—and therefore undemocratic—ideal. According to this view, a truly liberal immigration policy requires that foreigners be allowed the right to participate in the locals' society as they please so long as their arrival would not threaten locals' security. At the same time, however, democratic states should remain committed to the moral capacities of their citizens. Because citizens rely on their culture to express these capacities, a truly liberal immigration policy requires deliberate control over a society's cultural composition even in cases where preserving culture would come at the cost of exclusion. The final section resolves this tension.

26 Rawls, *Justice as Fairness*, 94.

The Right to Asylum as the Limit of Political Possibility: Resolution and Conclusion

Where the veil of ignorance allows locals to understand borders as inherently biased against foreigners, and where the moral powers define citizens as free and equal members of a society reliant on a contained and coherent culture, Rawls' idea of an overlapping consensus works as a model of political possibility. Here, the aim is to establish the limits of justice given the deep convictions of those at stake. In Rawls' own words, the idea of an overlapping consensus is "introduced to make the idea of a well-ordered society more realistic and to adjust it to the historical and social conditions of democratic societies."²⁷ The idea being that individuals have "conflicting religious, philosophical, and moral views" and, yet, they affirm the same understanding of justice "from within different and opposing comprehensive doctrines, and so, in part at least, for different reasons."²⁸ This means that within a society, everyone can affirm the same liberties and equalities but they affirm these liberties and equalities for their own deeply-held reasons.

Democracies, then, should aspire to "a free-standing view" of just relationships rather than a "workable compromise between known and existing political interests."²⁹ In the context of immigration and asylum, this means that what is aimed at is not that locals, having the power of the state behind them, forcibly exclude all but the immigrants they deem worthy or useful; nor is it that migrants and refugees, having overwhelmed border security with their numbers, force the locals to accept a demographic reality that they would not otherwise agree to. Instead, democracies should aspire to an understanding of justice that could be based on a fair and durable consensus between everyone effected.

For everyone effected by immigration policy—refugees escaping violence, migrants seeking better lives, locals hesitant about the effects of foreign influence—the idea of a free-standing consensus on what borders should mean will determine the justice that democracies should hope for. This is because refugees, migrants, and locals all have a stake in immigration—they all have deeply-held conceptions of value that

²⁷ Rawls, *Justice as Fairness*, 32.

²⁸ Rawls, *Justice as Fairness*, 32.

²⁹ Rawls, *Justice as Fairness*, 188.

border policies could favor or disfavor. So, by considering which border policies align with the deep convictions of everyone effected, we can determine the outer limit of what justice can ask of border policies. This will set the practical limit of what justice can be expected to achieve and, as a consequence, it will determine the kind of immigration policy that democracies should aspire to. In the remainder of this essay, I will move in parallel with the sections before: first, because removing bias would suggest a right to voluntary migration, I will consider whether an overlapping consensus can be achieved on this right; second, because the moral powers suggest a contained and cohesive culture, I will consider whether this would rule out an overlapping consensus on the right to asylum.

The Right to Voluntary Migration

Migrants pursuing work and a better life in another country, migrants pursuing a religious community established abroad, and migrants pursuing cultural opportunities in a distinctive foreign society all have well-defined reasons for supporting a right to move across open borders. Each migrant values something beyond their own frontiers and so they affirm the right to go out and get it. This distinguishes them from refugees. Where refugees move out of fear for their lives, migrants move in pursuit of a life that they want.³⁰

But for locals who have an interest in keeping their country the way it is—like the Czechs and Slovaks mentioned earlier—a consensus on the right to voluntary migration is impossible. These locals cannot support the right to voluntary migration for their own reasons because they value their nation and its national culture in important ways. While many Central Europeans may not see their national culture with well-considered opinions about its boundaries, obligations, and history, they nonetheless have an “intimate and inexpressible knowledge” of it.³¹ For this reason, they quietly expect that, in their daily lives, they will encounter their national culture and they would experience some disappointment and loss at its sudden change. Locals, then, can break the overlapping consensus on the right to voluntary migration. Not only

³⁰ Here, I have opted for a broader definition of refugee than the one offered in the 1951 UN Convention relating to the status of refugees (Geneva Convention) and the 1967 Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Where that agreement emphasizes fear of discriminate harm, my definition is concerned with the fear of harm generally.

³¹ Rawls, *Justice as Fairness*, 94.

do they lack a reason to support it, they have reasons *against* supporting it.

The Right to Asylum

Evidently, refugees have a reason to support the right to asylum. As people threatened by instability in their country of origin, they have an immediate interest in the right to live in a safer and more stable country. However, locals too have a reason to support the right to asylum, even when they value their national cultures in important ways. This is because citizens of democratic societies have an interest in freedom from oppression—thought of here as freedom from intimidation, arbitrary imprisonment, physical harm, or the destruction of property. Citizens of democracies have an interest in this freedom because it is a prerequisite to those freedoms that pertain to the pursuit of meaning and value in a free society. After all, it is only because they are free from oppression that democratic citizens are free to maintain their beliefs, express themselves, and associate with others. It is, then, in light of these deeply-held sources of meaning and value—including the value they give to their own cultures—that they can support freedom from oppression because the freedom from oppression supports the liberties and rights that, in turn, allow them to pursue meaning and value in their own lives.

The right to asylum derives from freedom from oppression: it guarantees that, in cases of a well-founded fear, the effected individuals maintain the right to escape the circumstances that threaten them and to find protection in a safer country. So, because of locals' commitment to the value and meaning in their lives, they can support freedom from oppression and agree to a right to asylum. There can be, then, an overlapping consensus on the right to asylum. But the right to asylum reaches the limit of political possibility in a liberal ethics of immigration. Nothing more can be justified because nothing more can be hoped for. This produces, then, a coherent policy conclusion: liberal societies can only be true to their commitments if they give refugees of all cultures the right to asylum.

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Deporting the Truth: Tracking the Impact of Longfellow and Deportation Literature in Quebec

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I am sometimes told I have Acadian facial features, and indeed, I am of French Acadian descent. Acadia is most famous for the deportation of 1755, where Acadian French settlers were uprooted from their homes. The story of the Acadian deportation has been told for many generations and inspired numerous literary works about the deportation, which I refer to as “deportation discourse.” This genre began with American poet Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, who, decades after the event, wrote a fictional account of the deportation with his famous 1847 poem *Evangeline*. After Longfellow, deportation discourse became popular among both well-known Canadian authors such as Bliss Carman and lesser-known writers like Carrie J. Harris. Despite the Acadian deportation’s fame in Canada, particularly in the Maritimes and Quebec, little academic research has been conducted concerning the literary representation of the event and how deportation discourse may have influenced how the deportation has been, and continues to be, presented in history. What impact did Longfellow have on deportation discourse? How has deportation discourse affected the presentation of the Acadian deportation in Quebec history? This essay will answer these questions by tracking Longfellow’s influence on an alarming trend in deportation discourse: a gradual exaggeration of narrative and statistics, an oversimplification of history, and an intensifying inflammatory rhetoric. By undertaking this research, I hope to discover what roles Longfellow and Quebec historical sources played in the aforementioned trend and what the outcomes may mean for how the Acadian deportation is understood.

Longfellow’s poem *Evangeline*, originally published in 1847, is one of the earliest literary works that add a personal narrative to the Acadian deportation. The poem follows the life of Evangeline, an Acadian who

is forced to separate from her true love, Gabriel Lajeunesse, due to the deportation. She eventually finds him again, years later, on his death bed, after her youth had been wasted away. One of the key elements of the poem is the “everyday narrative” used to elicit sympathy for the Acadian cause while discouraging critical thinking.¹ By personifying the deportation through Evangeline, Longfellow makes the reader feel they have a personal stake in the event. Indeed, the audience’s sorrow and sympathy are intensified through the portrayal of Evangeline, “the pride of the village.”² Longfellow specifically chose to use Evangeline, not only because she was a character who may have already had a little fame, but because a female protagonist would associate Acadians with stereotypical, weak, and sympathetic female attributes such as vulnerability and meekness, a common trope in colonial literature.³ Moreover, Evangeline is described as the “ideal” woman: selfless, forgiving, motherly, and even angelic. Her selflessness is demonstrated when she stays home and takes care of her seventy-year-old father and the household after her mother presumably passed away. She also works as a nurse after she is deported, spending her life taking care of others. Her forgiving nature is shown at the end of the poem when she finds Gabriel upon his deathbed, and instead of being angry with God, she thanks the Lord for letting her see her love one last time. Her motherly attributes are most apparent when the narrator ironically states that she “would bring to her husband’s house delight and abundance, filling it full of love and the ruddy faces of children.”⁴ However, the most important description of Evangeline is found in an angelic motif that reflects her innocence and piety. Her very name consists of the word “angel.” Her physical appearance is delicate and suggests a heavenly beauty with a “celestial brightness—a more ethereal beauty—shone on

¹ Mariana Souto-Manning, “Critical Narrative Analysis: The Interplay of Critical Discourse and Narrative Analyses,” *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education* 27 no. 2 (2012): 164, accessed February 13, 2018, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09518398.2012.737046>; Souto-Manning, “Critical Narrative Analysis,” 167.

² Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, *Evangeline* (London: Macmillan, 1928), 6.

³ Nancy Watson, *The Politics and Poetics of Irish Children’s Literature* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2003), 23.

⁴ Longfellow, *Evangeline*, 13; At the beginning of the poem the narrator knows that Evangeline will never be given the opportunity to be a wife and mother as she decides to wait for Gabriel, but the reader does not know this yet.

her face and encircled her form.”⁵ Even her pet cow is described as angelic, and “proud of her snow-white hide.”⁶ Just as angels are often depicted wearing white robes, the cow similarly wears its white (not spotted) hide like a holy garment. Evangeline’s lover, Gabriel, is also part of the angelic motif as he is presumably named after the biblical Archangel Gabriel. In short, Evangeline is portrayed as the “perfect” woman in order to make readers mourn the fact that such tragic circumstances could befall a good woman.

Another key element of Longfellow’s poem is an oversimplification and hyperbolizing of history. The distinction between the poem’s heroes and villains is clear: the innocent French Acadians are blessed by God, while the British are “tyrants of England” who “shall drive you way from your homesteads, burning your dwellings and barns, and stealing your farms and your cattle.”⁷ Indeed, one of the primary ways in which Longfellow oversimplifies the deportation is by not acknowledging the revolutionary zeitgeist of the era. Longfellow, writing almost one hundred years after the deportation occurred, assumed that the Acadians were deported because the British Crown ordered it, but he does not cite any sources, meaning there is no way to verify where he got his information. Moreover, there is no mention that only twenty years after the deportation at Grand-Pré, the American Revolution officially began, and by 1755 revolutionary American ideas and powerful revolutionaries such as Edward Holyoke had already been politically and socially active for some time.⁸ Longfellow also fails to examine the role American revolutionaries could have played in the deportation.⁹ Furthermore, he does not give a satisfactory reason as to

⁵ Longfellow, *Evangeline*, 7.

⁶ Longfellow, *Evangeline*, 15.

⁷ Longfellow, *Evangeline*, 37, 81.

⁸ For instance, while at Harvard, Holyoke taught numerous revolutionary leaders including Samuel Adams, Thomas Cushing, Josiah Quincy Jr and James Otis. Holyoke. “The Holyoke Diaries, 1709-1856,” *Internet Archive*, 1911, accessed April 4th, 2018, <https://archive.org/details/holyokediaries1700dowg>; “Foreshadowing the American Revolution,” *The Belcher Foundation*, accessed July 15th, 2017.

⁹ Some documents seem to indicate that the deportation may have been a revolutionary act. For instance, American born and raised revolutionary sympathizer Governor J. Belcher asked “that the expulsion of the French Acadians be treated as a military expense.” “NORTH AMERICA: Colonies: Nova Scotia: Lieut Governor J Belcher: asks that cost of...,” *The National Archives*, accessed November 8th, 2013.

why the Crown would choose to deport the Acadians, people who were accepted by the Crown as “His Majesty’s ‘new subjects.’”¹⁰ The only motive he can give is that it was “his Majesty’s pleasure.”¹¹ Indeed, by simply assuming the guilt of the British Crown and not differentiating between English loyalists and American revolutionaries, Longfellow sets a trend for future deportation discourse: an oversimplified, unverified version of history presented as fact through an everyday narrative.

One of the most famous poets inspired by Longfellow is Canadian author Bliss Carman. His 1893 poem “Low Tide on Grand Pré” alludes to Evangeline as it states, “a grievous stream...goes wandering as if to know why one beloved face should be so long from home and Acadie.”¹² Referring to Acadia in its French name and stating, “one beloved face” is a clear reference to Evangeline.¹³ Leaving Evangeline nameless creates the illusion of further separation between her and the shores of her home. The theme of separation is also emphasized through the setting of the poem as it takes place at low tide, highlighting the impossibility of the French settlers to return home since ships would be physically unable to reach the shore. Like Longfellow, Carman also uses personification to romanticize the deportation, making the reader feel a personal sense of loss for the Acadians. Carman personifies the sea at Grand-Pré, describing it as overcome with melancholy and grief as if it were one of the people exiled or separated from their Acadian family. The personification is meant to evoke sorrow as the audience witnesses the sea’s almost physical pain, the “aching barrens wide, a sigh like driven wind or foam; in grief the flood is bursting home.”¹⁴ As Longfellow gave life to the deportation through two separated lovers, Carman gives it life through a different kind of separated love, the break of a familial love between

¹⁰ “The Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the Use of Languages,” University of Ottawa, accessed July 14th, 2017, https://slmc.uottawa.ca/?q=royal_proclamation_1763.

¹¹ Longfellow, *Evangeline*, 36; On the other hand, American revolutionaries would have a clear motivation to deport the Acadians; it would be a clear act against the Crown and a good way to demonize the British in the eyes of the French.

¹² Bliss Carman, “Low Tide on Grand Pré: A Book of Lyrics,” *Early Canadiana Online* (1893): 12, accessed November 1st, 2013.

¹³ Carman, “Low Tide on Grand Pré,” 12.

¹⁴ Carman, “Low Tide on Grand Pré,” 14.

the Acadians and their home, making it seem as if a crime against nature had been committed.

Longfellow's impact on deportation literature can also be seen in lesser known authors, such as Canadian poet Carrie J. Harris, whose 1896 poem "Land of Evangeline" describes Acadia as "the land made known to fame by the pen [of] our beloved Longfellow."¹⁵ Like Carman, Harris takes Longfellow's original story and intensifies the negative affects. However, unlike Carman, Harris hyperbolizes the deportation to the point where the story is almost unrecognizable. Instead of appealing to sorrow and pity, Harris appeals to hatred and anger, accusing the British of having committed "one of the most cruel struggles ever recorded in history."¹⁶ Through inflammatory rhetoric, she dehumanizes the English, portraying the deportation like a massacre or a genocide: "those lovely fields stained red with human gore...the spirits of the departed Frenchmen were hovering around me."¹⁷ She even mentions people digging up a French graveyard and selling bones to tourists, as if Acadians were being oppressed even in their deaths.¹⁸ Deportation discourse prior to Harris focuses more on evoking pity and sympathy than demonizing the British, but through Harris' poetry, one can notice a change of focus to anger and hate, making the deportation a perfect tool for propaganda. Harris' work gives a glimpse of the huge impact Longfellow's *Evangeline* has had in terms of propaganda outside of literature, particularly in the Maritimes where "most everything is named Evangeline around here" including brands of "bicycles, oil, flour, butter, milk, hot sauce, chocolate, cola, mineral water, apples, bread, syrup, eggs, [and] toothpaste."¹⁹ Despite not being as popular as Carman, Harris shows an important shift in deportation discourse from appealing to sympathy to hyperbolizing the deportation, using inflammatory rhetoric that dehumanizes English speakers. Though Harris' intent with her poem remains unclear, she may have been attempting to divulge political convictions through narrative to create a "false impression of the absence of political views

¹⁵ Carrie J Harris, "A Modern Evangeline," *Early Canadiana Online* (1896): 5, accessed November 1st, 2013.

¹⁶ Harris, "A Modern Evangeline," 5.

¹⁷ Harris, "A Modern Evangeline," 5-6.

¹⁸ Harris, "A Modern Evangeline," 8-9.

¹⁹ Harris, "A Modern Evangeline," 8; "Évangéline: Histoire d'une collection."

and ideological concepts.”²⁰ Indeed, this is a rhetorical tactic which Québécois historic sources rely on as well.

Longfellow was the first of many to portray the Acadian deportation through an appeal to emotions, simplification of history, and inflammatory rhetoric. He created a cultural icon, popularizing Evangeline and inspiring others to retell her story while they cried “bushels of tears which have been wasted over the sufferings of a person who never had any existence.”²¹ Through Evangeline, Longfellow helped start a kind of discourse which portrays the Acadian deportation in a manner that makes it a powerful tool for propaganda. The portrayal of all English people as one solid, guilty, unit is a dangerous propaganda opportunity since blame is extended to any English speaker, adding fuel to the fiery feud between French and English Canadians. Indeed, the separation of “the French and English” Canadians is quite clear in deportation discourse.²² As I will demonstrate, in Quebec, the deportation is used to further divide a population which was once united through their “determination not to be American.”²³ The rhetoric and dehumanization used in deportation discourse is key to the separation of Canadians. As shown by Harris, dehumanizing a population through an everyday narrative, encourages people to respond to history emotionally rather than critically as it creates the illusion of being non-political.²⁴

Deportation discourse thus presents a golden opportunity for Quebec separatist propaganda. Twentieth century Quebec literature concerning the deportation often utilizes deportation discourse, using the same exaggerated narrative as Harris to create tension and disdain between French and English Canadians to advance apolitical agenda aimed at separation. One of the most evident works of Québécois deportation propaganda is the magazine *L'Oiseau Bleu*. This magazine dehumanizes the British and embellishes history to evoke negative affects. For example, several assumptions with no evidence are presented on the cover page of the June-July 1926 edition. Firstly, there

²⁰ Souto-Manning, “Critical Narrative Analysis,” 165.

²¹ Harris, “A Modern Evangeline,” 9.

²² Carman, “Low Tide on Grand Pré,” 7.

²³ George Grant, *Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism* (Montreal: McGill's University Press, 2005), 69.

²⁴ Souto-Manning, “Critical Narrative Analysis,” 165.

are two enormous ships and a lot of smoke rising in the distance over the sea as if unseen ships were on fire, implying a huge number of Acadians being deported. Secondly, the soldier on the cover is wearing a red coat, once more convicting the British of the deportation without question. Within the magazine, Acadian exiles are said to be killed by “any Anglophone or savage.”²⁵ The author oversimplifies the narrative by grouping loyalists and revolutionaries into one group. Moreover, the rhetoric dehumanizes Anglophones, making them sound like uncivilized animals. Like many before him, De Salvail also uses inflammatory rhetoric to fuel anger, claiming that deported Acadian families were split up and that the fathers were forced into slavery or sent to jail, having their children taken away.²⁶ Perhaps most alarming, however, is how the author makes these claims without citing any of his work. Clearly, the author's intent is not to show a critical account of history but simply to use history to evoke negative emotions within the audience. As people tend to simply adopt narratives which are presented to them, the damage is already done through the accusations alone; the French masses are furious and they will remember their disdain when they vote at referendums.²⁷ Twentieth century separatist propaganda exploits deportation discourse tropes and goes uncontested as the truth becomes increasingly buried within the past through layer upon layer of oversimplified history and negative affects.

Quebec separatist propaganda involving the Acadian deportation has even found its way into history books. Léandre Bergeron's 1971 *The History of Quebec: a Patriote's Handbook* is a prime example of how history has become entangled with propaganda using the affect, oversimplification and rhetoric found in deportation discourse. Bergeron completely ignores the revolutionary presence at the time of the deportation, presuming the guilt of the British. Like *L'Oiseau Bleu*, Bergeron also chooses to incorporate and omit information depending on his need. Additionally, he does not cite any information in his passage on the deportation of the Acadians. Once more, the truths of his statements are irrelevant; his goal is not to critically engage readers, but to infuriate French Canadians by making them feel oppressed.

²⁵ Elie De Salvail, “L'Oiseau Bleu” (Montréal: Société St-Jean Baptiste de Montréal, Juin-Juillet, 1926), 2, accessed July 15th, <http://collections.banq.qc.ca/ark:/52327/2225708>.

²⁶ De Salvail, “L'Oiseau Bleu,” 3.

²⁷ Souto-Manning, “Critical Narrative Analysis,” 167.

Bergeron's inflammatory rhetoric consists of dehumanizing Anglophones, claiming "it was hoped that by flooding the colony with English immigrants the French could be made to disappear," doing a "housecleaning" of Nova Scotia.²⁸ He uses rhetoric, as Harris does, not only to create disdain among French Canadians but also among English Canadians who feel offended at being dehumanized. Indeed, Bergeron dehumanizes all English speakers, claiming they "wanted to get rid of the Acadians."²⁹ As demonstrated, there is an alarming trend surrounding the Acadian deportation in Quebec; it appears that writers were more concerned with driving a wedge between French and English Canadians than presenting historical truths. The result is that separatist Quebec propaganda becomes confused with history.

Moreover, the embellishment of history is also shown through statistics. According to Longfellow in 1847, "more than a thousand persons" were deported.³⁰ However, according to Bergeron in 1971, the number increases to seven thousand.³¹ Decades later, in 2007, the *Chamber's Dictionary of World History* reported that ten thousand Acadians were deported.³² The further we get from 1755, the more Acadians are claimed to have been deported.

Whether he was aware of it or not, Longfellow set into motion a new niche genre of literature, deportation discourse. It became popular among authors and readers because of the powerful emotions it elicits through an everyday narrative, historic simplification, and inflammatory rhetoric. Due to its emotion rather than logic invoking characteristics, deportation discourse influenced Quebec separatist propaganda, which uses the deportation to push its agenda, and it is this propaganda that is being purposefully mistaken for history by writers and institutions in Quebec. Deportation discourse gives insight into the origins of the political convictions deportation propaganda instils within readers. However, history is not as simple as deportation discourse makes it

²⁸ Léandre Bergeron, *The History of Quebec: A Patriote's Handbook* (Toronto: Union Labour, 1971), 36.

²⁹ Bergeron, *The History of Quebec*, 36.

³⁰ Longfellow, *Evangeline*, xlv; Keeping in mind that Longfellow was writing about the deportation almost 100 years after it happened, it is likely that a thousand may also be an exaggeration from the original number.

³¹ Bergeron, *The History of Quebec*, 36.

³² "Acadia," *Chambers Dictionary of World History*. (Edinburgh: Chambers Harrap Publishers, 2007), 5.

seem. More in-depth interdisciplinary research needs to be conducted to verify why the Acadians were deported. Indeed, as we are living in a post-truth era, it is more important than ever to be able to analyze propaganda, narrative, and discourse critically.

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Meshed Frameworks: Liberal Democracy, Multiculturalism, and Settler-Colonial Reconciliation

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"The concept [of reconciliation] is virtually absent from the liberal tradition of Hobbes, Locke, Kant, Mill, Dewey, and Rawls, the tradition that poses individual liberty, civil and political rights, equality of citizenship, democratic elections, distributive justice, and punishment for criminals as central values, even despite its proponents' differing philosophical foundations: natural law, natural rights, utilitarianism, and pragmatism. Is this tradition now ready to receive reconciliation?"

—Daniel Philpott, 2006

The above quote by Philpott introduces a common approach to dealing with political reconciliation within a liberal democracy. Many scholars wonder how reconciliation can be configured so as to fit within the parameters of a liberal democratic society.¹ The result of this, in other colonial societies who have undergone similar reconciliation processes, has not always been favourable to Indigenous peoples. What this essay will seek to do is reverse this logic. I argue that liberal democracy is standing between Canada's current political reality and the objectives of reconciliation, and that the onus of change should be placed upon Canadian liberal democracy rather than the project of reconciliation. Much in the same way that the burden of proof falls on Indigenous peoples throughout the legal land claims process, Canadians risk putting Indigenous peoples and the project of reconciliation in a similarly precarious position.² This paper will begin by outlining the

¹Colleen Murphy, *A Moral Theory of Political Reconciliation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 17; Daniel Philpott, *Just and Unjust Peace: An Ethic of Political Reconciliation* (Oxford: University of Oxford Press, 2012), 12.

²Jérémie Gilbert, "Historical Indigenous Peoples' Land Claims: A Comparative and International Approach to the Common Law Doctrine on Indigenous Title," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 57, no. 3 (2007): 599; James Tully, "The

evolution of liberalism and liberal democracy in Canada in order to create a working definition of liberal democracy in the Canadian context. The essay will then examine the difficulties posed by a major aspect of Canadian political society—multiculturalism—to reconciliation with Indigenous peoples in settler Canada. Ultimately, this essay aims to establish that while reconciliation and multiculturalism are not diametrically opposed to one another, significant points of tension are stressed when reconciliation is pursued within a multicultural framework, to the point where the project of reconciliation itself may be jeopardized.

In coming to a definition of liberal democracy, I will utilize and examine previously conceived definitions of the term, identify foundational concepts, and explore the peculiarities of liberal democracy in the Canadian context. It is important to note, as Philpott does,³ that there are arguments against reconciliation which stem from political liberalism. Though given the seeming acceptance of the reconciliation project by Canada's governing party, and the lack of critiques voiced by opposition parties, those arguments will not be explored in this essay.

Defining Liberal Democracy: Historical Roots and Canadian Peculiarities

Liberalism as a political theory, and democracy as a method of governance, are far from synonymous, despite the frequency in which they work in concert with one another. The nature of liberal democracy has led to it being defined by a multitude of authors in different ways, often in widely varying lengths and complexities. Bollen and Paxton, for example, define it simply as “the degree to which a political system allows *democratic rule* and *political liberties*.”⁴ Zakaria provides a further description, defining it as a “political system marked not only by free

Struggles of Indigenous Peoples for and of Freedom” in *Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples*, eds. D. Ivison, P. Patton, and W. Sanders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000):49.

³ Daniel Philpott, “Beyond Politics as Usual: Is Reconciliation Compatible with Liberalism?” in *The Politics of Past Evil: Religion, Reconciliation, and the Dilemmas of Transitional Justice*, ed. Daniel Philpott (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006): 21.

⁴ Emphasis in the original. Kenneth A. Bollen and Pamela Paxton, “Subjective Measures of Liberal Democracy,” *Comparative Political Studies* 33, no. 1 (2000): 59.

and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property.”⁵ More recently, Ben-Porat and Feniger defined liberal democracy as being characterized “not only by formal procedures for electing representatives, but also by a private sphere free of state interference, the protection of individual liberties, a commitment to human equality, and the protection of the rights of minority groups.”⁶ In a precursory article to his book, Morlino also tackled this issue. A good democracy, he argues, must be liberal—jettisoning other types of democracies, such as exclusive democracy, domain democracy, illiberal democracy, and delegative democracy. Aside from this, a democracy must meet certain minimal thresholds such that it contains: “universal, adult suffrage; recurring, free, competitive, and fair elections; more than one political party; and more than one source of information.”⁷ Evident in all of these definitions is the fact that liberal democracy is multidimensional. It is not just the use of elections to select leaders, nor is it solely the protection of individual (among other) rights, but it is at the conjuncture of these two political thoughts that liberal democracy is found.

This multidimensional aspect points towards difficulties in assessing the degree to which a state is liberally democratic. Tilly outlined this when discussing the theoretical and practical consequences that come from not having a clear definition of democracy,⁸ and Diamond and Morlino encountered this issue when attempting to assess the quality of democracy.⁹ The multidimensionality of liberal democracy, however, also presents unique challenges to this type of political structure. Plattner refers to one of these challenges, a seemingly paradoxical situation, as “the dual nature of liberal democracy,” which describes the contrast between majority rule and individual rights, two underpinning

⁵ Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” *Foreign Affairs* 76, no 6 (1997): 22.

⁶ Guy Ben-Porat and Yariv Feniger, “Live at Let Buy? Consumerism, Secularization, and Liberalism,” *Comparative Politics* 41, no. 3 (2009): 296.

⁷ Leonardo Morlino, “What is a ‘Good’ Democracy?” *Democratization* 11, no. 5 (2004): 10.

⁸ Tilly, *The Struggles of Indigenous Peoples*, 38.

⁹ Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, *Assessing the Quality of Democracy* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2005), 4.

aspects of a liberal democracy.¹⁰ These two aspects often pull in different directions; majoritarian rule is tempered by the protection of individual rights which extend to those in minority situations. In relying on Madison, Plattner further shows how the first aspect—majoritarian rule—can be achieved rather simply through a regular vote, and that the real challenge lies in not only successfully “[protecting] the public good and private rights against majority factions . . . [but] to do so without departing from the ‘spirit and form of popular government.’”¹¹ Madison, as well as Hamilton and Jay—the other writers of *The Federalist Papers*—highlighted three possible solutions to this dilemma. The first was to eliminate the liberty that allowed these differences to form, and the second was to ensure uniformity among the public’s thoughts, beliefs, and opinions—both of which are unreasonable under the liberal democratic state they were hoping would form. As such, they thought a better remedy to the issue would be economic diversification, which would not impede individual rights, but would allow for individuals in minority situations to gain power. The logic behind discarding the first two potential ‘solutions’ fits well with the views of another major political theorist: John Rawls.

Though not an economic theorist, the reasons why the *Federalist* thinkers rejected the second possible solution mentioned above is logically synonymous with Rawls and his notion of reasonable pluralism. This idea, developed in his later work, *Political Liberalism*, outlines the “fact” that within a liberal democracy, “a plurality of conflicting reasonable comprehensive doctrines, [whether] religious, philosophical, [or] moral” is to be expected.¹² This is simply the inevitable result of the political culture which arises from a society that embraces liberal principles such as individual liberty and freedom of association. It is important to note that Rawls suggests that it is possible, or even likely, for these views to not only clash, but to be irreconcilable with one another, while at the same time being mutually reasonable ideas or opinions for one to hold. There are two main propositions that are drawn from this. The first is that it is possible for completely divergent opinions on a matter to be deemed reasonable

¹⁰ Marc F. Plattner, “Populism, Pluralism, and Liberal Democracy,” *Journal of Democracy* 21, no. 1 (2010): 83.

¹¹ Plattner, “Populism, Pluralism, and Liberal Democracy,” 85.

¹² John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 441.

within the same political society. The second is that it is the place of a liberal democratic state to safeguard citizens from harm from others, while simultaneously protecting those citizens' rights to have deeply held beliefs which may be profoundly and irreconcilably divergent.

To deal with this, Rawls turns to his idea of an overlapping consensus, outlined in *A Theory of Justice* and thoroughly expanded upon in *Justice as Fairness*. Rawls, in his seminal work, explains the overlapping consensus as follows:

There exists what we may refer to as overlapping rather than strict consensus. In general, the overlapping of professed conceptions of justice suffices for civil disobedience to be a reasonable and prudent form of political dissent. Of course, this overlapping consensus need not be perfect; it is enough that a condition of reciprocity is satisfied. Both sides must believe that however much their conceptions of justice differ, their views support the same judgment in the situation at hand, and would do so even should their respective positions be interchanged.¹³

It is important to remember that much of Rawls' work is predicated upon his original position as a foundation. The original position is a hypothetical thought-experiment where participants, ignorant of their own personal socio-economic characteristics, define and describe a political society in which they believe would be best to live. It is from this that many critiques of Rawls arise.¹⁴ As a thought experiment, the original position is unique and thought-provoking; as a pragmatic approach to democratization, however, it is not the most realistic approach. Rawls himself recognizes and eventually addresses this broadly, as well as how it pertains specifically to his overlapping consensus, when he tells his readers that the overlapping consensus is not designed to create a balance between pre-existing comprehensive doctrines; "There is plainly no guarantee," states Rawls, "that justice as fairness . . . can gain the support of an overlapping consensus."¹⁵ Rather, the utility of an overlapping consensus is found, removed from the

¹³ John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 340.

¹⁴ For example, see Harsanyi 1975; Clark 1986; Okin 2005.

¹⁵ John Rawls, *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 37.

Rawlsian hypothetical, in its ability to demonstrate the strength and potential unity that can be found within a pluralistic society.

Two other prominent theorists who focused, at least in part, on pluralism, are Flathman and Sartori. As Flathman states, though not all pluralisms are liberal, all notions of liberalism have inherent to them a degree or notion of pluralism.¹⁶ As such, his research is not directed towards whether pluralism should be a facet of liberal democracy, but rather, which pluralism is most acceptable. His book is dialogical in that, in each chapter, Flathman engages with the work of a particular theorist, and in weaving theories of pluralism from James, Arendt, Hampshire, and Oakeshott together, Flathman argues two things. The first is that an inward-facing notion of pluralism—a plurality within the individual person—is that which is, or should be, most central to liberalism. This is a point on which Flathman has faced many critiques. The second argument, however, is that the inner pluralism mentioned above is not incompatible with the more common notion of pluralism as a “diversity of individuals making up a social and political order.”¹⁷ The realization or acknowledgement that these two forms of pluralism can exist in cooperation is important, as it helps create a fuller definition of liberal democracy.

In turn, Sartori, in writing on the origins and emergence of pluralism, notes the strong relationship between toleration and pluralism (insofar as toleration is a prerequisite for pluralism), but succinctly notes their differences: “tolerance respects values, whereas pluralism posits values.”¹⁸ In search, then, of how pluralism was able to originally take root, Sartori looks at the emergence of political parties. Political parties are, in essence, the formalization of group factions who compete for power amongst one another, adding a level of legitimacy to this quest for power. As Burke writes, a party is “a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavours, the national interests upon some particular principle in which they are agreed.”¹⁹ Again, Sartori looks retroactively to the past to make an important distinction between

¹⁶ Richard E. Flathman, *Pluralism and Liberal Democracy* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2005), 163.

¹⁷ Richard E. Flathman, “Response to Critics,” *The Good Society* 15, no 3 (2006): 27.

¹⁸ Emphasis in the original. Giovanni Sartori, “Understanding Pluralism,” *Journal of Democracy* 8, no. 4 (1997): 57.

¹⁹ Emphasis in the original. Edmund Burke, *Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents* (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1990): 74.

party and faction, one which Burke made but, in his time, was unable to justify. Where “factions are parts *against* the whole,” parties are “part *of* a whole.”²⁰ It is through revisiting this centuries-old distinction first described by Burke that Sartori is thus able to locate if not *the* reason, at minimum, a major reason for the emergence of pluralism. In modern democracies, political parties often have vastly divergent platforms and ideas, but are nonetheless recognized as legitimate political entities, even by the citizens who would never vote for a particular party.

The Evolution of Liberalism and Liberal Democracy in Canada

Both liberalism broadly, and liberal democracy specifically, have developed in Canada in ways that preserve its foundational aspects, but also allow for the emergence and growth of certain peculiarities—liberal democratic phenomena that are either unique to Canada or whose developments are largely contributed to Canada. The remainder of this section will be spent discussing exactly this—how liberalism and liberal democracy have shifted Canada through time—and will be divided into two time periods: pre-1960 and post-1960. This is done for two reasons. First, it is not until after 1960 that all law-abiding adult Canadian citizens were granted the right to vote—a crucial aspect that underpins the legitimacy of elections. Second, despite its shortcomings that were largely addressed later in 1982, the Diefenbaker government’s 1960 *Bill of Rights* represents a marked and fundamental governmental shift towards the protection of individual liberties.

John Locke’s *Two Treatises of Government* are often cited when discussing the development of the Americas, and are useful in the pre-Confederation, and thus pre-1960, era. Locke’s work was originally published in 1690 and, the second book in particular, is largely seen as justifying both the use of slavery and, in a broader sense, the colonial activities that England was engaged in at the time. While this included slavery, Locke’s views on private property and land also meant that it included a justification for the dispossession of land from the Indigenous peoples of the Americas to the European colonizers. This dispossession of land, of course, is ultimately what allowed for the formation and emergence of the Canadian state. Some scholars, though

²⁰ Sartori, “Understanding Pluralism,” 74.

Arneil in particular, utilize the work of Locke to thoroughly examine how he and his work have been used to defend atrocities, which the liberal democracy that has come to envelope Canadian political society, would not be able to justify or defend.²¹ In her earlier work, Arneil uses three realms of Lockean thought to analyze colonialism in the Americas—the notion of natural law, an economic justification, and a justification based on property—all of which blend into Locke’s main contribution to liberal theory: the importance of private property and the particular types of land use.²²

While some economic arguments were based on the wellbeing of England—arguments which posit that the economic benefits received by England will outweigh the initial costs of setting up plantations in the Americas, for example—Locke’s use of property suggests that he transcends the former argument and is attempting to morally justify the forceful acquisition of land in the Americas. Certainly, there were pragmatic reasons as well. Many in England were opposed to their country’s colonial efforts (though, again, not for moral reasons). However, Locke’s justification goes beyond what would have been necessary if all he attempted to do was convince the people of England that their colonial efforts would not prove detrimental to their own country. Though Locke argues against the dispossession of land beyond “that which can be cultivated” in order to ensure there is land remaining for others, eurocentrism permeates this argument.²³ Indeed, throughout his work, Locke gives no regard to the multiplicity of ways in which Indigenous peoples used the land, nor to the inherent utility or importance that land may have to these peoples.

Centuries later, this liberal justification led to Canadian Confederation—after which, the Canadian state took a staunchly assimilationist approach to its relations with Indigenous peoples—and remnants remain even in the recent Canadian past. The forceful relocation of Indigenous children to Indian Residential Schools (IRS), the use of “assimilation-through-enfranchisement” policies, and the

²¹ Also see Flanagan 1989.

²² Barbara Arneil, “John Locke, Natural Law, and Colonialism,” *History of Political Thought* 13, no. 4 (1992): 588; Barbara Arneil, “Trade, Plantations, and Property: John Locke and the Economic Defense of Colonialism,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 55, no. 4 (1994): 593.

²³ Barbara, Arneil, *John Locke and America: The Defence of English Colonialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 606.

relegation of Indigenous peoples to the periphery of Canadian civil and political society has rendered Indigenous-state relations strained through much of Canadian history (if not all of it, including the present).²⁴

In 1960, two major events occurred which suggested a turning point in the formation of Canadian liberal democracy. First, as of 1960, Indigenous peoples in Canada were no longer required to surrender their First Nations status in order to cast a ballot in a federal election. While many Indigenous peoples have convincing reasons for abstaining from electoral participation, it is nonetheless important that they be allowed to participate should they so choose. Second, the Canadian government under Prime Minister Diefenbaker, passed the *Canadian Bill of Rights*. Though this law has been defined as quasi-constitutional and lacking teeth in terms of its ability to enforce the very rights it outlines, it nonetheless signified an important moment for Canadian liberal democracy. Diefenbaker's *Bill of Rights* sought to guarantee the "right of the individual to life, liberty, security of the person and enjoyment of property," the right to equality before the law, and freedoms of religion, speech, assembly and association, and the press.²⁵ The Bill also outlined that, unless expressly stated, future laws should conform to the notions set out in the Bill of Rights. While the criticisms of the Bill of Rights, especially in a pre-Charter Canada, are fully legitimate and valid, the recognition of, at minimum, the symbolically significant aspects of the Bill are equally legitimate.

Two decades later, in 1982, the successor to the Bill of Rights, the *Constitution Act, 1982*, was passed. This included the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which entrenched nearly all of the rights outlined in the Bill of Rights in the Canadian Constitution. Section 27 of the Charter, however, also enshrined a relatively new concept within the Constitution: multiculturalism. The Canadian government had officially adopted a multicultural approach to governing in 1971, and the Canadian Multiculturalism Act (CMA) was further passed in 1988. As important as Section 27 of the Charter is, the CMA fully expands on what multiculturalism is, and what obligations and responsibilities the state must undertake in order to ensure its protection. This has also

²⁴ Kiera L. Ladner and Michael McCrossan, *The Electoral Participation of Aboriginal People* (Elections Canada, 2007): 21.

²⁵ Bill of Rights, *S.C. 1960, c. 44*, retrieved from <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/C-12.3.pdf>.

led to the formation and protection of group-based rights in Canada, contrasting against the individual rights approach promoted by liberalism.

Multiculturalism is perhaps the one policy decision that has become an integral part of Canada's liberal democratic system itself; it has been woven into the very fabric of Canadian society. The extent of this is shown through many public opinion polls. In a Government of Canada report, 84% of respondents agreed that "Canada's multicultural makeup is one of the best things about Canada."²⁶ Further, 61% believed that multiculturalism strengthens national identity, 64% believed that multiculturalism breeds a richer and more tolerant society, and, without being prompted with any potential responses, multiculturalism scored higher than any other aspect of Canadian society in response to a question about what most deserves to be celebrated on Canada's 150th birthday. When the negative response was in favour of multiculturalism, the trend was the same. For example, 59% of Canadians did not believe that Canada is changing too quickly because of the number of visible minorities, and 64% disagreed that Canada would be better if everyone shared the same customs and traditions. These surveys were administered between 2006 and 2010, showing that even during a time when Canadians were increasingly favouring a conservative political party, these progressive views towards multiculturalism remained.

Liberal democracy, then, contains the above features, but is tempered by safeguards such as the executive-judicial division of power and regularly scheduled free and fair elections. As such, I posit that liberal democracy in the Canadian context can be defined as an overarching political system which, while placing importance on notions such as individual liberty and private property, also incorporates an overt multiculturalist and group-rights based approach when dealing with minority groups, and is safeguarded by the measures mentioned above. It might seem then, that liberal democracy is favourable towards Indigenous peoples. It would further appear as though multiculturalism would specifically be helpful for Indigenous peoples and their causes or interests. This, however, is not necessarily the case.

²⁶Government of Canada, *A Literature Review of Public Opinion Research on Canadian Attitudes Towards Multiculturalism and Immigration, 2006-2009* (2012). Retrieved from <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/research/por-multi-imm/sec02-1.asp>.

Multiculturalism & Indigenous Reconciliation: Points of Tension

Reconciliation, in the Canadian context is underexplored conceptually, at least in the public realm. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission has now been around for a decade, and there is now a host of literature written on the topic. However, the Canadian state and its people have not had the careful and nuanced conversation necessary to decipher what exactly reconciliation means theoretically, or what it entails pragmatically. As such, due to the somewhat limited scope of this article, I define reconciliation in a simple way as: ideas, policies, and actions that will lead to the amelioration of the relationship between Indigenous peoples and Canada's settler population. This makes numerous assumptions, but nonetheless provides a working definition against which these tensions can be analyzed. In other words, there will be issues with any definition of reconciliation—it is an essentially contestable term—so, at some point, a definition must be selected, even if just so hypotheses can be tested, or an argument can proceed.

Multiculturalism, despite its open and tolerant nature, does not always work alongside Indigenous interests. I identify four specific points of tension that are stressed when settler-colonial reconciliation is pursued within a multicultural framework. The first two can be attributed to the work of Will Kymlicka; the problematic nature of his typology of minorities (divided between polyethnic groups and national minorities) will be investigated, as will his idea that multiculturalism will lessen the need for mutual understanding through a decrease of engagement between Indigenous peoples and the state. The third point of tension comes when multiculturalism is viewed as a theory or ideology of equality, and the fourth stems from the fact that multiculturalism, no matter how it is utilized, remains an instrument of the settler state—a non-neutral actor that has its own interests to promote and protect.

When Kymlicka speaks of multicultural theory and group rights, he suggests that after the majority group and minorities are divided, the minority group can be further divided into polyethnic groups and national minorities. The easiest example of polyethnic groups are immigrant groups: people who are not part of the majority group and came to Canada of their own volition. National minorities, however, are “a historical society, with its own language and institutions, whose

territory has been incorporated (often involuntarily) into a larger country.”²⁷ In Canada, both the Quebecois and First Nations fit into this category. Certainly, leaving these categories as just described is easily problematized, as a group that includes both Indigenous peoples and settlers is likely to not be of much use. While both Quebecois and Indigenous peoples have a different relationship to the state than immigrant groups, the difference *between* Quebecois and Indigenous peoples is also significant. Kymlicka tried to rectify this in a later work by changing his terminology and creating a further distinction. Kymlicka replaces polyethnic with “new” minorities, and national minorities with “old” minorities, and further divides old minorities between “Indigenous groups and other historic minorities, often called ‘national minorities’ or ‘nationalities.’”²⁸ However, the book in which this new typology is found has a distinctly international focus, unlike many of Kymlicka’s earlier works. Thus, while this typology may make sense in other states who have a greater number of minorities to fit under the “old minority” umbrella, it is not of much use in Canada. Indeed, as MacDonald argues, “Indigenous peoples are not ‘immigrants among immigrants,’ nor ‘citizens plus,’ nor ‘minorities’ among a majority.”²⁹

Aside from not being overly useful in the Canadian context, two sharp critiques of this typology of minorities are also offered by Dick. She argues, first, that Kymlicka’s emphasis on group rights, while working to protect cultural traditions, goes even further in that it “affirms the ability of national minorities to oppress their members in the name of cultural authenticity.”³⁰ This highlights a tension, then, between multiculturalism (or, at least, one way in which multiculturalism can manifest) and liberal democracy. This particular tension, while not explicitly tied to Indigenous peoples, will nonetheless have residual effects for them, their struggles, and their movements, as the ensuing debate will push issues such as reconciliation to the

²⁷ Will Kymlicka, *Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 2.

²⁸ Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 77.

²⁹ Fiona MacDonald, “Democratic Multinationalism: A Political Approach to Indigenous-State Relations,” *Constellations* 21, no. 4 (2014): 608.

³⁰ Caroline Dick, *The Perils of Identity: Group Rights and the Politics of Intragroup Difference* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011), 58.

periphery. Dick's second point of contention is that Kymlicka essentializes minority groups, which results in the prioritization of ethnicity as an identity marker and ignores existing intragroup difference. This is something that many Indigenous scholars and writers also caution against.³¹ Further, both of Dick's critiques are easily carried into the realm of reconciliation, as Indigenous peoples are far from a monolithic group—there are over 600 First Nations in Canada, not including Métis and Inuit peoples—and engaging with Indigenous peoples in a meaningful way will require the state to acknowledge these differences.³²

Another component of Kymlicka's multicultural theory under examination is his claim that mutual understanding is not only unnecessary, but that it is the role of a multicultural state's institutions "to reduce the need for such mutual understanding, since they [multicultural policies] empower Indigenous peoples to speak for, and govern, themselves."³³ In explaining his justification for this, Kymlicka argues that

if we accept that mutual understanding is difficult to achieve, particularly in a context of deep cultural differences and histories of mistrust, then the aim of intercultural education should not primarily be deep mutual understanding, but rather acknowledgement of the (partial) opaqueness of cultural differences, and hence the necessity for groups to speak for and govern themselves, and the necessity of finding ways of co-existing that can be accepted by all.³⁴

Certainly, there are some points of agreement here. Mutual understanding between Indigenous peoples and the peoples and institutions of the settler state is difficult to achieve, and this is a fact

³¹ Glen Coulthard, *Red Skin White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 18; Pamela D. Palmater, *Beyond Blood: Rethinking Indigenous Identity* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011), 56; Audra Simpson, *Mobawak Interruptus: Political Life Across the Borders of Settler States* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 137; Chelsea Vowel, *Indigenous Writes: A Guide to First Nations, Métis, and Inuit Issues in Canada* (Winnipeg: Highwater Press, 2016), 55.

³² See, for example, Barcham 2000; Brownlie 2009.

³³ Will Kymlicka, "Multicultural States and Intercultural Citizens," *Theory in Research and Education* 1, no. 2: 165.

³⁴ Kymlicka, "Multicultural States and Intercultural Citizens," 164.

that is likely to persist. Further, by stipulating that the *primary* aim of intercultural education should not be mutual understanding, Kymlicka leaves open the possibility that it is nonetheless one aim of intercultural education and dialogue. However, the current reality in which Indigenous peoples are situated—a reality that is permeated with continued stereotyping and discrimination—is likely a result of exactly this lack of understanding described by Kymlicka. In other words, Kymlicka’s argument can be followed through logically: if a state adheres to multiculturalism genuinely, then Indigenous peoples will be given greater degrees of autonomy and self-governance, and this will lead to less interaction between Indigenous peoples and the state, thus requiring a lesser degree of understanding. This, however, is not how Indigenous-state relations have developed, nor is it how it continues to materialize, in a deeply entwined political landscape.

There is also an interpretation of multiculturalism as an idea that advances the promotion of equality and egalitarianism among a nation’s citizenry.³⁵ A theory of equality, or an ideology for equality, however, does not leave space for the unique relationship that Indigenous peoples have with the state. Indeed, Macklem argues this to such a degree that he states that “the very ideal thought by many to be threatened by the constitutionalization of differences among citizens [equality] is promoted by the existence of a unique constitutional relationship between [Indigenous] people and the Canadian state.”³⁶ Macklem goes on to argue that Indigenous peoples face unequal challenges in maintaining their culture and tradition and have uniquely legitimate claims to sovereignty and self-government, to the point where the recognition of Indigenous difference is not only helpful in terms of attaining equality, but is necessary. While Macklem sets up his argument through a constitutional lens and avoids dealing with multiculturalism, his argument still has ramifications for multicultural theory, as it recognizes and acknowledges a discrepancy between groups—something that multiculturalism often does not do, despite being capable.

Lastly, as MacDonald points out, Indigenous self-governance is often seen as simply a part of multicultural accommodation, despite the

³⁵ Brian Barry, *Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 4.

³⁶ Patrick Macklem, *Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 5.

fact that most Indigenous scholars and activists “do not identify as part of the multiculturalism rubric,” nor as a minority.³⁷ This is problematic for multiple reasons. First, it tokenizes Indigenous self-governance by ignoring the struggles of Indigenous movements that have been pushing for self-governance and downplaying the legitimacy of self-governing claims. Second, the multicultural theorists who pursue this idea have prescriptive power, which should be neither ignored nor underestimated. Third, the state is not a neutral arbiter in proceedings regarding Indigenous self-governance, and to view it as such is careless at best and dangerous at worst. As Hale notes, “this notion of the state as impartial arbiter of the conflict between individual and group rights is deeply suspect, since in nearly every important question of cultural rights the state is also a key protagonist in that conflict.”³⁸ In other words, the state has a vested interest in these types of proceedings, which often goes unacknowledged and unexamined.

Both Hale and MacDonald discuss and critique a notion they call neoliberal multiculturalism, which seeks to disguise the state’s neoliberal principles behind a mask of multicultural policies in order to advance policies that are in the state’s interest. Hale defines neoliberal multiculturalism as “a substantive, if limited, version of Indigenous cultural rights . . . [promoted] by proponents of the neoliberal doctrine . . . as a means to resolve their own problems and advance their own political agendas.”³⁹ Coulthard discusses this from an explicitly economic perspective,⁴⁰ whereas MacDonald, writing in the Canadian context, discusses the devolution of power regarding child welfare to First Nations in Manitoba as an act of neoliberal multiculturalism insofar as it is a “divestment of responsibility by the state in areas of social policy” as a public good.⁴¹ This last note is particularly important, as the fact that multiculturalism remains an instrument of the state that must not be overlooked.

³⁷ Fiona MacDonald, “Indigenous Peoples and Neoliberal ‘Privatization’ in Canada: Opportunities, Cautions, Constraints,” *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 2 (2011): 260.

³⁸ Charles Hale, “Does Multiculturalism Menace? Governance, Cultural Rights, and the Politics of Identity in Guatemala,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 34: 493.

³⁹ Hale, “Does Multiculturalism Menace?” 487.

⁴⁰ Coulthard, *Red Skin White Masks*, 170.

⁴¹ MacDonald, “Indigenous Peoples and Neoliberal ‘Privatization,’” 261.

Conclusion

Ultimately, this essay sought to accomplish two main tasks: outline the evolution of liberalism in order to adequately define liberal democracy in Canada; and, identify and analyze points of tension that occur between multiculturalism and settler-colonial reconciliation. To the first point, liberalism has had a long and enduring presence throughout pre- and post-Confederation Canadian development. It has been used to justify the dispossession of land from Indigenous peoples on a profound scale, as well as their continued colonization and oppression. It has also lead to the development of one of the most robust and stable liberal democracies in the Western world, characterized by the protection of individual rights and property, an overtly multicultural approach to diversity, and the recognition and appreciation of group-based rights.⁴² Second, there are multiple areas where conflict between multiculturalism and Indigenous reconciliation can be seen. Two of these characteristics are found in Kymlicka's work, including his typology of minorities, as well as his idea regarding how multiculturalism will affect the need for mutual understanding. Two others can be found when multiculturalism is viewed as a theory of, or ideology for, equality, and when the government or state is seen, through its multiculturalist policies, as a benign actor in negotiations. This is not to say that it is impossible for multiculturalism to work either alongside, or directly for, Indigenous peoples. Nor is it to say that Canada must completely jettison the multicultural project in order to pursue reconciliation. What it does say though, is that there are serious consequences that can arise when state and non-state actors are not cognizant of these points of tension, and reconciliation is pursued regardless.

⁴² What Canada currently is—a robust and stable liberal democracy—is in no way a justification of the injustices described in the prior sentence (or the hundreds of others not discussed in this paper), nor is it an attempt to find a “silver lining.”

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Spectres of the Black Lodge: An Engagement with Hauntology and Spectres Through *Twin Peaks*

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The 1990s David Lynch and Mark Frost's crime drama *Twin Peak* and its reboot *Twin Peaks: The Revival* display a form of storytelling unique even in the age of serialized television. The story progresses in a way that does not allow the viewer the necessary knowledge to comprehend what is occurring on screen. Location, time, dimension, reality and other fundamental indicators of setting are abandoned. *Twin Peaks: The Revival* continues the series after the events of the original series saw FBI Agent Dale Cooper (Kyle MacLachlan) becoming trapped in "The Black Lodge."¹ The Black Lodge exists as both a spiritual and interdimensional location. Cooper was tasked with investigating the murder of Laura Palmer (Sheryl Lee), a popular high schooler who came under the influence of "Bob" (Frank Silva), a Black Lodge entity. Cooper enters the lodge and pursues his Doppelganger (Evil Cooper), but Evil Cooper escapes the lodge trapping Cooper in the spiritual realm. *The Revival* revolves around Cooper's attempt to return to the "real" world as Evil Cooper wreaks havoc with no clear goal or endpoint.

What makes *Twin Peaks* such a compelling program is that it continuously forces the viewer to question what is occurring on-screen while simultaneously refusing to answer these same questions. As with any great mystery story, the viewer must attempt to discover and solve the puzzle. In *The Revival*, the viewer is prompted to consider the following questions: what are Evil Cooper's intentions? What is the Black Lodge? What are the boundaries between dimensions? The *Revival* concludes with Cooper and Laura being transported to another dimension without their knowledge as different versions of themselves, named Richard and Linda respectively. Thinking that they have reversed the effects of Laura's murder, they return to Laura's family

¹Lynch, *Twin Peaks*, Season 2, "Beyond Life and Death."

home where, to their shock, a new family resides. The series ends with Laura's piercing scream cutting off electricity to the home upon realizing that they are now trapped outside of their reality.

What can be said of the fixation on objective answers that surround the entire run of *Twin Peaks*? Are there narrative norms that predicate what is and what is not expected to be revealed to an audience? This article will apply Jacques Derrida's concept of hauntology to the story of *Twin Peaks*. Hauntology for Derrida is a way of viewing events and ideas where temporality itself disappears. Derrida describes time as repetition; "repetition and first time, but also repetition and last time, since the singularity of any first time, makes of it also a last time. Each time it is the event itself, a first time is a last time. Altogether other. Staging for the end of history. Let us call it a hauntology."² I will argue that *Twin Peaks* is an example of Derrida's hauntology and the ways that spectral images are used in the show allows the viewer to see impact of how television and other forms of media are consumed. To apply hauntology to the format of television, I will examine the work of Mark Fisher who pioneered the practice of reading tele-media through this lens.³ Fisher saw hauntology on film as being represented through shots of empty landscapes that make the viewer feel a sense of unease. In looking at how media is structured in the procedural format it becomes clear that shows such as *Twin Peaks* challenge the comfortable feelings of resolution and structure, instead creating an engagement with media that is unsatisfying and inherently strange.

To understand how Derrida comes to use the concept of hauntology, one must go back to the inspiration for his book, *Specters of Marx: The State of Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International*. In the opening of Karl Marx's *Communist Manifesto*, he writes "A spectre⁴ is haunting Europe—the spectre of Communism. All the Powers of Old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre."⁵ Communism, for Marx at the time of writing, was an ever-present entity. It was not housed in a physical institution, but

²Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 10.

³Mark Fisher, "What Is Hauntology?," *Film Quarterly* Vol. 66, No. 1 (2012): 21.

⁴ The usage of specter with an "re" as opposed to "er" denotes the intended usage in the respective citation.

⁵Karl Marx, *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*, ed. David McLellan, Second Edition (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 245.

rather it was becoming a way of feeling that seemingly rose out of the ground and from the sky; communism for Marx was thus spectral. It is this spectral element of Communism that leads to what Marx terms a “holy alliance,” where those with a vested interest in maintaining the current order put aside differences in order to achieve a common goal. While Communism in Marx’s life was recognizably constituted this way, after his death there were many instances of the specter of Communism emerging in states around the world. The most prominent of these Communist states was the Soviet Union.

It was the collapse of the Soviet Union that’s peaked Derrida’s interest in the notion of specters. In his book *Specters of Marx*, Derrida articulates a fascination with the fall of the Soviet Union and the supposed death of Communism, where an ideology that is purported to have been beaten by capitalism appears to still drive much of the global political discourse. There is an inherent “theatricalization” that emerges in much of Marx’s later work which arises out of a respect for the work of William Shakespeare.⁶ Marx’s admiration for Shakespeare pushes Derrida to look at the playwright’s famous work *Hamlet*, where the ghost of the titular character’s father returns from the dead to warn his son that his uncle is his murderer. It is the specter of the king returning, influencing the play by being simultaneously alive and dead that makes it hauntological. Derrida contends that hauntological specters are inherently theatrical, arguing that Marx’s portrayal of communism in *The Communist Manifesto* is that of a backstage presence which is emergent and “begins by coming back.”⁷ With this theatricalization Marx is setting the stage for a battle that the enemies of Communism cannot win, as they are unable to stop something that comes of its own volition and cannot be materially located. It is Marx’s understanding of Communism as ever emergent that pushes Derrida to apply this reading to the fall of the Soviet Union.

Looking at the specter or ghost, Derrida proposes the question “What is a ghost? What is the effectivity or the presence of a specter, that is, of what seems to remain as ineffective, virtual, insubstantial as a simulacrum? Is there *there*, between the thing itself and its simulacrum, an opposition that holds up?”⁸ In response to this question, Derrida introduces the concept of “Hauntology,” an idea that plays with the

⁶Fisher, “What Is Hauntology?,” 21.

⁷Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, 11.

⁸Author’s original emphasis. Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, 10.

concept of ontology as a way to connect the physical world with a presence that simultaneously exists and ends. The purpose of ontology is to attempt to understand what it means “to *be*, to be *real*, *actual* or *present*.”⁹ Ontological understandings establish the parameters through which we interact with the physical. When Derrida introduces Hauntology, it is not to suggest that ontology does not exist or is useless. Rather, it is that ontology fails to address the ideas and concepts that do not have a physical permanence, as Derrida explains

To haunt does not mean to be present, and it is necessary to introduce haunting into the very construction of a concept. Of every concept, beginning with the concepts of being and time. That is what we would be calling here a hauntology. Ontology opposes it only in a movement of exorcism. Ontology is a conjuration.¹⁰

For Derrida, ontology is a magical creation that exists through its “exorcism” of the self; in its critique of hauntology, ontology attempts to critique itself. When analyzing Marx through Derrida’s work, Pierre Macherey argues that it is necessary not to reaffirm work as if it is finished, but rather to look back upon it and affirm the significance of its ideas.¹¹ This understanding is important as it recognizes Marx’s work as being materialist but allows one to expand it into the realm of the spectral, away from the ontological understanding. By separating the historical materialism of Marx from the ideology of Communism, one is able to engage with Communism outside of its physical embodiments, such as the Soviet Union.

To properly engage with hauntology in this context, it is important to look at one of the most famous (or infamous) works to arise out of the collapse of the Soviet Union: Francis Fukuyama’s *The End of History and the Last Man*. Following World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in an ideological conflict known as the Cold War, with Liberal Democracy and Communism being pitted against each other. In *The End of History*, Fukuyama argues that the fall of the

⁹Dale Jacquette, *Ontology*, Central Problems of Philosophy (Montreal: MQUP, 2002), 2.

¹⁰Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, 202.

¹¹Pierre Macherey, “Marx Dematerialized, or the Spirit of Derrida,” in *Ghostly Demarcations: A Symposium on Jacques Derrida’s Specters of Marx*, ed. Michael Sprinker (London: Verso, 1999), 19.

Soviet Union, represented the end of history with Communism's collapse allowing Liberal Democracy to reign as the dominant global ideology.¹² Fukuyama conceives of history in the tradition of G.W.F. Hegel, where history unfolds in a dialectical movement of contradictions that eventually achieves synthesis. For Hegel, world history is teleological, meaning that it has an endpoint which "represents the development of the (absolute) spirit's consciousness of its own freedom and of the consequent realisation of this freedom."¹³ While Hegel never makes clear what this endpoint looks like or if it is even possible, Fukuyama saw the fall of the Soviet Union as a realization of the absolute spirit through Liberal Democracy. This understanding of the end of the Cold War comes into direct clash with Derrida's understanding of that same event. While not directly referencing Fukuyama, it is clear that Derrida is dismissive of this viewpoint when he writes:

As for the sleight-of-hand trick between history and nature, between historical empiricity and teleological transcendentality, between the supposed empirical reality of the event and the absolute ideality of the liberal telos, it can only be undone on the basis of a new thinking or a new experience of the event, and of another logic of its relation to the phantomatic.¹⁴

Here Derrida is arguing that hauntology allows for a dismissal of one dominant ideality, "liberal telos," as outside of the material reality, which for Fukuyama is represented by the fall of the Communism. In his compilation book of three interviews entitled *Positions*, Derrida states "I have attempted to systematize a deconstructive critique precisely of the authority of meaning, as the *transcendental signified* or as *telos*."¹⁵ Derrida does not think that spectral beings are themselves problematic, rather he is critical of bodies that claim to be the source of absolute authority and truth. Therefore, Derrida sees ideologies like

¹²Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), xii.

¹³Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 138.

¹⁴Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, 86.

¹⁵Author's original emphasis. Jacques Derrida, *Positions*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), <http://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/P/bo24847338.html>.

Communism as always having some semblance of appearance, while definitive ends as understood by Fukuyama do not have universal meaning as the ideas themselves both endure and end. In his work on hauntology, Liam Sprod argues that the teleological approach to history is inherently problematic. Sprod suggests that the end of history is not reflective of an empirical end but rather: "The specific end of history is only a manifestation of the deeper problems of ends themselves, temporality and the future, and it is through addressing this essential ontological problem that the path out of the end of history can be found."¹⁶ Fukuyama understands ideology in binaries, as either being true or false, meaning that the possibility of spectral ideology is impossible thus limiting the transcendence of events and ideas. Fukuyama seeks in *The End of History* to isolate an event, where Derrida locates the event as never ending or beginning.

The theorist that has brought Derrida's concept of hauntology into the present consciousness was Mark Fisher. In his book, *Ghosts of My Life: Writings on Depression, Hauntology and Lost Futures*, Fisher applies hauntology to his view of culture in the post-1970s neoliberal era. Fisher understands hauntology through "the spectre understood not as anything supernatural, but as that which acts without (physically) existing."¹⁷ Any attempt to locate the hauntological specter in a physical entity fails in that it does not account for "reverberant events." in the psyche.¹⁸ Returning to Communism, hauntology finds Communism not as a singular event or ideology, but as a series of events that we simultaneously engage with but have no connection to. However, Fisher argues that out of the fall of Communism Fukuyama's vision of capitalism emerged, which Fisher terms "capitalist realism."¹⁹ Fisher sees the haunting not within a continuation of Communism's presence, but rather in that out of the disappearance of the specter of Communism, capitalism has changed. It is not that one sees the dominance of Liberal Democracy confirmed, but rather capitalism was able to grow into something alien to that which existed in the Cold

¹⁶Liam Sprod, "Against All Ends: Hauntology, Aesthetics, Ontology," *3:AM Magazine*, May 11, 2012, <http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/against-all-ends-hauntology-aesthetics-ontology/>.

¹⁷Mark Fisher, *Ghosts of My Life: Writings on Depression, Hauntology and Lost Futures*, E-Book (Winchester, UK: Zero Books, 2014).

¹⁸Fisher, *Ghosts of My Life*.

¹⁹ Fisher, *Ghosts of My Life*.

War. This reading of Fisher allows for two examinations of hauntology; first, the influence that specter can have, and second, what the disappearance of that specter creates.

Following Derrida, I contend that ideas and concepts do not end, rather, they are consistently haunting in that they are never fully tangible or visible. It is this haunting that one is driven to study and engage with these concepts. For Derrida, hauntology is directly tied to media. He identifies a “frontier” between public and private life, the media, in which he suggests the limit of politics can be found.²⁰ He defines media as “news, the press, telecommunications, techno-tele-discursivity, techno-tele-iconicity.”²¹ In this way, *Twin Peaks* can be conceived as a medium through which politics is directly engaged through a new imagining of the frontier between public and private life. Consequently, it is important to view *Twin Peaks* through a hauntological lens. *Twin Peaks* as a whole is haunted by the specter of Laura Palmer, her translucent visage is even presented to the audience during the opening titles of *The Revival*. The plot of *Twin Peaks* continues to have less and less to do with Laura Palmer as the workings of the two lodges become clearer. The characters of the show, along with the audience, are initially driven by a desire to find out what happened to her, but what anchors them to the show are the peculiarities and mysticism that surrounds the events of the series.

Employing a hauntological perspective to *Twin Peaks*, it is evident that Laura Palmer is not the only specter that can be examined. In fact, the specter of *Twin Peaks* is not one particular entity. Rather, drawing on Fisher, it is an absence that creates a presence that one is enamoured by because the specter is no longer visible but rather points to futures that never occurred.²² *Twin Peaks*’ use of specters demonstrates how haunting characters can become a catalyst for the emergence of a new reality, without the character being physically present. Take for example the specter of Laura Palmer who appears on numerous occasions to Cooper during his visits to the Black Lodge. The apparition that Cooper sees is not the real Laura Palmer, but the cousin of the Man From Another Place. This quasi-Laura Palmer represents her specter. Additionally, Laura Palmer represents a kind of haunting in that she is

²⁰Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, 62–63.

²¹Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, 63.

²²Mark Fisher, “The Metaphysics of Crackle: Afrofuturism and Hauntology,” *Dancecult: Journal of Electronic Dance Music Culture* 5, no. 2 (October 24, 2013): 45.

still responsible for the instigation of the story, but also largely absent from *Twin Peaks*. This is demonstrated through several instances where she whispers into Cooper's ear evidence that the viewer is not privy to, nor which Cooper can remember. The absence occurs where the image of Laura as an innocent teenager the people of *Twin Peaks* knew, was replaced by that of a troubled girl, who unbeknownst to them, was being influenced by the entities of the Black Lodge. Laura Palmer can be seen as the hauntological specter in that she influences the narrative of the show both through the appearance and absence of her presence.

What draws audiences to *Twin Peaks* is that it disrupts the notion of clarity and comfort that exists in conventional television. Lynch has constructed a narrative and employs a way of filming that prevents the viewer from being comfortable; even the simplest of scenes creates for the audience a sense of uneasiness that is not rooted in horror or suspense. This feeling is epitomized through the re-emergence in the return of original series character Audrey Horne (Sherilyn Fenn) and her new husband Charlie (Clark Middleton). Prior to her re-emergence, Audrey's last appearance was in the season two finale where she was in a building that exploded, leaving her fate unknown.²³ Audrey's return is structured around a story that was already in progress, and none of the context that Audrey and Charlie discuss is rooted in the viewers knowledge. Similarly, other characters make reference to a character, Billy, who the audience never sees or understands beyond rumours off handed comments.

Audrey Horne's appearance seemingly has little to do with the main plot, yet by giving her exposure the audience becomes feverish to understand her relevance. At the end of her story arc, Audrey becomes trapped in an empty void and is never seen or referenced again. The possibility of Audrey's arc being that of polite fan service is rejected in favour of speculation. The speculation as to Audrey's involvement in the storyline disregards her position as a specter in the plot. Audrey is a specter, though, in that she is haunting the plot of the new series by reminding the audience of her impact on the original series. In this way, the audience has no way of knowing what events depicted are real, as the narrative structure of the show is unreliable. The events of Audrey's timeline work to provide familiarity and nostalgia while simultaneously provoking feelings of discomfort as a familiar character is in a place

²³David Lynch, *Twin Peaks: The Revival* (Showtime, 2017), "Part 12."

unrecognizable both to the audience and to herself. It is this attempt to revisit a specter of the past that shapes the viewers engagement with *Twin Peaks*.

Perhaps the scene that best represents hauntology in the show is when FBI Director Gordon Cole (David Lynch) recalls a mysterious dream. In Part 14 of *The Revival* Cole recounts “another Monica Belluccidream.”²⁴ His character recalls:

I was in Paris on a case. Monica called and asked me to meet her at a certain café, she said she needed to talk to me. When we met at the café Cooper was there (positioned to Cole’s right and behind in a standing position), but I couldn’t see his face. Monica was very pleasant, she had brought friends, we all had a coffee. And then she said the ancient phrase ‘we are like the dreamer, who dreams and then lives inside the dream.’ I told her I understood, and then she said ‘But who is the dreamer?’ A very powerful uneasy feeling came over me. Monica looked past me, and indicated to me to look back at something that was happening there. I turned and looked (back to where Cooper was standing). I saw myself, I saw myself from long ago in the old Philadelphia offices. Listening to Cooper telling me he was worried about a dream he had... and that was the day Phillip Jeffries (David Bowie) appeared, and didn’t appear. And while Jeffries was apparently there, he raised his arm and pointed at Cooper and asked me ‘Who do you think that is there?’²⁵

This monologue from Cole elucidates a specter that had been with him for years. The scene Cole describes is from a 1992 prequel film entitled *Twin Peaks: Fire Walk With Me*.²⁶ When “the long lost” Phillip Jeffries returns, both in the event itself and through the dream, Cole is reminded of his past as part of the FBI’s paranormal investigation unit and the mysterious events that led up to the murder of Laura Palmer.²⁷

²⁴ Monica Bellucci is an actress and is friends with David Lynch.

²⁵ Lynch, *Twin Peaks: The Revival*, “Part 14.”

²⁶ David Lynch, *Twin Peaks: Fire Walk With Me* (1992; New Line Cinema), Television.

²⁷ Lynch, *Twin Peaks: Fire Walk With Me*.

As well, the spectral image of Cooper looms in the background as Cole enjoys coffee with Monica Bellucci. At this point in the series Cole has yet to reconnect with the normal Cooper as he is still trapped in between the Black Lodge and 'reality.' Cole is remembering that Cooper's shadow has loomed over the series events since he went missing, and even though he has not been involved in the story, he still believes in and welcomes the influence of Cooper into his dream revelation. It is through Cole's conversation with the ghostly image of Monica Bellucci that he is able to discern that there has been a spectral element driving the case that he had been simultaneously unaware of.

Beyond just being an example of hauntology, how *Twin Peaks* is understood can be tied directly to what is viewed as comfortable in contemporary popular culture. Audiences have been trained to view programming and engage with this type of story through procedural narratives. For media studies scholar Chandler Harriss, "procedurals filter the ratioinative action through characters who actively investigate the mystery for the viewer, following procedures that are prescribed by their professions."²⁸ Procedurals are not limited to police investigations, they are best identified as following the day to day routine of professionals from doctors to cowboys. Harriss applies the work of folklorist Vladimir Propp to four successful cop shows: *Law and Order*, *Homicide: Life on the Street*, *The X-Files* and *CSI*. Harriss' altered method unfolds in stages with subsequent sub-moves, where there is some freedom as to what steps are taken but in the end it will still progress in the same fashion until the ultimate resolution of the "Perpetrator being removed from society."²⁹ As well, each archetype of character in a procedural must stay within its own sphere, where victims are victims, investigators investigate, and so forth.³⁰ For Harriss, the structure of the procedural must stay consistent throughout; the entirety of each episode and the show as a whole must follow a set formula.³¹ As a story, *Twin Peaks* begins as a standard procedural, but as the show progresses it becomes clear that it is not restricted to the norms of procedurals. *Twin Peaks* only adheres to the first aspect of a procedural,

²⁸Chandler Harriss, "Policing Propp: Toward a Textualist Definition of the Procedural Drama," *Journal of Film and Video* 60, no. 1 (2008): 43.

²⁹Harriss, "Policing Propp," 56.

³⁰Harriss, "Policing Propp," 46.

that there is a victim and the crime will be investigated. There are aspects of the procedural throughout its run, but they are out of order and are satiated by explorations outside of the procedural. There is nothing normal about what occurs after the investigation begins, as the investigators never appear to be in control. The hauntological specter of the Black Lodge determines what unfolds. *The Revival* ends with no clear resolution as it appears that Cooper has once again become trapped in a reality he does not understand and no definitive proof is found that the series villain, Bob, has been defeated.

What can be gleaned from this knowledge of hauntological experience? How one interprets the world around them is largely determined by what they see and the feedback loop that is formed out of this interaction. *Twin Peaks* acts as a means for one to envision how concepts can become hauntological through the use of specters in its narrative. It is both representative of the concept of hauntology, and how hauntology can create affect on a viewer's experience. What Derrida's hauntology provides is a sense of legitimacy of concepts even if they have lost their physical form. The Soviet Union has collapsed, but its specter can be seen in two ways: as a consistent presence in the world that is necessarily shaped by actions taken by the former entity, or the gap through which the disappearance of its embodied form was filled by a globally dominant form of capitalism. Chasing that which is obscure and unknowable is unsatisfactory; rather there needs to be an engagement with the things that make one believe that the unknown is a puzzle that can be solved. The hauntological specter of procedural forms of television makes the audience believe that there has to be a definable set of conclusions. Popular culture has conditioned audiences to search for clues and when there is an outright absence of clarity, audiences tend to express panic and discomfort. The potentials for this hauntological understanding of modern popular culture can be expanded to other domains, where the desire to return to sunny pasts or to go toward completely new futures blind one from the realities that always existent specters create. The strange and sublime experience that is *Twin Peaks* is not an anomaly of popular culture, but a raised alert to the ever-present specters of television's pasts, presents and futures.

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<http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/against-all-ends-hauntology-aesthetics-ontology/>.

Errors in Judgement? Lessons on Slipping-up, Solidarity and Technology from MSM Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP) Users and Non-Users in Ontario

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Condom use is synonymous with safety. Known colloquially as a sheath, protection or simply ‘safe,’ not using a condom is to forgo one’s own well being and engage in ‘unprotected’ sex. Willingly or unwillingly, not practicing the barrier method is understood to be an error in judgment. Safer-sex, however, is not limited to condom use, nor do condoms always live up to their promise of near total protection. Recent developments in highly active antiviral treatment has given rise to the possibility of pre-exposure HIV-prophylaxis as a complement to condom use. This project contrasts interpretations of the one-a-day pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) pill, between user and non-users. I discuss how PrEP challenges taken-for-granted norms in HIV prevention and sexual negotiations. I examine the accounts of men who have sex with men (MSM), PrEP users and non-users, as they grapple with how HIV-risk, safer sex and condom use are shifting due to PrEP. In particular how “slipping-up” and prophylactic preference can help outline diverging notions of responsibility, intimacy and contagion brought about by PrEP.

Truvada (PrEP) is a group of HIV prophylactics that interfere with the chemical reproduction of HIV. Initially an HIV treatment, Truvada was quickly conceived as an alternative prophylactic for groups at high risk of transmitting HIV. Though Truvada is well known and highly effective as an HIV treatment¹ as a prophylactic, it has been met with a

¹AS Fauci et al., “Guidelines for the Use of Antiretroviral Agents in Hiv-Infected Adults and Adolescents,” in *Annals of Internal Medicine*, ed. Department of Health and Human Services (Panel on Clinical Practices for Treatment of HIV Infection, 2002), f-15; World Health Organization, “19th Who Model List of Essential Medicines (April 2015). Apr 2015,” (2016), 12-3.

considerable resistance from both medical practitioners and members of ‘at risk’ communities. The main barrier to a widespread introduction to PrEP has been its interference with the norms within stakeholder groups and, more specifically, how being fear free of HIV when having sex bears on how we understand HIV-risk.²

The focus of this project, however, is how PrEP impacts evaluations of safety. In particular, how notions of what is perceived of as unsafe sex, often framed as a mistake or ‘slipping-up,’ is diverging as a result of a novel prophylactic. Those who take PrEP do indeed experience a sense of relief with respect to guilt, fear and anxiety around HIV.³ But how does that appear to those who do not, or cannot access PrEP? Kane Race noted that PrEP appears as a “reluctant object” –an object that offers “tangible difference to people’s lives, but whose promise is so threatening or confronting to enduring habits of getting by in this world that it provokes aversion, avoidance — even condemnation and moralism.”⁴ He argues primarily for its association with unbridled sexuality. Arguments that PrEP is not a prevention option but a sexual enhancement drug, have led to the epithet “Truvada whore,”⁵ and is noted as the reasoning behind reluctance from policy makers to approve PrEP for widespread use.⁶ Further, PrEP may also be the subject of avoidance because it is defined as being for those “high risk,”⁷ thus implying the user is contradictorily both taking the necessary “responsible” precautions yet are irresponsible for emulating

²Maarten Paul Maria Jansen, Noor Tromp, and Rob Baltussen, “Prep: Why We Are Waiting,” *The Lancet HIV* 3, no. 1 (2016).

³Kimberly Koester et al., “Risk, Safety and Sex among Male Prep Users: Time for a New Understanding,” *Culture, Health & Sexuality* (2017): 5-6.

⁴Kane Race, “Reluctant Objects: Sexual Pleasure as a Problem for Hiv Biomedical Prevention,” *GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies* 22, no. 1 (2016): 17.

⁵Andrew Spieldenner, “Prep Whores and Hiv Prevention: The Queer Communication of Hiv Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (Prep),” *Journal of Homosexuality* 63, no. 12 (2016): 1690-1. Sarah K. Calabrese and Kristen. Underhill, “How Stigma Surrounding the Use of Hiv Preexposure Prophylaxis Undermines Prevention and Pleasure: A Call to Destigmatize “Truvada Whores”,” *American Journal of Public Health* 105, no. 10 (2015): 1960.; Julia Belluz, “The Truvada Wars,” *British Medical Journal* 348 (2014): 348:g3811.

⁶Jansen, Tromp, and Baltussen, “Prep: Why We Are Waiting,” e11; Unknown, “Prep: Why Are We Waiting?,” *The Lancet HIV* 2, no. 10 (2015): e401.

⁷Gilead Sciences Canada, “Product Monograph Truvada,” ed. Gilead Sciences Canada (Mississauga, ON: Gilead Sciences Canada, Inc, 2017), 4.

unsanctioned sexual conduct.⁸ As a result, it appears that PrEP is highly desired but under accessed as would-be users cannot adequately negotiate the fine line between too responsible and too irresponsible. By further examining how and why PrEP is resisted, this project hopes to understand the preexisting and emergent ways MSM have responded to HIV.

The controversy around PrEP offers a window into how HIV is imagined and sexuality is negotiated, in part, through how prophylactic technologies are used or (perhaps more importantly) not used. PrEP is employed in what Masha Rosengarten and Mike Michael call a “prophylactic assemblage,”⁹ a dynamic system of open and interrelated parts, the ontological status of which is neither static nor permanent and where the specific arrangement of actors and actants in space and time gives rise to an event.¹⁰ Race notes that ignoring these relations misses the constellations of actors and actants that make HIV transmission possible, resulting in HIV interventions that make HIV-positive persons exclusively responsible for transmission.¹¹ This conception largely misunderstands the negotiations, both interpersonal and between humans and non-humans that make HIV-transmission possible.¹² PrEP is therefore interesting as a case study in error, as it brings attention to these silent actors as they conflict with commonly held understandings and practices in HIV-transmission and prevention. PrEP offers an especially interesting window into how the socio-technological relationship can offer insight into broader social processes and ultimately help explain social change. Specifically, this novel medical technology demonstrates how something as small and seemingly inconsequential as a pill can drastically impact how people relate to one another. In this case, notions of health and healthy behaviour, and conversely health risks, are brought into conflict by a

⁸Martin Holt, “Configuring the Users of New Hiv-Prevention Technologies: The Case of Hiv Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis,” *Culture, health & sexuality* 17, no. 4 (2015): 8-10.

⁹Marsha Rosengarten and Mike Micheal, “Hiv Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (Prep) and the Complexities of Biomedical Prevention: Ontological Openness and the Prevention Assemblage,” in *Hiv Treatment and Prevention Technologies in International Perspective*, ed. M. Davis and C. Squire (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 167-80.

¹⁰Couze Venn, “A Note on Assemblage,” *Theory, Culture & Society* 23, no. 2-3 (2006).

¹¹Kane Race, “Framing Responsibility: Hiv, Biomedical Prevention, and the Performativity of the Law,” *Journal of Bioethical Inquiry* 9, no. 3 (2012): 333-6.

¹²Barry D. Adam et al., “Silence, Assent and Hiv Risk,” *Culture, Health & Sexuality* 10, no. 8 (2008): 769-71.

new prophylactic. These notions are often framed as discreet phenomena where ambiguity around those concepts are seen as an obstacle to be overcome.¹³ At both the level of policy and in everyday life, these risks are assumed to be stable, concrete and relatively unchanging. The controversy around PrEP demonstrates how variable notions of healthy behaviour are within communities of MSM. Though these groups of men are themselves largely framed as a discreet group of “men who have sex with men,” how and why these groups of men implement or choose not to implement PrEP is multiple and may at times conflict. This project calls attention to how our current understandings of health and HIV risk, often framed in terms of either a lack of education or a lack of adequate care for the self and/or for others ignores the dynamic nature of these social and technologically constituted assemblages and must be addressed both symmetrically and with an eye to the potential futures enabled by those relationships.¹⁴

I engage with the argument that medical conditions, and therefore health provision and healthy behaviour, are values made flesh”¹⁵ Values about what constitutes sanctioned ‘safer’ sex, HIV risk and how a sexual encounter ought to occur are codified in clinical trials to be taken up, resisted, used or misused by those at the ‘highest risk’ of HIV transmission. These norms, built into the artefact and reinforced by HIV-prevention discourse, are normative and coercive. Together they imply that certain behaviours are unhealthy and therefore should be understood as an error, either in judgment or in socialization.

I also engage with the notion that chemicals, like PrEP, can be major vectors for identity. Following the arguments of Nancy Tuana and Mel Chen, I argue that the chemicals we ingest become us. It is common to understand the body and our self as discreet ‘natural’ beings and build our politics on who ought to be empowered in the face of attack on that being.¹⁶ However, chemicals we ingest, either willingly

¹³Monica Greco, “Thinking Beyond Polemics: Approaching the Health Society through Foucault,” *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 34, no. 2 (2009): 18-20.

¹⁴Monica Greco, “Afterword: Thinking with Outrageous Propositions,” in *Speculative Research: The Lure of Possible Futures*, ed. Martin Savransky Alex Wilkie, Marsha Rosengarten, (New York: Routledge, 2017), 219-25.

¹⁵A Mol, *The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 82-5.

¹⁶Greco, “Thinking Beyond Polemics: Approaching the Health Society through Foucault.”

such as medications,¹⁷ chemicals absorbed unwillingly from the environment¹⁸ or as a side effect of another medical treatment,¹⁹ change the composition of our bodies, minds and inform our identities. Chemicals change who and what we are and therefore inform our politics far beyond the medical sphere.²⁰ Our behaviours and understandings of the world are intertwined with the material world, the possibilities they offer as well as the inequalities contained within them. Thus, any understanding of the ethics of a health intervention must attend to how that intervention extends into the broader constellation of social phenomena, beyond 'outcomes' and beyond the dichotomous understanding of healthy/unhealthy and of use/misuse.

This project attends to how users and non-users are co-constituted by PrEP. The behavioural label 'MSM' is often used to describe same gender sex acts as a homogeneous risk group; they are in-fact heterogeneous.²¹ By paying attention to the varying interpretations of a technology, it is possible to uncover the differing goals and needs of the subcultures that vie for the use of a technology that best fits their needs.²² Trevor J. Pinch and Wiebe E. Bijker make the point that seemingly homogeneous groups such as "bike riders" can be, as Elizabeth Siegel Watkins notes, "a heterogeneous assemblage of homogenous subsets."²³ By following the negotiations of these subsets, Pinch and Bijker were able to further understand the negotiations that forced the evolution of the bicycle.

¹⁷Johanne Collin, "On Social Plasticity: The Transformative Power of Pharmaceuticals on Health, Nature and Identity," *Sociology of Health & Illness* 38, no. 1 (2016), 73-89.

¹⁸Nancy Tuana, "Viscous Porosity: Witnessing Katrina," in *Material Feminisms* ed. S. Alaimo and S. Hekman (Indiana: Indiana University Press., 2008), 190-8.

¹⁹Mel Y Chen, *Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012), 159-225.

²⁰Tuana, "Viscous Porosity: Witnessing Katrina," 198-200.; Collin, "On Social Plasticity: The Transformative Power of Pharmaceuticals on Health, Nature and Identity," 78-84.

²¹Rebecca M. Young and Ilan H. Meyer, "The Trouble with "Msm" and "Wsw": Erasure of the Sexual-Minority Person in Public Health Discourse," *American Journal of Public Health* 95, no. 7 (2005): 1144-9.

²²Trevor J. Pinch and Wiebe E. Bijker, "The Social Construction of Facts and Artefacts: Or How the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each Other," *Social Studies of Science* 14, no. 3 (1984): 409-19.

²³Elizabeth Siegel Watkins, "The Construction of a Contraceptive Technology: An Investigation of the Meanings of Norplant," *Science, Technology, & Human Values* 36, no. 1 (2011): 35.

While paying attention to the role of these differing subsets of users illuminates how technology co-constitutes a community, non-use, particularly in the case of HIV-prevention, can be especially important. How PrEP is resisted and re-interpreted by MSM can tell us a great deal about the values inherent to specific communities of MSM, offering greater detail as to how HIV-risk and pleasure are negotiated. Resistance to a drug can explain why otherwise effective medical technologies fail to live up to expectations.²⁴ Though PrEP, as it is currently imagined, is a highly effective HIV-prevention technology, how it is resisted, used and re-interpreted speaks as much to the relations that constitute HIV-prevention as it does about the communities that use or ‘fail’ to use it.

Though both users and non-users share a sense of being at risk and are concerned at the prospect of misusing condoms or ‘slipping-up,’ they see PrEP as a way to mitigate that risk. Therefore, perspectives on HIV-risk, sexual responsibility and desirability, where notions of what constitutes a mistake or dangerous sexual act, appear to be diverging. In the following sections, I examine how condom-use is understood by users and non-users, as well as how HIV risk appears to shift as a result of PrEP use. Though users do express using PrEP as a replacement for condoms, the reasons for doing so appear to be more complex than some form of repressed hedonism. Rather, PrEP appears to allow users to imagine their partners in a different light, making new forms of intimacy and solidarity possible.

Method

I interviewed two groups of PrEP non-users and sent questionnaires to PrEP users detailing their experience of taking the drug.^{*} In total, I facilitated 2 focus groups with a total of 9 non-users and received questionnaires from 5 users for a total of 14 participants. The questionnaires discuss two key aspects of PrEP usership: becoming a user and negotiating sexuality while using PrEP. Users outlined how

²⁴Watkins, “The Construction of a Contraceptive Technology: An Investigation of the Meanings of Norplant,” 42-48.

^{*}As a result of different data gathering strategies, users and non-users are accorded differing levels of anonymity. Users were allowed to choose their own name; non-users were assigned a number. This method was approved by the Carleton University ethics board in July, 2016.

they learned about PrEP, how they managed to acquire a prescription and then explained how PrEP has changed their sex lives and their relationships more generally. I asked participants to discuss their view on condomless sex, or 'barebacking,' and whether or not their view has changed since taking PrEP. Participants were encouraged to write at least one paragraph in response to each question; paying attention to the timing of the event, the actors involved, the progression of events and to reflect on their affective experience of that event.

Non-user participants were given a fifteen-minute presentation on PrEP. This presentation outlined PrEP, its mechanism of action, how it is used and the process one would have to undergo should they choose to start taking PrEP. Following this presentation, participants were asked about their perceptions of PrEP. Participants were prompted to outline exactly what excites and concerns them about PrEP. Lastly, participants were introduced to three hypothetical scenarios and asked to imagine how they would act in scenarios involving a PrEP user.

Responses were analyzed using an adapted "listening guide:"²⁵ Responses were first transcribed into n-vivo, re-transcribed to develop a coherent narrative and coded according to 4 different 'readings,' each time focusing on the story, subjects and interpersonal, structural aspects of the narrative. This analysis strategy compensates for small sample size by providing a 'multi-layered' approach to the different dimensions of an event experienced by a respondent that can be gleaned by their response. These narratives construct a particular social world reflective of, though not necessarily constituted by, respondent 'expertise' and experiences.²⁶ By attending to not only what is said, but how it is said this guide attends to the ontological, public, conceptual and metanarratives that frame the existence of respondents. Further, this strategy foregrounds both the affective experiences, as well as the social and material relationships that lead to the crystallization of a particular technology.

²⁵Andrea Doucet and Natasha S. Mauthner, "What Can Be Known and How? Narrated Subjects and the Listening Guide," *Qualitative Research* 8, no. 3 (2008),399-409

²⁶Bent Flyvbjerg, *Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and How It Can Succeed Again* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge university press, 2001), 66-87.

Findings Resistance: Condom use, PrEP use and divergent conceptions of safer-sex

Though PrEP has proven to decrease HIV transmission in MSM communities,²⁷ policy makers are reluctant to make PrEP fully available without completely understanding how PrEP will impact “normative aspects” such as regular condom use.²⁸ The concerns of PrEP interfering with the patterns of normal sexuality make PrEP a resistant object. Resistant objects are otherwise useful objects which are either underutilized or fall out of use completely because they interfere with the taken for granted norms and habits in one’s day-to-day life.²⁹ PrEP interferes with traditionally ‘safer’ sex practices and is therefore a substantive impact on the lives of gay men, appearing as if the person is acting in error. Indeed, non-user participants were aware of how useful PrEP would be in their lives, yet they also expressed concerns about how PrEP interfered with rituals they used to engage in safe sex, in particular the failure to utilize condoms. Because PrEP interfered with these rituals, particularly when and how condoms were employed, PrEP users were often discussed as untrustworthy, unaware or outright dangerous. For Example, 001 noted that though intentionally not using condoms must be a result of, “not understanding exactly how risky it is, or not caring because of a lack of education or care for themselves.” Though many non-users admitted they did not always use condoms themselves, the thought of intentionally engaging in condomless sex was highly undesirable.

Non-users routinely expressed that PrEP users are untrustworthy or worse, assaulting their partners, by not wearing a condom. Participant 008 explained that a proposal not to use condoms seemed “creepy” to him, even from a PrEP user. 002 noted that if a person were to inform him that they did not want to use a condom, he would reply “okay cool,

²⁷Robert Grant et al., “Preexposure Chemoprophylaxis for Hiv Prevention in Men Who Have Sex with Men,” *New England Journal of Medicine* 363, no. 27 (2010), 2587-99; Koester et al., “Risk, Safety and Sex among Male Prep Users: Time for a New Understanding.”; Junjun Jiang et al., “Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis for the Prevention of Hiv Infection in High Risk Populations: A Meta-Analysis of Randomized Controlled Trials,” *PLoS One* 9, no. 2 (2014), 1-7.

²⁸Jansen, Tromp, and Baltussen, “Prep: Why We Are Waiting,” e401

²⁹Race, “Reluctant Objects: Sexual Pleasure as a Problem for Hiv Biomedical Prevention,” 17.

then we are not having sex.” Regardless of protections against HIV, 002 explained that there are still other STIs that he wants to avoid. Even though he knows that STIs are a normal “every day thing,” they are stigmatized and thus to be avoided. Building on 002’s point, 004 said that “if someone tells me they aren’t going to have sex with me if we don’t use a condom, if they are pressuring me in that way then I’m going to say, ‘fuck you’ and ‘no.’” They continued to suggest that if someone says they are not going to have sex unless it is without a condom it simply does not seem “very consensual” to them, explaining that the PrEP user does not seem of good character. The above comments point to how PrEP disrupts the negotiations typical of asexual encounter. Though one can be pragmatic about these negotiations—a point made by non-user 003, the loss of control felt by the rest of the group of non-users underscore significant challenges to PrEP’s implementation. Though I never specified any details about this hypothetical PrEP user, simply the implication of not wearing a condom was enough to make 004 so uncomfortable as to begin constructing a sexual assault scenario. These divergences in acceptable sexuality point to emergent technological frames around condom and PrEP use.³⁰ Condoms have been a trusted form of safer sex since the discovery of HIV and have been argued to offer a “mode of ordinariness in a situation of unendurable and ongoing crisis.”³¹ That is to say, current safer sex practices allow those at risk to forget the impending threat of HIV. Unfortunately, this mode of thinking seems to contribute to a heightened sense of anxiety when condoms were not used.

Slipping-up: Sexuality and risk

For non-users PrEP was best suited as added protection should they ‘slip-up’ and not use a condom. For this group of non-users, PrEP was to be used within existing safer sex strategies, rather than as a replacement. While both users and non-users were optimistic about PrEP’s role in reducing risk in their sexual lives and stigma in the broader community, PrEP non-users continued to resist the use of PrEP for unprotected sex and attributed moral failings to PrEP users for

³⁰Wiebe E. Bijker, “How Is Technology Made?—That Is the Question!,” *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 34, no. 1 (2010): 69–70.

³¹Race, “Reluctant Objects: Sexual Pleasure as a Problem for Hiv Biomedical Prevention,” 21.

doing so. Users also discussed slipping-up but were far more upfront about their interest in using PrEP to engage in condomless sex and expressed how PrEP helped eliminate that anxiety.

Users Mark and Vince, for example, both expressed they were highly anxious with respect to condomless sex prior to starting PrEP. Vince explains that all sex made him uncomfortable, writing,

Even though I loved bareback sex and porn, I was terrified to do it and even resented people who engaged in the bareback lifestyle. I judged them for being irresponsible and spreading HIV, but I was also curious and envious. I only had bareback sex with long-term partners and I avoided anal sex altogether with most casual partners.

Now that he takes PrEP, Vince feels a “weight” taken off his shoulders. PrEP eliminated what was a great source of anxiety. Similarly, Mark writes that he had a change of heart and is “simply no longer afraid of barebacking.” In fact, all STIs appear to take on a different meaning. Mark explains how, “other STIs are curable or can be tolerated,” writing, “My partner also doesn’t really care any longer.” Indeed, PrEP users in this study expressed a great sense of relief after taking PrEP, while noting no notable increased risk taking. As Eric explained, PrEP helps balance risk and pleasure, likening the experience to walking the tightrope:

The acrobat isn’t supposed to fall when doing tricks in the air, but sometimes they do, and the net is there to make sure that in the off-chance this happens, they don’t fall to their death...

Users routinely expressed coming to terms with their inconsistent condom use and found PrEP to be a solution. Rather than actively search for access to excess, PrEP users used PrEP to mitigate their risk, should they eventually miscalculate whilst ‘doing a trick.’

Users often wrote that ‘slipping-up’ gave way to the realization that condomless sex was their preferred sex. Many noted that though engaging in condomless sex felt like a mistake, they did it far too often for it to be a mistake. When trying to reconcile their desire to be responsible with their interest in not using condoms, PrEP users often mentioned an “animal need” to explain their desire to go without condoms. How users expressed this desire speaks to how PrEP diverges

from condoms and thus creates new possibilities for how prophylaxis is engaged with in relationships. Eric is a regular condom user and has no intent to stop using them, however, he sees a place for condomless sex in his life. He described his experience of engaging in condomless sex as “uninhibited, naked and utterly logically pointless, at least for anything beyond pleasure and bonding.” He went on to say:

So how does a condom fit into such conduct? It doesn't. I think the best sex involves shedding these layers (latex or otherwise) of logic and responsibility and enjoying our full animal selves along with another person we desire or better yet even admire and care for.

Eric's narrative points to how PrEP enables fuller access to partner(s) in situations where closer emotional connection is desired but are not necessarily recognizably romantic.³² Condoms are responsible but illogical in that they do not meet the purpose of the interaction. He notes that for some sexual encounters, condoms are fine; but when he wants to enjoy the “full animal selves” of his partner, he cannot use a condom, as it defeats the purpose of the encounter.

These comments further clarify how PrEP challenges commonly held beliefs about HIV. HIV infection is commonly understood as occurring only once the virus “breaches our defenses.” Condoms contribute to this sense in that they create a barrier between you and your partner and thus requires one to perceive the body of one's partner as potentially harmful. Understanding intimate encounters as necessarily defensive, however, is problematic as it requires prioritizing HIV over any bonding enacted through sex. By interacting with HIV at the molecular level, however, PrEP engenders a different logic than condoms. PrEP allows one to conceive of the body as non-threatening and thus allows one to experience closeness not afforded by condoms. Thus, PrEP is not just a useful HIV-prevention method, it redefines how bodies are perceived to be contaminated. By removing the universality of the threat, PrEP-use appears to allow for safer demonstrations of intimacy.

³²Staci Newmahr, *Playing on the Edge: Sadoomasochism, Risk, and Intimacy*. (Bloomington, IN. : Indiana University Press. , 2011), 168-72.

Living in Error: Contamination, solidarity and optimism for PrEP

As I have noted above, the majority of resistance to PrEP stems from its capacity to allow the user unbridled access to sexual pleasure.³³ The narratives above, however point to a more nuanced interpretation of how PrEP should be used and speaks to the historical context in which HIV risk and ‘slipping-up’ is understood. As technological responses to HIV are developed, virus-related risk assessments shift as a result.³⁴ How HIV-risk is understood today has roots in the conflicting understandings of HIV-risk that emerged in the 1980s. In the early years of the outbreak, all gay men were expected to consider themselves at least potentially infected. The discovery of the virus and the development of the HIV-test further shifted this frame as HIV-risk was now relegated to *certain* gay men.³⁵ Meanwhile, debates about the veracity of the HIV-AIDS connection raged on until the mid-1990s.³⁶ Until then, AIDS was at least partially conceived as immune overload, a result of the lifestyles of HIV-endemic groups.³⁷ In the midst of this debate Canadian Blood services was formed, in large to protect the Canadian blood supply from HIV/AIDS.³⁸ Over time these policies come to reflect these streams of thought, culminating in the highly controversial universal ‘ban’ on donations from MSM.

Tuana writes that the flesh of our bodies and the “flesh” of the world is porous.³⁹ Inequalities materialize, both in performance and in the concrete composition of our bodies. In this sense, ‘slipping-up’ and

³³Belluz, “The Truvada Wars,” 348:g3811; Calabrese and Underhill, “How Stigma Surrounding the Use of Hiv Preexposure Prophylaxis Undermines Prevention and Pleasure: A Call to Destigmatize ‘Truvada Whores,’” 1960-2; Race, “Reluctant Objects: Sexual Pleasure as a Problem for Hiv Biomedical Prevention,” 12; Marsha Rosengarten and Mike Micheal, “Rethinking the Bioethical Enactment of Medically Drugged Bodies: Paradoxes of Using Anti-Hiv Drug Therapy as a Technology for Prevention,” *Science as Culture* 18, no. 2 (2009): 184-7.

³⁴Paul Flowers, “Gay Men and Hiv/Aids Risk Management,” *Health* 5, no. 1 (2001): 51.

³⁵Flowers, “Gay Men and Hiv/Aids Risk Management,” 56.

³⁶Steven Epstein, *Impure Science: Aids, Activism, and the Politics of Knowledge* (London: University of California Press, 1996), 143-78.

³⁷Epstein, *Impure Science: Aids, Activism, and the Politics of Knowledge*, 45-9.

³⁸Horace Krever, “Commission of Inquiry on the Blood System in Canada,” (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997), 1053.

³⁹Tuana, “Viscous Porosity: Witnessing Katrina,” 198-203.

PrEP's mixed reception is intertwined with the historical emergence of HIV as a disease of indulgence.⁴⁰ While both non-users and users identified themselves as high risk and ideal PrEP users, their definitions of 'high risk' appear to vary greatly. Despite identifying a number of sexual practices, with varying levels of associated risk, users and non-users alike framed their sexuality alone as an HIV-risk. For example, Vince explained that he:

had tried sex with girls with and without condoms, and preferred without condoms. The worry with them was pregnancy. But once I came out as gay, I only had sex with men, and HIV became the new worry.

Vince is not alone in expressing his sexuality as the main referent of his HIV-risk. Common to both users and non-users was the simultaneous transition from identifying as 'straight' and at risk for pregnancy to 'gay' and at risk for HIV. This theme indexes a sense that HIV risk is a problem associated more so with same-gender sexual practices than actual 'risky' behaviour. A conflation that was not lost on my participants who routinely discussed their HIV risk in the same breath as the act of 'coming-out.'

Thus, PrEP was understood as an intervention that disrupted not just HIV risk, but the bedrock upon which sexual orientation stood. In discussing his hopes with respect to PrEP, 003 expressed his excitement to give blood. Surprised, I delved into the issue for clarity. He explained:

I give blood. I don't give blood. I have blood tests very frequently, but I can't give blood because of my HIV risk. So, I guess in my life, I guess-- like my father, it was really hard coming out to him and I dealt with a lot of his ignorance about HIV for the first couple years and it was really hard for me to talk to him about my sexuality. Like, he grew up during the HIV/AIDS epidemic so he has a certain idea of the type of people that get AIDS (003).

His ideas about HIV, medical care, risk and his relationship with his father as a gay man are all wrapped up in his blood. For him, all these notions were related to PrEP. Though PrEP has been argued to

⁴⁰Paula A Treichler, "Aids, Homophobia and Biomedical Discourse: An Epidemic of Signification," *Cultural studies* 1, no. 3 (1987): 44-54.

untether queer men from their obligation to their community,⁴¹ for 003 PrEP represented inclusion in Canadian society more broadly. He gives blood frequently, for a number of other reasons, yet is unable to overcome a barrier that is his very blood and participate in what he understands as a social responsibility to donate blood.

These statements unwrapped a network of relationships between blood, toxicity and HIV-risk. What is particularly interesting, however, is that they transgressed personal, inter-group and national boundaries. Participants expressed a future where the boundaries of queer inclusion were not determined by HIV. Elaborating, 001 noted the role of blood in the recent massacre in Orlando:

After the whole [Pulse nightclub] shooting they were calling for blood donation from people in the Orlando area...Half of the people actually affected by the shooting could not give blood to, like, their loved ones and stuff— I don't know, it's cruel to be kept out of like helping other people especially other people who are being harmed for the same reason that we aren't allowed to help them.

Participants 003 and 001 illuminated how blood and the presumption of contamination enabled this social death in this instance, but also translated into loss of life in another. 001's comments complement 003's, which clarify the relationship between blood, HIV risk and the emancipatory potential of PrEP. Due to the presumption that queer blood is presumed to be contaminated, actual lives were lost. Responding to 001's point, 003 further expanded this point connecting medical care, tragedy, intimacy and PrEP through his discussion of barriers:

Say ten or twenty years ago, you entered a relationship with someone who was HIV-positive but you weren't able to be intimate with them for fear of contracting HIV... I just think that situations like that are unfair and seeing PrEP as a potential way to avoid situations like that... I'm fully supportive of it.

⁴¹Joshua Pocius, "Of Bodies, Borders, and Barebacking: The Geocorpographies of Hiv, " in *In security, Race, Biopower* ed. Holly Randell-Moon and Ryan Tippet (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016), 37-8.

In light of these comments concerning my participants' discussion of condoms, intimacy, blood and self-image, the decision to use PrEP is indeed more significant than simply unbridled access to pleasure. What is brought to light is how multifaceted PrEP's impact on how safer sex is understood. PrEP is fascinating in this regard because it conflicts, and indeed appears to, mutate conceptions of bodies, virus and sexuality that formed in the wake of the HIV epidemic. This offers an increased sense of security for users than when engaged with condoms alone; however, how PrEP is accessed is uneven and thus makes emergent two distinct social groups with irreconcilable perspectives on safer-sex.

Conclusions

This paper aims to underscore the importance of the material world in social and political theory. As I have outlined, the desire for PrEP and the result of its use seem to span far beyond the narrow confines of HIV prevention. Though PrEP is useful in the event one might 'slip-up,' how and why my participants imagined slipping-up, how condom use and the controversy around HIV may inform those notions and how PrEP might mitigate that risk points to far more pervasive problem in HIV prevention. Not only could PrEP interfere with condom use and the paradoxical risks that come with that newfound sense of immunity; PrEP appears to spread its tendrils far past personal risk into the national and international political domains of contemporary life for MSM. Overall, this discussion points to how something as innocuous as technological use is a political choice with political consequences. How PrEP is resisted and taken-up, reinterested and mutated by use is tied to a political future that extends beyond the narrow confines of epidemiology and HIV-prevention. This paper is therefore a call to continue looking to the "missing masses" of social and political life.⁴² The role of technology in social and political theory, at a time of increasingly polarized politics, can help us further understand how a person's lived experience, through the products they use and the way they interpret these technologies informs the dissolution of social solidarity without presuming one group is in error.

⁴²Bruno Latour, "Where Are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artefacts.," in *Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change*, ed. Weibe Bijker and John Law (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 227.

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