To Be Decided*

Journal of Interdisciplinary Theory

Volume 1 Issue 1

Riot

Journal of Interdisciplinary Theory

Cover art: 'Riot in the Gallery' Umberto Boccioni, 1909

Published by
Acadia University
15 University Avenue
Wolfville, NS
B4P 2R6

www.tbdjournal.com

Articles which appear in this journal have undergone double-blind peer-review and appear at the approval of the editors and their academic advisor. For inquiries about this issue or upcoming ones, please contact us at tbdgraduatejournal@gmail.com

To Be Decided*

Journal of Interdisciplinary Theory

Volume 1 Issue 1: Riot

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements

When we launched *To Be Decided** with 'Riot', we did not expect to capture its chaos in the process. The two of us could no more easily incite a riot in the streets than we could run a journal. Fortunately for the editors, we were not alone. We are greatly indebted to a number of dedicated, generous and supportive conspirators.

Before a riot spills onto the streets it builds up behind closed doors. As this is our inaugural issue, it rests on the framework that many others have erected. The faculty of Acadia's Social and Political Thought Program and its coordinator, Dr. Geoffrey Whitehall, made this issue possible through their unrelenting insistence on the project's value for students and the university. The foundation for *TBD** was also laid down by the SPT cohort's work in previous years. We are grateful for the Research and Graduate Award that has provided funding for a number of the students who have worked on the journal. We would also like to thank SSHRC for funding our first issue and Dr. David MacKinnon and Research and Graduate Studies at Acadia University for guiding us through the application process.

For this issue, our academic advisor, Dr. Geoffrey Whitehall, stoked the fires and broke through institutional barricades. Dr. Inna Viriasova was an inexhaustible resource in moments of doubt and confusion (the gripping conditions of riot itself). And, of course, we owe all of our contributors great thanks for sharing their work. Finally, while there are many individuals we should name, it is the mob of anonymous reviewers who have truly made this possible. Without their considered and expert feedback, there could be no journal. Though our struggles often feel anonymous, the review dialogue reminds us that community makes both academia and the university fulfilling. As Deleuze and Guattari write, "Since each of us was several, there was already quite a crowd."

Now, we invite you, reader, to rub shoulders with all of us.

Editors' Introduction

Perhaps the essential image of the modern riot is of violent conflict between the State and protestors. Police with shields, truncheons and teargas confront demonstrators, their barricades and banners. While this is one riot, the concept is much more.

Umberto Boccioni's 1909 painting 'Riot in the Gallery' (cover) captures this complexity. The colourful streets are flooded with a crowd in motion. Are they fighting? Dancing? Protesting? There is no way to know for sure. We often wonder the same during a riot: what are we doing here? Sometimes the answer is lost in the confusion. What are the rhythms that govern and create this space? Is the riot a celebration? A destruction? Perhaps, like Boccioni's painting implies, it is both. Though colours may clash, bodies may collide and glass might shatter, the riot is not just divisive. The riot is collective. It is a coming together.

For its inaugural issue, *To Be Decided** wanted to explode 'Riot'. Like a fragmentary grenade's tortoise-shell casing, the many facets of 'Riot' hint at the trajectories it contains. And like the grenade, 'Riot' has claimed many casualties

George Mantzios' article 'With…or Without Time: Discerning the Unforeseeable in the Work of Fanon' engages the indeterminacy riot belies. Reading *Black Skin, White Masks* Mantzios argues that time is constuitive in fixing bodies and experience in the social. Those who are out-of-sync with or syncopate these rhythms resist this stratification. Mantzios argues that both the alienated subject and Fanon's text demonstrate this uncertainty.

'The Adamic Signifier of (Neo)liberal Consciousness' by Adam Foster makes a comparative analysis of Stafford Beer and Steven Shaviro to question the future horizon of capitalism. Capitalism's totalizing tendencies seem to demand the rupture of riot; yet, they also suppress. We are left to wonder whether such a possibility remains available.

But this bleak perspective is not shared by all. Myriam Tardif takes us into those who continue to resist in her article 'Riots in the 2012 Student Strike: Reclaiming Politics through Bodies'. She peels back the masks of the rioter. The faces she reveals are not those of the disaffected, violent or uncoordinated. Tardif maps the birth of the radical political subject from the apparently 'ordinary' citizen.

Katie MacLeod's article 'United Against Fracking: Opposition to Shale Gas Exploration in Elispogtog, New Brunswick' explores another moment of resistance. She applies frames to understand the common protests of Mi'kmaq, Acadians and environmentalists. Her work points to the importance of apparently disparate groups collectively employing shared resources, histories and knowledges to accomplish their goals.

But protest is nothing new; and the riot is not always perpetuated by those on the picket-lines. In 'The Power of Silence: Shifting Perceptions of the Silent Sentinels in 1917', Chelsea Barranger explores violence *against* suffragists in America. To explain this reversal, she analyzes the role of gender in determining the form of protest, the public's perception and permitting the Wilson administration's response.

Riot is not just protest. The French root of riot is '*riote*': to debate and quarrel. Hanna Jones-Erickson's articles unites these analyses by asking what is 'The Epistemic and Moral Value of Disagreement'? Though we might be inclined to acquiesce to those who smarter or more experienced, it may not always be rational to do so. Her work shows that both the individual and their community may benefit from holding their line.

This issue concludes with two book reviews that deal with riots happening elsewhere. Hope Campbell reviews The Invisible Committee's exploration of the uprisings of the early 2010s: *To Our Friends.* Cameron Brown reviews Costas Douzinas' work *Philosophy and Resistance in the Crisis* which uses radical political theory to understand resistance to austerity in Greece.

It may seem that the shrapnel of 'Riot' is flying in all directions, but it came from one grenade: theory. *TBD** is an interdisciplinary journal that focuses on the shared use of theory in different fields. Each of these papers uses and contributes to this body. But enough talking; the pin has been pulled and at the turn of this page the grenade will go off.

*To Be Decided** Journal
Managing Editors
Lauren Hooper and Robert Pantalone

With…or Without Time: Discerning the Unforeseeable in the Work of Fanon

George Mantzios
Ph.D. Student in Social-Cultural Anthropology at the University of Toronto

"Don't expect to see any explosion today. It's too early… or too late."–Frantz Fanon[1] (1952: xi)

"We are always-already subjects."–Louis Althusser[2]

The 'always-already' and the 'too early… or too late'—two distinct temporalities of the sensible, two distinct tenses of the (im-)possible. The always-already, as both the grammar of interpellation and the force of social determination, affords no vacancy, no 'before', for a pre-social ontology of the subject. Alternatively, with the 'too early…or too late' a more uncertain temporal rhythm, the '…or', syncopates any seeming foreclosure of the future-present as a space of the otherwise. Fanon's lament that in intellectualizing black existence by insisting on the revolutionary role of black poetry in *Black Orpheus*, Sartre consigned black consciousness to a pre-existent meaning is instructive. Rather than introducing necessity as a support for the black man's freedom, Fanon insists that Sartre should have "opposed the unforeseeable to historical destiny".[3] What deserves elaboration is precisely this relationship between the *tense* of the 'too early…or too late' and the *sense* of the opposition between the unforeseeable and historical destiny in Fanon's work. Towards these ends, this paper asks: to what extent is the indeterminacy implied in the '…or' evocative of the unforeseeable as a condition of possibility for Fanon's reading of disalienation?

---

[1] Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Richard Philcox. (1952; New York: Press Grove, 2008), xi.
[2] Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)", in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, trans. Ben Brewster. (1971; New York, Monthly Review Press, 2001), 27.
[3] Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 113.

In his introduction to *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952), Fanon writes, "The structure of the present work is grounded in temporality".[4] The present analysis will attempt to trace out this temporality, albeit circuitously, by first engaging in a larger consideration of the forms of power that articulate time to the body, both the body of the normative subject in the work of Bourdieu and ultimately to the body of Fanon's text itself. The overarching objective is to outline how power works with time to produce and mediate the relationship between dominant structures of subject-formation and what Raymond Williams (1977) describes as pre-emergent/emergent forms, 'structures of feeling'. Key here is Williams' insistence on the role of the aesthetic as a mode of practical consciousness sensitive to and even constitutive of the pre-emergent, the unforeseeable. By drawing attention to the stylistics of Fanon's text—e.g., to the rhythm of its impulsive oscillations between hope and despair—the revolutionary spirit of the text will be identified with the unforeseeable as the specific tense and sense of disalienation.

First, by way of contrast, consider how for Althusser the determining force of ideological interpellation is conditioned by the totalitarian tense of the future-anterior-present, the always-already.[5] Consequently, the always-already has the effect of delimiting any consideration of culture or society to what Raymond Williams calls the 'habitual past tense', to fixed forms of institutions, relationships, and experiences.[6] What these analyses miss is: 1) an account of the constitutive (vs. determining) forms of power that work with time on the body in the production and distribution of the sensible; and 2) an account of the conditions of possibility for a practical consciousness of as-of-yet undetermined and emergent alternatives to fixed dominant forms of sociality. To reiterate Williams' crucial point, the discernment of such alternatives defies the dichotomization of thought and feeling precisely because such alternatives, in their pre-emergent and emergent forms, are irreducible to the 'saturating silences' of the hegemonic or to the 'otherness' of an unconscious.[7]

---

[4] Ibid., xvi.

[5] Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)", 2001 [1971].

[6] Raymond Williams, *Marxism and Literature.* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 128.

[7] Ibid., 128-130.

The Secret Heart of the Clock: Social time and the body

The relationship between power, time, and the body plays a decidedly formative role in Bourdieu's theorization of doxa and the seamless reproduction of hierarchical social divisions it conditions.[8] Bourdieu's work demonstrates how such hierarchical divisions are based on the unsuspecting conformism of group members to collective rhythms that articulate structures of belief to flows of (gendered and classed) practice. As he insists in *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (1977: 162), social time as form, "in the musical sense", innervates and orchestrates practice at all levels of society, structuring not only the group's representation of the world but the group itself, in the process delimiting the very boundaries of the sensible and thinkable.[9] What is key here is that such synchronizations of social space and time naturalize the individual's place in society at the micro-level of bodily practice. That is, each bodily practice has its own marked moment, tempo, and duration, a temporal signature that is indicative of a social class position. After all, practice is never neutral in Bourdieu's framework. The temporal signature of any practice is intimately linked to the way time works on and through the body in the production of taste and judgment, modalities that striate social space into class positions.

Social time thus conceived positions individuals in social space by demarcating the normative divisions of that space in terms of bodily practice. The implication here is that social time is a measure of the threshold between conformity and transgression *at the level of practice*. That is, someone who betrays the assigned rhythms of a practice by performing it too fast or slow (or not at all, like Bartleby)[10] is perceived

[8] Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice. (London; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

[9] Ibid., 163.

[10] Bartleby is the name of the protagonist of Herman Melville's short story 'Bartleby the Scrivener: A Story of Wall Street' (1853). The story relates the unfortunate fate of a Manhattan lawyer, the story's narrator, who hires a forlorn-looking man, Bartleby, as a scrivener at his law firm. Before too long Bartleby begins shirking his work, eventually responding to every request and proposition posed to him with an obstinate, 'I would prefer not to'. A tradition of Marxist criticism has interpreted Bartleby as a literary figuration of the alienation of the worker within capitalist modernity. Along these lines Bartleby's refusal has become emblematic of a form of resistance to these conditions of alienation through the interruption of the tempo of production, circulation, and exchange

as matter out of place, as disruptive to the established social order. Thus social time structures the correspondence between subjective aspirations and objective chances in ways that *tend toward* doxa, a condition where this correspondence is 'quasi-perfect' and existing social relations and hierarchical divisions appear as self-evident, as natural.[11]

But what happens when these rhythms are significantly disrupted? How does Bourdieu account for the struggles that disarticulate the body from social time in the movement from doxa to orthodoxy and heterodoxy? After all, Bourdieu insists that dominated classes always have an interest in pushing back the limits of doxa and "exposing the arbitrariness of the taken for granted".[12] It is at this point in his argument that Bourdieu advances a theory of crisis that serves as a principle of change in his model. He tells us that objective crisis breaks the immediate correspondence between subjective aspirations and objective chances and destroys the self-evidence of the doxic mode 'practically'.[13] Correspondingly, in elaborating the conditions of possibility that render a structure of feeling sensible, Raymond Williams describes a tension between 'official consciousness' (the common sense that structures normative understandings of what is/is not possible) and 'practical consciousness' (the immanent lived sense of pre-/emergent possibilities relating to how things are). This tension often produces an unease, a latency that marks the site of the unforeseeable.[14]

The correspondence between this tension and Bourdieu's notion of crisis is corroborated by the importance both authors attribute to the concept of practicality, which in both accounts characterizes the sort of consciousness that prevails in moments of breakdown. As Williams insists, practical consciousness is "what is actually being lived, and not only what it is thought is being lived".[15] Interesting in this regard is the fact that Williams' account of practical consciousness is derived largely from a reading of an excerpt from Marx's first thesis on Feuerbach. It is precisely *the same* excerpt that opens *Bourdieu's Outline of a Theory of Practice.* In it Marx argues for a theory of materiality that is not opposed

upon which such conditions depend. Bartleby interrupts this tempo by quite literally personifying matter out of place.

[11] Ibid., 164.

[12] Ibid., 169.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid., 130.

[15] Ibid., 131.

to consciousness and sensuous activity (what he calls 'practice'); Marx critiques the tendency in materialist philosophies to treat the object of the senses as an abstracted object of contemplation as distinct from the inherently social and material *activity* of the senses on that object. A key implication that both Williams and Bourdieu draw from Marx is that language is a form of practical consciousness insofar as it is a *constitutive* material social activity. Seen from this point of view, practical consciousness affords a dynamic understanding of society and culture as open-ended processes rather than determined forms fixed in the habitual past tense, abstracted from an economic base.

The same attentiveness to the open-endedness of practical consciousness is only dimly evident in Bourdieu's theory of crisis when he insists that objective crisis is never sufficient in itself for the production of critical discourse.[16] In effect, this qualification briefly opens for consideration a pre-discursive space of as-of-yet undetermined, ambiguous yet undeniable and insistent social experiences of the lived present. However such experiences, even if theoretically tenable in Bourdieu's model, are severely underdeveloped as productive sites of cultural analysis. In fact, Bourdieu is insistent on characterizing crisis as a 'dividing-line' between doxa and discourse, between "the most radical form of misrecognition and the awakening of political consciousness".[17] This dividing-line risks consigning doxa and discourse to the habitual past tense as distinct fixed forms. Occluded from view are the emergent forms of heretical and orthodox discourse which may not even coincide with the event of crisis but precede it and impinge upon it in an imminent form.

This last point is borne out in the Comaroffs' reading of hegemony as an inherently unstable and continuous process such that it "never succeeds in supplanting prior forms, what came before… It is always threatened by the vitality that remains in the forms of life it thwarts".[18] Implicit in this reading of hegemony is a critique of the historicist assumptions that construe conceptions of historical change as epochal. What we are confronted with is an account of change based on an incessant imbrication of social forms that cannot be definitively cordoned

[16] Ibid., 169.

[17] Ibid., 170.

[18] Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution, Vol. I: Christianity, Colonialism, & Consciousness in South Africa* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 23.

off into a past and present precisely because of the contingent relevance such forms hold out for the unfolding character of events. Thus latency, which as we have seen figures so centrally in Williams' account of the tension between official and practical consciousness, is in the Comaroffs' reading of hegemony a constitutive principle of historical experience. Note also how closely the Comaroffs' reading of hegemony comes to Marx's conception of (bourgeois) history in the *Grundrisse* in precisely this respect:

> The categories which express its relations, the comprehension of its structure, also allows insights into the structure and the relations out of whose ruins and elements it built itself up, *partly still unconquered remnants are carried along with it, whose mere nuances have developed explicit significance within it*, etc. [emphasis mine][19]

Along these lines, and building on Bourdieu and Williams, the Comaroffs reconfigure the relationship between doxa and discourse as a *continuum* between hegemony and ideology, which are two ways that power is entailed in a cultural field. According to the Comaroffs, the non-agentive power of hegemony exists in what it silences, i.e., what it positions beyond the limits of the sayable and thinkable. However, in itself, hegemony eludes the analytics of practice—it is only ascertainable in its relationship of 'reciprocal interdependence' with ideology, that modality of culture that just won't shut-up, proliferating regimes of signification and articulating *agents* of power in a cultural field.[20]

The Seen, the Unseen, & the Unforeseeable

Ideology can make seen aspects of the cultural field that hegemony renders invisible. For instance, ideologies of subordinate groups may give expression to discordant and voiceless experiences of contradictions that a prevailing hegemony can no longer conceal. Crucially, what qualifies this reciprocal interdependence between hegemony and ideology as a continuum rather than merely a dialectical relationship is the Comaroffs' vital insight that, "even when there is no opposing ideology, no clearly articulated collective consciousness among subordinate populations, such

[19] Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, trans. Martin Nicolaus. (1939-41, Penguin Press, 1973), 241.
[20] Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution, Vol. I: Christianity, Colonialism, & Consciousness in South Africa*, 17.

struggles may still occur."[21] What this formulation implies is that there is in fact another active dimension that intercedes between hegemony and ideology: the dimension of 'partial recognition'. The Comaroffs describe partial recognition as a realm of poetic imagination and experimentations in expressive techniques of 'conjuring with ambiguity'; it is a space of "inchoate awareness, ambiguous perception, and creative tensions."[22] In a significant way the realm of partial recognition corresponds to Graeber's reading of imaginative counter-power: it signals a 'spectral zone' where the creation of new social forms, as well as the revalorization and transformation of existing ones, can be fashioned into an ethics of revolutionary action.[23] Faithful to the concept of history outlined above, Graeber's conception of revolutionary action connotes the active cultivation of a practical consciousness of the structures of feeling that express changes of presence: alternative social and material modes of being-in-the-world that transgress the 'dividing-lines' of hegemony and ideology.

Important to keep in mind here is Raymond Williams' insistence that in speaking about 'structures of feeling' we are speaking about impulse, restraint, and tone. These are the affective elements of consciousness and relationships that designate the 'generative immediacy' of emergent forms of lived social experiences. But being at "the very edge of semantic availability"[24], structures of feeling are accessible through art and literature, whose conventions and rhetorical figures are expressive of living social processes. Moreover, insofar as such literary forms are elements of a social material process (i.e. manifestations of a practical consciousness), they are also *constitutive* of structures of feeling.[25] As such structures of feeling provide a corrective to synchronic analyses that consign culture to the 'habitual past tense'. Structures of feeling allow us to orient our analyses to the open-endedness of the unforeseeable, the (pre-)emergent, as a constitutive dimension of sociality.

---

[21] Ibid., 28.
[22] Ibid., 29-30.
[23] David Graeber, *Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology* (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2004), 36.
[24] Williams, *Marxism and Literature*, 131.
[25] Ibid., 131-2.

The Soul of the Work, (…or) Heterotopia

Perhaps no one apprehends the dangers of the habitual past tense more clearly than Fanon. His work forfeits the past to insist that the future is, "linked to the present insofar as I consider the present something to be overtaken".[26] And yet it would be impetuous to read past the deep ambiguities and ambivalences that colour his text in order to identify a decisive program of disalienation in this moment of conscious reflection. The temporal signature—the structure of feeling—of the work must be deciphered from the very rhythm of these oscillating ambivalences and ambiguities. The soul of the work can only be discerned in the physiognomy of the text.

Black Skin, White Masks is fraught with violent oscillations between hope and despair, roving machinations between the unforeseeable, the impulsive, and the density of historical necessity. What we are confronted with is the objectification and fragmentation of the black subject in relation to a scrutinizing White gaze. This insidious gaze achieves categorical signification as the unconscious Other in the black psyche; an internalized Other that alienates the black subject from himself. And yet, as Fanon insists, "since the racial drama is played out in the open, the black man has no time to 'unconsciousnessize' it."[27] Thus the black subject collapses into the facticity of his flesh, flanked from the inside by that which aggresses upon him from the outside. Consigned to the universal dead-ends of his epidermis and the collective unconscious, that historical cultural-racial *imposition*, the black man seems trapped in the brute stalemate of the always-already: waiting there for the White gaze, waiting there "not yet white and no longer black."[28]

And yet it is precisely in the unforeseeable space between the 'not yet' and the 'no longer' that a contrapuntal sentiment of defiance syncopates all the theoretical determinations in the text that consign the (black) subject—in the name of a reclaimed authenticity or an unconscious subjection—to the 'habitual past tense' of what s/he always-already is: a black (subject). These sentiments of defiance find their most brazen expression in Fanon's use of the poems of Aimé Césaire, Jacques Roumain, and David Diop, which he juxtaposes in order to 'conjure with

[26] Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, xvii.
[27] Ibid., 129.
[28] Ibid., 116.

ambiguity"[29] the impulsive position that opposes the unforeseeable to historical destiny. Thus in defense of his affirmation of the self-sufficiency of black consciousness *in spite* of its historical determination, Fanon juxtaposes Roumain's verse, "Workers peasants of every land…/We proclaim the unity of suffering/And revolt,"[30] with Diop's, "But when gorged with empty, lofty words/You step again on the bitter red earth of Africa/These words of anguish will beat rhythm to your uneasy walk."[31] The result: a creative tension that leads Fanon to reply that, "the black experience is ambiguous, for there is not *one* Negro—there are many black men."[32]

This is a crucial point that speaks as much to Fanon's place in the text as it does of the text's relationship to time. What is discernible in the ambiguities and ambivalences that structure the text is an attempt to *render the 'Black Subject' unforeseeable*, anomalous, so that the singularity of (black) subjects can be apprehended as the real stakes of their respective disalienation. Thus, when Fanon insists, "many Blacks will not recognize themselves in the following pages…Likewise many whites" (xvi), he is not merely negatively outlining the starting point of his analysis of (self-)alienation; he is positively gesturing towards its unforeseeable end-point where "the black man is not. [N]o more than the white man".[33]

Fanon opens the final chapter with a telling excerpt from Marx's, *The Eighteenth Brumaire*: "[T]he social revolution cannot draw its poetry from the past, but only from the future."[34] In this open-ended final chapter we witness a sudden change in writing style. Short emphatic sentences claim their own paragraphs, assembling into quasi-stanzas. The tempo of the writing is swift and incisive. Hope and despair reconcile in incantations ("[O] my body, always make me a man who questions"[35]). A first-person pronoun asserts itself again and again in defiant affirmations, but we can't be sure that it is Fanon speaking here. In comparison to earlier chapters, it feels as if the text has begun to speak for itself—"was my freedom not given me to build the world of *you*, man?" Contrast this to Fanon's

[29] Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution, Vol. I: Christianity, Colonialism, & Consciousness in South Africa*, 30.
[30] Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 115.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid., 116.
[33] Ibid., 206.
[34] Ibid., 198.
[35] Ibid., 206.

insistence at the outset of his analysis: "[I]n no way is it up to me to prepare for the world coming after me."[36] Fanon is as much a product of his text as his text is a product of him.

Recall here Williams' insistence that "literary writing is always in some sense self-composition and social composition, but it cannot always be reduced to its precipitate in a personality or ideology".[37] The text—black ink, white page—exceeds itself; its style is irreducible to an identity. In the final analysis, what informs the literary force of the text, its poetics, is a practical consciousness of unease, tension and latency that implores the reader to remain open to the unforeseeable, and to the touch of the deracinated other, to the pre-emergent world of *youness*.[38] The text stages this unforeseeable encounter in a realm of partial recognition between the 'no longer' and the 'not yet', according to the contrapuntal rhythm, '…or'. It is precisely this rhythmic force that constitutes the *soul* of Fanon's text. It is that frenetic force which swells beyond the time and place of the text to take hold of the bodies that mark the imminence of its most radical address. Thus, following 'Bifo' Berardi's provocative reading of Lucretius into an account of the sort of soul at stake in contemporary forms of alienation and autonomy, it is here being argued that the soul of Fanon's work is the *clinamen*—the *swerve*— of the textual body, the rhythmic force that takes hold of bodies and makes them resonate together unpredictably, out-of-sync with dominant socio-historical time.[39]

---

[36] Ibid., xvii.

[37] Ibid., 211.

[38] See Fanon, 207.

[39] Franco 'Bifo' Berardi, *The Soul at Work: From Alienation to Autonomy*, trans. Francesca Cadel and Giuseppina Mecchia. (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2008). Berardi demonstrates how it is no longer only the body but also the soul—conceived through the idioms of language, creativity, affect—that has become a primary site of capital valuation, exploitation, and mass psychopathology in an age of digital mediation. By situating a discussion of the Epicurean soul within contemporary debates about cognitive capitalism, Berardi builds on Marxist notions of the social brain and general intellect to delineate the precarious temporality specific to contemporary forms of alienation. Specifically, this temporality connotes the destabilizing experiences of sudden changes in rhythms that characterize contemporary work cycles primed to just-in-time production and permanently on-call comportments of work readiness. Underlying the elucidation of this temporality is a demonstration of how cognitive capitalism reproduces itself through the accumulation of speed, and how this in turn depends on the mobilization and coordination of desiring subjects that embody these speeds. It is according to this temporality, conditioned on an Epicurean reading of the soul that Berardi gestures towards the conditions of possibility for both alienation and autonomy. It is along these

As we have seen, this *clinamen*, this contrapuntal force, is manifested in the literarity that sequences and juxtaposes the poetic locutions of the text, rallying ambivalences and ambiguities that interject lines of disincorporation—the '…or'—into imaginary collective bodies (i.e. the Black Subject, White Subject). As Fanon himself asserts: "literature increasingly involves itself in its only real task, which is to get society to reflect and mediate…My book is, I hope, a mirror with a progressive infrastructure where the black man can find the path to his disalienation."[40] The book as mirror must not merely reflect and mediate, but also stage a reflection on its mediation. We are reminded here of the mirror Foucault evokes in order to stage a reflection on heterotopic spaces.[41] On the one hand, a mirror is a metaphor for utopia in the sense that the image that you see in it does not exist, but it is also a heterotopia since the mirror is an actual object that informs the way you relate to your image.

This Foucauldian mirror affords us a glimpse—at once a reflection and a mediation—of the 'progressive infrastructure' of the Fanonian mirror, a glimpse that reflects the ethical stakes of seeing and being seen in *Black Skin, White Masks*. As we have seen, Fanon's text identifies the non-place/(im)possibility of disalienation as the unforeseeable '…or' of the 'too early…or too late' of psycho-historical determination. *At the same time*, as heterotopia, the book, *Black Skin, White Masks*, continues to proliferate, circulating beyond the formal and informal reading publics it has made possible, provoking bodies to step through their reflection in practical consciousness, onto the streets—themselves a kind of mirror—if need be. Such is the progressive infrastructure of the Fanonian mirror, one which occupies this space, the '…or', as a real p(l)ace of revolutionary action.

---

lines that I take my cue in recruiting a reading of the *clinamen* in gesturing to the principles of alienation and autonomy at work in Fanon's text.

[40] Fanon, 161.

[41] Michel Foucault, "Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias", in *Architecture/Mouvement/Continuité*, trans. Jay Miskowiec, 1984 [1967]. http://web.mit.edu/allanmc/www/foucault1.pdf

Works Cited

Althusser, Louis. "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)." In *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, 85-126. Translated by Ben Brewster. New York: Monthly Review Press, [1971]2008.

Berardi, Franco 'Bifo'. *The Soul at Work: From Alienation to Autonomy*. Translated by Francesca Cadel and Giuseppina Mecchia. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2008.

Bourdieu, Pierre. *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Translated by Richard Nice. London; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Comaroff, Jean, and John L. Comaroff. *Of Revelation and Revolution, Vol. I: Christianity, Colonialism, & Consciousness in South Africa*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.

Fanon, Frantz. *Black Skin, White Masks*. Translated by Richard Philcox. New York: Press Grove, 2008 [1952].

Foucault, Michel. "Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias." *Architecture/Mouvement/Continuité*. Translated by Jay Miskowiec. (1984 [1967]) http://web.mit.edu/allanmc/www/foucault1.pdf, accessed December 13, 2014.

Graeber, David. *Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology*. Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2004.

Marx, Karl. *Grundrisse*. Translated by Martin Nicolaus. Penguin Press, 1973[1939-41].

Williams, Raymond. *Marxism and Literature*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1977.

The Adamic Signifier of (Neo)liberal Capitalism: Comparing Steven Shaviro and Stafford Beer

Adam Foster
Ph.D. Student in Political Science at the University of Hawai'i at Manoa

James Berger begins his analysis of Oliver Sacks and Don DeLillo[1] with the biblical parable of the Tower of Babel. This is a familiar story. In the book of Genesis, the descendants of Noah strove to build a tower so tall that it would reach the heavens. God rebuked them, striking down the tower and punishing them by separating the tribes into different languages. As Berger notes, the Zohar states that during the time of Babel, "the whole earth was of one language … [it] was still a unity with one single faith in the Holy One."[2] Drawing on Walter Benjamin, Berger argues that prior to the fall, "all Adam's undivided significations must, of necessity, have piled together into a single huge signifier whose single aspiration and referent could only be God."[3] With the fall of Babel, God "smashed this natural signifier, this excrescence of Adamic meaning, and henceforth authorized only multiple and divided significations. The broken tower was a sign of liberation."[4] When one considers the fabric of contemporary life, the parable of Babel begins to reemerge.

Many Marxist scholars would argue society is faced with its own Adamic signifier: that of capitalism. They argue that every fabric of our life and labor has fallen into the realm of neoliberal ideology. Following this, a common feature of Marxist scholarship is the notion that this way of structuring society is not tenable. Such scholarship looks critically at poverty and income inequality across the world, and the failure of capitalism that may have occurred in the 2008 global recession. It follows for some that capitalism ought to be or *will* be replaced, as the capitalist

[1]James Berger, "Falling Towers and Postmodern Wild Children: Oliver Sacks, Don DeLillo, and Turns against Language," *PMLA* 120, no. 2 (March 1, 2005): 341–61.
[2]Ibid., 341.
[3]James Berger, "Falling Towers and Postmodern Wild Children: Oliver Sacks, Don DeLillo, and Turns against Language," *PMLA* 120, no. 2 (2005): 342.
[4]Ibid., 342.

ontology has begun to crumble. Could the future invite the fall of our own capitalist tower of Babel? The usual retort to this claim by free-market advocates and defenders is that capitalism is "too big to fail." However, it is not a question of "when" capitalism will be replaced, but "can" it be replaced? And if so, "how" can it be replaced?

In *Designing Freedom,*[5] a series of lectures delivered for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's annual Massey Lectures, Stafford Beer articulates a model for thinking about the relationship between societies and individuals that would allow for societies to alter the structure of the world through human endeavors. Such a model, when applied to capitalism, argues that capitalism *can* be replaced, and allows for a conversation on how individuals could begin to do so through altering their societal environments. On the other hand, in *No Speed Limit: Three Essays on Accelerationism*[6] Steven Shaviro views capitalism and its subsuming properties as resilient, boasting their own autonomy that exceeds the limits of what humanity can successfully alter. Both texts offer insight into the systematic nature of political structures. Following this, politics of optimism and pessimism towards a speculative non-capitalist future can be articulated using these two works.

The paper will address the pessimistic perspective Shaviro presents regarding acceleration in the neoliberal world order while simultaneously articulating what an optimistic and pragmatic approach that begins a consideration of how the gloom of an undesirable capitalist future can be avoided. Beginning with a discussion on the relationship between acceleration and the future in the capitalist world order, followed by a consideration of what pessimistic and optimistic approaches to this problem entail. In doing so, Beer and Shaviro's theories of systems will be contrasted according to their respective theories of political agency, ontology of the system, and the finitude (or lack thereof) of the system that is present at large in the world. The goal is to articulate both an optimist-pragmatic approach and a pessimist-indifferent approach to the possibility of a non-capitalist future.

Beer and Shaviro's work can be situated in a long and substantial tradition within Western social sciences. Predicting the future is not relegated simply to the realm of fantasy and classical literature with

[5]Stafford Beer, "Designing Freedom," *SCiO Building Viable Organisations*, 1973, http://www.scio.org.uk/sites/default/files/designing_freedom.pdf.

[6]Steven Shaviro, *No Speed Limit: Three Essays on Accelerationism* (University Of Minnesota Press, 2015).

characters of the oracle or fortune teller who are able to see into the future. Social scientists attempt to "predict" the future through statistically extending historical trends into the future, or attempting to find patterns using Kondratiev waves.[7] However, the potential to accurately predict the future is questionable at best. Even with the most rigorous tools used to attempt this very deed, the future remains ontologically elusive.[8] The validity and efficacy of these methods is contingent on current conditions remaining the same, and it is not certain that they will. These tools do not take the possibility of drastic change into consideration. The future is, for all intensive purposes, unknown. It is a temporal space that lies outside of the possibility of total human comprehension and understanding. How, then, ought one think of the future?

Instead of considering these predictive approaches to the future, Shaviro turns to science fiction to explain accelerationism, a philosophy that understands capitalism as finite. For accelerationists, by pushing capitalism to its limit, society can move *beyond* capitalism.[9] It is not a matter of *replacing* capitalism, but more akin to capitalism living out its life and dying: living fast and dying young. Science fiction helps Shaviro articulate futures that can emerge from an accelerationist lens. For him, science fiction "works to *extrapolate* elements of the present, to consider what these elements might lead to if allowed to reach their full potential."[10] This is more of a forecast (a projection of a possible future) as it is centered on a "what if" than it is a prediction. With this in mind, Shaviro defines accelerationism as a "speculative movement that seeks to extrapolate the entire globalized neoliberal capitalist order."[11] The "what if" that accelerationism is predicated on is: what if capitalism is pushed to its absolute limit? Accelerationism is thus assumes the "hope … that, in fully expressing the potentialities of capitalism, we will be able to exhaust it and thereby open up access to something beyond it."[12] In other

[7]A Kondratiev wave is a graph that visually appears as peaks and valleys. A popular tool in traditional futures forecasting, Kondratiev waves are used to chart and predict the reoccurance of trends over time.

[8]For Shaviro, the future may not be so elusive. Shaviro's opinions on an immanent future will be discussed at a later point in this paper.

[9]Shaviro, *No Speed Limit*, 3.

[10]Ibid., 2.

[11]Ibid., 3.

[12]Ibid.

words "to overcome globalized neoliberal capitalism, we need to drain it to the dregs, push it to its most extreme point, follow it into its furthest and strangest consequences…the only way out is the way through."[13] Capitalism cannot be replaced. For it to be replaced, something has to come *after* capitalism; it would require a *future of capitalism*. However, Shaviro argues that "neoliberal capitalism has…robbed us of our future" by turning "everything in to an eternal present."[14] Capitalism does this by enveloping change. Shaviro quotes Ernst Bloch's statement that contemporary society can be characterized by "sheer aimless infinity and incessant changeability; where everything ought to be constantly new, everything remains just as it was."[15] This is most evident in the notion of a minor software update that allegedly "changes everything."[16] A technological revolution has not truly changed the system, and so to for a social revolution. It follows then that because of the choke-hold capitalism has on progress and change the very idea of changing the capitalist social structure *is* a capitalist action in itself. Therefore, capitalism can't be replaced. It must be broken, just as the only means of doing away with the tower of Babel was its ultimate destruction. The possibility of capitalism ending becomes a possible future. While capitalism has just as many defenders as it does opponents, the question arises as to whether those who are against capitalism ought to be optimistic about such a future emerging.

While for Beer the answer to this question is yes (as will be seen later in this paper), for Shaviro it is a resounding no. He has good reason for holding such views. It must be noted that accelerationism is not a belief or an ideology; acceleration is an action that its proponents argue must be undertaken. For Shaviro, this is not so. Accelerationism is not something that *should* happen—a potential activity that ought to be undertaken and advocated for—but is something that *is happening* as a side-effect of neoliberal tendencies. For Shaviro, science fiction "picks out 'futuristic' trends that are already embedded within our actual social and technological situation" and "are not literal matters of fact, but they really exist *as* tendencies or potentialities."[17] With this in mind, Shaviro

[13]Ibid., 2.
[14]Ibid., 10.
[15]Quoted in ibid.
[16]Shaviro, *No Speed Limit*.
[17]Ibid., 3.

argues that "we are all accelerationists now."[18] Shaviro grounds this claim in the current neoliberal ontology. Shaviro quotes Robin James in saying that "for the neoliberal subject, the point of life is to 'push it to the limit'…[it] has an insatiable appetite for more and more novel difference."[19] We are all accelerationists because, in neoliberal society, to be a subject is to be individuated as a consumer and we have been driven to accelerationism by our capitalist-influenced desires. Furthermore, this consumer ontology leads to a fetishization of the "new," where one is always craving and pushing for the latest innovations and products.

At first, it may appear as if Shaviro's account of accelerationism is vulnerable to the same problem of contingency levied against traditional modes of prediction. Is accelerationism not contingent on things remaining the same? It is, but it is contingent on capitalism persevering in a way that is different than simply projecting current conditions into the future. The difference lies in how Shaviro sees this persisting condition taking shape in the future. Threats, challenges, and even *deaths* of capitalism only engender "dramas of 'creative destruction" by means of which phoenix-like capitalism repeatedly renews itself,"[20] reinventing itself and emerging in a new form. Shaviro argues that "neoliberalism is not just the ideology or belief system of this form of capitalism" in which everything is 'subsumed' under capitalism,[21] but is also "the concrete way in which the system works."[22] The idea that capitalism is a "system" is the locus where one may begin to question Shaviro. It is from this point that the relationship between Shaviro's text and Beer's becomes apparent. For Stafford Beer, a system is an entity that "consist of related parts, and the relations—the [connections]—between those parts."[23] Instead of an economic system, Beer cites "the homes, the offices, the schools, the cities, the firms, the states, the countries" as examples of systems that are "dynamic and surviving" and are not "just sitting there brooding: they are

[18]Ibid., 34.
[19]Ibid., 32
[20]Ibid.
[21]By 'subsumed,' Shaviro is referring to the transition between "formal subsumption" to "real subsumption" as elaborated by Italian Autonomist thinkers, most notably Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. For Marx, labor was subsumed under the rhetoric of capital, meaning that the system of capitalism has taken control of labor. For the the Italian Autonomists, "real subsumption" means that it is no longer just labor that has been subsumed by capital, but rather "all apsects of personal and social life." Ibid., 27.
[22]Ibid., 29.
[23]Beer, "Designing Freedom," 1.

all 'on the go."[24] For Beer, then, a system is not a structure through which present conditions continue into the future. Rather, they are constantly evolving and changing as time progresses.

Shaviro's definition of neoliberal capitalism can be classified as a system under Beer's definition. In his definition of neoliberalism, there are two discernible subjects. First are financial institutions—"banks and other large corporations"—which are "dominating… [and] facilitate transfers of wealth from everybody else to the extremely wealthy."[25] Second are "human beings" redefined "as private owners of their own 'human capital."[26] Shaviro himself considers capitalism to be a system and describes it as such,[27] but his analysis of capitalism also meets the criteria set by Beer's description as to what constitutes a system. The two subjects of neoliberalism are intertwined and work together to create what he calls, drawing on Karl Marx and Michel Foucault, "a specific mode of capitalist production (Marx), and a form of governmentality (Foucault)."[28] Capitalism is thus not a phenomena or tendency that appears in both the individual and the institution, but rather a process that is created through the connections between these two parts forming an inter-related system seen in Beer's work.

There are three levels on which Shaviro and Beer's respective notions of an all-encompassing or universal system enter into an interesting discussion with one another. The first level is the question of agency. The second aspect is the question of what shape this all-encompassing system may take (which have so far remained unclear in this discussion). Lastly, the question must be raised regarding whether these systems are temporally finite, alterable, or breakable.

On the question of agency, the two thinkers' texts disagree with one another. While Shaviro asserts that "these processes work on a global scale; they extend far beyond the level of immediate individual experience,"[29] Beer does not view systems as outside of human control. Shaviro argues that "our culture…insists on the absolute freedom of the individual [which] our society cannot live up to," [30] and that "we are all

[24]Ibid.
[25]Shaviro, *No Speed Limit*, 7.
[26]Ibid., 8.
[27]Ibid., 10.
[28]Ibid., 7.
[29]Ibid., 8.
[30]Beer, "Designing Freedom," 9.

captives of gigantic systems beyond our individual control,"[31] this need not be the case. Beer instead argues that "science must be handled in a new way…the control of science and technology [must be removed] from those who alone can finance its development, and to vest its control in the people."[32] The answer as to how one does this is simple: Beer argues that "as long as we have any semblance of democracy, [these systems] are not beyond our *collective* control."[33] The question of agency thus emerges. While many would argue that contemporary representational liberal democracy is not truly democratic, it is hard to argue that we do not at the very least have the *semblance* of democracy. Democratic principles do, undoubtedly, exist in the countries that display the hallmarks of contemporary capitalism. Through these principles, one can gain access to the system's controls and change them in such a way that the capitalist system could be altered, and in principle even eliminated. Given that prediction is not possible, it is difficult to say if capitalism can or cannot be altered. Nonetheless, an adherence to Beer's argument would lead one to be optimistic that it can.

For both Beer and Shaviro, liberalism hinders agency in one form or another. For Beer, the foe is classical liberal ideology. The complexity of a systemic world simply cannot be attenuated by the individual. The solution is thus a collective action, something akin to a traditional sense of Athenian democracy wherein agency and political activity is granted to all. Of course, a truly Athenian democracy that functions is utopian. It requires a public sphere in which participants deliberate and are able to make a collective decision. What follows from this is that it requires consensus. Beer argues that "if we make a terrible mess of interpreting simply cybernetic discoveries in our society…it is because there is no agreed machinery for setting clearly which parts of the system are which."[34] Yet it is impossible to conceive of a society in which there is genuine and pure consensus, where everyone agrees as to how society should function and the role its components should play. The semblance of such a system is often true only in name, as it glosses over disagreement and forces coherence, making it far from utopian.[35]

---

[31]Ibid., 10.

[32]Ibid., 24.

[33]Ibid., 10 emphasis added.

[34]Ibid., 31.

[35]As is demonstrated in the work of Jacques Rancière.

To Beer's credit, he is not claiming that this is an issue of a purely deliberative decision of how to structure society. He does not envision the system as the utopian public sphere where Athenian democracy may take place. Beer defines civilization as operating "through a set of institutions with a particular organization."[36] Implicit in this definition of civilization is the existence of confines in which a system can be altered and operated according to given organization. These confines emerge through the concept of a level of recursion, meaning that a change must remain viable according to the larger aggregates of the system under which the part functions.[37] These confines take the form of resistance to change, and it is this resistance that Beer finds problematic. He argues that "the problem is that the *institutions* in which we humans have our stake resist change."[38] This is juxtaposed to "people, considered as individuals" who he believes "seem to like change rather a lot."[39] The issue for Beer is that, because individuals have their stake in these systems, they feel as though they "cannot afford to embrace [change]."[40] Abhorring this, Beer argues that "people will need to…become active… [and] get into societary institutions and try to change them."[41] If liberal principles are preventing people from being involved in the evolution of the system, the solution is to renounce those principles and change the system themselves *en masse.* A future without capitalism is not much more complicated than society *wanting* change, renouncing capitalism, and creating a new society through institutional mechanisms. While for Shaviro the system is capitalist itself, for Beer capitalism is what the system is being used for. The system is a tool used to build the capitalist tower of Babel that stands over contemporary society. For Beer, the task is simple: build something else.

Beer's subjects are construed as inherently rational, and by banding together to enact change is by some accounts replacing one mode of liberalism (classical liberalism) with another variant (coalition liberalism).[42] Liberalism is thus a way in which individuals act and

---

[36]Ibid., 4.
[37]Ibid., 31.
[38]Ibid., 33.
[39]Ibid.
[40]Ibid.
[41]Ibid., 42.
[42]The idea that Beer is or is not a liberalism, and is or is not providing a solution to liberalism, are not questions that would concern Beer himself. He does not use the term

engage with the world. For Shaviro, liberalism is instead the way in which *the world* engages with individuals. For Shaviro, liberalism is not so easily removed. The very tools that Beer argues can be used to design a desired future are the very things that are enabling capitalism and suppressing its subjects. It is necessary to note that, drawing on Foucault, Shaviro defines neoliberalism as a form of governmentality.[43] Foucault defines governmentality in his College De France lecture *Society, Territory, and Population* as "the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target."[44] Given that neoliberalism focuses on the individual as its unit of consideration,[45] there is a paradoxical tension between the rhetoric of the population (or the whole) with that of the individual. Foucault addresses this tension in *Discipline and Punish* with his description of individualization, a process by which "treating the body, *en masse*, 'wholesale', as if it were an indissociable unity, but of working it 'retail', individually"[46] effectively creates the subject of (neo)liberalism. The construct of the individual subject is the project of an act of governmentality where the whole is governed through the lens of individuality. Through this mechanism the overarching power of neoliberalism imposes upon society functions through the mass of singular and partitioned individuals.[47] Instead of a bottom-up model of liberation, wherein subjects alter and govern through the system, Shaviro articulates a top down model wherein large macro systems, like the state, dominate subjects.

The second tension between Beer and Shaviro is the issue of an overarching entity that structures society. To return to my opening example of the Tower of Babel and the Adamic signifier, what is the edifice through which there is an overarching symbolic unity? What is contemporary societies' single great signifier? What unites the two

---

"liberal" or "liberalism" at all throughout *Designing Freedom*, despite the strong comparisons that I have made.

[43]Shaviro, *No Speed Limit*, 14.

[44]Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977--1978*, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell, 1 edition (Picador, 2009), 144.

[45]As noted earlier; Shaviro, *No Speed Limit*, 14.

[46]Michel Foucault, *Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, REP edition (New York: Vintage, 1995), 137.

[47]Shaviro, *No Speed Limit*, 18.

thinkers is the role of technology in their respective societal ontologies. For Shaviro, such an over-arching structure is, of course, capitalism. But the accelerationist tendencies he agrees exist in capitalism are inherently tied to technological advancement. In their "#ACCELERATE MANIFESTO For An Accelerationist Politics," Alex Williams and Nick Srnicek forward the notion that the "essential metabolism of capitalism demands economic growth, with competition between individual capitalist entities setting in motion increasing technological developments in an attempt to achieve competitive advantage."[48] Shaviro is in agreement with Srnicek and Williams: he admits that capitalism boasts "globe-spanning technologies" that have allowed for the "creation and use of an incredibly powerful computation and communication infrastructure, [a] mobilization of general intellect, and...machinic automation of irksome toil, contemporary capitalism" that has "provided us with the *conditions* for universal abundance."[49] Disillusioned with this fact, Shaviro proclaims that "in our world today, there is *already* enough accumulated wealth, and sufficiently advanced technology, for every human being to lead a life of leisure and self-cultivation."[50] Yet capitalism has not produced a techno-utopia where humans are liberated from labor. In fact, he argues that the contemporary era is "a time when financial mechanisms subsume everything there is"[51] where "labor, subjectivity, and social life are no longer 'outside' capital and antagonistic to it."[52] In effect, technology has become a form of suppression and not a tool of liberation as was initially hoped.

This is not so for Beer. Shaviro's notion of neoliberal capitalism subsuming all aspects of labor runs counter to Beer's own characterization of technological advancement. For Beer, science has become in many regards "the servant of consuming man" in that "we have been sold labour-saving devices of every kind as the fruit of science and technology."[53] In fact, technology is a *liberating* feature instead of a

[48]Alex Williams and Nick Srineck, "#ACCELERATE MANIFESTO for an Accelerationist Politics," *Critical Legal Thinking*, May 14, 2013, http://criticallegalthinking.com/2013/05/14/accelerate-manifesto-for-an-accelerationist-politics/.
[49]Shaviro, *No Speed Limit*, 53–54.
[50]Ibid., 54.
[51]Ibid., 34.
[52]Ibid., 35.
[53]Beer, "Designing Freedom," 23.

means of neoliberal domination. For Beer, "the computer…is really their only hope."[54] At the crux of his project, Beer is attempting to move beneath current uses of science and technology to find new modalities that have remained hidden. In doing so, it is an attempt to move *beyond* the oppressiveness that Shaviro speaks of. For while he believes that "the societary use of science we have is threatening…oppressive and alienating," he argues that "the societary use of science we could have is a *liberation.*"[55] The problems society faces thus have solutions. Society must simply find the tools to answer these problems, even if the tools are now the very sources of our problems. Shaviro's view of technology is pessimistic. A technological future is not unforeseeable for Shaviro, but it is a future of continued suppression and domination from a capitalist ontology. Beer's position is instead one of optimism—not only for the future—but for a technological future.

To reiterate, Beer argues that for "ordinary people…the computer…is really their only hope."[56] He thus advocates for a form of socialist technocracy, governing society through a mastery and strategic usage of technology to address a society's material needs.[57] It is instead something radically different; it is aesthetics that is ordinary people's only hope. For Shaviro, aesthetics is the one thing that boasts the potential to *not* be subsumed under capitalism. This is not to say that aesthetics are never subsumed by capitalism, for often they are. Shaviro admits that "the constraints of political economy can, and do, get in the way of aesthetics."[58] There are two ways that political economics does this.

Firstly, Shaviro notes that there are certain material and physical conditions that block an individual from experiencing aesthetic pleasure, arguing that our "needs" must be attended to before we can experience an aesthetic pleasure.[59] The example Shaviro gives is that of a person who must be free of hunger before they can experience the aesthetic experience of *haute cuisine.* However, these "needs" are not necessarily things like

[54]Ibid., 10.
[55]Ibid., 24.
[56]Ibid., 10.
[57]Such a model was attempted by Beer in Chile with CyberSyn, a computerized system that determined how to redistribute needed products according to surplus and need of particular regions. This system was never fully utilized, as shortly thereafter Augusto Pinochet took control of Chile and enacted radical free market policies.
[58]Shaviro, *No Speed Limit*, 33.
[59]Ibid.

hunger and thirst that are unequivocally required to subsist. They include the "need" for socio-economic stability, something that is more of a privileged need (something that is not required to live, yet is still manifest as a need according to our socio-economic ontology) than a fundamental need required to simply continue to live. An example of this distinction are the characters in Paolo Sorrentino's 2013 film *The Great Beauty,* most notably the protagonist Jep Gambardella who having achieved a level of success, wealth, and cultural stature is able to relegate himself to living an aesthetic lifestyle, throwing parties and concerning himself with finding beauty in life. These are not experiences he would be able to pursue if he were not in a privileged position. Given that Shaviro argues contemporary society "*already* [has] enough accumulated wealth…for every human being to lead a life of leisure and self-cultivation,"[60] it would seemingly follow that an aesthetic lifestyle like Jep's is easy to obtain. The neoliberal subject never reaches this period where they realize they have accumulated enough wealth. This hinges on "the paradox that capitalism creates abundance, but at the same time it always needs to transform this abundance into an imposed scarcity."[61] As long as one is subjected to capitalist production, this subject is constantly in the process of accumulating wealth out of the imposed notion that they do not have enough (in part because capitalism conditions them to believe so, and in part because the potential for wealth is seemingly infinite). Therefore, in such an ontology, the aesthetic liberation is not as easily obtained as the technological tools for change seen in Beer's work. As long as subjects are bound up into a capitalist system, they will constantly be distracted from aesthetic joy.

It is hard to escape these trappings as seen in the second obstacle facing the neoliberal subject: the emergence of real subsumption where "affects and feelings" and "expressions and desires" have become "appropriated and turned into sources of surplus value."[62] The market has become a space filled with affect, as is evident through the idiom of 'service with a smile'. Joined with the material product itself the laborer's emotion has become an assemblage. Increasingly one purchases not just a product, but a feeling. For example, a waiter must go beyond providing factually good service, bringing food on time and attending to needs, but must also do so while providing feelings of comfort through their

[60]Ibid., 54.
[61]Ibid., 52.
[62]Ibid., 35.

emotional appearance and demeanor. Something as immaterial and emotive as the act of smiling becomes an act of labor and a piece of the product. An accelerationist aesthetics is no different, and "does not even deny that its own intensities serve the aim of extracting surplus value and accumulating profit."[63] It is therefore impossible to craft an aesthetic mode of existence that cannot be subsumed by capitalism. However, Shaviro is not saying that one *ought* to try and create such an aesthetic experience. Instead, he argues that "aesthetics is never essential, but this is what allows it to be irreducible to the essential."[64] It "presupposes a liberation from need" and "offers us a way out from the artificial scarcity imposed by the capitalist mode of production."[65] This is not a categorical shift, but rather a subjective shift. One becomes disinterested in the ends to which capitalism subsumes their affects and feelings.

While the economy will never exist without subsuming aesthetics, a *particular* mode of aesthetics can be liberated from the economy. Drawing on Kant, an aesthetic judgment is "disinterested."[66] While Shaviro argues that disinteredness means it "doesn't relate to [one's] own needs and desires" and that one enjoys it "entirely for its own sake, with no ulterior motives, and with no profit to [oneself],"[67] this does not reflect the liberating capacities of being disinterested that are required. To be disinterested is to refuse to be subject to a process of ordering and structuring the world, and existing outside of these rules and regulations.[68] Thus When Shaviro argues that "aesthetic accelerationism, unlike the politico-economic kind, does not claim any efficacy for its own operations,"[69] he is arguing that it does so because it is not *interested* in being efficient or having an operative goal. Therefore, aesthetics can be a liberating tool if one channels an aesthetic modality that, instead of challenging acceleration and capitalism, simply ignores it and exists on its own terrain.

Finally, the question must be raised as to if these systems – whether they be economic for Shaviro or technological for Beer – are temporally

---

[63]Ibid., 47.
[64]Ibid., 32.
[65]Ibid., 33.
[66]Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, Revised edition (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 42–50.
[67]Ibid.
[68]I am indebted to Geoffrey Whitehall for this understanding of disinterest.
[69]Shaviro, *No Speed Limit*, 46.

finite. Once again, there is disagreement between the two theorists. For Stafford Beer, there are a limited number of possible states that a system can have. While this language at first seems limiting, it is also an affirmation that the status quo need not exist. There are other possible ways in which a system, such as our society, could be structured given that systems are inherently *dynamic*.[70] Central to this dynamism is Beer's concept of variety, or, "the number of possible states of the system."[71] He puts forth the claim that the "number [of possible states] grows daily."[72] Therefore, not only is the system constantly changing, but the number of possible alternative configurations that can emerge that is expanding exponentially with the passing of time. The question emerges as to if these new alternatives constitute either a new system, or a system that is constantly emerging? The possibility for both exists. While Beer's belief that individuals can band together and reconfigure societal systems has already been noted, he also believes that systems also boast a capacity for attending to these emerging varieties. While the system is dynamic and constantly changing, it is also *regulated* by limiting this variety through "attenuators" and by increasing the means of addressing this variety through "amplifiers."[73] The purpose of these tools is to fend off a "catastrophic collapse" caused by overloading the system with variety and demands.[74] For Beer this collapse will not happen, but in theory it could. There are thus two ways in which a system for Beer can be temporally finite. It can either be short-lived because individuals change it, thus effectively creating a new system that may not bear any likeness to the one that proceeded it. The other is the potential for system collapse, which would mark an end of the system (even if this is only a theoretical situation). For Beer, the fall of Babel may not occur, and it certainly is not *imminent.* However, though the edifice of Babel is detrimental to society, one need not—and should not—adopt a defeatist disposition for the world. The possibility of Babel falling is possible. But it will be the populace, and not God, that brings it to the ground.

Implicit in Stafford Beer's idea of systems is the potential for a new system (even if it is the old system in a new format). Unlike Beer, Steven Shaviro believes that capitalism is the only configuration that is possible.

---

[70]Beer, "Designing Freedom," 8.
[71]Ibid.
[72]Ibid.
[73]Ibid., 9.
[74]Ibid., 10.

And while accelerating capitalism does boast notions of progress and change that would *suggest* change akin to that of Beer, it remains capitalism. It furthermore doesn't become a changing sense of capitalism that would mimic Beer's idea of a dynamic system. Capitalism remains capitalism with the key components of subsumption, labor, and capital pervading over the world it occupies. Shaviro argues that "in our current state of affairs, the future exists only in order to be colonized and made into an investment opportunity."[75] In this conception, the future doesn't boast the potential for change as it does for Beer. While politico-economic accelerationism operates on a premise of "creation-destruction," pushing capitalism to its limits until it breaks, Shaviro does not see this as ever being possible. Even if one games the system by amplifying (to use Beer's language), the contradictions and cracks in capitalism, capitalism will find a way to thrive. Shaviro argues that "capitalism perpetuates itself through a continual series of readjustments" and that "the intensification of capitalism's contradictions has not led to an explosion."[76] Shaviro may be guilty of predicting the future (something that has been scoffed at in this paper), but his pessimism is warranted. There have been many opportunities for capitalism to fail, and the market ideology has rebounded consistently and never faltered. The edifice that capitalism has built is problematic in its unifying features. However, unlike the tower of Babel, Shaviro does not believe that it can fall.

[75]Shaviro, *No Speed Limit*, 17.
[76]Ibid., 51.

Works Cited

Beer, Stafford. "Designing Freedom." *SCiO Building Viable Organisations*, 1973. http://www.scio.org.uk/sites/default/files/designing_freedom.pdf.

Berger, James. "Falling Towers and Postmodern Wild Children: Oliver Sacks, Don DeLillo, and Turns against Language." *PMLA* 120, no. 2 (March 1, 2005): 341–61.

Foucault, Michel. *Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. REP edition. New York: Vintage, 1995.

———. *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977--1978*. Edited by Michel Senellart. Translated by Graham Burchell. 1 edition. Picador, 2009.

Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Judgement*. Revised edition. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Shaviro, Steven. *No Speed Limit: Three Essays on Accelerationism*. University Of Minnesota Press, 2015.

Whitehall, Geoffrey. "Foucault's Hustle: Modes of Subjectivation and the Aesthetic Subject of Indifference." New Orleans, LA, 2015.

Williams, Alex, and Nick Srineck. "#ACCELERATE MANIFESTO for an Accelerationist Politics." *Critical Legal Thinking*, May 14, 2013. http://criticallegalthinking.com/2013/05/14/accelerate-manifesto-for-an-accelerationist-politics/.

Riots in the 2012 Quebec Student Strike: Reclaiming Politics through Bodies

Myriam Tardif
M.A. in Sociology and Anthropology at Concordia University

For the past few years, the number of riots around the world has been constantly rising. Alain Bertho, a French anthropologist, named the 2001-2011 decade: "le temps des émeutes," the time of riots. In 2011 alone he counted more than 1800 riots in approximately 128 different countries, leading him to say that the rise of riots has been exponential since 2010 (there were 1200 riots in 2010). A fifth of this number were student riots. In the context of the 2012 Québec Student strike, we can say that multiple high intensity events qualified as 'riots' and shaped the imagination of those who would recall these moments later on. In the context of this paper we are asking: what makes these events 'riots' and why do they happen? We argue that these events are part of a process of student radicalisation that is inscribed in the context of "escalade des moyens de pression"[1] during the student struggle that took place in 2012. We will explore this by examining who the rioters were and what meaning they gave to their actions.

Methodology

This research was performed in the context of a sociology class on social movements that we took immediately following the 2012 Québec Student Strike. Having been deeply involved in the strike, we wanted to address it as an issue that has been largely demonized by the police and in the media, and to approach it from the point of view of those who have experienced it from inside. The intention of this was not to ask to be excused, but rather to contribute to the literature understanding the events. We conducted six semi-directed interviews of one hour in length, with five women and one man were participants in the events that were called riots during the 2012 Student Strike. Five of the participants were

[1] "Escalation of pressure tactics". There is no "official" English translation of most of Quebec Student Movement's political terms. The translations in this paper are mine or those of my dedicated reviewers.

students, and one identified herself as someone who was seeking alternatives to working; to live a different life. One of these women was a mother of a 2-year-old child at the time. Some of them told us that they had trouble theorizing or objectifying their experiences because of the lack of distance (we did the interviews in November 2012, only a few months after the end of the strike). As such, we started from the lived experience of the participants and sought to analyse them later with political and anthropological literature on social movements. This research was never published in an academic context because we thought that this knowledge ought to belong to the communities in which it had formed. We created a zine with the paper we wrote and diffused it widely. When we saw the call-out for *TBD** Journal, we thought it was a great way to share this on-the-ground knowledge and make it travel outside of Québec by translating it in English and adapting it to a wider audience.

Definitions and Context

We tried to define the term 'riot' while keeping its component of heterogeneity. In the context of this paper, 'riot' will be defined as a popular uprising that is both spontaneous and unorganised and that has an origin of shared collective emotion. For us, it also represents a form of confrontation against an ideological and material system (in this context, capitalism) and thus constitutes a reappropriation of the means to struggle against that system, both symbolically and physically. In the context of the 2012 Québec Student Strike, respondents qualified multiple events as 'riots': the demo against police brutality (March 15), the demo against the Salon du Plan Nord[2] (April 20), the May Day demonstration (May 1), and the demo against the Quebec Liberal Party Congress in Victoriaville (May 4). There are two causes to these events we would like to discern. First, the context of the Student Struggle—a strike that lasted for at least 6 months initially planned against the 75% tuition increase, that rapidly became a much broader struggle. Indeed, each of these events represented a point of tension and intensity in the broader struggle, a respondent reporting that: "they were all culminant

[2] The "Salon du Plan Nord" is a place where people could bring their CVs to employers to work in the context of the government's "Plan Nord"; a project to exploit the Nord of "so called Québec", on indigenous lands.

point in the general tension and it was always linked to a very particular event or circumstance."[3]

The second cause of initiation was independent factors in the events in themselves. In each of these instances, the riots started as a response to a dialectical game between repressive violence and protesters' power that are both alternating and increasing progressively until the moment where "those who are there to shout their anger succeed in inversing the control. It's at this moment that we are talking about riot,"[4] told me one of the participant. For those who experienced it, it is the shift in the 'rapport de force', the balance of power, between the students and the police and the subsequent inversion of social control that seem to be the key characteristics in the definition of a riot.

Who are the rioters?

Who are the rioters? It is an essential question, because we do not believe that they were participating in a riot, but rather that they were the riot. A riot does not exist outside of the actors that makes it happen, and these actors do not join the riot, they *riot*. We will discuss now the rioters relation to a radical ideology, to their modes of organisation and to their repertoire of actions.

Ideologies

To begin, it would be an incredibly difficult task to create a sociological portrait of the Student Strike rioters because of the lack of extensive information as well as heterogeneity. Most of them were students, but not all were. Bertho spoke similarly of the 2005 riots in France's suburbs and states that riots were not necessarily formed of criminals or uneducated persons, but rather that they were part of the very ordinary youth.[5] However, to delegitimize these political phenomena, adversaries will often define riot participants as irrational or apolitical beings, though to Francis Dupuis-Déry, such an explanation is "at best intellectual laziness, at worst a lie".[6]

---

[3] « C'étaient tous des points culminants côté tension générale et c'était toujours rattaché à un événement ou une circonstance en particulier »

[4] « Ceux qui sont là pour crier leur opposition réussissent à renverser le contrôle. C'est à partir de ce moment-là qu'on parle d'émeute »

[5] Alain Bertho, "Nous n'avons vu que des ombres," *Mouvements*. 44 (2006): 26-31.

[6] Francis Dupuis-Déry, *Les black blocs; la liberté et l'égalité se manifestent* (Montréal: Lux, 2007), 115.

Riot participants on the contrary have well-articulated political thoughts. All six respondents reported that they had started thinking about the political issues of the strike well before acting reporting that they already had a thoroughly profound political reflection that supported their actions. These personal political reflections contributed to the fact that they participated in these riots, did not leave when they started, and returned to participate in others. They all had very different trajectories and previous militant experiences Participation in the 2012 Student Strike and in the riots have been turning moments and contributed to their process of radicalisation. Many experienced a triggering moment in their life that helped them pass from theory to action, shifting their relation to the political field.

During our interviews, we asked participants what changes they would like to see in the world. Their answers were very diverse, including critiques of the political representation system, a desire for autonomy, a larger equality between individuals, the end of all hierarchies and oppressions, an abolition of the capitalist system and the police; (or at least a transformation of it). Each had a radically different vision of the world. Here we can talk about "radical cultures", where the participation in radical spaces and organisation contributes to the creation of radical intellectuals.[7] There is a narrative of justification behind political violence, which is not to say that violence is a result of an ideology that can apologize for it, but rather that it is not irrational or apolitical. On the contrary, as Angela Davis once explained in an interview she gave in 1972 while in the California State Prison, political violence is a means towards an ultimate goal not an end in itself.[8] Moreover, we cannot dismiss the fact that in radical milieus there are multiple strategic and ethical debates on the different means of action and praxis that are used. This is demonstrated by Della Porta and Dupuis-Déry, as well as by the people we interviewed. Participants highlighted critiques and limitations to the efficacy of riots. For example, many of them agreed that riots do not really change anything and that they mainly contribute to polarizing the debate and the loss of allies. Riots are hard emotionally and include a very high level of risk for the participants (physical, legal, mental, etc.).

---

[7] Donatella Della Porta, "Mouvements sociaus et violence politique," in *Les violences politiques en Europe*, edited by Xavier Crettiez and Lauren Mucchielli, 271-291, Paris: La Découverte, 2010, 284.

[8] Olsson, Goran, "The Black Power Mixtape 1967-1975". Sweden. 100 minutes. 2011. [1972].

But as we will see later, this all seems very peculiar in a context where the participants do not have anything left to lose and have exhausted all other means of political actions.

To understand the riot, it must be conceptualized with its adversity component. This is rooted in deep ideological and material struggle. We will do that using the concept of *conscience des contradictions.*[9,10] The (neo)liberal ideology is hegemonic, in the sense that it was progressively imposed up to the point of which it created a consensus that was naturalized and legitimized. This became invisible – or hegemonic. However, like Comaroff argue, hegemony is never total; it always has cracks and faults. Student activists and many others perceived strong contradictions between the world they were presented and the world as it was actually lived and experienced. If this relation between hegemony and ideology is a continuum, then some see ideological elements in the hegemony while others do not and the nature of the elements that are perceived as contingent to the social position of individuals or groups. That explains why, in certain circumstances, some individuals will resist certain elements of the hegemony, but not others; we do bear our own share of contradictions (not to mention the processes of internalization of the hegemony which we undergo). This consciousness of contradiction could have led some people to act and sometimes act in more radical manner.

Modes of action

Riots are a type of action that form a part of the direct action paradigm. "An action is *direct* when an individual acts by itself on the political scene, without obeying a chief and without representatives that talk and act in its name."[11] We can include in this definition of direct action the following: mobilisation in the streets, flyering, sit-ins, civil

[9] Not to forget that this concept was inspired by the Gramscian "contradictory consciousness" (Hoare 1999). It is the contradiction between what we call the Good Sense and Common Sense. The common sense comes from the past (traditions), and is absorbed in an uncritical manner that does not necessarily go with our own best interest. We all refer to our common sense that we believe is shared by everyone, but it is not. The good sense, would be instead our capacity to think deeply and critically which is shared by everybody.

[10] Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism and Consciousness in South Africa* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 11-32.

[11] Dupuis-Déry,*Les black blocs; la liberté et l'égalité se manifestent*, 82.

disobedience, blockades, occupations, riots, sabotage, etc. Everyone we interviewed said they actively engaged in many forms of direct action and definitely preferred acting in this way. But direct actions are not all equal. They have different levels of intensity, risk and security, and are all subject to strategic and ethical debates. The use of more disruptive action versus actions that are designed to be more visible or symbolic seemed to be preferred by the people we interviewed, although we believe every action to have a component of symbolism and visibility. However, each of the participants strongly believed in a concept that emerged during the alter-globalization movement in the early 2000s; diversity of tactics.[12] This concept is meant to valorize political autonomy and to recognize the legitimacy of the heterogeneity of forms of contestations. This is what the young mother of the group thought about it:

> ...As for me, I want us to talk about this violence that they accuse us of all the time. I would like that we de-dramatize it so that we can feel legitimate in doing it. It's true that pacifist sit-in are not my kind of thing, there is a distinction. I perceive direct action like the moment where we consider our body as our political voice, that is it.[13]

Riot was also a way to get out of the frame imposed by the state and to confront the source of power of their opponents; in this context, materialized by the police. They were considered like the culmination of the means of action when everything else was tried and had failed. She continued:

> We have had demands for a long time... The riot is like the culmination of all that. They are people who are really frustrated at a very particular moment and this is when it explodes. It's a means to express this frustration but it is not... but there are not necessarily demands at the end. Because we know that it's not the

[12] David Graeber, *Direct Action: An Ethnography* (California: AK Press, 2009).

[13] "[…] moi je veux qu'on parle de cette violence-là dont on nous accuse tout le temps, je veux qu'on la dédramatise et qu'on se sente légitime de le faire. C'est sûr que les sit-in pacifistes, c'est pas mon genre non plus, je fais la distinction. L'action directe je la perçois vraiment comme le moment où on considère notre corps comme notre voix politique, c'est ça."

> best way to pass a message. It is a way to fight against the machine with the little means we have.[14]

Let's examine the black bloc. We have to be precise: it is not an organization, but a tactic, a means of action. It is a "bloc", a group, a collective of individuals, like any other contingent; like *baby bloc* or *pink bloc*. People who want to participate in a black bloc share more or less the same vision of direct action and want to get together to become invisible in a group. One of our interviewees said that she had participated in black blocs many times:

> It is an anonymous movement of solidarity. It is a chance for anyone who wants to participate in the "destruction" of society in an anonymous way. It can valorise some people and give them the courage to act in the way they really want to.[15]

These blocs are open to anyone who act according to the same code (black clothes, masks...). Not everyone that participates in black blocs participate in political violence like breaking windows. Sometimes, being in an anonymous group where everyone is dressed the same permits more vulnerable persons to participate in a demonstration (for example, non-status or criminalized people). There has also been a lot of discussion about the participation of "agents provocateurs"[16] in black blocs or demonstrations, and others tactics of surveillance and infiltration by the police and CSIS (as well as other militarized forces). Although participants recognized the existence of this threat, they did not have the experiences relating to this. We do recognize that these tactics of

---

[14] "[…] Parce qu'on revendique des affaires pendant longtemps […] L'émeute c'est un peu l'aboutissement de tout ça, c'est des gens qui sont vraiment frustrés à un moment en particulier et c'est là que ça explose. C'est un moyen d'exprimer sa frustration, mais c'est pas…y'a pas nécessairement de fin de revendications en tant que telles. Parce qu'on s'entend que c'est pas comme ça que le message passe le mieux. C'est se battre contre la machine avec les faibles moyens qu'on a."

[15] « C'est un mouvement de solidarité complètement anonyme. C'est une chance pour n'importe qui de manière anonyme de participer à la « destruction » de la société (guillemet de la personne interrogée). […] Qui peut valoriser du monde et donner le courage d'agir de la manière qu'ils veulent vraiment. »

[16] *Inciting agent.* It is a term used by the police to describe persons who commits or commit to incite other people to commit illegal acts. They are often undercover police agents.

infiltration exist and have been extensively used in Québec and elsewhere, but it is not the subject of our paper.

Solidarity and Adversity

Riots, characterized by some participants as "war zones" usually create both alliances and clashes. First, the notion of solidarity was repeated many times during the interviews and seems to be an important element in the creation of a collective identity against opponents. Some talked about the strength of the cohesion between rioters as sometimes so intense that it would prevent them from quitting the riot even when they had felt they were surpassing their own boundaries because they did not want to abandon the group. Each reported that they would never go to a demonstration or to a riot alone, as it would be dangerous if no one knew where they were if something happened (let's not forget the high risks associated to riot, such as detentions, injuries, etc.). This notion of solidarity is also extended to strangers. Some participants in riots spend all of their time helping injured people and distributing Maalox (a neutralizing liquid used against the effect of tear gas and pepper spray). Others would be there without doing anything really, feeling that they were there to help cover more "courageous" people who were closer to the front lines. In that way, they would also be there to help others if something bad happened.

Riots also represent a moment that confronts opposing ideologies or classes that are materialized in the bodies of those who hold power: the state and government. Della Porta theorized those emotions, saying that the stronger the solidarity in the group, the stronger the hatred is for their opponent (and vice versa), leading to a "dehumanization" on both sides.[17] However, since the "enemy" is a very abstract category in our capitalist-democratic cities and countries, in the street, they are symbolized by the *forces de l'ordre*, the police; whether it is the municipal, provincial or anti-riot police. We can see here a shift from an ideological confrontation to a physical one. Even if they "do not throw rocks for nothing,"[18] in the words of one of our participant, it is not the slogans or the arguments that are important anymore. Many respondents told us that they would prepare themselves to fight before going to a demonstration, since they never knew in advance if it would turn into a riot in the end. To fight

[17] Della Porta, "Mouvements sociaux et violence politique"

[18] « ne lancent pas des roches pour rien »

and to continue fighting, hoping for the moment they would "win" the riot.[19] Most told us they would expect confrontation and would be disappointed if it did not come. Others told us that the very definition of a riot is an event constituted multiple confrontations during its duration, sustained with anger and rage. Most of them also told us that they thought a riot would start as soon as people resist police violence and repression: "A riot is declared once we start resisting, at the very moment when we start resisting the anti-riot squad violence."[20]

This is why Francis Dupuis-Déry's concept "émeutes policières" (riot police) is so interesting. It affirms that we have to consider the police/demonstrators relation as something very complex. It also states that we have to stop believing that the police intervene when demonstrators are committing violent or "criminal" acts. In fact, a more precise observation shows that the police intervene most of the time even when the demonstrations are very peaceful. This dynamic is something that can lead demonstrators to want to respond to these police attacks that they judge (with purpose) as illegitimate or to defend themselves. Della Porta, on her part, states that most of the time, riots happen precisely in reaction to the *forces de l'ordre*, but particularly in reaction to the militarization of the police that has exponentially increased in the Western world and elsewhere and that this militarization is "perceptible through the equipment, the training and the adopted tactics."[21] In Montréal, we just have to think of the mass arrest tactics that were denounced multiple times by the UN.[22] Hence, is it interesting to ask who started the riot first? Or rather, why riots are iterative and repeat themselves at an exponential rate despite very different contexts?

---

[19] After saying this, the participant had that she had the impression that it was always the police who was winning, because they were stronger. But she said she would still continue participating in those events, waiting for the moment of victory and to the upcoming of the *real resistance.*

[20] « L'émeute va être déclarée à partir du moment où on résiste, au moment où on résiste à la violence de l'anti-émeute. »

[21] Della Porta, "Mouvements sociaux et violence politique", 279.

[22] Francis Dupuis-Déry, "L'ONU blâme la police de Montréal," *Le Couac,* 2006, accessed December 10, 2012, http://www.radio-canada.ca/nouvelles/Index/2005/11/03/001-spvm-onu.shtml.

Meaning and Symbolism

What is the meaning of the riot? From an analytical point of view, it is possible to determine the trajectories of individuals that can lead them to *riot (doing riot)*, but how do they give meaning and symbolism to this kind of action?

Symbolic violence

In the definitions, discourse, and in the testimonies about riot, there are discussions about violence. If we spoke before about repressive violence and of its role as a driving force that leads to the escalation of the pressure tactics, we would conceptualize the symbolic violence experienced by the protesters and then see the riot as a form of counterattack. Like one of my participant expressed: "the violence is first and foremost that of the conditions in which we have to live, that of those who defend them… and more rarely, alas, the one that we throw back at their face."[23] This excerpt from the magazine *Inflammable* that collects different texts from anarchists, is a window into violence as it is lived and experienced by some. From their perspective, the experienced violence is that of capitalism, an institutionalized and political violence that maintains them in a state of political and economic dispossession.[24] All of our respondents addressed a frustration felt toward a globalized neoliberal/capitalist system that they were rejecting. This conceptualization of violence, as lived by the actors, can make us see the riot as a struggle against an "enemy without a face. Against those who negated them daily, and that condemned them to a social non-existence and reserved them a dead-end future."[25]

As a counterattack, riots are using a political violence that to Della Porta, consists in "using a physical force with the goal of harming their

[23] « La violence est d'abord celle des conditions qui nous sont faites, celles des gens qui les défendent... et plus rarement, hélas, celle que nous leur renvoyons à la gueule » – Excerpt from the magazine *Inflammable* n.2.

[24]David Harvey, *A Companion to Marx's Capital*, (London: Verso, 2010). Harvey is talking about an « accumulation by dispossession » that would occur in neoliberal time vs. a primitive accumulation (the enclosures system and the theft of collective land to transform them in a private ownership). Dispossession of social rights that we fought for, to redistribute the wealth and privileges to the "capitalist" classes.

[25] Laurent Mucchielli, "Lémeute, forme élémentaire de la protestation," *Cités,* Vol. 2 (2012) 50.

political opponents."[26] According to her perspective, riots are combining physical violence (that is inscribed in the body; attacks, traumatisms, injuries, muscles, blood), and a violence that is residing in the attack of symbols. When a police car is knocked over, (for example, as in the demo against police violence, on March 15), when a bank window is broken, when congress meeting of all the big "faces of power" (deputies, bosses, CEOs, prime ministers and the rest) is disturbed, it is important to see what is really under attack: the symbols of oppression.

We also have to reconsider the discourse on the violence of riots. It is not to say that there is never any kind of violence perpetuated by rioters, but to remind ourselves of its exceptional character. Demonstrators tried to tear down the fences that were erected to protect the Québec Liberal Party's congress in May 2012, to which the Surety of Québec (SQ) answered with tear gas and rubber bullets. It seems essential to review this notion of the violence in demonstrations, as the gap between the physical violence of the police and the "violence" it is a reaction to (which is most of the time nonexistent), is startling. Bertho wrote, "if there is an urban guerilla, we see it, it's a symbolic guerilla."[27] This was in response to the 2005 riots in the Paris Suburbs and meant that in spite of the burning garbage cans, the violence of riots was more symbolic than physical (which does not diminish its potential strength). It's necessary for us to de-dramatize this violence by contextualizing it.[28] We have to remember that it is a counterattack toward an invisible violence that is endured daily by the protestors, and to which is added a very concrete and physical violence and threat from the police:

> From this moment where we resist to violence, where we say no, it is certain that we will answer with violence… but as for me, I do not consider that it is a dramatic violence when the person in face of you is armed (…). I think that it is really legitimate.[29]

---

[26] Della Porta, "Mouvements sociaux et violence politique", 273.

[27] Bertho, "Nous n'avons vu que des ombres," 29.

[28] Della Porta, "Mouvements sociaux et violence politique".

[29] « À partir du moment où on résiste à la violence, on dit non, c'est sûr on va répondre par la violence…mais moi je considère pas que c'est une violence dramatique quand c'est quelqu'un qui est armé en face de moi […] J'trouve que c'est super légitime. »

From demonstration to riot

In every testimony we collected, the riot was described as something that was predictable (because of the tense or exciting atmosphere), but never as something that was planned. In the events we examined, there is a transition from of the demonstration toward a bursting of the clashes. How do we make sense of this transition? It seems that this transformation can be attributed to the refusal of social control, of pacification and of the police order imposed on protestors.

> You feel liberated from this state frame…I think riots are interesting because it's something that goes outside of the norms,…the norms that are normally there…they are put away temporarily."[30]

We have to remember that the riot is extra-ordinary. Almost everyone who told us they were participating in riots said that they were also participating in a demonstration. So *rioting* is not a refusal of the demonstration *per se*, but rather a refusal of the rules that limit its frame and of the rules that are symbolically imposed by the law, but mostly physically by the police. The demonstration-riot transition could then be understood as a radicalisation of the modes of action, against the predictable and institutionalized traditional frame of the demonstration: banners and itinerary prepared in advance, marshals to keep the route, a sound truck to diffuse discourses proclaimed by "leaders" and "representatives." The political meaning of the riot is contained in its potentiality. Rioting, *doing riot*, is a way to reclaim the means of acting politically in 'society'[31], but also on one's own life. Rioting is liberating.

Riots as performance and *mise-en-scène*

> When I talk about seeing your body as your political voice, it is true, it is because inevitably when you are in

[30] « Tu te sens libéré de ce cadre étatique […] je trouve ça intéressant les émeutes parce que c'est quelque chose qui ressort des normes, […] les normes qui sont là normalement […] sont mises de côté temporairement. »

[31] Society is not a term we are comfortable with, (who is society? What are its boundary? Who is included/excluded and who can decide?) (See Wolf 2001), but we will use it here as a shortcut.

> a situation where you do a direct action, eventually, you know, you have a public, it is a performance.[32]

The theatrical dimension of the riot takes all of its meaning in this idea of the performance. It is because direct action seeks to communicate through images, but is defined in its bodily resistance and this is why it is a performance: "I don't think that it's the Molotov cocktail that declares the riot, no, it's the fact that we resist."[33] This performance also exists because there is a public: the 'civil society', or more accurately; the individuals who watch the media or riot videos. Those images of riots are captivating spectators with their particular aesthetic: "The image…become an diffusion arm of affects and pulsions. We are…in an aesthetisation of society, of the existence. And violence becomes then also an aesthetic and spectacular question."[34] The number of riot videos on the Internet speaks to this fascination of images, however it should not be reduced to this since those videos also act as testimonies.

The dramatization of riots also goes through the *mise-en-scène* of the confrontation between two opposing sides, that exists outside of the riots but that are embodied through action. Riots are birthed through a "combatant" performance that takes place in the resistance against dangerous and deadly police violence. When the police start to control demonstrations with rubber bullets, tear gas, sound bombs, and batons (and other militarized arms) that cause lethal injuries to demonstrators and threaten their lives, the rules of confrontation shift. The goal of the police is not to disperse the group anymore or to demobilize them, but to strike a hard or fatal blow. The confrontation goes through the body as many told us: "it's now a confrontation that is more physical than ideological, you have the police and the others (…). There are no more

[32] « Quand je parle de considérer ton corps comme ta voix politique, c'est vrai, c'est qu'inévitablement, quand tu te trouves dans une situation où tu fais une action directe, éventuellement, t'sais, tu as un public, c'est une performance. »

[33] « J'pense pas que c'est le cocktail Molotov qui déclare l'émeute, non, c'est le fait de résister. »

[34] Fabio La Rocca, "Langage visual et émeute," *Socétés* Vol 4. No. 94 (2006):24

arguments, no more slogans, it is more: who will win? Who will leave first, who will be more scared?"[35]

It is a spectacle of the collective anger against the powers of a government and a ruling class that are deaf to the contestations and demands of people. For rioters the issue is then to try to inverse the roles of the typical protagonists, and hence the power relations that are tied to them. One of them told us:

> Police didn't have control on us anymore. Us, we would just disperse and since we were in the city, we knew all its nooks and crannies. We could just disperse and reunite. (…) Policemen (…) at some point, we were just running after them… roles were almost inversed. [36]

Conclusion

Throughout this paper, we thought about how the ideologies and preferred modes of action of rioters could lead them to *riot*. We also addressed the riot as a heterogeneous phenomenon, composed by people with different positionality and experiences. Finally, we considered the riot as a spectacular performance using a symbolic *repertoire* to try to be heard when all the other means were extinguished. "We have nothing to lose" is what they seem to be saying, and since the situation is unbearable, they put their body into play physically and morally. In the context of the 2012 Québec Student Strike, we can explain the riots by the presence of different individuals (that were part of the social movement)[37] that were organizing themselves in horizontal, anti-hierarchical and direct ways. That is reflecting a particular ideology, including a desire for autonomy. This is why their modes of engagement, like direct action, translate this by reclaiming a politics without representatives. With some distance, it would be interesting to ask how the riots changed the

[35] « C'est maintenant une confrontation qui est plus physique qu'idéologique, t'as la police et t'as les autres (…). Y'a plus d'arguments, plus de slogans, c'est plus : qui va gagner? Qui va partir en premier, qui va avoir le plus peur? »

[36] « La police n'avait plus le contrôle sur nous. Nous, on faisait juste se disperser et vu que c'était dans la ville on connaissait tous les recoins de la ville. On pouvait se disperser pis ensuite se réunir […] les policiers, [...] à un moment donné on leur courait après... les rôles étaient inversés presque »

[37] Versus "external and provocation agent" that would "infiltrate" peaceful and legitimate demonstrations to perform violence.

individuals who enacted them, but maybe even more to ask; how rioters drastically changed the course of the struggle and its outcome?

Works Cited

Anonymous. *Inflammable.* Vol.2 2012. http://www.sabotagemedia.anarkhia.org/2012/11/inflammable-n%C2%B02/ Accessed online, 10 December 2012.

Athané, François. "Pour une solidarité avec les émeutiers", *Les mots sont importants.* 2005. http://lmsi.net/Pour-une-solidarite-avec-les Accessed 12 December 2012.

Bertho, Alain. "Nous n'avons vu que des ombres". *Mouvements.* No.44. p.26-31, 2006.

———. "Les émeutes et la globalisation". Conference at Comité Centre-sud, Montréal. May 10, 2012.

Bourdieu, Pierre. "La force de la representation", *Ce que parler veut dire.* 135-148, Paris: Fayard, 1982.

———. "Comprendre". *La misère du monde.* Paris: Le Seuil. 947p. 1993.

———. *Sur la télévision,* Liber-Raisons d'agir: Paris, 1986.

Comaroff Jean and John Comaroff. "Introduction", *Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa.* 11-32, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991.

Della Porta, Donatella. "Mouvements sociaux et violence politique". *Les violences politiques en Europe,* edited by Xavier Crettiez and Laurent Mucchielli, 271-291, Paris: La Découverte. 2010.

Dupuis-Déry, Francis. 2006. "L'ONU blâme la police de Montréal", *Le Couac.* http://www.radiocanada.ca/nouvelles/Index/2005/11/03/001-spvm-onu.shtml Accessed 10 December 2012.

———. *Les black blocs; la liberté et l'égalité se manifestent.* Montréal: Lux, 2007.

Fillieule, Olivier et Mathieu Lilan, "Structures des opportunités politiques", *Dictionnaire des mouvements sociaux,* edited by Fillieule, Olivier, Mathieu Lilan, Péchu Céline, 530-540, Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2009.

Graeber, David. *Direct Action: An Ethnography.* California: AK Press, 2009.

Harvey, David, *A companion to Marx's Capital.* London: Verso, 2010.

Hoare, Quentin and Geoffrey N. Smith, "Some Preliminary Points of Reference", *Selections From the Prison Notebooks.* 626-655, London: Elecbook, 1999 [1971].

Kaspar, Johann, "Nous ne revendiquons rien", 626-655, Marseille: Senonevero, 2010.

La Rocca, Fabio, "Langage visuel et émeute", *Sociétés*, 19-25, Vol.4. no. 94, 2006.

Le Soleil, "La SQ défend sa gestion de l'émeute à Victoriaville" May 10, 2012. http://www.lapresse.ca/le-soleil/actualites/justice-et-faits-divers/201205/10/01-4524089-la-sq-defend-sa-gestion-de-lemeute-a-victoriaville.php accessed December 16 2012.

Mucchielli, Laurent, "L'émeute, forme élémentaire de la protestation", 49-56, *Cités*, Vol. 2, 2012.

Radio Canada, "Les manifestations tournent à l'émeute au centre-ville de Montréal", April 21st, 2012. http://www.radio-canada.ca/nouvelles/societe/2012/04/20/001-conflit-etudiant-vendredi.shtml accessed 16 December 2012.

Snow David, "Analyse de cadre et mouvements sociaux", *Les Formes de l'action collective*, 27-49, Paris: Éditions de l'EHESS, 2001.

Olsson, Goran, "The Black Power Mixtape 1967-1975". Sweden. 100 minutes. 2011. [1972].

United Against Fracking: Opposition to Shale Gas Exploration in Elispogtog, New Brunswick

Katie K. MacLeod
Ph.D. Candidate in Sociology and Social Anthropology at Dalhousie University

In October 2013, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) responded to a blockade twenty kilometers north of Moncton, New Brunswick on Highway 134 near Rexton and Elsipogtog First Nation. The blockade and subsequent protest sought to prevent trucks and equipment belonging to the Texas-based Southwestern Energy (SWN) Resources from reaching their destinations in New Brunswick to conduct in shale gas exploration for hydrocarbon extraction.[1] Fully armed RCMP officers, some whom were dressed in camouflage and positioned as snipers, responded in to the protestors. Signs at the Elsipogtog protest read, 'Frack Off', 'Say No to Shale Gas'. Mi'kmaq, Acadian, and New Brunswick flags flew. The Elsipogtog protest has been framed as an Indigenous rights protest; however, at the core of the movement is the concern for the environment and safety of the people from the impacts of fracking.[2]

Hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, is a process in which a pressurized fluid containing various chemicals, water and sand are injected into gas-bearing shale.[3] The pressure creates fractures in the shale that allow gases to then be extracted. This process can result in harmful chemicals to move beyond the shale layer and seep into well water resulting in the contamination of ground water and can lead to long-term water pollution issues.[4] Leaks and emissions from fracking sites can lead to poor air

[1] Melanie Patten, "Elsipogtog First Nation Sees Violence as RCMP Moves to End Protest." *The Canadian Press* October 17, 2013, par 3. *The Canadian Press,* Accessed March 30, 2016. http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2013/10/17/elsipogtog-photos-rcmp-protest-violence_n_4114506.html

[2] Also referred to as hydraulic fracturing.

[3] Frank. R. Spellman, *Environment Impacts of Hydraulic Fracturing.* (CRC Press, 2012), xiii.

[4] Madelon L. Finkel and Adam Law, "The rush to drill for natural gas: a public health cautionary tale." *American Journal of Public Health* 101, 5 (2011): 784.

quality and potential health impacts.[5] Improper wastewater and hazardous waste disposal or spills can lead to further contamination of water and land.[6]

Land, water, and air can become contaminated and exposed to toxins through hydraulic fracturing.[7] Chemicals, gases, and toxins released in this process are suspected to be endocrine disputers, contains benzene, and the wastewater from fracking can contain iron, strontium, barium and arsenic, all of which could be contributing to various cancers in humans.[8] The resultant air pollution can also lead to the development of lung cancer and asthma.[9] For animals, more specifically, food animals, presence of hydraulic fracturing can result in decreased reproduction and increased respiratory and growth problems.[10]

New Brunswick is no stranger to fracking or companies exploring their land as potential sites of shale gas extraction. Between 2000 and 2006 Corridor Resources began setting up injection wells to power a local potash mine.[11] Farmlands and fields contain injection wells on fracking grids with pipes buried beneath the surface, creating greater risks for farmers and their families.[12] Although not much came out of these initiatives, seismic testing occurred and millions of litres of hazardous chemicals were injected for hydraulic fracturing.[13] As a result of this activity, many properties' values decreased; some of which now stand at only $10,000.[14]

Since fracking began in New Brunswick in the early 2000s, farmers and other residents who engaged in these negotiations began to realize

---

[5] Robert B. Jackson et. al,. "The Environmental Costs and Benefits of Fracking." *Annual Review of Environment and Resources* 39 (2014): 353.

[6] Finkel and Law, "The rush to drill for natural gas," 784; Jackson et al "The Environmental Costs and Benefits of Fracking," 353.

[7] Michelle Bamberger and Robert E. Oswald, "Long-term impacts of unconventional drilling operations on human and animal health." *Journal of Environmental Science and Health, Part A* 50, no. 5 (2015): 450.

[8] Miles Howe, *Debriefing Elsipogtog: The Anatomy of a Struggle.* (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing Company, 2015), 15; Bharadwaj, Lalita, and Bernard D. Goldstein. "Shale gas development in Canada: What are the potential health effects?" *Canadian Medical Association Journal* (2014): 99.

[9] Bharadwaj and Goldstein. "Shale gas development in Canada," 99.

[10] Ibid, 99.

[11] Howe, *Debriefing Elsipogtog,* 13.

[12] Ibid, 13.

[13] Ibid, 14.

[14] Ibid, 14.

the negative effects of fracking on their land, crops, animals, and products.[15] Many residents regretted allowing fracking on their land but were unable to reverse their decisions. Additionally, many of those who entered into fracking agreements with various companies were not gaining any long-term benefits, financial or otherwise, from the fracking occurring on their properties. One farmer interviewed by Miles Howe noted that in her original agreement with Corridor Resources she was to be compensated $1,000 per year for the four well pads on her land, but this had decreased to $50 per year by 2015.[16]

Conceptual Framework

The term frame derives from a social constructionism. Social constructionists see symbolic presentation of a given social problem as essential to the success of a social movement.[17] A frame is "an interpretative schemata that simplifies and condenses the 'world out there' by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one's present or past environment."[18] Erving Goffman[19] explains that individuals employ frameworks (frames) or schemata (schemas) in order to "locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences." As a result, a frame, in the context of a social movement, functions to "organize [the] experience and guide [the] action[s]" of social actors.[20] Social actors have the ability to construct, shape and modify the frame through collective and individual goals and motivations. Social actors use

[15] Ibid, 17.
[16] Ibid, 15.
[17] Stella M. Čapek, "The "Environmental Justice" Frame: A Conceptual Discussion and an Application." *Social Problems* 40, 1 (1993): 5; Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford, Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation." *American Sociological Review* 51, 4 (1986): 464; Turner, Ralph. "Figure and ground analysis of social movements." *Symbolic Interaction, 6* (1983): 175.
[18] David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Master frames and cycles of protest." *Frontiers in social movement theory* (1992): 137.
[19] Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience.* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 21.
[20] Snow and Benford, "Master frames and cycles of protest," 464.

frames to demonstrate the purpose of a movement and aid others to identify with its purpose.[21]

Resources exist within frames of social justice and each frame and social actor have access to different resources. Within the context of a social movement, material and non-material resources are able increase power.[22] Examples of resources include, but are not limited to, money, knowledge, skills, media, alliances, and access. The presence or absence of resources can determine the level of success a movement is able to attain.[23] The resource mobilization approach to social movements "examines the variety of resources that must be mobilized, the linkages to social movements to other groups, the dependence of movements upon external support for success, and the tactics used by authorities to control or incorporate movements."[24] In order for a movement to form collective action, resources must be accumulated from social actors and frames involved; however, this is not to say that the movement will be able to sustain the same degree of access to resources for the duration of the movement.[25]

I will examine the Elsipogtog protest against shale gas exploration through social actors present at the protest and the frames these actors employed. I argue that those present at the Elsipogtog were able to successfully apply frames and mobilize their resources to enact justice. Within the context of these protests, I see justice as the ability for protestors and activists to create a degree of social change by counteracting the actions of SWN Resources and RCMP presence.
The social actors and frames I will examine are 1) the Mi'kmaq and a frame of Indigenous rights; 2) the Acadians and a frame of historic relations; and 3) the environmentalists and a frame of environmental

---

[21] Snow and Benford, "Master frames and cycles of protest," 465; Bob, Clifford. *The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International Activism.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 28.
[22] Sewell (Jr), William H. *The Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation.* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 134-5.
[23] John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory". *American Journal of Sociology* 82 (6). University of Chicago Press: (1977): 1212; Jenkins, J. Craig. "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements." *Annual Review of Sociology* 9 (1983): 528.
[24] McCarthy and Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements," 1213.
[25] McCarthy and Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements," 1213; Jenkins, "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements," 529; Sewell, *The Logics of History*, 145.

rights. The goal of the protest was to protect the land and waters of New Brunswick from the harmful effects of shale gas explorations and the possibility of further long-term fracking on Mi'kmaw territory.[26] I will examine how the social actors present at the Elsipogtog protest were able to form a strong unified front that did not sway from their overall goal for ecological social justice through the mobilization of resources within their respective frames.

I position the Canadian state as a structure that reproduces (neo)colonial social systems and assert that this structure does not represent all populations in Canada. Since Canada does not account for all social actors within its borders it empowers some actors and controls others.[27] In applying frames and mobilizing resources, social actors are able to extend frames into new contexts and reach tangible gains.[28] Through the enactment of the above frames, the actors in Elsipogtog were able to mobilize resources as a source of power within the protest.[29] Treaties, for example, could be mobilized as non-human resources. This resource mobilization can allow social actors to produce social power dependent on the frames that inform their use.[30] The following sections will explore how each group of social actors were able to mobilize such resources through the application of their respective frames while maintaining the overall goal of ecological social justice for New Brunswick land and waters.

Indigenous Rights Frame

When the Elsipogtog protest began in 2013, there had already been significant attention given to Indigenous protests and social movements during the 2012 Idle No More movement. There is debate around whether or not Idle No More is a social movement or if it should be categorized as a protest movement.[31] For the purpose of this article, I

[26] Howe, *Debriefing Elsipogtog,* 18; Howe, Miles. "8 Women of the 8th Fire lay smack down on RCMP Negotiators." *Halifax Media Co-op,* October 2, 2013, par 3; Lindsay, Hillary B. "A Show of Unity and Solidarity." *Halifax Media Co-Op,* November 25, 2013, par 2.

[27] Sewell, *The Logics of History,* 143.

[28] Sewell, *The Logics of History,* 145; Bob, *The Marketing of Rebellion,* 46; Jenkins, "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements," 529-533.

[29] Sewell, *The Logics of History,* 142.

[30] Ibid, 132.

[31] Terry Wotherspoon and John Hansen, "The" Idle No More" Movement: Paradoxes of First Nations Inclusion in the Canadian Context." *Social Inclusion* 1, 1 (2013): 21.

will be viewing Idle No More as a social movement, as it focused more broadly on Indigenous rights. Clifford Bob argues that in order for a social movement to gain outside support and access resources, they must fit into a "trendy" social movement issue within that particular time and space.[32] The Idle No More movement became an essential resource for the Elsipogtog protest actors as it already had Canada's attention on Indigenous rights and the issues First Nations people were facing. With the resources of Idle No More and social media, a series of solidarity protests and rallies took place across the country and abroad in support of the Elsipogtog protest.[33] Using the social media hashtag #ShutDownCanada on December 2, 2013, supporters gathered in a day of solidarity in various cities including Houston, Montreal, Vancouver and Halifax.[34]

In addition to Idle No More, Mi'kmaq were able to mobilize their attachment to the land, and treaty rights as resources. The Elsipogtog protest raised important questions in regard to whether the government was honoring these agreements. There were no terms within Peace and Friendship Treaties ceding the territory of Mi'maw'ki to the British. This increases the power of these treaties to enact justice for this protest as the territory in question remains unceded land.[35] Treaties of Peace and Friendship were signed between the British and Mi'kmaq, Maliseet, and Passamaquoddy between 1720 and 1752[36] The Peace and Friendship treaties aimed to create an alliance between the Mi'kmaq, Maliseet, and Passamaquoddy and the British to secure trade relations and ensure the Indigenous groups did not bear arms against the British.[37] Mi'kmaq,

---

[32] Bob, *The Marketing of Rebellion,* 31.

[33] Robert Devet, "Halifax takes to the street in protest of RCMP actions in Elsipogtog." *Halifax Media Co-op,* October 19, 2013, par 1; McSorley, Tim. "Wave of #ShutDownCanada Actions Shows Support for Anti-Fracking in Elsipogtog." *The Media Co-op,* December 4, 2013, par 1.

[34] McSorley, "Wave of #ShutDownCanada Actions Shows Support for Anti-Fracking in Elsipogtog," par 5.

[35] William. C Wicken, *The colonization of mi'kmaw memory and history, 1794-1928: The King v. Gabriel Sylliboy.* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 155; Issac, Thomas. *Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in the Maritimes: The Marshall Decision and Beyond.* (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing Ltd, 2001), 30.

[36] Wicken, *The colonization of Mi'kmaw memory and history,* 9; Issac, *Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in the Maritimes,* 50.

[37] Geoffery Plank, *Unsettled Conquest.* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2003), 70; Wicken, *The colonization of Mi'kmaw memory and history,* 9.

Maliseet, and Passamaquoddy were in control of their natural resources prior to British colonization;[38] however, with the signing of treaties these Indigenous communities relinquished a degree of control over their resources.

Indigenous peoples have a deep attachment and familiarity with their land and waters as well as an awareness of other living elements in their environment.[39] Despite this, colonial and assimilatory policies, such as the Royal Proclamation 1763, the implementation of the Indian Residential School system and the Indian Act, meant that "First Nations have gone from being the richest peoples in the world to the most impoverished, as their lands, resources, and ways of being were stolen from them."[40]

Compared to post-confederation treaties, Peace and Friendship Treaties are less concerned with resource development. Many Numbered Treaties specify what kind of resource development can and cannot occur on treaty land. Peace and Friendship Treaties were not designed for this purpose.[41] To support the use of treaties as a resource to enact justice, I look to the case of the Supreme Court of Canada Marshall Decisions. In 1999, Donald Marshall Jr. was charged with the illegally fishing for eel in a closed season and without a proper license in Nova Scotia. Marshall maintained that the fishing was within his rights according to Peace and Friendship Treaties signed in 1760 and 1761 between the Mi'kmaq and the British Crown.[42] The Supreme Court of Canada established that Mi'kmaq, Maliseet, and Passamaquoddy have a treaty right to use natural resources for "moderate livelihood" but not for an "open-ended accumulation of wealth."[43] The Marshall Decisions demonstrate how treaties of Peace and Friendship could be implemented in the

[38] Sable, T. & Francis, B. *The Language of this land, Mi'kma'ki.* (Sydney: Cape Breton University Press, 2012), 42.

[39] Krech, S. Reflections on conservation, sustainability, and environmentalism in indigenous North America. *Peace Research Abstracts Journal*, 42, 5 (2005): 79.

[40] Pamela Palmater, Stretched Beyond Human Limits: Death by Poverty in First Nations. *Canadian Review of Social Policy, 65/66*, (2011): 112-3.

[41] Wicken, *The colonization of Mi'kmaw memory and history,* 155.

[42] R. *v.* Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533

[43] R. *v.* Marshall, par 7; Wiber, Melanie, & Milley, Chris. After Marshall: Implementation of Aboriginal Fishing Rights in Atlantic Canada. *Journal of Legal Pluralism,* 55, (2007): 164.

development of the Mi'kmaq fishery.[44] The establishment of treaty rights with the Marshall Decisions have not come into full effect across all Mi'kmaq communities.[45] Despite this, the case remains a successful implementation of the Peace and Friendship Treaties for Mi'kmaq social justice through the employment of the treaties as resources within an Indigenous rights frame.

Ignorance and disregard of treaty agreements was at the heart of the conflict in Elsipogtog. The perpetuation of colonial attitudes toward First Nations peoples and their struggles has resulted from a lack of education among the general population and misrepresentation in the mass media.[46] This has resulted in the government having a tendency to place blame on First Nation communities for their problems and distance themselves from responsibilities that result from colonialism and governmental policies that position First Nations in their present-day struggles.[47]

Palmater discusses victim blaming in the context of First Nations poverty describing an overall ignorance in society's response to Indigenous issues in Canada.[48] Furthermore, she attributes a general lack of empathy being placed with the First Nations people to the non-Indigenous population in addition to a failure to challenge or demand change from their governments.[49] In Elsipogtog there is less victim blaming and increased unity and solidarity between those to be effected by SWN fracking. There was a shared empathy, concern, and goal to prevent environmental damage and protect the land and waters of New Brunswick. As a result of the frames implemented within the protest itself, there was a different relationship that perpetuated a shared concern for the environment and was not framed solely as a First Nation issue, but one that non-Indigenous people could relate to and demand change. In Elsipogtog, there was increased collaboration with non-Indigenous actors fighting alongside Indigenous Peoples. Though many of these

---

[44] Harald E. L. Prins, The Mi'kmaq: Resistance, Accommodation and Cultural Survival. (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1996), 89; Fox, Gretchen. Mediating Resource Management in the Mi'kmaq Fisheries Canada. *Development,* 49(3), (2006): 122.

[45] Russel L. Barsh, *Netukulimk* Past and Present: Mi'kmaq Ethics and the Atlantic Fishery, *Journal of Canadian Studies, 37,1.* (2002): 30.

[46] Palmater, "Stretched Beyond Human Limits," 123.

[47] Ibid, 113.

[48] Ibid, 118.

[49] Ibid, 118.

actors were present during the Marshall Decision, there has clearly been a change in relationship. At that time many Acadian fishermen did not stand in solidarity with the Mi'kmaq. Acadian fishermen opposed the Marshall decision due to the losses they felt they had incurred.[50] This process demonstrates that social justice is a process. The use of an Indigenous rights frame within the protest was crucial. The shale gas exploration occurred near Elsipogtog First Nation on the treaty land of the Mi'kmaq, Maliseet, and Passamaquoddy. Although specific parts of society disregard Indigenous issues and the government continues to neglect their Peace and Friendship Treaties obligation, the mobilization of resources by the marginalized peoples are able to increase the capacity of their protests and lead to tangible results.

Historic Relations Frame

The mobilization of the Peace and Friendship treaties as resources within the Indigenous rights frame led Acadians to mobilize their own history with the Mi'kmaq as an additional frame for protest in Elsipogtog. While many have focused on Indigenous voice, Acadians were able to employ a frame of historic relations with the Mi'kmaq to enact justice for their connection to the land. I argue here that Acadians are using shared colonial histories, which garnered a similar attachment to the land for the Acadian peoples as a result of the relations with the Mi'kmaq as a frame to solve a similarly shaped problem of social justice and provide solidarity.

Early relationships between the Acadians and the Mi'kmaq were not hostile. In fact, the Mi'kmaq considered themselves superior to Acadians due to the lack of knowledge the Acadians had about the land.[51] The nature of these early relationships were based on land habitation and founded on understandings of land use and occupancy that led to relationships mutuality and reciprocity.[52] The Mi'kmaq also relied on the Acadians for trade goods and weapons, and in exchange, the Acadians relied on the Mi'kmaq for defense against other Europeans.[53] Although the arrival of the British and the imposition of colonial rule disrupted the

[50] Diana Gin, Power without Law: The Supreme Court of Canada, the Marshall Decisions, and the Failure of Judicial Activism. *Ottawa Law Review, 42,* (2010): 3.
[51] Gary. P. Gould, & Semple, Alan. J. *Our land: The Maritimes: the basis of the Indian claim in the Maritime provinces of Canada.* (Fredericton: Saint Annes Point Press, 1980), 2.
[52] Ibid, 2.
[53] Ibid, 3.

strong relations between these two populations, as a result of the shared environmental threat posed by fracking historic alliances resurfaced in the protests at Elsipogtog.

Acadian protestors in Elsipogtog advocated for the recognition of treaty rights under the 1686 treaty of neutrality.[54] This treaty was cited by the Mi'kmaq Women of 8th Fire in a written document to RCMP negotiators on October 2, 2013. They stated: "We are uniting and standing in solidarity with grassroots people to assert our rights. We are also uniting with our Acadian brothers and sisters, who also have Treaty Rights (1686)."[55] This was an attempt on the part of the social actors to align the Acadian and Mi'kmaq histories and land occupation and promote the historic rights frame within the protest. British negotiations with Acadians were rarely treaty based. The 1686 treaty, also known as the Whitehall treaty, was negotiated with the colonies of Acadia and Massachusetts. It was signed by King Louis XIV of France and King James II of England to settle their interests in North America.[56] Although this treaty did not necessarily give Acadians rights comparable to Mi'kmaq treaties, Acadians did make numerous negotiations with the British in the form of oaths and agreements that were largely focused on their neutral position which were less legally binding.

Neutrality became the foundation for Acadians' political position throughout the colonization of Acadia. Acadians wanted to remain politically independent from the British and therefore asserted they would take a neutral position within the colony. This position enabled them to sustain their strong alliance with the Mi'kmaq as they were not required to become British allies. Between 1719 and 1730 there were a number of oaths taken by the Acadians to British authorities pertaining to their claim to political neutrality which emphasized that Acadians would not bear arms against the British.[57] The British were not satisfied

---

[54] Howe, "Women of the 8th Fire lay smack down on RCMP Negotiators," par 5; Griffiths, N. E. S. *From Migrant to Acadian: A North American Border People, 1604–1755.* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005), 137.

[55] Howe, "Women of the 8th Fire lay smack down on RCMP Negotiators," par 5.

[56] John M. Faragher, *A great and noble scheme: The tragic story of the expulsion of the French Acadians from their American Homeland.* (New York: W.W Norton & Co, 2005), 100; Griffiths, *From Migrant to Acadian,* 137.

[57] Maurice Basque, *Atlantic Realities, Acadian Identities, Arcadian Dreams,* in J. G. Reid, et al., *The "Conquest" of Acadia, 1710: Imperial, Colonial, and Aboriginal Constructions.* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 66; Griffiths, *From Migrant to Acadian,* 303-306.

with the Acadian claim to neutrality and became more insistent on Acadians taking oath or pressuring them to become British allies. Acadians became frustrated with their marginal position and began to develop sophisticated way to resist these oaths while sustaining their neutral political position.[58] However, the marginalization of the Acadians by the British ultimately increased their independence as a people and strengthened their identity and political structure.[59] The application of Acadian rights to New Brunswick land alongside the assertion of Mi'kmaq rights validated both frames. Drawing upon pre-colonial relations between the Mi'kmaq and Acadians on the land demonstrated the existence of historic relations and the need for ecological social justice for both groups.

In Rogersville, New Brunswick a group of 60 Acadian, Anglophone and Indigenous people gathered near an active SWN test line that was next to a cemetery. They argued it was disrespectful to their ancestors buried in the cemetery. They also discovered "the presence of traditionally used medicinal plants growing directly next to un-detonated shot holes."[60] This history emphasizes the violation felt by these populations who have coexisted upon these lands for centuries and the fears they share surrounding the resource extractions that has the potential to destroy that land.

Acadians have a strong attachment to the land and its resources rooted in their history of coexistence, close relations and intermarriage with Mi'kmaq. Among Acadians and self-identifying Métis in southwestern Nova Scotia, these early relations were based on a common understanding and mutual respect for land, animals and waters in the territory.[61] Many Acadians and Metis expressed negative views against over consumption of resources through hunting and fishing. Rather, they

---

[58] Faragher, *A great and noble scheme*, 140.

[59] Griffiths, *From Migrant to Acadian*, 260; MacLeod, Katie. K. "Emergence and Progression of Acadian Ethnic and Political Identities: Alliance and Land-Based Inter-Peoples Relations in Early Acadia to Today." *Totem: The University of Western Ontario Journal of Anthropology* 23, 1 (2015): 56.

[60] Howe, Miles. "Uncover RMP crash anti-shale gas press conference, activists remain in woods on 'Line 5.'" *Halifax Media Co-op*, July 23, 2013, par 19.

[61] MacLeod, Katie. K. "Displaced Mixed-Blood: An Ethnographic Exploration of Métis Identities in Nova Scotia." Master's Degree Thesis, Carleton University, Ottawa, May, 2013, 64; Chute, Janet.E. Mi'kmaq fishing in the Maritimes: a historical overview. In *Earth, water, air and fire: studies in Canadian ethnohistory*, (Eds.) D. McNab. (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1998), 102.

focused on sharing, as well as activism against pollution of local lakes and rivers by a company farming minks in the municipality of Clare.[62]
Employing Bourdieuian thought and concept of habitus can provide further understanding for how early ecopolitical relations between the Mi'kmaq and the Acadians are relevant to the current situation in Elsipogtog. Bourdieu defines habitus as:

> a system of lasting transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a *matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions* and makes possible the achievement of infinitely diversified tasks, thanks to analogical transfers of schemes permitting the solution of *similarly shaped problems.*[63]

Bourdieu viewed power as being symbolically created through a social process that shifts over time.[64] The Acadians and the Mi'kmaq were able to employ their respective historic frames (or schemes) to the present day situation at Elsipogtog. We see these two populations with *similarly shaped problems* in the present day that result from similarly shaped histories. This line of thought provides the historical relations between the two populations in conversation with each other in a contemporary context of mobilizing resources for the resolution of a similarly shaped problem whereby historic alliances can benefit their cause. The tendency for both groups to act upon this social problem has been shaped by past events and structures. Transposing the frame of history onto the situation in Elsipogtog allows for Acadians to ally themselves in the Mi'kmaq struggle for ecological social justice and provide a deeper history to what the Mi'kmaq have presented in the mobilization of Peace and Friendship Treaties as resources within the Indigenous rights frame.

Environmental Frame

The environmental frame of justice expands upon the prior discussion of Mi'kmaq and Acadian relationships to territory and environment. The main motivation behind the Elsipogtog protest is the environmental threat. This attracted other local activists. These groups included: 'Our

[62] MacLeod, "Displaced Mixed-Blood," 69.
[63] Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of Practice Theory.* Translated by Richard Nice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977, 83; emphasis added.
[64] Bourdieu, *Outline of Practice Theory,* 83.

Environment, Our Choice'; 'Quality of Life Initiative'; 'Ban Fracking NB'; 'New Brunswickers Against Fracking'; and 'Council of Canadians.'[65] By offering scientific and specified knowledge of how to the protect the environment the presence of these groups increased the resources available to the protest.

On April 30, 2013, a collective of 27 community groups sent an open letter to SWN Resources Canada along with other oil and gas companies that operate in the province. The letter asserted that New Brunswickers did not want hydrocarbon extraction on their lands without their consent.[66] It expressed that "tens of thousands of New Brunswickers, urban and rural; Anglophone, Francophone and Aboriginal" were all of concerned for the water, their health and climate change.[67]

Environmental social actors in opposition to SWN began culminating at the Elsipogtog protest with the increased focus on the negative environmental effects of hydraulic fracking. The combination of an environmental frame with an Indigenous rights frame is common in efforts to seek environmental justice, particularly if that justice has a focus on land.[68] A shift from environmental advocacy to sustainable development in environmental thought and philosophy resulted in the protection of indigenous rights alongside ecological issues.[69]

Brosius describes the use of Penan knowledges, a Maylasian indigenous population, by Western environmentalists in 1987 in resource management material against logging companies. [70] Bob presents a similar case of the Ogoni in Nigeria who employed both environmental and indigenous frames to oppose the operation of the Shell Petroleum Development Company on the land and the Ogoni people beginning in 1958.[71] The alliance between Indigenous peoples and environmentalists

---

[65] T. Wishart, "NB Groups Want the Provincial Government to Heed Their Message." *New Brunswick Environmental Network,* April 10, 2012, par 2. Accessed March 30, 2016 http://www.nben.ca/en/collaborative-action/caucuses/shale-gas-caucus/shale-groups-campaigns-actions/item/283-moncton-fraction-saturday-september-17

[66] Roy MacMullin, "Citizens put exploration company on notice." *Moncton Free Press.* April 30, 2013, par 2.

[67] Ibid, par 6.

[68] B.A. Conkin, & Graham, L.R. Shifting Middle Ground: Amazonian Indians and Eco-Politics. *American Anthropologist, 97*,4, (1995): 696.

[69] Ibid, 697.

[70] Peter J. Brosius, "Environmentalism: Movements, Rhetorics, Representations." *Capitalism Nature Socialism* 8, 4 (1997): 136.

[71] Bob, *The Marketing of Rebellion,* 85.

creates political benefits for both groups of social actors in order to further mobilize.[72]

In a similar fashion, the actors at Elsipogtog employed an environmental frame alongside their Indigenous rights frame. With environmental groups organizing marches and events to draw provincial government attention as early as September 2011, it is evident that they have a significant role in protest.[73] A representative from 'Our Environment, Our Choice' stated:

> It's shameful that our government has not honestly engaged and informed its citizens of the dangers of this industry. We have an intelligent group here. We have done our homework; now the government needs to do the same. It has been reading off of cheat sheets provided by industry. The same tired lines that we're all sick of hearing. The people of New Brunswick have a right to know what we are really facing.[74]

The presence of environmentalists in Elsipogtog allowed the protesters to draw upon a different forms of technical knowledge. The environmental actors within the movement became critically engaged with voicing the harmful effects of hydraulic fracturing and the problematic position of the government. Sewell argues that agency is located in the capacity to use language. [75] Therefore, with the mobilization of knowledge and language within the environmental frame provides social actors with increased agency. Scientific knowledge provides them with a language that the colonial structure is more familiar with than the one being enacted within the Indigenous rights frame. Thus it increases their overall agency as a collective group of actors.
Conversely, many New Brunswick residents are turning to Mi'kmaq for information on the effects that shale gas exploration may have on their land and waters.[76] Using Mi'kmaq knowledge in conjunction with

---

[72] Conkin and Graham, "Shifting Middle Ground," 696; Bob, *The Marketing of Rebellion,* 114.
[73] T. Wishart, "NB Groups Want the Provincial Government to Heed Their Message," par 2.
[74] Ibid, par 3.
[75] Sewell, *The Logics of History,* 144.
[76] Jorge Barrera, "NB residents turn to Mi'kmaq as environmental concerns bubble to surface in wake of shale gas exploration." *APTN National News,* November 18, 2013, par 5.

environmental knowledge allows for more effective protests. Indigenous knowledge systems can be interpreted and used in polices by environmentalists; however, it is best done in consultation with Indigenous knowledge keepers and without exposing traditional elements that should not be shared publically.[77] The co-existence of these knowledge systems and the collaboration of environmentalists with Indigenous populations provided a cohesive and united message at the Elsipogtog protest.

Conclusion

Isabelle Knockwood, a Mi'kmaw Elder, asserts there is a cultural divide between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in Canada and it is important for every actor seeking to analyze the current state of Indigenous issues in Canada to know their relation to other people and issues in the country.[78] Michael Asch takes a similar approach to Indigenous-Settler relations in Canada as he maintains that we must 'find a place to stand' in order to engage in a conversation of coexistence.[79] There is an overall need to work together to transform the structure of the Canadian state; the unity between Indigenous and non-Indigenous actors at Elsipogtog is a good place to start.

Drawing upon Anthony Giddens, Sewell states: "if enough people, or even a few people who are powerful enough, act in innovative ways, their action may have the consequence of transforming the very structure that gave them the capacity to act."[80] Similarly, Bob maintains that social movements can borrow frames and alter the movements' goals in order to gain access to further resources. I argue this phenomenon is intensified in Elsipogtog. Rather than a heterogeneous group of actors borrowing frames and applying them to social actors the movement does not necessarily represent, in Elsipogtog there are a number of actors from diverse groups of actors collectively drawing upon their respective frames in order to enact justice. Unified actors central to the protest's ability to mobilize resources. This united front is aptly represented in an image by

---

[77] Brosius, "Environmentalism," 136.

[78] Isabelle Knockwood, "Mi'kmaw Women and Social Justice: Teaching and Talking Circle." *Helen Ralston Memorial Lecture,* Saint Mary's University, Halifax, NS, December, 6, 2013.

[79] Michael Asch, Indigenous Self-Determination and Applied Anthropology in Canada: Finding a Place to Stand. *Anthropologica, 43(2),* (2001): 206.

[80] Sewell, *The Logics of History,* 127.

Edward Kwong, which was reminiscent of WWII propaganda images. The image shows three protestors each bearing a flag: from left to right are the New Brunswick flag, the Mi'kmaq flag, and the Acadian flag. The image was shared on social media during the protests and mounted upon signs on the ground, reading "United Against Fracking: Solidarity with New Brunswick."

While all actors have agency, their actions will differ significantly due to social positions, and access to frames and resources.[81] I contend that due to the range of actors participating in the Elsipogtog protest and the range of resources mobilized and frames transposed increased the overall agency and chances of social transformation. The innovative ways frames are employed, as described by both Bob[82] and Sewell, focuses on how actors were able to outline goals and gain resources in order to transform the structure.[83] It was through the application of these multiple frames and resources in a unified protest of against SWN shale gas exploration to enact social change within the structure of the Canadian State itself. The protest in Elsipogtog was successful in gaining national attention. On December 6, 2013, Elizabeth May, Green Party MP for Sannich-Gulf Islands, questioned former Prime Minster Stephen Harper about Canada's role in consulting with First Nations on resource development with reference to a government-sponsored report tabled from the special envoy for west-coast energy projects.[84] Reading from the report May stated:

> Aboriginal communities hold constitutionally protected rights. The law requires that those rights be taken into account. Mr. Speaker, in the context of the increasing tensions in New Brunswick, in the fracking protests there, does the Prime Minster recognize that he is legally bound to ensure that the Mi'kmaq of Elsipogtog are fully consulted in advance of any fracking on their unceded territory?[85]

---

[81] Sewell, *The Logics of History,* 136.
[82] Bob, *The Marketing of Rebellion,* 46.
[83] Sewell, *The Logics of History,* 132.
[84] "Elsipogtog comes up in Question Period." *APTN National News.* December 6, 2013, par 1.
[85] Elizabeth May, House of Commons Debates 147, 031, Natural Resources. December 5, 2013, 1455.

This attention at the national level and questions about the government's role in resource development on treaty or First Nations land is evidence of success of the Indigenous rights frame that was used within the protest at Elsipogtog. However, with this as the dominant discourse around the protests at Elsipogtog, the other actors in the protest fall to the way side. In the former Prime Minster's response to May he noted that consultations with the Aboriginal People of Canada are part of the responsible resource development initiatives and that within the commission of the tabled report, he hoped to increase participation and benefit for Indigenous Peoples with regard to resource development on or near their territories.

On December 6, 2013 SWN withdrew from Highway 134 as they had completed "seismic acquisitions program in New Brunswick" until 2015.[86] Elsipogtog War Chief John Levi cautions any celebration with the departure of SWN:

> We can't allow any drilling, we didn't allow them to do the testing from the beginning, we went through a lot. We need some time for this to sink in and think about everything, think about what we went through…People did a lot of sacrificing.[87]

Through employing the frames by the various actors described above to gain access to a variety of resources the actors were successful in increasing their own agency as social justice actors and increase the power of the resources.[88] The movement against shale gas exploration was effective as SWN did not continue with fracking plans in the region.[89] There have been positive developments within the province of New Brunswick related to the future of fracking in the province. In December 2014, there was a moratorium on fracking that will only be lifted upon approval of New Brunswickers.[90] The conditions of the moratorium include:

- "A "social licence" be established through consultations to lift the moratorium;

---

[86] "SWN ending exploration work in NB, will be back in 2015: Elsipogtog War Chief Levi." *APTN National News.* December 6, 2013, par 6.
[87] Ibid, par 12.
[88] Sewell, *The Logics of History,* 143.
[89] Howe, *Debriefing Elsipogtog,* 180.
[90] Alan White, "SWN Resources closes Moncton office." *CBC News*, March 17, 2016, par 2.

- Clear and credible information on the impacts on air, health and water so a regulatory regime can be developed;
- A plan to mitigate impacts on public infrastructure and address issues such as waste water disposal is established;
- A process is in place to fulfill the province's obligation to consult with First Nations;
- A "proper royalty structure" is established to ensure benefits are maximized for New Brunswickers"[91]

In March 2016, SWN Resources Canada closed their office in Moncton, New Brunswick. Although the closure of the office does not completely remove SWN activity from the region, the withdrawal from the province came as a result and impact of the moratorium.[92] A representative from SWN Resources, Christina Fowler, noted:

> Uncertainty over the timetable for developing this project has reduced the need for an office in the province at this time. While this uncertainty continues, we will oversee this project from our headquarters in Houston.[93]

Additionally, the New Brunswick government has established a commission to study the impacts of hydraulic fracturing in the province.

The situation at Elsipogtog involved a unified collective of Mi'kmaq, Acadian, environmentalist and other Maritimers.[94] Furthermore, it brought attention to the importance of Indigenous rights within movements for ecological justice and anti-capitalist struggles. Placing Elsipogtog in alignment with other Indigenous struggles in Canada provides us with a greater understanding of how the Canadian state responds to social movements.[95] Recognition is an important step toward social justice. Recognition of Indigenous rights requires

[91] "Shale gas moratorium details unveiled by Brian Gallant." *CBC News.* December 18, 2014, par 6.
[92] White, "SWN Resources closes Moncton office," par 1-3.
[93] Ibid, par 3.
[94] Lindsay, "A Show of Unity and Solidarity," par 2.
[95] Asch, "Indigenous Self-Determination and Applied Anthropology in Canada," 206; Alfred Taiaiake and Jeff Corntassel, "Being Indigenous: Resurgences against Contemporary Colonialism." *Government and Opposition,* 40 4 (2005): 597.

acknowledgement by the state.[96] Although national attention did not represent all the social actors and frames, the attention it has gained through the Indigenous rights frame is a step in the right direction to social justice and changing state politics in terms of resource exploration and development.

[96] Glen. S. Coulthard, Subjects of Empire: Indigenous Peoples and the 'Politics of Recognition' in Canada. *Contemporary Political Theory,* 6, (2007): 438.

Works Cited

APTN National News. "Elsipogtog comes up in Question Period." *APTN National News.* December 6, 2013. Accessed March 30, 2016. http://aptn.ca/news/2013/12/06/elsipogtog-comes-question-period/

APTN National News. "SWN ending exploration work in NB, will be back in 2015: Elsipogtog War Chief Levi." *APTN National News.* December 6, 2013. Accessed March 30, 2016. http://aptn.ca/news/2013/12/06/swn-ending-exploration-work-nb-back-2015-war-chief-levi/

Alfred, Taiaiake, and Jeff Corntassel. "Being Indigenous: Resurgences against Contemporary Colonialism." *Government and Opposition,* 40, 4 (2005): 597-614.

Asch, Michael. Indigenous Self-Determination and Applied Anthropology in Canada: Finding a Place to Stand. *Anthropologica*, 43, 2, (2001): 201-207.

Bamberger, Michelle, and Robert E. Oswald. "Long-term impacts of unconventional drilling operations on human and animal health." *Journal of Environmental Science and Health.* 50, 5 (2015): 447-459.

Barsh, R. L. *Netukulimk* Past and Present: Mi'kmaq Ethics and the Atlantic Fishery, *Journal of Canadian Studies,* 37, 1, (2002): 15-42.

Barrera, Jorge. "NB residents turn to Mi'kmaq as environmental concerns bubble to surface in wake of shale gas exploration." *APTN National News.* November 18, 2013. Accessed March 30, 2016. http://aptn.ca/news/2013/11/18/nb-residents-turn-mikmaq-environmental-concerns-bubble-surface-wake-shale-gasexploration/

Basque, Maurice. *Atlantic Realities, Acadian Identities, Arcadian Dreams*, in J. G. Reid, et al., *The "Conquest" of Acadia, 1710: Imperial, Colonial, and Aboriginal Constructions.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004.

Bharadwaj, Lalita, and Bernard D. Goldstein. "Shale gas development in Canada: What are the potential health effects?" *Canadian Medical Association Journal* (2014): cmaj-140599.

Bob, Clifford. *The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International Activism.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Bourdieu, Pierre. *Outline of Practice Theory.* Translated by Richard Nice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Brosius, J. Peter. "Environmentalism: Movements, Rhetorics, Representations." *Capitalism Nature Socialism* 8, 4 (1997): 135-49.

Čapek, Stella M. "The "Environmental Justice" Frame: A Conceptual Discussion and an Application." *Social Problems* 40, 1 (1993): 5-24.

CBC News. "Shale gas moratorium details unveiled by Brian Gallant." *CBC News.* December 18, 2014. Accessed March 30, 2016. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/new-brunswick/shale-gas-moratorium-details-unveiled-by-brian-gallant-1.2877440

Chute, Janet. E. Mi'kmaq fishing in the Maritimes: a historical overview. In *Earth, water, air and fire: studies in Canadian ethnohistory*, (Eds.) D. McNab. (95-114). Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1998.

Coates, Ken. Breathing New Life into Treaties: History, Politics, the Law andAboriginal Grievances in Canada's Maritime Provinces. *Agricultural History,* 77, 2 (2003): 33-354

Conkin, Beth A., & Graham, Laura R. Shifting Middle Ground: Amazonian Indians and Eco-Politics. *American Anthropologist, 97*, 4, (1995): 695-710.

Coulthard, Glen. S. Subjects of Empire: Indigenous Peoples and the 'Politics of Recognition' in Canada. *Contemporary Political Theory,* 6, (2007): 437-460

Devet, Robert. "Halifax takes to the street in protest of RCMP actions in Elsipogtog." *Halifax Media Co-op,* October 19, 2013. Accessed March 30, 2016. http://halifax.mediacoop.ca/story/halifax-takes-street-protest-rcmp-actions-elsipogt/19367.

Faragher, John. M. *A great and noble scheme: The tragic story of the expulsion of the French Acadians from their American Homeland.* New York: W.W Norton & Co, 2005.

Finkel, Madelon L., and Adam Law. "The rush to drill for natural gas: a public health cautionary tale." *American Journal of Public Health* 101, 5 (2011): 784-785.

Fox, G. Mediating Resource Management in the Mi'kmaq Fisheries Canada. *Development,* 49, 3 (2006): 119-124

Gin, Diana. Power without Law: The Supreme Court of Canada, the Marshall Decisions, and the Failure of Judicial Activism. *Ottawa Law Review, 42,* (2010): 1-7

Goffman, Erving. *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience.* New York: Harper & Row, 1974.

Gould, Gary. P., & Semple, Alan. J. *Our land: The Maritimes : the basis of the Indian claim in the Maritime provinces of Canada.* Fredericton: Saint Annes Point Press, 1980.

Griffiths, Naomi. E. S. *From Migrant to Acadian: A North American Border People, 1604-1755.* Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005.

Howe, Miles. *Debriefing Elsipogtog: The Anatomy of a Struggle.* Halifax: Fernwood Publishing Company, 2015.

Howe, Miles. "8 Women of the 8th Fire lay smack down on RCMP Negotiators." *Halifax Media Co-op.* October 2, 2013. Accessed March 30, 2016. http://halifax.mediacoop.ca/fr/story/8-women-8th-fire-lay-treaty-law-smack-down-rcmp-ne/19103

————. "Uncover RMP crash anti-shale gas press conference, activists remain in woods on 'Line 5.'" *Halifax Media Co-op.* July 23, 2013. Accessed March 30, 2016 http://halifax.mediacoop.ca/story/undercover-rcmp-crash-anti-shale-gas-press-confere/18362

Issac, T. *Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in the Maritimes: The Marshall Decision and Beyond.* Saskatoon: Purich Publishing Ltd, 2001.

Jackson, Robert B., Avner Vengosh, J. William Carey, Richard J. Davies, Thomas H. Darrah, Francis O'Sullivan, and Gabrielle Ptron. "The Environmental Costs and Benefits of Fracking." *Annual Review of Environment and Resources* 39 (2014): 327-62.

Jenkins, J. Craig. "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements." *Annual Review of Sociology* 9 (1983): 527-53

Knockwood, Isabelle. Mi'kmaw Women and Social Justice: Teaching and Talking Circle. Helen Ralston Memorial Lecture, December 6, 2013. Saint Mary's University, Halifax, NS.

Krech, S. Reflections on conservation, sustainability, and environmentalism in Indigenous North America. *Peace Research Abstracts Journal* 42, 5 (2005): 78-86.

Lindsay, Hillary B. A Show of Unity and Solidarity. *Halifax Media Co-Op.* November 25, 2013. Accessed March 30, 2016. http://halifax.mediacoop.ca/story/show-unity-and-solidarity/20038

MacLeod, Katie K. "Emergence and Progression of Acadian Ethnic and Political Identities: Alliance and Land-Based Inter-Peoples Relations in Early Acadia to Today." *Totem: The University of Western Ontario Journal of Anthropology* 23, 1 (2015): 7.

———. "Displaced Mixed-Blood: An Ethnographic Exploration of Métis Identities in Nova Scotia." Master's Degree Thesis, Carleton University, Ottawa, May, 2013.

MacMullin, Roy. "Citizens put exploration company on notice." *Moncton Free Press.* April 30, 2013. Accessed March 30, 2016. https://monctonfreepress.ca/post/13423

May, Elizabeth. House of Commons Debates 147, 031, Natural Resources. December 5, 2013, 1455. Accessed March 30, 2016. http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Doc=31&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=41&Pub=Hansard&Ses=2

McCarthy, John D., and Mayer N. Zald. "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory". *American Journal of Sociology* 82 6 (1977): 1212–41.

McSorley, Tim. "Wave of #ShutDownCanada Actions Shows Support for Anti-Fracking in Elsipogtog." *The Media Co-op,* December 4, 2013. Accessed March 30, 2016. http://www.mediacoop.ca/photo/shutdowncanada/20212

Palmater, Pamela. Stretched Beyond Human Limits: Death By Poverty in First Nations. *Canadian Review of Social Policy, 65/66*, (2011): 112-127.

Patten, Melanie. "Elsipogtog First Nation Sees Violence as RCMP Moves to End Protest." *The Canadian Press,* October 17, 2013. Accessed March 30, 2016. http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2013/10/17/elsipogtog-photos-rcmp-protest-violence_n_4114506.html

Plank, Geoffery. *Unsettled Conquest.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2003.

Prins, Harald E. L. The Mi'kmaq: Resistance, Accommodation and Cultural Survival. Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1996.

R. *v.* Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533.

Sable, Trudy. & Francis, Bernard. *The Language of this land, Mi'kma'ki.* Sydney: Cape Breton University Press, 2012.

Sewell (Jr), William H. *The Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.

Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford, Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation." *American Sociological Review* 51, (1986): 464-81.

Snow, David A., and Robert D. Benford. "Master frames and cycles of protest." *Frontiers in social movement theory* (1992): 133-155.

Spellman, Frank. R. *Environment Impacts of Hydraulic Fracturing.* CRC Press, 2012.

Turner, Ralph. "Figure and ground analysis of social movements." *Symbolic Interaction,* 6 *(*1983): 175-86.

White, Alan. "SWN Resources closes Moncton office." *CBC News*, March 17, 2016. Accessed March 30, 2016. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/new-brunswick/swn- resources-moncton-office-closure-1.3495214

Wiber, Melanie., & Milley, Chris. After Marshall: Implementation of Aboriginal Fishing Rights in Atlantic Canada. *Journal of Legal Pluralism,* 55, (2007) : 163-186

Wicken, William. C. *The colonization of mi'kmaw memory and history, 1794-1928 :The king v. gabriel sylliboy.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012.

Wishart, T. "NB Groups Want the Provincial Government to Heed Their Message." *New Brunswick Environmental Network,* April 10, 2012. Accessed March 30, 2016. http://www.nben.ca/en/collaborative-action/caucuses/shale-gas-caucus/shale-groups-campaigns-actions/item/283-moncton-fraction-saturday-september-17

Wotherspoon, Terry, and John Hansen. "The" Idle No More" Movement: Paradoxes of First Nations Inclusion in the Canadian Context." *Social Inclusion* 1, 1 (2013): 21.

The Power of Silence: Shifting Perceptions of the Silent Sentinels in 1917

Chelsea Barranger
Ph.D. Candidate in History at McMaster University

On January 10 1917, members of the National Woman's Party (NWP) began a year-long campaign of picketing the White House for women's suffrage. Initially, the Wilson administration, the press and general public considered them a mild nuisance and dubbed the women 'Silent Sentinels,' and 'iron jawed angels. The perception and treatment of the Sentinels changed upon America's entry into World War One on April 6 1917. Following the NWP's decision to continue focussing solely on attaining a suffrage amendment rather than supporting the war effort, the press and the Wilson administration became more critical of the picketers' protests. Further, from June to November 1917, the picketers were subjected to increasing levels of violence, after unveiling banners bearing messages deemed unpatriotic, such as comparing President Woodrow Wilson to the German Kaiser.[1] The sustained violence to which these women were subjected has often been characterized as a symptom of war hysteria.[2] War hysteria is a term used to describe public tension and elevated patriotic feeling in times of war. However, war hysteria alone does not explain why the picketers continued to face violence and repression even after doing away with the aforementioned banners. It also does not explain why the public and press, who quickly endorsed violence against these women, shifted to criticizing said violence by the end of 1917. Nor does it explain President Woodrow Wilson's sudden support for woman's suffrage in January 1918. Lastly, it does not explain why the picketers were eventually treated in a more benevolent manner than pacifists and 'enemy aliens.'

[1]Sally Hunter Graham, "Woodrow Wilson, Alice Paul, and the Woman Suffrage Movement," *Political Science Quarterly* vol. 98, no. 4 (Winter 1983-1984): pp. 667, 673.
[2]Christopher Capozzola, *Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the Modern American Citizen* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 111-3; Linda G. Ford, *Iron Jawed Angels: The Suffrage Militancy of the National Woman's Party, 1912-1920* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1991), p. 147.

Understanding the sudden shift in attitude towards the NWP picketers requires an analysis of not only war hysteria but also gender. The most prominent gender ideology of the period was the belief in a natural binary in which males and females were defined in opposition to one another. Men and women were not only defined by their physical biology, but also according to cultural constructions of appropriate gender roles/behaviours.[3] Men were considered physically strong and rational, making them the logical protectors and providers for women.[4] Women were considered emotional, frail, and best suited to the role of wife and mother due to their biological capabilities.[5] Appropriate roles for men and women were often categorized according to the separation of public and private spheres. The public sphere was defined as outside the home and included paid employment and politics.[6] Involvement in the public sphere was tied to the notion that education, status, and political power required a strong and therefore 'male' body.[7] Women were relegated to the private sphere of the home, where they were expected to run the house and raise children.[8] It was the job of the wife and mother to create a respectable and moral home. Historian Barbara Welter argues that in the United States 'true womanhood' or 'ideal femininity' was defined in terms of "piety, purity, submissiveness and domesticity."[9] White, Protestant, middle to upper class women were expected to fulfill this 'ideal femininity.' Due to its association with gambling, drinking and prostitution, the public sphere was deemed immoral and an inappropriate place for respectable women. Men feared that the entry of women into the public sphere could lead to women abandoning their natural role as wife and mother, resulting in the

---

[3]Joan Wallach Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History* (New York: Columbia University, 1988), p. 32.

[4]Aileen S. Kraditor, *The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 1890-1920* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1981), pp. 15, 18, 20.

[5]Ibid, p. 24.

[6]Belinda A. Stillion Southard, "Militancy, Power and Identity: The Silent Sentinels as Women Fighting for the Political Vote," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* vol. 10 no. 3 (2007): p. 402.

[7]Gail Bederman, *Manliness & Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880-1917* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 14.

[8]Cathleen Nista Rauterkus, *Go Get Mother's Picket Sign: Crossing Spheres with the Material Culture of Suffrage* (New York: University of America, Inc., 2010), p. 3.

[9]Barbara Welter, "The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860," *American Quarterly* Vol. 18, No. 2, Part 1 (Summer, 1996): p. 152.

breakdown of the family.[10] The male establishment barred women from participation in the political system by arguing that political participation, be it involvement in the electoral process or public demonstrations, would be too stressful and taxing on the delicate constitutions of women.[11] While public men were considered virtuous and honorable, public women were considered '"vile and sexually suspect."[12]

According to gender theorist Judith Butler, gender identity is not stable or fixed, but rather a construction in which "bodily gestures, movements, and styles of various kinds constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self."[13] By continuing to 'perform' or behave in a manner considered 'appropriate' to one's gender, the ideology that men and women were naturally distinct became embedded into society. The more embedded the belief in these roles, the more likely one would be punished for not conforming to them.[14] Gender historian Joan Wallach Scott argues that the reinforcing of these gender roles can reveal a great deal about social relationships and power dynamics. [15] By defining women as weak and irrational men were able to assert that it was only natural that they alone held the power in society and legitimized women's exclusion from political processes. Suffragists, such as the members of the NWP, were dubbed 'militant' and 'radical' by the press due to their beliefs that women should have fundamental rights equal to men, and their greater willingness to engage in public protests and acts of civil disobedience (picketing). Historian Gail Bederman argues that the suffragists' attempts to enter the public sphere challenged white middle and upper class male belief "that they alone should control the nation's destiny."[16] The NWP's refusal to end their picketing upon America's entry into the war and use of banners critical of the Presidential administration not only embarrassed but threatened the established patriarchy of the country. As a result, the Wilson administration and press sought to 'silence' and suppress these women. War hysteria became

---

[10]Jane Jerome Camhi, *Women Against Women: American Anti-Suffragism, 1880-1920* (New York: Carlson Publishing Inc., 1994), p. 19; Bederman, pp. 14, 20.
[11]Kraditor, pp. 18, 20.
[12]Linda Lumsden, *Rampant Women: Suffragists and the Right of Assembly* (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1997), p. xviii.
[13]Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 178-9.
[14]Ibid.
[15]Scott, pp. 42-3, 48-9.
[16]Bederman, p. 15.

a convenient tool to rally the support of the general public to punish and teach the picketers about their 'proper place' in society – the home.

The NWP believed that the vote for women was a natural right and that its provision would create a better society. Far from destroying the family, female participation in politics would strengthen it. The suffragists believed that through political participation women could be better mothers as they could not only teach their children civic responsibility but be an example of it.[17] The vote would also make them more equal to their husbands, leading to stronger marriages.[18] Two of the most prominent American suffragist organizations of the period were the NWP and the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA). The membership of both organizations was composed of prominent white Protestant women of the middle and upper classes.[19] NAWSA was the larger of the two suffrage organizations. Its members favoured a co-operative approach with the government and focussed on the creation of petitions and developing connections with prominent male politicians.[20] The NWP was a smaller organization that attracted women who wished to engage in more active forms of attaining the vote, such as parades and theatrical demonstrations. Despite the efforts of both groups, President Wilson informed American suffragists in 1913 and in 1917 that he would not support passing a suffrage amendment unless his party asked him to do so.[21] Wilson did not fully support women attaining suffrage and often expressed similar sentiments to the above to appease or evade suffrage groups.[22]

Having been repeatedly denied support by the President, the leadership of the NWP decided to change their tactics.[23] The President had to be convinced to endorse suffrage. Since the home was considered the 'proper place' of women, the NWP took their cause to the home of the President – the White House. The NWP began picketing the White

[17]Lumsden, *Rampant Women*, pp. 55-6.
[18]Ibid.
[19]Rauterkus, *Go Get Mother's Picket Sign,* p. 14; Mary Chapman, *Making Noise, Making News: Suffrage Print Culture and U.S. Modernism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 57.
[20]Christine A. Lunardini, *Women's Rights* (Phoenix, AZ: Oryx Press, 1996), p. 99.
[21]Inez Hayes Irwin, *The Story of Alice Paul and the National Woman's Party* (Virginia: Denlinger's Publishers, LTD., 1997), p. 199; "'Picket' White House: Suffragists, After Futile Appeal Announce Daily Vigil," *The Washington Post*, January 10 1917.
[22]Capozzola, p. 108.
[23]Lunardini, p. 99.

House on January 10 1917. The Sentinels would stand silently at the gates of the White House wearing sashes in the colours of the suffrage party (purple, gold and white) and bearing banners. Their goal was to remind the President of their cause every time he entered and left the White House.

Picketing and public oration were considered the political tools of men.[24] By picketing, these women were engaging in a behaviour deemed masculine. In her memoir, *Jailed for Freedom*, Doris Stevens, a NWP member and picketer, recalled how even supportive husbands of suffragists were uncomfortable with their wives picketing as it was not "ladylike."[25] The NWP leadership understood that for their protest to be accepted and gain support, they needed to maintain certain gender roles to ease the fears of the male population.

One of the first goals of the NWP was to counter the argument that picketing would reduce their femininity. The women of the NWP challenged these views by ensuring that the majority of women picketing the White House were young and attractive. The NWP paper, *The Suffragist*, routinely discussed the picketers in terms of their age and beauty, calling them young, lovely, gorgeous, demure and even serene in numerous articles.[26] By emphasizing the youth and beauty of its picketers, the NWP challenged the conception that participation in the public sphere masculinized women and made them unattractive. This tactic proved to be successful. Newspapers often discussed the youth and beauty of the picketers. *The Washington Post* described picketer Miss Hazel Hunkins as "pretty and 23" and strong in her "earnest conviction" for suffrage.[27]

The NWP also employed silent protest. As mentioned previously, oration was considered a political tool of men. Silence was associated with women, as it represented passivity, submissiveness and inferiority.[28] Women lacked a voice in the American political arena. Women were

---

[24]Chapman, p. 57.

[25]Doris Stevens, *Jailed for Freedom* (Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1971), p. 69.

[26]"Suffragists Wait at the White House for Action," *The Suffragist*, January 17 1917; "The Seventh Week of the Suffrage Picket," *The Suffragist*, March 3 1917; Stillion Southard, p. 403.

[27]"Vassar Suffrage Sentinel Tells What It Is to Picket White House," *The Washington Post*, January 29 1917.

[28]Stillion Southard, p. 405; Cheryl Glenn, *Unspoken: A Rhetoric of Silence* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2004), p. 10; Welter, pp. 158-9.

listed, like children, as the dependents of men. It was believed that when a father or husband voted, he did not vote solely for himself, but also in the interest of his dependents.[29] The picketers' silence loudly drew attention to their lack of a political voice. By placing themselves in the public's eye these women used their bodies to defy the submissiveness associated with female silence, by boldly inviting the public to gaze at their attractive female bodies. The youth and beauty of the white middle to upper class picketers, combined with the bright colours of their sashes demanded attention. Historian Mary Chapman argues that the silent protest of the picketers reworked their political silence into an effective tool that challenged the state's refusal to allow women to speak or engage in dialogue regarding a suffrage amendment.[30] Through beauty and silence the NWP picketers simultaneously enforced and challenged the gender roles that barred their participation in the political process. Although silent, the actions of the picketers spoke loudly.

The initial response of the Wilson administration and general public towards the picketers from January through to April 1917 was respectful. NWP tactics helped reduce criticisms regarding the masculinisation or immoral character of the picketers. Due to the class of the women, men were still expected to treat the picketers politely and respectfully. *The Suffragist* recorded incidents of numerous men taking off their hats in the presence of the picketers and offering encouraging comments such as "keep it up."[31] Visitors to the capital watched the pickets, cheered them on and even asked to hold their banners.[32] An article in *The Suffragist* reported that the police always smiled at them and joked that the picketers were "sharing the same beat."[33] At the start of 1917 even President Wilson treated the women in a courteous fashion. He was seen numerous times tipping his hat to the women as he left the White House and offered them warmth inside the White House on a particularly cold day in January.[34]

---

[29]Bederman, p. 20; Kraditor, p. 24.

[30]Chapman, pp. 58, 77.

[31]"Suffragists Wait at the White House for Action," *The Suffragist*, January 17 1917; "Fourth Week of the White House Guard," *The Suffragist*, February 7 1917; "Labor Day on the Picket Line," *The Suffragist*, February 24 1917.

[32]"Fourth Week of the White House Guard," *The Suffragist*, February 7 1917; "The Seventh Week of the Suffrage Picket," *The Suffragist*, March 3 1917.

[33]"The Seventh Week of the Suffrage Picket," *The Suffragist*, March 3 1917.

[34]"President Offers Shelter to 'Pickets': Invites Suffragist Sentinels into White House to Get Warm, but they Decline," *The New York Times*, January 12 1917.

Newspapers, especially *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post,* were dismissive and generally opposed to the picketers.[35] A January 11 1917 article in *The New York Times* stated: "That the female mind is inferior to the male mind need not be assumed," and that "votes for women would constitute a political danger is or ought to be plain to everybody."[36] The article accused the picketers of being "petty," for attempting to use duress to push their agenda where argument had failed.[37] *The Washington Post* also accused the picketers of engaging in "retaliation" because the President would not support their suffrage amendment.[38] At the end of January 1917 *The Washington Post* published an article about the NWP failing to pay its rent for the picket's campaign headquarters. The article accused the women of being too busy "heckling" to notice that their rent was due. It described NWP efforts to secure the funds as "scurrying around the city."[39] The article mocked the picketers as mere hecklers who were not responsible enough to pay their rent; as such, how could they be trusted to vote? By using the term 'scurrying' the article alludes that the women, like vermin, are undesirable pests. In an interview with an NWP picketer, Miss Hunkins, *The Washington Post* included coverage of the "comic nature" of a little boy who taunted and jeered the women.[40] The seriousness of the protest was reduced to the mocking image of women unable to deal with a little boy. Both newspapers presented the NWP picketers as inferior, childish and not belonging in the realm of politics. Despite the dismissive and mocking nature of the press, the picketers were viewed by the administration and general public as being peaceful, if mildly annoying. No large protests or public outcries were evident between January and April of 1917, but the respectful and at times dismissive treatment of the picketers turned violent following America's entry into World War One.

---

[35]This paper relies heavily on two major newspapers of the period, *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post,* not as a reflection of public opinion but rather the elites' conception of the way society ought to be. Thus, they are very useful for analyzing what were perceived to be acceptable gender norms of the period.

[36]"Silent, Silly, and Offensive," *The New York Times,* January 11 1917.

[37]Ibid.

[38]"Picket' White House: Suffragists, After Futile Appeal Announce Daily Vigil," *The Washington Post,* January 10 1917.

[39]"Suffragists Forget Big Rent: Overlook about $4,000 for Home, as Pickets Guard the White House," *The Washington Post*, January 21 1917.

[40]"Vassar Suffrage Sentinel Tells What It Is to Picket White House," *The Washington Post*, January 29 1917.

On April 6 1917 the United States declared war on Germany. Historian Christopher Capozzola argues that during the war American citizens' understanding of citizenship and obligations to the state were redefined; war support and service were not merely good deeds, but the duty and obligation of all good citizens.[41] Men were expected to serve as soldiers and women were expected to sacrifice their men and put all of their efforts into supporting the war.[42] NAWSA committed itself to the war effort, putting suffrage work to the side, in the hope that such 'good behaviour' would result in a suffrage amendment at the war's conclusion.[43]

The NWP feared that abandoning their fight for the vote, as they had done during the Civil War, would further delay the passage of a suffrage amendment. As a result, the NWP declared it would continue with its picketing campaign and focus solely on attaining a suffrage amendment. The leader of the NWP, Alice Paul, was a Quaker and staunch pacifist. Paul promoted the belief that women were naturally peaceful and men were aggressive.[44] As such, the NWP could not support the war effort as it would be against the core beliefs of the organization and its understanding of what it meant to be a woman. Throughout the war, *The Suffragist* only published articles regarding their pickets and ignored the very existence of the war.[45] However, the NWP did not prevent its members from engaging in war work, if they so desired.[46] This pacifist stance was another way the group asserted it femininity and challenged the argument that female participation in politics would lead to their masculinization.

When it became clear that the NWP would not stop picketing during the war, the tone of the major newspapers changed from mocking humor to condemnation. After the declaration of war whenever the picketers were mentioned it was in quotation marks, similar to the newspapers' treatment of 'conscientious objectors' and 'slackers.'[47] *The Washington*

---

[41]Capozzola, pp. 6, 8, 13, 15.

[42]Linda Lumsden, "'Excellent Ammunition': Suffrage Strategies during World War I," *Journalism History* 25, 2, (summer 1999): p. 53.

[43]Ibid, p. 55.

[44]Linda Ford, "Alice Paul and the Politics of Nonviolent Protest," in *Votes for Women: The Struggle for Suffrage Revisited* ed. by Jean H. Baker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 179; Linda G. Ford, *Iron Jawed Angels*, p. 130.

[45]Lumsden, "'Excellent Ammunition,'" p. 58.

[46]Lunardini, *Women's Rights*, p. 101.

[47]Capozzola, p. 110.

Post wrote: "The suffragette problem, in the opinion of officials, has taken a place alongside the slacker problem as a menace to the successful conduct of the war."[48] Newspapers also began to refer to the picketers as 'militant' and increasingly compared them to the British suffragettes known for violent actions such as throwing stones and damaging property.[49] One *Washington Post* article argued, "that the people of the United States are not ready to accept the militant tactics practiced in England by suffragists, and that they resent the 'picketing' as ill advised and discourteous."[50] As early as February of 1917, a Mr. Atkinson wrote to *The Washington Post* expressing his concerns that such behaviour "affects the minds of American men unfavorably."[51] The papers were able to connect the American suffragists to the British suffragettes as Alice Paul had spent time in England working with the British suffragettes at the beginning of the 1900s.

Though the picketers had not changed their tactics, the newspapers started to attack the respectability and femininity of the Sentinels. *The New York Times* argued that "men expect women to be wiser and better mannered than themselves and are angry when they show themselves to be no better."[52] In a letter to the editor of *The Washington Post*, a Mr. Foster accused the picketers of "annoying" the President and possessing "bad manners."[53] Due to Alice Paul's belief in the peaceful role of women, the NWP deliberately stayed away from the violent activities of the British suffragettes in favour of non-violent protest.[54] The newspapers' continued attempts to connect the British suffragettes to the NWP were designed to dismantle the peaceful and 'feminine' image that the picketers had crafted between January and April. By relating the NWP to a more violent and therefore 'masculine' group, the newspapers were able to foster the fear that the NWP wanted women to step outside their 'naturally' defined roles.

---

[48]"'Suffs' War Menace," *The Washington Post*, June 30 1917.

[49]Kraditor, p. 239. Suffragist is a general term for members of the suffrage movement. Suffragettes is a term used to define a more militant branch of the movement associated with more direct and at times violent protest.

[50]"'Pickets' Delay Legislation, Mrs. Catt Tells Miss Paul; Call' Em Off, Plea," *The Washington Post*, May 26 1917.

[51]"His Reason for Opposing Militant Suffrage Policy," *The Washington Post*, February 5 1917.

[52]"They Hurt Their Own Cause," *The New York Times*, June 27 1917.

[53]"Bad Manners, Mad Banners," *The Washington Post*, April 23 1917.

[54]Linda G. Ford, *Iron Jawed Angels,* p. 132.

Physical violence soon followed the newspaper attacks. In an address to Congress on April 2 1917, Wilson had stated that America fought to ensure "the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments."[55] To the NWP, this speech was hypocritical. How could the United States foster the development of democracy in the rest of the world when it refused to let women have the vote? The NWP expressed their outrage in messages on their banners. On June 20 the Sentinels displayed a new banner in time for a visit from the Russian delegation to Washington. The banner read: "We, the women of America, tell you that America is not a Democracy" and "Help us make this nation really free. Tell our Government it must liberate people before it can claim free Russia as an ally."[56] Quickly, a crowd gathered and destroyed the banner. Many in the crowd, deeming the banner 'unpatriotic,' were dismayed to hear that the police had no intention of arresting the picketers.[57]

President Wilson expected that every American would contribute to the war effort "as a dictate of patriotism which no one can now expect ever to be excused or forgiven for ignoring."[58] The NWP's refusal to support the war effort, combined with their banner to the Russian delegation, embarrassed the President. The President needed a way to 'silence' the Sentinels. The police were ordered to arrest the picketers a few days after their banner had been put up under the charge of obstructing the sidewalk.[59] To the surprise of the President and the courts, the picketers refused to pay the resulting $25 fine or promise to stop protesting, opting instead to spend three days in jail.[60]

The willingness of the women to be incarcerated shocked the male establishment. Doris Stevens, a member of the NWP, recalled that one judge simply could not believe "that ladies of distinction" would chose to go to jail.[61] Jails were associated with prostitution, as well as violent and

---

[55]Woodrow Wilson, "Wilson's Address to Congress Advising that Germany's Course Be Declared War Against the United States - April 2 1917," in *President Wilson's State Papers and Addresses* (New York: The Review of Reviews Company, 1918), pp. 382-3.

[56]"Crowd Destroys Suffrage Banner at White House," *The New York Times*, June 21 1917.

[57]Ibid.

[58]Woodrow Wilson, "Wilson's Address to His Fellow-Countrymen on Ways to Serve the Nation during the War - April 16 1917," in *President Wilson's State Papers and Addresses* (New York: The Review of Reviews Company, 1918) p. 392.

[59]Graham, p. 673.

[60]"Suffragettes in Jail," *The Washington Post*, June 28 1917.

[61]Stevens, 106.

immoral acts considered masculine. Incarceration challenged the NWP's claims to femininity as 'proper,' respectable, and moral women. The NWP's femininity was further challenged when the Wilson administration and police ceased providing picketers with protection outside the White House.[62] Stevens recalled that the police allowed mobs of men to get nearer and nearer.[63] The act of the police 'stepping aside' symbolized to the mob that these women were no longer worthy of the male protection afforded to respectable women.[64]

In August, the picketers unveiled new banners bearing the text "Kaiser Wilson."[65] The banners were quickly torn and destroyed by a mob. According to *The Suffragist*, members of the mob "unlawfully did strike, choke, drag and generally mistreat and injure and abuse the said women."[66] The mob then followed the picketers back to the NWP headquarters where property was stolen, and a shot was fired at the windows.[67] In the ensuing days the violence against the picketers escalated. On one occasion a sailor dragged Alice Paul down the sidewalk in an attempt to rip off her sash, causing her to be severely bruised.[68] Throughout these riots the police provided the picketers with little to no protection. No one from the mob itself was arrested, only members of the NWP and the men who had attempted to protect them.[69]

Soon after these violent altercations the Sentinels changed the messages on their banners to contain only excerpts of the President's speeches. Yet, the picketers faced increasing levels of violence and arrest. From June through to November, one of the most common and frequent attacks on the picketers was the destruction of their banners. These banners had represented the sole acceptable way for these women to challenge their exclusion from politics. Since public oration was considered a masculine tool, the banners conformed to the accepted gender role of women as silent and passive. The attacks on the banners, regardless of their content, represented an attack on the suffrage

[62]Capozzola, p. 112.
[63]Stevens, pp. 94-5.
[64]Linda G. Ford, *Iron Jawed Angels,* p. 147.
[65]"Suffragettes Lose Two More Banners," *The New York Times*, August 12 1917.
[66]"A Congressional Investigation of the Lawless Attack on the Suffrage Picket Demanded," *The Suffragist,* August 25 1917.
[67]"The Administration Versus the Woman's Party," *The Suffragist,* August 25 1917.
[68]Ibid.
[69]Ibid.

movement itself. The tearing down and destruction of the banners was meant to 'silence' the picketers and show them that they did not belong in politics.

When violence and threats of incarceration did not deter the picketers, the federal state increased the term of the jail sentences at the Occoquan Workhouse in Virginia. An article in *The Suffragist* noted that those convicted of drunk and disorderly conduct received fifteen days in jail, prostitutes received thirty days, and the Silent Sentinels received sixty days in jail.[70] Extreme sentences were common for those deemed 'unpatriotic.' Conscientious objectors could face up to ninety days in jail if they dodged the draft.[71] The harsh treatment of those deemed 'unpatriotic' was supported by the general public. In a letter to the editor of *The Washington Post*, F.H. Brooks stated: "That we are a peaceful people, yet there is a limit to all things."[72] The suffragists' sentences were therefore not considered excessive. For challenging the 'natural order' of things, the NWP were perceived to be harming society. The federal state was acting in the "defence of society"[73] by sending these women to jail. These jail sentences represented not merely punishment but reform. According to theorist Michael Foucault, the purpose of prisons is "to exercise a power of normalization."[74] Thus, the Wilson administration used incarceration in an attempt to correct the 'abnormal' behaviour of these women.

Women's sentences were served in the abysmal conditions of the Occoquan Workhouse. The women were shocked to find that they were given food with worms, had to share a communal bar of soap, and were forced to sleep next to women whose syphilis sores were in the process of healing.[75] The women demanded to be treated as political prisoners, and engaged in hunger strikes. The Occoquan Workhouse responded to the hunger strikes with force feedings. The conditions and treatment the women faced were not reported on by the press. NWP member, Doris

---

[70]"Pickets Get Maximum Sentence from Administration," *The Suffragist,* October 29 1917.

[71]Capozzola, p. 75.

[72]"Approves Patriotic Stand of the Post's Editorial's," *The Washington Post*, April 9 1917.

[73]Michael Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), pp. 74, 90, 109.

[74]Ibid, pp. 109, 227, 304, 308.

[75]"Investigation of Government Workhouse Demanded," *The Suffragist*, September 8 1917.

Stevens, argued that the newspapers presented it as if the women were being treated and fed in the comfort that their class and gender demanded.[76] *The Washington Post* printed information that made the imprisonment and force feedings of the suffragists appear fair and safe with the patient feeling better afterwards.[77] A note smuggled out of the prison by NWP member Rose Winslow presents a much darker and painful image of forced feedings. Winslow writes that during the process she vomited and afterwards suffered from severe headaches, throat pain and nausea.[78]

The violence against the picketers escalated further when intimidation through jail sentences and poor conditions failed. The worst of the violence occurred on November 14 1917. Upon their arrival at Occoquan, the new NWP prisoners demanded that they be allowed to protest directly to Superintendent Whittaker as political prisoners. Mrs. Mary A. Nolan, present at the incident, described that when Superintendent Whittaker finally did arrive he was accompanied by men who were not prison guards.[79] The women were rounded up and shoved into cells with no windows. One woman was chained with her arms above her head, while another was beaten against an iron bench as one of the men yelled, "The - suffrager! My mother aint [sic] no suffrager. I'll put you through -."[80] These attacks reinforce Butler's argument that challenges to gender constructions are often met with punishment.[81] These women were being punished for challenging the accepted belief in the natural binary that justified female exclusion from politics. They were being punished for not acting the way a woman was supposed to. Further, they were being punished for continuing to fight for their cause when they should have been reformed by their incarceration. By physically beating the women, the men were emphasizing the women's frailty compared to their physical strength. The men were reasserting

[76]Stevens, pp. 108-9.
[77]"Militants Plight Shocks President," *The Washington Post*, July 19 1917; "Pickets Fed by Force," *The Washington Post*, November 9 1917.
[78]"Rose Winslow, Prison Notes, Smuggled to Friends from the District Jail (1917)," in *Treacherous Texts: U.S. Suffrage Literature, 1846-1946* ed. by Mary Chapman and Angela Mills (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2012), pp. 282-3.
[79]"'Night of Terror,' November 14 1917," *The Suffragist*, December 1 1917.
[80]Ibid.
[81]Butler, p. 178.

what they believed to be the 'naturalness' of the American patriarchal system.

Additional measures were taken to discredit the picketers, particularly the leader of the NWP, Alice Paul. Following her arrest and subsequent hunger strike, Paul was transferred to the psychiatric ward. While in the psychiatric ward, Paul experienced force-feedings and sleep deprivation.[82] Paul was denied visitors and more importantly her right to an attorney.[83] The Wilson administration used similar tactics against 'conscientious objectors' during the war. A psychiatric diagnosis that these women were 'unfit' or 'abnormal' would discredit their cause, and legitimize the states punishment and treatment of them.[84] If they could be diagnosed as 'deviants' or 'mentally unwell' then their views could be ignored.[85] However, the increasing levels of violence used against the women eventually resulted in backlash against the Wilson administration.

Although initially supportive of the arrests of the picketers, many Americans felt that neither the police nor the mob had a right to engage in physical violence against women, even during a time of war. The Sentinels had challenged what society perceived to be the appropriate roles of women. However, the mobs, jailers, press and Wilson administration had also challenged the appropriate roles defined for men. Women were believed to be opposite and inferior to men. American men were raised to believe that their manhood was defined through their ability to protect "vulnerable women and children."[86] If a man's natural role in society was to protect women, then the physical violence the picketers experienced at the hands of men debased the legitimacy of male authority in society. A distinction had to be made between the treatment of 'draft dodgers,' 'pro-Germans,' and respectable white middle to upper class American women.[87]

Criticisms of the government's treatment of the picketers were framed in gendered language, particularity the need to 'protect' or 'defend' the women. Charles A. Lindbergh, upon witnessing the harassment of these women in the capital, wrote to the President "to beg for justice to the women who are petitioning at your door. They have

[82]Lumsden, "'Excellent Ammunition,'" p. 132; Graham, p. 676.
[83]Ibid.
[84]Foucault, pp. 18, 227.
[85]Capozzola, p. 75.
[86]Scott, pp. 48-9.
[87]Capozzola, pp. 113-4.

been misrepresented in the public press and hounded by hoodlums enough."[88] Senator J. Hamilton Lewis of Illinois, husband to one of the picketers, visited the workhouse and was shocked to see the ladies subjected to "indignities" that no "gentlemen" could stand by and allow.[89] Dudley Field Malone, an attorney and Collector of Customs at New York, complained to the President regarding the treatment of the picketers. Malone had been a supporter of President Wilson, however, the treatment of the picketers led to his resignation and his taking up the cause of the imprisoned suffragists.[90] Even *The New York Times,* which had been dismissive of the picketers throughout 1917, began to focus on the treatment of the imprisoned women. Throughout November it published articles sympathetic to Alice Paul, and released details of the violent attacks of November 14.[91]

The public and press' criticism of the treatment of the Sentinels pressured the Wilson administration to abandon its tactic of using violence to coerce the picketers into submission. The Wilson administration, seeing no end in sight to the Sentinels protest, and in an attempt to garner positive publicity, sent a representative to meet with Alice Paul. If the NWP would bring an end to its picketing President Wilson promised to support the suffrage amendment.[92] Though there is no record of Paul's response, soon after the meeting the sentences of Paul and other picketers were commuted, and the picketing stopped. In January of 1918 President Wilson announced his support for a suffrage amendment, which was quickly passed through the House of Representatives.[93]

The pickets of the NWP simultaneously conformed to and challenged the gender ideologies of the period. While they believed women should be engaged in the political process, they also supported the belief that men and women were naturally different and should occupy different roles in society. By conforming to the 'proper' traits and

---

[88]"Charles A. Lindbergh, Letter to President Wilson," in *Women's Suffrage in America* ed. by Elizabeth Frost-Knappman & Kathryn Cullen-DuPont (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 2005), p. 336.

[89]Stevens, p. 142.

[90]"Malone in Conference with Militants in Jail," *The New York Times*, July 19 1917; Irwin, p. 261.

[91]"Hunger Striker is Forcibly Feed," *The New York Times*, November 9 1917; "Accuse Jailers of Suffragists," *The New York Times*, November 17 1917.

[92]Capozzola, p. 114; Graham, p. 678.

[93]Graham, p. 678.

behaviours of women (beauty and silence), their protest of the White House was initially met with minor support and considered at worst to be a mild annoyance. However, the NWP's refusal to support its country in a time of war combined with its tactics of embarrassing the symbolic head of not only the government, but the patriarchy of the United States, resulted in a massive backlash against the group. The press and the Wilson administration attempted to 'silence' the Sentinels and return them to their 'proper place' in the home. War hysteria became a convenient tool to rally the support of the general public to punish the unpatriotic picketers through the use of violence and incarceration. However, in punishing the picketers for stepping outside of their gender roles, the mobs, jailers, press and Wilson administration had themselves challenged established male gender roles. The understanding that it was the natural role of men to protect and defend vulnerable women had become entrenched in the American conception of masculinity, and eventually led to denunciations of the harsh treatment of the picketers. In order to regain public support and the legitimacy of the patriarchal state, the Wilson administration acquiesced to public demands that the women be treated in a manner appropriate to their gender and conceded to support an amendment for women's suffrage. Clearly, gender, as much as war hysteria, shaped the press, public and Presidential administration's perception and treatment of the Silent Sentinels throughout 1917.

Works Cited

Primary

Chapman, Mary and Angela Mills. *Treacherous Texts: U.S. Suffrage Literature, 1846-1946*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2012.

Frost-Knappman, Elizabeth & Kathryn Cullen-DuPont. *Women's Suffrage in America*. New York: Facts on File, Inc., 2005.

The New York Times.

Stevens, Doris. *Jailed for Freedom*. Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1971.

The Suffragist.

The Washington Post.

Wilson, Woodrow. *President Wilson's State Papers and Addresses*. New York: The Review of Reviews Company, 1918.

Secondary

Baker, Jean H. *Votes for Women: The Struggle for Suffrage Revisited*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Bederman, Gail. *Manliness & Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880-1917. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995*.

Butler, Judith. *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. New York: Routledge, 1999.

Camhi, Jane Jerome. *Women Against Women: American Anti-Suffragism, 1880-1920*. New York: Carlson Publishing Inc., 1994.

Capozzola, Christopher. *Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the Modern American Citizen*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Chapman, Mary. *Making Noise, Making News: Suffrage Print Culture and U.S. Modernism*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Ford, Linda G. *Iron Jawed Angels: The Suffrage Militancy of the National Woman's Party, 1912-1920*. Lanham: University Press of America, 1991.

Foucault, Michael. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1977.

Glenn, Cheryl. *Unspoken: A Rhetoric of Silence*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2004.

Graham, Sally. "Woodrow Wilson, Alice Paul and the Woman Suffrage Movement." *Political Science Quarterly* vol. 98, no. 4 (Winter 1983-1984): 665-679 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2149723 (accessed October 29 2014).

Irwin, Inez Hayes. *The Story of Alice Paul and the National Woman's Party.* Virginia: Denlinger's Publishers, LTD., 1977.

Kraditor, Aileen S. *The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 1890-1920.* New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1981.

Lunardini, Christine A. *Women's Rights.* Phoenix, AZ: Oryx Press, 1996.

Lumsden, Linda. "'Excellent Ammunition': Suffrage Newspaper Strategies during World War I." *Journalism History* 25, 2 (summer 1999): 53-63.

Lumsden, Linda J. *Rampant Women: Suffragists and the Right of Assembly.* Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1997.

Rauterkus, Cathleen Nista. *Go Get Mother's Picket Sign: Crossing Spheres with the Material Culture of Suffrage.* New York: University Press of America, Inc., 2007.

Scott, Joan Wallach. *Gender and the Politics of History.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.

Stillion Southard, Belinda A. "Militancy, Power and Identity: The Sentinels Silent Sentinels as Women Fighting for the Political Vote." *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* vol. 10 no. 3 (2007): 399-418.

Welter, Barbara. "The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860." *American Quarterly* Vol. 18, No. 2, Part 1 (Summer, 1996): pp. 151-174. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2711179 (accessed January 20, 2016).

The Epistemic and Moral Value of Disagreement

Hanna Jones-Eriksson
M.A. in Philosophy at the
University of Guelph

One of the aims of the epistemology of disagreement is to investigate what one ought to do in the event of a disagreement. Upon finding that you and I, given the same evidence, come to opposite judgments should we stand our ground, suspend judgment or revise our belief? And do these attitudes change depending on if our disagreement is with an epistemic peer, a superior or an inferior? In this paper I will illustrate that in some instances it is morally and epistemically valuable for us to hold our ground and maintain our beliefs. I begin by outlining Richard Feldman's argument for why we should suspend judgment in disagreements with epistemic peers, called the "equal weight view," and how this translates to revising beliefs when it comes to epistemic superiors. Afterwards, I introduce two cases where there are moral and epistemic consequences for the epistemic agent and their community if they do not stand their ground. Based on these outcomes I conclude that in some instances of disagreement it is beneficial for us to maintain our position, neither suspending judgment nor revising our belief.

Peers and Superiors

Before I begin, it is important to establish the characters I engage with from the literature on epistemic disagreement: the epistemic peer and the epistemic superior. In broad strokes, epistemic peers are individuals who, in all relevant epistemic senses, are equals. They possess the same intellectual abilities and have spent equal time with the evidence. These intellectual abilities include, but are not limited to, intelligence, reasoning skills, thoroughness and memory. In his article "Reflection and Disagreement" Adam Elga says that epistemic peers are as good as each other at evaluating claims.[1] As Katia Vavova writes in

[1] Adam Elga, "Reflection and Disagreement," *Noûs* 41:3 (2007): 484.

"Confidence, Evidence and Disagreement," because epistemic peers reach the same conclusions they generally agree upon matters.[2]

An epistemic superior is someone who has an epistemic advantage over others. However, what constitutes an 'epistemic advantage' varies from writer to writer. For example, in his article "The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement", Thomas Kelly defines an epistemic superior as someone who has increased familiarity with the evidence, either possessing greater evidence or having analyzed the same evidence more closely.[3] An epistemic superior could also enjoy "superiority with respect to general epistemic virtues" such as intelligence or thoughtfulness.[4] Returning to Elga's writings, he defines epistemic superiority through the language of experts. An expert, Elga contends, has all the information you do and more.[5] They also have better judgment: the manner in which they form their opinions will more often lead to correct results. Finally, in her article "Persistent Disagreement," Catherine Elgin presents a robust definition of an epistemic superior. Through the example of the philosopher David Lewis, whom she views as an epistemic superior[6], Elgin illustrates her belief that epistemic superiors are individuals who have more evidence, superior reasoning abilities and more training than someone who would be an epistemic peer. These definitions reveal epistemic superiors as someone who has more evidence, has looked at it more closely and comes to sounder judgments regarding said evidence.

The Equal Weight View

With these definitions of epistemic peers and epistemic superiors in hand we can now participate in the discourse regarding epistemic disagreement. A compelling response to disagreement with an epistemic peer is articulated by the "equal weight view." It contends that if one

---

[2] Katia Vavova, "Confidence, Evidence and Disagreement," *Erkenn* 79 (2014): 174.

[3] Thomas Kelly, "The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement," *Oup,* Volume 1 (2005): 9.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Elga, "Reflection and Disagreement," 479.

[6] Elgin, "Persistent Disagreement," in *Disagreement,* eds. Richard Feldman and Ted A. Warfields (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 58. While Elgin does not directly present this definition of epistemic superiority in her article, she implies it through her characterization of Lewis. She describes David Lewis as "incredibly smart," "philosophically gifted," "intellectually responsible" and "knowledgeable physicist" who makes arguments with "enormous care" that are "admirably well defended."

evaluates a body of evidence and comes to a conclusion, only to discover their epistemic peer has reached the opposite conclusion, then one ought to suspend judgment.[7] According to Richard Feldman in "Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement," this is the only "reasonable" propositional attitude to take, seeing as your epistemic peer is just as good as you at evaluating claims and getting them right.[8] Because you are equals, you are no more likely to be right than your counterpart is and therefore you should not privilege your own position. One should attribute equal weight to each view and therefore mutually suspend judgment.

The equal weight view implies that there can only be one propositional attitude supported by a body of evidence at a time.[9] That is, given evidence *p*, one may either believe, disbelieve or suspend judgment, but only one of these attitudes is correct. If the evidence supported more than one propositional attitude then the significance of disagreement would disappear. It would no longer matter if one came to different conclusions based on the same evidence. This condition is referred to as the uniqueness thesis.[10]

Despite the force of the equal weight view, I believe there are some instances when one should not suspend judgment in the event of a disagreement. I will argue this by examining the equal weight view in terms of disagreement with epistemic superiors. Using two examples, I point to instances where there are moral and epistemic benefits to not revising one's belief, or at least not immediately. Then, translating back into the arena of epistemic peers, I argue that if one can maintain their belief in the face of disagreement with an epistemic superior, one should not suspend their belief in the event of a disagreement with an epistemic peer. I will conclude that one does not need to follow the equal weight view in all cases of disagreement.

---

[7] Elga, "Reflection and Disagreement," 484.

[8] Feldman, "Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement," in *Epistemology Futures*, ed. Stephen Hetherington (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 13.

[9] Richard Feldman, "Reasonable Religious Disagreements," in *Social Epistemology: Essential Readings*, eds. Alvin Goldman and Dennis Whitcomb (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 148.

[10] Ibid.

Disagreement with Epistemic Superiors

Let us maintain the argument structure of the equal weight view, but suppose we are in a disagreement with an epistemic superior. Referring back to our earlier definition of an epistemic superior as someone who has more evidence, increased familiarity with the evidence and greater reasoning abilities – there should be no doubt that one ought to revise their belief to match the superior's. It would be prudent to acknowledge they are more likely to be correct and this should be reflected in one's beliefs. Whereas one ought to suspend judgment with epistemic peers because both had an equal chance of being right, this equality disappears with epistemic superiors.

There is widespread support for this reasoning in the literature on disagreement. For example, Elga states that "[t]here are experts and gurus, people to whom we should defer entirely."[11] Likewise, according to Kelly it is "uncontroversial that there are some circumstances in which one should give considerable weight to the judgments of another party in deciding what to believe" where this party is your epistemic superior.[12]

However, some philosophers have acknowledged the potential for disagreement with epistemic superiors. The option to disregard the beliefs of an epistemic superior emerges if we look closely at the writing of Elga and Vavova. Elga argues it is possible to disagree with an epistemic superior when they propose a claim that falls outside of an "appropriate range" – that is, it is unbelievable, or outside the range of possibility.[13] For example, if your weather forecaster informs you it is going to rain eggplants tomorrow you may dismiss their assertion, despite their superiority. Vavova takes a similar stance in her example of "crazy math." According to this example, your friend, who is otherwise a mathematical genius, calculates eac h of your shares of a restaurant bill at $385, while you calculated only $43.[14] Because her answer is astronomical and would overpay the bill significantly, Vavova contends you can disregard her answer. Vavova's reasoning is that it is more likely your friend is "joking or drunk" than that you each owe $385.[15]

---

[11] Elga, "Reflection and Disagreement," 478.
[12] Kelly, "The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement," 9.
[13] Elga, "Reflection and Disagreement," 483.
[14] Vavova, "Confidence, Evidence and Disagreement," 175.
[15] Ibid., 176.

While these examples present instances of reasonable disagreement with epistemic superiors, they do so because they sidestep the issue of superiority altogether. Elga and Vavova maneuver around an epistemic superior's higher reasoning by creating examples where epistemic superiors are no longer at an advantage. While epistemic superiors should have better reasoning abilities and more familiarity with the evidence, a forecaster who predicts eggplants or a drunken genius who estimates portions of the bill that are larger than the bill itself are no more likely to be correct in their assertions than you are. Thus, by discrediting epistemic superiors in these contexts, Elga and Vavova create the space for reasonable disagreement. Although this is one way of illustrating how we can acceptably privilege our own beliefs, these have not been cases of non-genuine epistemic superiority. Rather than sidestepping the issue, I would like to concentrate on whether we can maintain disagreement in the face of genuine epistemic superiority.

When Should We Disagree?

If epistemic superiors are indeed our betters and are more likely to be correct, then when, if ever, can we reasonably disagree with them and hold our ground? The following examples demonstrate instances of reasonable disagreement with an epistemic superior. The first example will demonstrate the *moral value* of disagreement. The second example will illustrate the *epistemic value* of disagreement. I will then use the second example to explore the value of being wrong without immediately revising your belief, as well as the disadvantages of repeatedly revising your belief in the event of sustained disagreement with an epistemic superior.

Both examples draw on two concepts developed by Miranda Fricker in *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing:* 'testimonial justice' and 'naïve insight.' While the second example does not engage with testimonial justice directly, the concept of naïve insight is derived from testimonial justice. Fricker develops the epistemic virtue of "testimonial justice" in order to combat what she calls "testimonial injustice."[16] Testimonial injustice is when a listener, or receiver of testimonial exchange, does not attribute the appropriate level of credibility to the speaker.[17] Their credibility is either over or under estimated based on

[16] Ibid., 92.
[17] Ibid., 17.

negative identity prejudices.[18] That is, negative judgments against someone owing to a feature of their social identity, such as their sex, gender, race, or occupation.[19] Testimonial justice counteracts testimonial injustice by appropriately distributing credibility. The 'virtue of testimonial justice'[20] is a correctly trained sensitivity, honed through experience,[21] that critically responds to the 'epistemically salient features' of the situation that allows the virtuous individual to "just see" her interlocutor in the correct light and respond to her testimony appropriately.[22] Although the majority of the population must train themselves to be virtuous, some have a natural disposition.[23] This is what Fricker refers to as naive insight. To illustrate her point Fricker draws attention to the character Jean Louise (Scout) Finch from Harper Lee's *To Kill a Mockingbird*.[24] Scout possesses the virtue of testimonial justice more or less naively, since despite her lack of formal critical reflection or training, she has largely remained untouched by the racially prejudiced views of her society.[25]

Moral Benefit of Disagreement

I would like to take up Fricker's concept of a 'naïve insight' and bring it into our discussion on disagreement. For the purposes of this paper I will understand naive insight as an untrained sensitivity to the evidence such that one will, or is likely to, arrive at an unprejudiced proposition. The following example summarizes events from *To Kill a Mockingbird* in order to illustrate an instance of where it is valuable to disagree with an epistemic superior. As we will see, if Scout revises her belief about the fundamental equality of African-Americans to match her superior's, such as the prosecutor, morally problematic outcomes ensue.

> *Scout Example:* Growing up in Maycomb County, Alabama, in 1935, a young white girl named Scout is exposed to many racially prejudiced views against 'Negros.' In the town, Tom Robinson, a young black

[18] Ibid., 18.
[19] Ibid., 16.
[20] Ibid., 92.
[21] Ibid., 80.
[22] Ibid., 76.
[23] Ibid., 93.
[24] Ibid., 23-25.
[25] Ibid., 93.

> man, has been accused of raping Mayella Ewell, a young white girl.
> Watching the court proceedings for Tom's trial, Scout believes he is innocent – but the trial is being unfairly conducted. At a recess in the proceedings, she expresses her view to the prosecutor Mr. Glimer. Mr. Glimer, whose beliefs are founded on the principle that 'blacks are inferior to whites,' informs Scout she is wrong. Tom is getting what he deserves.[26]

Although we benefit from historical hindsight and can see that Mr. Glimer's beliefs suffer from the racial prejudices of the 1930s, he is still Scout's epistemic superior based on our earlier articulations of epistemic superiority. Being a prosecutor and an adult, he has greater reasoning abilities, judgment and training than Scout. Having worked the case for some time he also has greater familiarity with the evidence. And yet, if Scout endorsed "the equal weight view" and revised her belief about the court proceedings, or the type of justice Tom deserved, there would be morally noxious repercussions for both the individual and the community.

First, at the individual level, the equal weight view forces Scout in line with the same 'ethically poisonous' view Mr. Glimer holds.[27] It would debase her moral character because Scout's moral position, which is more progressive than the view currently held, would be lost. Second, at the level of the community, encouraging Scout to revise her belief would limit the possibility for social change. Although Scout is not the only one who believes in justice for Tom, her neighbor Miss Maudie, Aunt Alexandra, her brother Jem, and her friend Dill are all uncomfortable with the racist attitudes of the day, she is vocal about her beliefs where others are not. Scout actively challenges others to reconsider their beliefs. An example of this is when Scout changes the minds of the members of a late-night lynch mob.[28] By no means do Scout's actions compare to her father's, who is Tom's defense lawyer. However, as a child, she also represents the future of Maycomb: she embodies the potential of a future

[26] Adaptation from Harper Lee, *To Kill a Mockingbird* (New York: Warner Books Inc., 1960), 166-211. Fricker's representation and analysis of Robinson's case is in *Epistemic Injustice,* 23-26; 90-96; 136-137.
[27] Concept of an 'ethically poisonous' epistemic position is from Fricker, *Epistemic Injustice,* 22.
[28] Lee, *To Kill a Mockingbird*, 154.

community. Thus, encouraging Scout to revise her beliefs about justice and the equality of humans would perpetuate the racist thinking of the day. If no alternative is presented, nothing challenges the residents of Maycomb and forces them to reconsider their beliefs. From these outcomes, it becomes *morally valuable* for Scout to maintain her position and stand strong behind her belief despite Mr. Glimer's opposition as an epistemic superior.

Epistemic Benefit of Disagreement

Keeping with Fricker's notion of possession of naïve insight, let us consider it from a purely epistemic realm. While there is certainly an important epistemic dimension to Scout's situation, such as beliefs about justice and the equal status of African-Americans, her surroundings are very morally charged. I will direct our attention to another example in order to consider the epistemic value of disagreement.[29]

> *Poem Example:* You are an English student who is writing an essay on a poem for an assignment. Before you start you meet with your professor to discuss your interpretation of the poem. Based on attending the lectures and your time spent studying the poem, you believe the poem represents p. But your professor disagrees. From her expertise in the field, her own research and multiple readings of the poem, it represents $\neg p$.

Like Mr. Glimer, it is clear the professor, by our definition, is one's epistemic superior. She has a greater familiarity with the evidence from her time spent reading and thinking through the course. Based on her background in English literature and theory, she most likely has increased evidence from reading a larger number of the poet's works and being familiar with the secondary literature. This same background provides

[29] It could be argued that all situations are morally salient and therefore considering another example is not a useful strategy. At some level, this is correct. As we will see there are essential social and moral dimensions to the poem example as well. Yet, it is less morally charged than Scout's situation. By which I mean that the moral stakes don't seem quite as high as in Scout's case. As a result the poem example allows us to appreciate the epistemic value of disagreement more independently.

her with a higher degree of training, and equips her with better reasoning and judgment skills when it comes to English literature.

Even though you are not an expert, you should not instantly dismiss your belief regarding the poem's meaning. It is possible that, despite your lack of training, familiarity and reasoning, you are correct in your interpretation of the poem. Like Scout, you may possess a naïve insight about the piece: an intuitive grasp on the correct interpretation of the poem. As a result, if you revised your belief as per our extension of the equal weight view, your knowledge would be lost. Your naïve insight would be replaced by your professor's incorrect representation and as a result you, your professor and your epistemic community of English literary tradition would overlook a new piece of knowledge. Epistemic practices aim to promote and increase the possession of true beliefs. But in the event that an agent possesses a naïve insight, adhering to our extension of the equal weight view would move the individuals and the epistemic community involved away from this goal. Thus it is *epistemically valuable* for you to maintain your position and not revise your belief.

Immediate and Long-term Disagreement

There are two further points I will raise in light of this example.[30] Where the above discussions focused on the moral and epistemic value of not revising beliefs at all, in some cases there may be advantages to revising your belief, but not doing so *immediately*. Moving away from the concept of naïve insight, let us suppose you are wrong and should revise your belief about what the poem represents. Even in this instance there are desirable epistemic and sociopolitical benefits to maintaining your belief – at least for a little while. I will consider the epistemic and sociopolitical disadvantages of revising too quickly from two perspectives: the short and long-term harms.

Our first perspective addresses the immediate disadvantages of revising your belief prematurely. These harms manifest through the loss of a chance to contribute towards your epistemic character and opportunity for intellectual improvement. In terms of epistemic character, even though you are mistaken in your interpretation of the poem, your intellectual ventures should still be fostered and rewarded.

[30] Although I discuss these disadvantages in terms of the poem example, they extend to Scout's example as well.

This will contribute towards the construction of your epistemic character. Continuing with the poem example, the professor should recognize the student's intellectual ventures, such as critically engaging with the poem, creating an interpretation, being epistemically brave enough to share it, by appreciating the student and participating in a meaningful discussion with them and their beliefs. This would foster the development of a number of key epistemic traits, such as epistemic creativity, integrity and confidence. In turn, it promotes beneficial epistemic activities such as a willingness to put forth new ideas and delve into new areas of research. Revising one's position too early could deprive one of the possibility of future growth and legitimate engagement with the material.

Regarding intellectual improvement, not immediately revising your interpretation of the poem to match your professor's can help expand your knowledge in that subject. Instead of uncritically revising your belief to match the 'correct answer,' maintaining your belief in order to think through your interpretation in comparison to your professor's encourages you to learn *how* you were wrong and what methods you can use to interpret a poem correctly next time. In so doing, you achieve a greater understanding of the poem as well as a broader understanding of literary theory. Again, revising immediately would rob one of this opportunity. Second, let us analyze the long-term disadvantages of not maintaining your belief in the event of a disagreement with an epistemic superior. By 'long-term disadvantages' I am referring to the idea that sustained disagreement with a superior would have lasting negative consequences. In order to develop this position, I return to Fricker but adopt a new idea: that persistently abandoning your beliefs has long-term effects. Looking at the consequences of testimonial injustice, Fricker speaks of an "erosion of epistemic confidence" and inhibition of the development of epistemic characteristics.[31] To support her point, Fricker highlights the self-fulfilling nature of stereotypes. She draws from a study demonstrating how African-Americans perform poorly on intellectual tests when faced with negative stereotypes about their race, but perform dramatically better once the "stereotype threat" is lifted. For Fricker, this demonstrates how being told you are not intelligent and your beliefs are inferior causes individuals to perform poorly intellectually.[32]

---

[31] Fricker, *Epistemic Injustice*, 49.

[32] Claude M. Steele and Joshua Aronson, "Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* Vol. 69 No. 5 (1995): 809.

There is a parallel experience when women confront their stereotypes. We see this through Pauline Rose Clance and Suzanne Imes' concept of "imposter syndrome." Clance and Imes note how women, despite successful careers in academia and elsewhere, still feel unintelligent and believe they have fooled anyone who thinks otherwise.[33] Clance and Imes suggest that women "have apparently internalized into a self-stereotype the societal sex-role stereotype that they are not considered competent."[34] This phenomenon has certain specifically epistemic effects. For example, a study found that undergraduate women are less confident than their male counterparts in assessing their intellectual performances.[35] Perhaps a reason for this is that the female participant's perceptions of the role of women and what women are capable of appears to feed into their confidence in their epistemic capabilities.

Fricker, Clance and Imes all demonstrate that how one views themselves and their intelligence in relation to others impacts one's epistemic confidence and, in some cases, intellectual performance. I believe these effects can translate into the dynamic I have been analyzing between the epistemic superior and inferior. Being repeatedly pressured to revise your beliefs to reflect someone else's conclusions could be intellectually damaging if experienced frequently over a period of time. Consequently, the equal weight view would lead to an erosion of confidence or delayed epistemic development of the individual repeatedly disagreeing with their epistemic superior.

Considering both the immediate and long-term effects of disagreement, there are benefits to not instantly revising your beliefs. At the immediate level there is a loss of intellectual growth and epistemic character; long-term there is the erosion of epistemic confidence. Whereas our earlier articulations of the Scout and poem examples had clear moral or epistemic harms, these potential outcomes have both moral and epistemic dimensions. From a moral or social perspective, revising your belief too quickly is undesirable because it blocks the opportunity for the development of the individual. It is also epistemic because this

[33] Pauline Clance and Suzanne Imes, "The Imposter Phenomenon in High Achieving Women," *Psychotherapy Theory, Research and Practice* Vol. 15 No. 3 (1978): 1.
[34] Ibid., 2.
[35] Mary A. Lundeberg, Paul Fox and Judith Punćochar, "Highly Confident But Wrong: Gender Differences and Similarities in Confidence Judgments" *Journal of Educational Philosophy* vol. 86 no. 1 (1994): 115.

development concerns their epistemic character and their intellectual abilities.

Concluding Remarks

In this paper I have illustrated that while one may generally want to revise their beliefs in the event of a disagreement with an epistemic superior, there are some moral and epistemic instances where one ought to maintain their beliefs. Indeed, there are various advantages to not revising in these cases. Despite a superior's higher intellectual reasoning or familiarity with the evidence, some intellectual inferiors may have a naïve insight that would be valuable for the moral or intellectual community to have access to. In the Scout example, her naïve insight about equality would be important to changing the racist attitudes of her community. Moreover, changing her beliefs would degrade her individual and unique moral character. Similarly, in the poem example, an untrained insight could be an important asset to the literary community. Naïve insights aside, the practice of disagreement, even if you are wrong, can have worthwhile epistemic and moral outcomes through the development of the epistemic inferior's intellectual character.[36] Based on these benefits, and the dangers of maintaining your belief, it becomes clear that we should not always revise our beliefs to meet our epistemic superior's – or at least not immediately.

Returning to our opening discussion of peer disagreement, this new perspective provides a critical re-examining of the equal weight view. I do not believe suspending judgment is the correct option. If, as the Scout and poem examples illustrate, we should not always revise our beliefs in the event of a disagreement with an epistemic superior, and in fact there are advantages to being wrong and still maintaining your beliefs, these considerations should extend to disagreement between peers. After all, if it is reasonable to maintain your beliefs with someone who has more evidence, greater familiarity with said evidence and higher reasoning skills, then it is still reasonable to do so with an individual who has the same evidence and equal intellectual abilities. Therefore, despite the force of the equal weight view, there are some instances where one should not suspend judgment, or at least not revise one's beliefs immediately.

---

[36] For example, James Montmarquet believes intellectual courage is a key intellectual virtue and an integral component of their good epistemic character. See James Montmarquet, *Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: Maryland, 1993), 23.

Works Cited

Elga, Adam. "Reflection and Disagreement." *Noûs* 41:3 (2007): 478–502.

Elgin, Catherine. "Persistent Disagreement." In *Disagreement* edited by Richard Feldman and Ted A. Warfields, 53-68. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Clance, Pauline Rose and Suzanne Imes. "The Imposter Phenomenon in High Achieving Women." *Psychotherapy Theory, Research and Practice* Vol. 15 No. 3 (1978): 1-8

Feldman, Richard. "Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement." In *Epistemology Futures* edited by Stephen Hetherington, 216-236. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

————. "Reasonable Religious Disagreements." In *Social Epistemology: Essential Readings*, edited by Alvin Goldman and Dennis Whitcomb, 137-157. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Fricker, Miranda. *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Kelly, Thomas. "The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement." *Oup,* Volume 1 (2005): 167-196.

Lundeberg, Mary A., Paul Fox and Judith Punćochar. "Highly Confident But Wrong: Gender Differences and Similarities in Confidence Judgments." *Journal of Educational Philosophy* vol. 86 no. 1(1994): 114-121.

Montmarquet, James. *Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility.* Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: Maryland, 1993.

Steele, Claude M. and Joshua Aronson. "Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* Vol. 69 No. 5 (1995): 797-811.

Vavova, Katia. "Confidence, Evidence and Disagreement." *Erkenn* 79 (2014): 173–183.

To Our Friends

The Invisible Committee – Semiotext(e) 2015

Review by Hope Campbell
M.A. in Politics at Acadia University

"Thinking, attacking, building – such is our fabulous agenda. This Text is the beginning of a plan. See you soon, Invisible Committee" (The Invisible Committee 2015, 239). The very sentences that end *To Our Friends* summarize the aim of this book: to provide understanding of the failures of the uprisings of the early 2010s in the hope that there can be a change in the current structures of governance.

In their follow up to the Coming Insurrection (2008), The Invisible Committee examines recent insurrections from Tahrir Square to Wall Street, from Syntagma Square to Puerto del Sol, to understand how uprisings can function. The Invisible Committee laments, "we have lost sight of revolution *as a* process" (p. 13); which demands organizing whilst being weary of organizations. The nature of revolution must change as the nature of governance itself has changed for "*power now resides in the infrastructures of the world*" (p. 83). Power affects the ways we communicate, value government, and contribute to the economy. Power does not reside simply in the hands of the government or particular banks, but is found in the way banks and governments function. By assuming that power resides within particular people or institutions limits our way of understanding the relations of power. The Invisible Committee uses the Occupy Wall Street Movement to exemplify this. The Occupy Wall Street movement assumed that democracy could provide a way to govern the movement which accurately represented the protestors' interests. Therefore it implemented democratically organized 'working groups' to create a legislative body. By becoming an organization instead of simply being organized, Occupy Wall Street internalized the same structures of governance they challenged in the first place. The Invisible Committee argues that to create a revolution against infrastructures of global governance, one must fight them asymmetrically (p. 159); one must first understand what one is struggling against and what one is protesting for. Without this, revolutions mirror and incorporate the structures of the institutions against which they opposed.

To Our Friends is both a lament and a hopeful invitation. *To Our Friends* unpacks the possibility of what revolution must do to be successful. The insurrections which the Invisible Committee predicted in their 2008 work "have come, finally" (p.11). However, their failures are examined throughout *To Our Friends.* The Invisible Committee offers an insightful critique of the technophilia and technophobia of modern revolutionaries. While many scholars have taken either to praising or disparaging the use of technology in recent revolutions, the Invisible Committee refocuses the debate: "technophilia and technophobia form a diabolical pair joined together by a central untruth: that such a thing as the technical exists" (p. 121). By changing the discourse from the 'pros' and 'cons' of technology, the Invisible Committee asks if there actually is technology. In doing so, the Invisible Committee suggests a re-evaluation of existing 'technologies' used in protests today. Social media sites and popular communication apps, such as Facebook, may be used by protestors; however, the Invisible Committee argues, those forms of media are primarily for policing of peoples (p. 104). Their function of data-collection leads to the rise of 'smart' technology, which track, categorize and measure human movement and actions. Smart technology does not enlighten us or liberate us; instead it controls us to work within the 'smart' society. Smart technologies allow for the development of self-governing through these technologies, which is referred to as cybernetics. Cybernetics becomes "an art of governing whose formative moments are almost forgotten" (p.107). The Invisible Committee demands that we understand what we call technology as being a discourse on techniques. Techniques are the processes of inviting and breaking down; they have ethics; they are not neutral. Technique allows protestors to be creative and think outside the technology of global governance.

Although *To Our Friends* provides many critiques of the protests and social movements of the early 2010s, it does so within the frame of the local's relation to the global. The local is understood as a product of the global as the local can only be seen in its negation to the global. The local is not separate from the global; the local is produced by the global. Without the global, the concept of the local would be meaningless. The global is "the local without walls" (p. 194). Through the creation of the commune the local becomes the centre of the global revolution. The commune offers a localized epicentre in which the individuals are able to organize themselves around their individual needs and interests. The

Invisible Committee argues the commune is a way the revolution can be organized without being an organization (p. 231). When movements become organizations, they take on hierarchies and power structures of the very institutions they are against. However, the should question this understanding of the local as a product of the global and particularly whether these 'walls' separating the global and the local should be transcended. Will the needs and interests of those who are protesting on the local level be able to be understood through global action? The justice the Invisible Committee and their friends demand gives little space for those who struggle against this infrastructural governance, but are unengaged with revolution.

Despite this, *To Our Friends* offers a compelling critique of both the modern global governance and the recent social movements and protests against this governance. In the address to their friends at the end of the book, the Invisible Committee writes that they have "*taken the time to write with the hope that others would take the time to read*" (p. 238). This hope should be fulfilled.

The Invisible Committee. 2015. *To Our Friends.* South Pasadena: Semiotext(e).

Philosophy and Resistance in the Crisis: Greece and the Future of Europe

Costas Douzinas – Polity 2013

Review by Cameron Brown
M.A. in Social and Political Thought at
Acadia University

Costa Douzinas' *Philosophy and Resistance in the Crisis* explores the relation between austerity and radical movements in Greece and contributes essential insights to contemporary theories, reflections, and practices of resistance. The first of three parts, 'Crisis', sets the neo-liberal conditions and fields of political struggle in Greece. Part two, 'Philosophy', expands on this struggle by engaging its philosophical instruments and tensions. Finally, 'Resistance' examines practices and practitioners of radical disobedience in Greece; it relates them to one another, to resistance movements elsewhere, and examines their production of subjectivities. The operation is twofold: to apply radical philosophy to inspect contemporary movements, and to apply the experience of resistance to test and improve these methods. An essential value of Douzinas' project is the relationship between moral perception and political action. *Philosophy and Resistance in the Crisis* urges the reader to situate their morality not in an abstract and/or universal notion of justice, but in the struggle for political existences and expressions which are denied, assaulted, or prevented.

'Crisis' looks at the cultural, political, and economic characteristics of neo-liberal austerity in Greece. It reveals the crisis as a socio-political force exploited by elites to threaten the population into submitting to economic austerity and political impotence. Douzinas does not treat economic conditions as an objective reading, but as a contested field of interpretation that informs subjective positions. Acknowledging economics as a space of social and political struggle emphasizes the deceitful nature of characterizing austerity as a 'necessity'. It "is precisely to reduce workers' salaries, rights and social benefits" that austerity is imposed (Douzinas, 2013, 28). Popular fear of debt permits attacks on the political-economic positions of the working population (67). Austerity is not the solution to debt. On the contrary, debt serves as the

method of austerity. It reduces politics to pure market-based administration. Law becomes the mere regulation of populations under austerity. Disenchantment, fear, and aggressiveness arise as state and economic governance abandons the social ethos of "popular values, habits and understandings" (51). This leads to social alienation, cultural estrangement, and political cynicism. Images of revolving political inadequacies repeat, as the failures of austerity are attributed to "the state and resisting citizens," whose "frustrations of expectations and failure" are replayed and reinforced in negotiations with Europe and the IMF (68).

In 'Philosophy', Douzinas turns to traditional and radical theories of law, rights, and resistance. He analyses the paradoxical role of resistance in traditional political and legal theory. While resistance is a foundational condition for the establishment of legal order, it is simultaneously confined by legal frameworks. Citizenship as "conflictual or nothing" expresses this paradox (Balibar cited in Douzinas, 94). By reconfiguring the spaces and operations of politics, those denied claims and stakes in official politics create new forms of citizenship. Distinctions between traditional and radical theories are primarily expressed in their respective formulations of political agents in this conflict. Whereas the former develops theories of democracy based on 'the people' as a unity constituted through the state, radical political theory turns to the many who refuse to transfer the legitimation of their "rights to the sovereign" (121). These subjectivities make up the basis for analyzing the form and success of resistance in radical theory.

In 'Resistance' Douzinas turns to the radical movements in Greece to inform and contribute to this approach. Douzinas explains how the Greek 2008 insurrection, the *sans papiers* hunger strike, and the Syntagma Square encampment produced unique forms of subjectivation. Subjectivation is the process in which individual's perceptions of reality are shaped. Determinations of these truths are informed by experiences of events that can reaffirm or "change the parameters of a situation," maintaining or altering the possibilities of political action (143). Obedient subjectivities are undermined or destroyed only by negating and refusing dominant political parameters which then give way to new possibilities of political becoming. Thus, the rejection of legal obligations in street riots (145), the solidarity with those denied documentation (150), and the reconfiguring of public space into collective political expression (163) create spaces of radical subjectivities. Douzinas' primary concern is not those objectives which focus on particular political results.

Instead, he applies the concept of praxis to draw attention to objectives directed toward the performances themselves. In this self-referential and self-perfecting focus, individual praxis forms radical new subjectivities and collective praxis forms radical new communities (195).

Key to Douzinas' argument is the binding of politics and morality. He first points to how neo-liberal moralization controls populations and disciplines individuals. In Greece's prevailing political discourse, the collective duties of national modernization surpass regard for welfare and eclipse religious or 'oriental' cultural concerns. The fault for the national debt incurred in grandiose projects of modernization, such as the 2004 Olympics, are collectivized, despite most Greeks neither partaking in nor benefiting from such spending (35). The common recognition of these conditions leads to feelings of 'collective guilt' and 'guilty innocence' (39). As the moralization of politics excludes and condemns large numbers of people "to symbolic and physical death," individual and collective action arise in defence of their political existence (63). These actions go beyond merely rejecting neo-liberal moralization in favour of an alternative moralization of politics, on the contrary they demand a politicization of morality itself. Transferable subjective motivations are to be privileged over normative notions of justice and injustice (80). By transcending "local interest and specific identities," personal moral acts transform into collective forms of political resistance (99). The place-based and globally informed demos of Syntagma square demonstrates this, as the moral demands for friendship, dignity and hospitality, give rise to principles of autonomy, publicity and equality (194). Herein, political identity and commitment demonstrate themselves in consensus decision making (148), while "proximity and emotional intensity" create volunteer care (166) and production based on need and capabilities (167). All this shows the potency of morality in relation to praxis.

Situating morality from the stand point of personal and collective praxis accentuates the necessity of political reflections. Given recent events, one can fairly question Douzinas' optimism about Syriza's role and ability to represent these resistance movements (192).[1] However,

[1] Syriza has continued to implement austerity measures in Greece, as in accordance with their agreements with the EC, EU, and IMF for further loans. For a pessimistic take on Syriza's actions see: Costas Lapavitsas, "One year on, Syriza has sold its soul for power," *The Guardian,* January 27th, 2016, accessed March 13th, 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jan/25/one-year-on-syriza-radicalism-power-euro-alexis-tsipras. For an optimistic take see: Slavoj Zizek, "How Alexis Tsipras

Douzinas' central plea is for a balanced approach of pragmatisms and "unwavering commitment to principle" (192). As demonstrated, the latter speaks not to attaching our morality or praxis to the success or failures of any political party, but to the demands for endurance of expression, unity, and dignity being performed in the streets and the squares. Therefore, it is in this moral and political praxis one ought to seek the future of Europe.

Douzinas, Costas, *Philosophy and Resistance in the Crisis: Greece and the Future of Europe* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2013)

and Syriza Outmaneuvered Angela Merkel and the Eurocrats," *In These Times,* July 23, 2015, accessed March 13th, 2016, http://inthesetimes.com/article/18229/slavoj-zizek-syriza-tsipras-merkel.