# To Be Decided*

Journal of Interdisciplinary Theory



## Volume 2

## Monsters and Beasts

Cover art: 'Les Origines' Odilon Redon, 1883

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Volume 2: Monsters and Beasts

*"Second Issue, Two Heads"*

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# Acknowledgements

When we, the editors of TBD*, released the call for papers for our second issue on Monsters and Beasts, we knew that we would need help. After all, monsters are rarely defeated by lone warriors and beasts travel in packs. So, like any adventurer worth their salt, we enlisted companions to help us on our journey. Now that this monster has been slain, this beast tamed, it is time to offer our thanks to all of those who made such a feat possible.

The faculty of Acadia's Social and Political Thought program have offered invaluable feedback. Their mentorship has endowed us with the skills needed to realize this issue. In particular, we are indebted to the program's co-ordinator, Dr. Geoffrey Whitehall, who equipped us with the tools to make the journal and reminded us of the need to use them. The path for this issue has been smoothed by the numerous SPT students who have trod it before us. We are grateful for their work.

As always, the heart of the journal remains those who create its content. We thank the authors for their leap of faith of submitting their work and trust that the editors would treat their work with the care and respect that they do. We are equally grateful to all of those who reviewed articles for the bravery to share their honest and generous comments. In the absence of this thoughtful and critical input publishing *TBD** would be impossible.

# Editors' Introduction

The monster and the beast have been persistent categories in theory. They are often seen as the double of the human subject. The monster exceeds the human: it is the abnormal, deformed and dangerous. Likewise, the beast precedes the human: it is the untamed, feral and unpredictable. But these associations are not more natural than monsters and beasts themselves. They are instead the product with social, affective, political and aesthetic qualities. As Odile Redon's cyclops (1883, cover) suggests, our monsters and beasts are not so far removed from ourselves. The cyclops' face is familiar, its smile unnervingly like our own. We should not adopt the cyclops' flat, one-eyed gaze but instead try to see our doubles in relief. The challenge of this issue is not to characterize what the monster and beast *are*, but what they *do*. To do so, the monsters must be let out from under our beds, and the beasts released from their cages. Such an undertaking is dangerous. In confronting these creatures we may realize that there was nothing there at all, or, worse, see more of ourselves than we wish.

But we cannot look away. As every child knows, that's when they'll get you.

In her article 'Freudian Horror in Joyce Carol Oates' *A Fair Maiden*: Affect and Oedipal Desire', Katherine Walton explores why we are attracted to monsters and horror. It is not that readers are ineffably drawn to the violence of the novella. Instead, Walton argues that a Freudian analysis of Oates' work reveals that *A Fair Maiden*'s narrative leads the reader to identify with the characters and thus provides an affective experience.

Siobhan Carlson analyzes how Drew Hayden Taylor uses the Algonquin narrative of the Windigo to counteract its colonial appropriation and refigure the colonizer as their own monster, the vampire. Her article '(Un)Frozen Hearts: Wendigoes, Gothic Tropes, and Indigenous Knowledge' argues that Taylor's graphic novel is both a salient commentary on colonialism and an act of resistance that makes possible new Indigenous futures.

The relationship of possible futures to remembered past is also a central theme of Francesca Boschetti's piece, 'Memories in Kazuo Ishiguro's Never Let Me Go: A Clone's Humanity'. The central

character, Kathy, is a clone whose organs are about to be donated. Boschetti shows that just as Kathy's story-telling allows her to see a future through recounting her past. Just as her life is being taken away, she finds meaning in it.

Dessa Bayrock deals with a similar problem in her article 'Data Doppelgangers and the Search for Immortality'. For Bayrock, we are haunted by a dream of immortality. As digital storage and data collection have advanced, this dream may become a waking nightmare. Bayrock's article analyzes how the possibility of a digital consciousness impacts our own subjectivity.

How we related to ourselves and others is also a concern for Hiba Alhomoud. She engages feminist theory to ask whether thinking of ourselves as beautiful requires that we see the other as a beast. Her article 'Can There Be a Beauty Without a Beast? On Re-Writing Predominant Constructions of Selfhood' suggests that this is possible, but requires that we confront a dominant Western tradition in which the self is thought of as total and unified.

Sarah Nash also considers the way monsters are used to demonize others in her piece 'The Characterization of Catiline as a Monstrum in Cicero's *Pro Caelio*'. Nash shows that Cicero first condemns Catiline for being an absolute evil, but also as a hermaphroditic monster that confuses binaries of righteousness and malevolence. Cicero gives the monster a political function that allows him to exonerate some and censure others depending on his ends.

For Milan Bernard, political monsters must be defeated in order to effect revolutionary change. 'From Hercules and the Hydra to SYRIZA vs. Global Capitalism: Diffusion and Disappointment of the World Left' explores how the notion of a heroic struggle both gives a narrative to politics and limits possible changes. Bernard asks whether faith in a leftist movement remains possible when the monsters that it confronts are so powerful.

This issue concludes with Adam Foster's review of Claude Lévi-Strauss' *We Are All Cannibals – And Other Essays*. Lévi-Strauss work helps to reveal how some are constructed as monstrous, and how are all may be complicit.

Though this taxonomy of monsters and beasts is wildly varied, they all reside in the same zoo. *TBD** is an interdisciplinary project that brings together different fields through a common use of theory. Each article

provokes a new mutation, changing the body of work from which it emerges. But the creatures are hungry and it is time for them to be fed.

The only question is who is eating who.

*To Be Decided** Journal of Interdisciplinary Theory
Managing Editors,
Robert Pantalone and Laura Townend

# Freudian Horror in Joyce Carol Oates' *A Fair Maiden*: Affect and Oedipal Desire

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## Human Works of Horror: Narrative Affect and the Reader's Role

In her essay "The Aesthetics of Fear," Joyce Carol Oates asks her readers "Why should we wish to experience fear? What is the mysterious appeal, in the structured coherences of art, of such dissolving emotions as anxiety, dislocation, terror? Is fear a singular, universal experience, or is it ever-shifting, undefinable?"[1] Western art has, in a certain sense, always been intrigued by and sought to explain that which frightens, which unsettles, which causes us to question our place within the world, and within ourselves. Oates reminds us that while we frequently position the objects of our fear as monsters separate from us, sometimes those monsters are not so separate after all, but, as she remarks, are "*in here*, in the soul."[2] The enduring influence of such thought is evident in the literary genre of horror fiction, and the proliferation of new stories intended to elicit our fear suggests that the questions Oates asks are still relevant when considering why and how these narratives affect us.

Affective power is of central importance to the success of horror as a form art, and herein these forms have certain designs upon their audiences. They may prompt us to ask questions like Oates', to consider our own humanity in light of that which unfolds before us, where our responses of shock and disgust act as the means by which we reassert boundaries between the monsters and ourselves. Nonetheless, the affective nature of the work of horror demands that its audience develop some kind of investment in the story at hand; it simply does not work if it fails to affect its audience, if its audience remains as detached observers of a fictional world contained by a narrative. For the reader of a piece of literary horror, there must exist some kind of personal stake in the

[1] Joyce Carol Oates, "The Aesthetics of Fear," in Where I've Been and Where I'm Going: Essays, Reviews, and Prose (New York: Penguin, 1999), 26.
[2] Oates, "The Aesthetics of Fear," 30.

narrative—in order for a literary iteration of this genre to be successful, it must draw its reader into the narrative and in so doing establish a connection with the reader, one which encourages the reader to model his or her responses to the narrative by way of the narrative itself. What literature in particular affords us more than any other artistic medium is intimate access to another's perspective—to the thoughts, feelings, and actions of another which are directly transposed into the mind by way of words written on pages. In reading, we inhabit a perspective different from our own, through which we necessarily explore the realities of those characters with whom we proceed throughout the story. In reading a work of horror, more often than not our own responses, guided by our experience of another's perspective, are of an affective kind and in turn instill within us an uncomfortable sensation of fear, perhaps especially when that fear, through an affective narrative design, is directed at ourselves.

Oates' fiction capitalizes on the affective power of perspective, embedding its readers in imaginative dialogues with the characters found within her narratives. More specifically, Greg Johnson suggests that her "particular genius is her ability to convey psychological states with unerring fidelity," her characters depicted "within a psychological pressure-cooker, responding to intense personal and societal conflicts which lead almost inevitably to violence."[3] In Oates' works, it is in the interchange between a character's psychological reality and the reader's sense of self that the work of horror is carried out.[4] These works are deeply unsettling, and purposefully so; the perspectives to which we are made privy and with which we are made to identify are almost always, to varying degrees, damaged by some form of violence. Oates' delivery of these perspectives in turn disturbs our sense of ourselves as readers who exist in separation from the narrative reality: in Oates' words, "One criterion of horror is that we are compelled to [...] inhabit the material without question and virtually as its protagonist."[5] Her novel *A Fair*

[3] Greg Johnson, Understanding Joyce Carol Oates, ed. Matthew J. Bruccoli (Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1987), 8, 18.

[4] For different genre studies on Oates' works, particularly her earlier Gothic novels and her postmodern aesthetics, see Helene Meyers' Femicidal Fears: Narratives of the Gothic Experience (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001) and Joanne V. Creighton's Joyce Carol Oates: Novels of the Middle Years (New York: Twayne, 1992).

[5] Joyce Carol Oates, "Reflections on the Grotesque," in Transmutations of Horror in Late Twentieth Century Art, ed. Cristoph Grunenberg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 35.

*Maiden* makes use of these techniques, where, for the majority of the narrative, the autonomous voice which presents us with the story is engaged in free indirect discourse with the novel's protagonist, Katya Spivak. It is this autonomous voice as it inhabits Katya's voice that establishes the narrative ground, makes its conflicts available to us, and in effect guides us as readers into our own form of free indirect discourse with Katya. As Lauren Berlant suggests, "free indirect discourse performs the impossibility of locating an observational intelligence" within another, "and therefore forces the reader to transact a different, more open relation of unfolding to what she is reading, judging, being, and thinking she understands."[6] Berlant here describes an intersubjective framework between character and reader—one which is essential to the work of horror and allows *A Fair Maiden* to function as a piece of literary horror. Through intimate access to Katya's personal reality, by having Katya's voice guide us through the story, Oates establishes a complex system of identification which aligns—indeed, affects—us such that we become sympathetically and affectively bound to Katya, whose own perspective acts as the chief barometer of the reality presented by the novel.

The novel itself explores the increasingly unsettling relationship between Katya, a precocious teenage nanny, and Marcus Kidder, an elderly and affluent artist. We learn that Katya has travelled during her summer holidays to Bayhead Harbour in order to work for the Engelhardts, a *nouveau riche* nuclear family recently ensconced in upper-middle class opulence. In so doing, it is Katya's goal to escape from her impoverished upbringing and her abusive mother, whom she both passionately loves and hates. On Oates' works more generally, Joanne V. Creighton notes that there exist only two "female types, Mothers and Daughters."[7] In *A Fair Maiden*, Katya simultaneously embodies both, and she struggles ceaselessly against her liminal condition, not quite a child, not quite an adult. Contributing to Katya's indefinite sense of self is her role as surrogate-mother to various other characters—the Engelhardt children, her own mother, and later Marcus—not quite a daughter to anyone, nor a fully-realized mother figure. All this

[6] Lauren Berlant, "Cruel Optimism," in The Affect Theory Reader, eds. Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 96.

[7] Joanne V. Creighton, "Unliberated Women in Joyce Carol Oates' Fiction," in Critical Essays on Joyce Carol Oates, eds. Linda W. Wagner and James Nagel (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1979), 148.

compounded by her disgust for the sexual desires of older men and her concomitant desire for the love of one following her abandonment by her father, the novel traces her entry into adulthood, which is marked not by her previous sexual experience or her work as a nanny, but by her happenstance meeting with Marcus during her daily outing with her young charges while she lingers outside of a coastal boutique, eyeing a piece of expensive lingerie.[8] What is perhaps most peculiar about Katya's incremental development away from childhood is that the near seamless blending of narrative voice and Katya's inner dialogue insists at every turn of the page that desire is a psychological remnant of childhood, made basic and violent by desperation and want. Indeed, as the intimacy between Katya and Marcus develops, their experiences of desire result in Katya's betrayal and abuse by older men and Marcus' brutal and near-fatal beating.

In teasing out the dynamics of Katya and Marcus' relationship, at its heart, the narrative addresses the vicissitudes of childhood desire. As the narrative progresses, this desire increasingly manifests as a source of danger and horror, and indicates the growing psychological perversions of the novel's characters. As this paper shall seek to confirm, Freudian or psychoanalytic analysis is particularly well-suited to a study of this novel's type of affective horror. Oates herself seems to guide us towards this sort of reading—beyond the behaviours and appetites belonging to both Katya and Marcus, and with which the larger portion of this paper shall engage, Oates provides us with a direct reference to Freudian theory when Marcus quotes a well-known passage, excerpted from Freud's *Civilization and its Discontents*: "Freud said, 'Beauty has no discernible use. Yet without it, life would be unbearable.'"[9] To set the novel's tenor,

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[8] Joyce Carol Oates, A Fair Maiden (New York: First Mariner Books, 2010), 27-8.

[9] Ibid., 23. In Sigmund Freud's Civilization and its Discontents, trans. Joan Riviere, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1958), the fuller passage reads as follows: "The enjoyment of beauty produces a particular, mildly intoxicating kind of sensation. There is no very evident use in beauty; the necessity of it for cultural purposes is not apparent, and yet civilization could not do without it. The science of aesthetics investigates the conditions in which things are regarded as beautiful; it can give no explanation of the nature or origin of beauty; as usual, its lack of results is concealed under a flood of resounding and meaningless words. Unfortunately, psychoanalysis, too, has less to say about beauty than about most things. Its derivation from the realms of sexual sensation is all that seems certain; the love of beauty is a perfect example of a feeling with an inhibited aim. 'Beauty' and 'attraction' are first of all the attributes of a sexual object. It is remarkable that the genitals themselves, the sight of which is always exciting, are hardly

Marcus' words follow Katya's first visit to his seaside manor, where she admires his countless glass sculptures of extinct species of flowers. These, for Katya, are beautiful, but "grotesquely shaped" and reminiscent of "the smooth hairless vagina of a young girl."[10] As she reaches out to touch one of these fragile objects, the sharp glass opens her finger and causes her to bleed, all this unnoticed by Marcus, who "brood[s] over the glass flowers," caught by his obsession.[11] Throughout the narrative, repeated interactions of this nature occur between Katya and Marcus and lead to the novel's almost pornographic and certainly violent climax, in which the narrator's play on Katya's and our respective positions as readers exposes us at once to the violence which Katya herself suffers and the violent desires which we explore through her perspective. Moreover, that same play reveals to us our own complicity in the enacting of such desires, since, in free indirect discourse with Katya, we become equal participants in violating others and, by extension, in doing violence to ourselves.

If a successful work of horror must affect its readers, *A Fair Maiden* works, then, precisely because it accesses its readers' anxieties surrounding the terrible desires which unfold in the novel, affectively awakening our own Freudian fears, experiencing, to use a Freudian terminology, a return of the repressed through vicarious association with the novel's characters. As a reader, and in the act of reading, we become like Katya and Marcus—we occupy the psychological space assigned to us through the act of narration, and through which the novel forces us to consciously examine the desiring responses which it stimulates within these characters and within ourselves. This meta-narrative dialogue so established thus effects within readers a kind of Freudian self-recognition and constitutes the affective ends of the narrative itself. Hence while the narrative at first proceeds at a slow burn, much in line with Katya's own hesitant approach to Marcus and her increasingly precarious situation, the revulsion which accompanies the enacting of desire during the explosive denouement brands the reader as a voyeur who equally participates in and reproduces the perversions which, as the novel suggests, are ultimately a part of a wider reality of human experience. Oates' canny crafting of the tale and her skillful interweaving of narrative thematics, especially during the careful denouement, create a lasting and

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ever regarded as beautiful; the quality of beauty seems, on the other hand, to attach to certain secondary sexual characters," 25.

[10] Oates, A Fair Maiden, 22.

[11] Ibid., 23.

supremely troubling identification with the characters—the distressing acts with which the reader becomes complicit resist any sense of resolution.[12] Coupled with the narrative's unsatisfactory and decidedly vague conclusion which serves to maintain the reader's connection with the characters, the novel ultimately refuses to afford the cathartic release of the Freudian impulses contained therein, its final and greatest work of horror.

## Freudian Horror: Disturbing Doubling and Uncanny Action

Freud's theory of the Oedipus complex posits that a child's desires, specifically sexual in nature, develop during his or her first years, those desires oriented towards the parent of the opposite sex. The two others to whom the child has been most exposed thus far in life, the parents represent the means by which the child may assert his or her sense of being in a system of identification, a set of relations which, while establishing desire for one parent, thereby offers dominance over the other. As the oedipal boy desires his mother, so he must identify with and enter into competition with his father for the mother's love; the oedipal girl in turn desires her father, and thus identifies with her mother-rival. In both cases, according to Freud, the child actively wishes to supplant and assume the sexual role of the parent of the same sex so as to fully obtain and possess the love and attention of the parent of the opposite sex.[13] This process of identification manifests due to the child's egotistic love for his or her own body in tandem with the cathexis (or obsession) for an object of sexual desire. While the boy may fully identify with the father due to anatomic consistencies in sexual organs, out of fear of punishment and castration by the father he rejects his desire for the mother. The girl, on the other hand, similarly experiences desire for the mother, whereupon the discovery that the mother lacks the

[12] In his essay "[On Joyce Carol Oates]" in Critical Essays on Joyce Carol Oates (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1979), Alfred Kazin remarks that Oates "is too attentive to [her characters'] mysterious clamour to want to be an artist, to make the right and well-fitting structure" (160), a comment which has earned a great deal of critical attention in later scholarship on Oates' works. In the case of the novel discussed in this paper, Kazin's observation seems contrary to the rigorous composition of dialogue and narrative.

[13] Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, trans. A.A. Brill (New York: Macmillan, 1913), 212-9.

corresponding sexual attributes of the father, a lack conferred upon her in simultaneous identification with the mother, the girl rejects her desire for the mother in anger and disgust. She then develops object-cathexis for her father in the hope that he may impart upon her his bodily wholeness if not physically, then symbolically through the conception of a child. Unlike the boy's active decision to turn from the mother in fear and anxiety, however, the girl passively relinquishes her cathexis for her father due to that desire remaining unfulfilled. As Freud asserts, in proceeding developmental stages the child fully represses his or her incestual inclinations and transfers such impulses to others outside of the family, retaining no conscious recollection of the initial oedipal experience.[14] Freud maintains, however, that moments may occur when such desires, relegated to the unconscious mind, may become subject to reproduction, since repetition alone may serve to satisfy the unfulfilled sexual wish which is disavowed, but not erased, from the memory of childhood.[15]

In *A Fair Maiden*, Katya's impulses are much in line with a psychoanalytic understanding of oedipal desire. Marilyn C. Wesley notes that many of Oates' novels "are concerned with relations incestuous in tone, if not in fact, between young girls and their fathers or figurative fathers. Incest, so qualified, is, in fact, one of the most important motifs in Oates' fiction."[16] Katya's interactions with Marcus and what he means to her most explicitly represent and allow her to enact her desire for her perennially absent biological father, Jude Spivak. At the outset of the

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[14] Sigmund Freud, "The Passing of the Oedipus Complex (1924)," in Collected Papers, Volume 2: Clinical Papers, Papers on Technique, trans. Joan Riviere (London: Hogarth Press, 1950), 269-76.

[15] Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, 207.

[16] Marlilyn C. Wesley, "Father-Daughter Incest as Social Transgression: A Feminist Reading of Joyce Carol Oates," Women's Studies 21, no. 3 (1992): 251. Although Wesley discusses the motif of incest as a means of extending a feminist critique of social structures and "the father who represents coercive restraint" (255-6), an observation not directly applicable to my study here, her argument contributes to an ongoing feminist conversation on Oates' works that variously interprets the thematics which I also discuss. See Brenda Daly's Lavish Self-Divisions: The Novels of Joyce Carol Oates (Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi, 1996); Marilyn C. Wesley's "Reverence, Rape, Resistance: Joyce Carol Oates and Feminist Film," in Mosaic: A Journal for the Interdisciplinary Study of Literature 32, no.2 (1999): 75-85; Helene Meyers' Femicidal Fears: Narratives of the Gothic *Experience* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001); and Tanya Horeck's "Lost Girls: The Fiction of Joyce Carol Oates," in Contemporary Women's Writing 4, no.1 (2010): 24-39.

novel, and with the Engelhardt children, Katya pauses before a coastal boutique advertising sleepwear and lingerie, where Marcus, passing by, stops to speak with her. Although she is unsettled by his interest, particularly by his offer to purchase for her a piece in red lace at which she had been gazing, she believes that he is sincere and charming, and "hopes that passersby might imagine them together, maybe related."[17] Thus ensues a series of meetings where Katya calls on Marcus at his coastal manor, most of which are inspired by, or result in, resurgences of memories concerning her father. A compulsive gambler, Jude's mantra––"Let the dice decide"—frequently precedes Kayta's decisions to go to Marcus, particularly when she is in need of financial support.[18] This Marcus offers to her in exchange for her services as a model, to which she reluctantly agrees: "Vaguely Katya nodded [...] she did feel, she supposed, some sort of rapport with this man that she'd never quite felt with any older man, she guessed. Her father had been much younger when she'd last seen him."[19] Despite her anxiety during these sessions, especially regarding the growing contractual nature of the relationship and the sexual tension building between them, she returns continuously for the money and intimacy that Marcus quietly offers her. The support which Marcus does provide affords Katya with a sense of security and belonging which she does not know; her need for a father-figure is so overwhelming that, convinced that "*So long as Mr. Kidder sees me, I am safe*" she falls asleep while the old man paints her portrait, recalling her father's departure from her childhood home.[20] She then dreams that Jude watches her—when in fact it is Marcus. Immediately before Marcus wakes her, she hopes that "If Katya became really beautiful, Daddy would be impressed and come to claim her."[21] Indeed, Katya continually seeks to impress Marcus in place of Jude, those words she chooses to speak to him calculated based upon her experience with older men, "with the hope of making them like her; making them feel that she was valuable to them; wrestling some of their power from them, if but fleetingly. It was like provoking a boy or a man to want you."[22] Later, impressing Marcus becomes analogous with placating him in his desires and obeying his

[17] Oates, A Fair Maiden, 4-5.
[18] Ibid., 12, 35, 114.
[19] Ibid., 60.
[20] Ibid., 65.
[21] Ibid., 66.
[22] Ibid., 23.

commands in his studio, since "When he encountered opposition, he became infuriated. And this was so, Katya thought, for all the men she'd known, including her father. *You do not contradict a man. If you want him to love you, you do not.* "[23] Increasingly, Marcus represents for Katya a father-figure, who, absent no longer, lavishes her with attention to an obsessive degree.[24] Driven by a need for love, and believing that Marcus may offer her the type of love which she desperately desires, she begins to return his feelings—a love which she imagines may reconcile the pain and rejection that she associates with her mother.

Katya's relationship with her mother, Essie, is ambivalent; throughout the narrative, despite repeated attempts to reject her influence, Katya continuously identifies with her mother. As with Katya's troubled longing for her father, the damaging familial dynamic between daughter and mother is best understood through the application of an appropriate psychoanalytic lens. In Nancy Chodorow's revision of the Oedipus complex, the specifically female oedipal stage is marked by a psychological complexity that extends beyond rejection of the mother. Rather, the daughter retains a fundamental association with the mother which is "pre-oedipal" and desexualized; due to this lasting identification, the girl realizes herself through a system of juxtaposition between self and other, which may extend to her adult relationships.[25] In so doing, the girl may experience a failure to self-identify, or may conceive of herself as "a continuation or extension" of the mother and "later of the world in general," reflected in a process of doubling between mother and daughter.[26] Similar to Katya's internalization of her father's gambling mantra, she equally adopts her mother's words. As the narrative progresses, Essie's typical rebuke—"*Katya has a mouth on her! A mouth that wants slapping*"—is assimilated with Katya's opinion of herself and is expressed in Katya's voice: "That look of Katya's – makes you want to slap it off her face. And that mouth of Katya's."[27] Her unconscious identification with her mother's words indicates her lingering desire for her mother's affection, particularly in situations where she identifies with

[23] Ibid., 125.

[24] For further comparisons between Marcus and Jude, see ibid, 5, 38, 51.

[25] Nancy Chodorow, "Gender Differences in the Pre-Oedipal Period," in The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 92-8.

[26] Ibid., 100-9.

[27] Oates, A Fair Maiden, 6, 27.

others as a mother herself. In debt and fearing incarceration, Essie calls Katya at the Engelhardt's suburban home, desperate for financial assistance.[28] This drives Katya to Marcus, and while she accepts Marcus' cheque with "childlike gratitude," it is in supervision of the Engelhardt children that Katya posts the money, "Thinking, *Now Momma will love me.*"[29] In satisfying her mother's need as a mother-figure herself, Katya is better able to express her desires for love which, although located within behaviour associated with motherhood, are nonetheless those of a child.

It is not only by way of Marcus and Essie that Katya explores her childhood desires—Katya perceives, implicitly if not explicitly, all adults as oedipal fathers and mothers, even as doubles of one another, and by the end of the novel she is more fully engaged with a Freudian form of childhood desire which survives into adulthood. Her thoughts about Max Engelhardt, her employer and a father himself, are always predicated upon her motherly interactions with his children; during one such moment she recalls that "From time to time he'd tipped her – 'No need for Lorraine to know Katya. Just between you and me.'"[30] Earlier, she connects words such as these with transgressive male sexual desire, more specifically with her initial fear concerning Marcus' designs: "*Don't need to tell anyone* was what men said, wanting to share a sex secret with a teenager."[31] Katya's perception of Lorraine Engelhardt, Max's wife, is conveyed with an ambiguity similar to Katya's feelings concerning Essie. Katya attempts to identify with Lorraine as a child who imagines that she is subject to an evening curfew, her bedtime hour revoked by the sole exception that she "watch [...] late-night TV movies with Mrs. Engelhardt weeknights when Mr. Engelhardt was in the city working," mother and daughter equally awaiting father's return.[32] When Katya later returns to the household following the abuse she suffers, however, she interprets Lorraine's concern for her as jealousy: "*She thinks I'm pregnant. She's anxious that the father might be her husband.*"[33] Katya's interactions with all of narrative's adult characters mark her psychological progress towards the realization of her oedipal desires. Rather than

[28] Ibid., 49.
[29] Ibid., 57, 68.
[30] Ibid., 92.
[31] Ibid., 29.
[32] Ibid., 49.
[33] Ibid., 155.

providing her with causes for self-censorship, her interactions increasingly motivate her conscious thought towards the possession and substitution of parental figures, all doubled and reflective of one another. Her thoughts of her place within the Engelhardt family as Lorraine's potential sexual successor, much like her thoughts of Marcus and of Essie, suggest that, throughout the course of the novel, Katya herself undergoes a transformation from oedipal child to oedipal mother.

Katya's transformation, however, does not occur within a vacuum. Due to our own readerly limitation in free indirect discourse with Katya's perspective, we are not often made privy to Marcus' inner dialogue. Nonetheless, there exist signs within the narrative that Marcus' desires affect Katya's experience and these furthermore disclose to us his own oedipal obsession; like Katya, Marcus exhibits behaviours which are suggestive of his need to fulfill the childhood wish to supplant and possess parental figures. Despite his cordial bearing, and to her unease, Katya notes almost immediately upon arriving at his manor for the first time that Marcus' gaze belies his hunger for her: "in his face was a sick-sinking expression of something like abject and raw desire he hoped to disguise."[34] He reveals to Katya in confidence that he considers himself "at this advanced age yet a child," and later requests that she address him by his given name, since "Mr. Kidder is – was – my elderly father," who "scarcely deserves *you*," his words a sign of an oedipal competition for some kind of mother-figure.[35] As the treacherous intimacy between them develops, more and more Marcus seeks to separate Katya from any pre-existing attachments, desiring union with her alone: while Katya frequently uses the Engelhardts and her work as an excuse to escape from Marcus and his advances, he attempts to replace her employers, promising her large sums for her work in his studio and deriding her for her "perversely attached" desire to return to the relative safety of the Engelhardt home after her modelling.[36] His ultimate aim in so doing is to create a "perfect likeness"—Katya at first assumes this has to do with the practice of his portraiture, yet it soon adopts a more sinister colour, as Katya herself becomes Marcus' project.[37] Hence, while Marcus never explicitly elaborates upon what this 'likeness' may be, he does mention

[34] Ibid., 15.

[35] Ibid., 61, 119

[36] Ibid., 133. On Marcus' contempt for the Engelhardts, see 5, 29, 64-5, 66, 119. On the promise of payment, see 89, 91, 103, 113, 114, 135.

[37] Ibid., 99.

his belief that Katya is his "soul mate," and his manoeuvrings suggest that his goal in drawing Katya closer to him is one of becoming, which will serve to shape Katya into an image of his desire.[38]

The oedipal desires of both Katya and Marcus are underlined in the narrative's increasingly distressing descriptions of the characters' perversions by distinct moments which we may consider as uncanny—or *unheimlich*; that which causes fear, discomfort, and is what "ought to have remained secret and hidden but has come to light"—and which Freud links with mental disturbances arising from a re-presentation of childhood experience.[39] While the encounter with a 'double' of the self or of an object of fear or desire may cause a resurgence of oedipal obsessions, that which is experienced as uncanny is always predicated upon "something repressed which *recurs*."[40] Marcus' use of the word "*heimweh*, homesickness" to describe his sensation upon first seeing Katya on the coast is fitting; he continues, "A yearning for home, but for something more – a past self, perhaps. A lost self."[41] Katya reminds Marcus of a girl named Naomi, whom he lost in his youth, and who eventually represents for Marcus an "incomplete Katya," an earlier version of himself, or a past state of object-cathexis, projected onto Katya as a substitute, as an object or a 'perfect likeness' through which he may manifest his repressed or previously disappointed desires.[42] Similarly, Katya's own uncanny experience suggests that while Marcus desires some kind of mother-figure through which he might realize himself, Katya, in identification with her own mother, becomes that figure in her desire for a father. Her transformation is marked throughout the narrative by a symbol of womanhood—the red lace lingerie that frames Katya and Marcus' first meeting. Marcus does purchase this for her, but when he first presents it as a gift, Katya rejects it angrily, along with its "absurd" implications.[43] She later dons the gift in his presence, however, and experiences a flurry of violent emotions stemming directly from the recollection that "Her mother wore lingerie like this."[44] In this moment,

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[38] Ibid., 59.

[39] Sigmund Freud, "The Uncanny," in Literary Theory: An Anthology 2nd ed, eds. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan, trans. James Strachey (Singapore: Blackwell, 2004), 418-20.

[40] Freud, "The Uncanny (1919)," 425, 429.

[41] Oates, A Fair Maiden, 42.

[42] Ibid., 86-7, 121.

[43] Ibid., 24.

[44] Ibid., 97.

Katya internalizes Marcus' desire and simultaneously projects her own upon him: "*He wants to marry me! Or maybe adopt me.*"[45] This oedipal transformation is mirrored in her desire to possess Marcus such that she enjoys the fact that "*Naomi is dead*;" she recognizes that she has replaced Naomi as Marcus' object of desire—a recognition which in turn satisfies her need for the love of a desiring other who for her occupies a paternal role.[46]

The transgressive oedipal desires of both characters culminate in the denouement's vicious and almost pornographic acts, Katya's final modelling session, during which Marcus adulterates Katya's wine (while not explicitly revealed to us, Katya's physical reaction and Marcus' later admission that he has painkillers in his possession is evidence enough).[47] We subsequently follow Katya's dimmed awareness of what can only be her rape, her confused inner dialogue decidedly against that which she is powerless to stop. The narrative voice then shifts between Katya's and Marcus' perspectives, where Marcus' voice recites a faerie tale about a King who, pursued by the monster Death, finds salvation in a Fair Maiden, effectively delivering him from the monster in the alternative form of death that she provides.[48] When Katya awakes, however, it is Marcus who embodies Death—suddenly "ghastly, ghoulish," he reveals to her that cancer will eventually end his life.[49] It is his wish that she become the Fair Maiden and assist in his suicide using those same drugs by which he has rendered her vulnerable. Horrified, with her desires both realized and transgressed, she flees his presence which is so much akin now not to her father, but to "her own grandfather Spivak [...] an elderly sick pitiable man yet like a vulture, the hungry eyes, the disgusting mouth sucking at her energy."[50] In enacting the violence of his desire upon Katya, Marcus transforms from a surrogate-father and a lover into an animal-father, a dehumanized monster of oedipal desire and a harbinger of the fear and disgust which Katya has struggled to repress and from which she has been attempting to escape all along.

Bewildered and afraid, Katya quickly transfers her desire and her illusions to her cousin Roy Mraz, heretofore physically absent from the

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[45] Ibid., 100.
[46] Ibid., 73.
[47] Ibid., 128, 134-5.
[48] Ibid., 129-32.
[49] Ibid., 133.
[50] Ibid., 136.

narrative and another object of affection, the only other man with whom she has had sexual experience. Katya calls Roy "in the voice of a hurt and vindictive child," inciting him to take revenge on her behalf.[51] When Roy arrives, however, in another instance of doubling, he gives her methamphetamine drugs and "Pulling impatiently at her [...] as a child might," proceeds to abuse her.[52] Katya then leads Roy to Marcus where Roy brutally assaults the artist, telling the old man that he "owes" them for Katya's suffering.[53] To the ensuing sound of Roy's pealing laughter, Marcus, described here as a vulnerable "elderly man," is finally left crippled. Herself bleeding from Roy's indiscriminate violence and staring in "horror," railing inwardly at her betrayal of the dying man who had once been so kind to her, Katya's narration sets her sympathy for Marcus into relation with Roy's lack thereof.[54] In one final act of (cruelly ironic) violence, Roy informs Katya that Jude Spivak has been dead since Katya's childhood, murdered at some undisclosed time and location by his creditors—to which Katya responds by fleeing and contacting emergency services with the hope that Marcus might be saved.[55] The abuse to which both characters are subjected, and the objectification to which both subject each other, here results in what may most directly be identified as that which positions the novel in the genre of horror in its unrelenting, almost pornographic explosion of violence—for which its eerie psychological cadences have thus far not prepared us.

## Affective Horror: The Cathartic Impulse Denied

Beyond the horror that we may feel towards the narrative action at face-value, however, what is it precisely about the novel that is so personally disturbing for its readers? How do we engage with these events and the characters who catalyze them when they are so shocking and so perverse that they feel foreign to us? What is perhaps most unsettling is the system of identification between character and reader, dependent upon the narrative processes by which both Katya and Marcus are humanized. As in the tacitly contractual relationship between Katya and Marcus, in a process of doubling projected onto us as readers, we become subject to the violence that the characters experience. Peter

[51] Ibid., 138.
[52] Ibid., 141-2.
[53] Ibid., 148.
[54] Ibid., 149-51.
[55] Ibid., 151-2.

Brooks suggests that narratives occur "*in situation* between teller and listener" and in the act of receiving a tale, audiences become complicit in the "violation" of self which would otherwise remain separate from the text.[56] Audiences enter into "a place of rhetorical exchange," a space of "transaction" or "transference" which "becomes the space [...] in which affect [...] is acted out."[57] Affect is at work in *A Fair Maiden* as we internalize its narrative, experiencing our own responses which are simultaneously products of, and autonomous to, the narrative situation. And I am inclined to argue that the narrative situation, as well as our situation within the narrative, is not broken by its violence. On pornography in narrative, Slavoj Žižek suggests that the explicitness of the sexual act causes us to lose "our balance [when] follow[ing] the narration with the usual disavowed belief in the diagetic reality. The sexual act [...] undermin[es] the consistency" of the text.[58] Katya's descriptions, the first moments of violence which threaten to dislodge us from our identificatory reading relationship, are borderline pornographic—there is no doubt as to what unfolds, and the language is certainly explicit—but the context into which we are placed serves to mask the acts as in the haze of ingested drugs. The ways in which Katya is abused and by which the narrative disabuses its readers is mediated in such a way that the acts are made real only through our own interpretive and mnemonic reading processes. What is horrible, then, is the novel's play on ambiguity; we are jarred, but never afforded the opportunity to sunder ourselves from the narrative account.

Furthermore, while we may reject Roy's actions (as Katya does), Marcus' are digested by a narrator in free indirect discourse with Katya. We are thereby impelled to sympathize not only with her, but with Marcus, as well; Katya explicitly sympathizes with Marcus, but never provides us with more justification than the fact that she loves him, and that, in the wake of her father's death, he is the only man who loves her.[59] We may extend such reasoning to her desire for a father-surrogate, but in so doing we must also follow Katya's psychological process: as established by her relationship with her mother, she is only able to

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[56] Peter Brooks, "Narrative Transaction and Transference," in Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), 216-8.
[57] Ibid., 234.
[58] Savoj Žižek, Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan Through Popular Culture (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 88.
[59] Oates, A Fair Maiden, 142.

identify through comparison, through a process of doubling by which she accesses the relational subjectivities of herself and of others. Juxtaposed with Roy, we notice that Marcus, although deranged, never genuinely desires to harm anyone, except, perhaps, himself. For Katya, this knowledge is enough to form a lasting love-attachment and it fuels her object-cathexis for her chosen father-surrogate. Moreover, through Katya, we identify with Marcus during his own victimization; although we should feel disgust for what he has done, we pity him, experiencing the horror which Katya feels towards herself for inciting Roy's brutality. Indeed, in mutual victimhood both Katya and Marcus are humanized, at once subjects and objects. The narrative itself makes available to the reader no comfortable position of rebuke—to reject one is to equally condone the other. The novel is designed to elicit such a conflicted response in its readers and necessitates our consideration of both characters' realities, which in turn elicits our disgust and self-horror, since in sympathy with either of these characters, with them we inevitably explore and experience their desires. The narrative technique removes the distance we may enjoy between ourselves and the characters, and should we fully engage with either or both Katya and Marcus, the satisfaction of their desires equally fulfills our own which we have adopted through our free indirect discourse with them, the violence they enact that which we enact upon them by entering into complicity with the text.

Alongside the desire made real within us as readers in our participation with the text at hand, Oates' novel refuses to satisfy our cathartic reading impulse, the means by which we may separate ourselves from the narrative.[60] We experience this refusal as a form of violence which the novel enacts upon us, which we enact upon ourselves, not only in concurrence with the denouement's destructive desires, but during the novel's unsatisfactory conclusion, as well. Mary Kathryn Grant notes that "A subtle type of violence Oates uses in her fiction is the deliberately [...] disconcerting absence of a resolution;" rather, Oates' narratives "stop [...]

[60] A notion informed by the psychoanalytic theory of transference, which posits that patients and analysts enter into an affective relationship founded upon a mutual process of projection. This process is later marked by the reassertion of individual psychological boundaries through cathartic release. See Freud, trans. Joan Riviere, "The Dynamics of the Transference (1912)," in *Collected Papers, Volume 2: Clinical Papers, Papers on Technique* (London: Hogarth Press, 1950), 314; and Thomas H. Ogden, Projective Identification and Psychotherapeutic Technique (New York: J. Aronson, 1982), 12.

before catharsis and the effect is shock, not relief or release."[61] Katya later discovers that Marcus survives Roy's beating, and as Bayhead Harbour police search for "*Two Caucasian males* [...] Katya was given to know that Marcus Kidder had forgiven her."[62] He then summons her for one final meeting, where they both more fully explore their oedipal roles. Before entering Marcus' home, Katya imaginatively cries out the words "*Mommy! Daddy*!" and the narrative voice then separates itself from her thoughts for one uncharacteristic interjection: "As through our lives such sensations overcome us. Springing out of nowhere to threaten our souls with extinction but then, as abruptly as they've appeared, they disappear. Or so we wish to think."[63] Inside, as Katya approaches Marcus' deathbed, that voice reminds us that we are not so different, that our experiences are the same. Informed that they are to be married immediately, with motherly tenderness Katya feeds Marcus his painkillers, holding him "tight, and snug, as at times, when three-year-old Tricia Engelhardt had been frightened of going to sleep, Katya had done."[64] Finally, the two sleep; when Katya awakes, she "grip[s] the old man's fingers, now stiffened with cold."[65] Such is the conclusion that both Katya and her readers are afforded. Berlant's notion of "cruel optimism" is particularly fitting: she posits that "all objects or scenes of desire are problematic in that investments in them and projections onto them are less about them than about what cluster of desires and affects we can manage to keep magnetized to them."[66] Just as the text affectively projects onto and fosters within its readers a host of Freudian fears, we project onto it the desire for reconciliation, for cathartic release of its (and our) disturbing desires, a release which the narrative summarily denies. Hence we maintain that 'magnetized' desire which connects us to Katya—still confused in her uncomfortable, liminal state, still clinging tightly to those cold fingers of optimistic hope, still thoroughly disappointed by the cruelty of her circumstances, those terrible oedipal desires made unwholesomely real. Our optimism that the narrative will fulfill the promise of resolution and allow us to renounce the desires generated by

[61] Mary Kathryn Grant, The Tragic Vision of Joyce Carol Oates (Durham: Duke University Press, 1978), 93, 133.
[62] Oates, A Fair Maiden, 156.
[63] Oates, 159.
[64] Ibid., 164.
[65] Ibid., 165.
[66] Berlant, "Cruel Optimism," 94.

the story results only in our disappointment, since the narrator refuses to provide us with the means to re-repress those desires, or to exit out of complicity with the text. We are instead left with the unsettling feeling that, like Katya, we have somehow failed to resolve those problems presented to us as inherent to the human condition and which, by extension, come to inform our experience of reality.

As one final remark, I will concede that, like any other text, Oates' novel is subject to interpretation, to our subjective readings based upon our own respective psychological states and the analytical framework by which we might desire to read a piece of literature. As Freud submits, however, "Suggestion is supposed to be able to do anything, and our successes would then be results of suggestion and not of psycho-analysis."[67] What remains, then, is to assess whether the novel truly is as successful in eliciting our fear and anxiety—our horror in response to the monsters about which we read in the narrative and in ourselves—as I have suggested here.

[67] Sigmund Freud, "The Future Prospects of Psycho-Analytic Therapy: An Address Delivered Before the Second International Psycho-Analytical Congress at Nuremberg in 1910," in Collected Papers, Volume 2: Clinical Papers, Papers on Technique, trans. Joan Riviere (London: Hogarth Press, 1950), 291.

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# (Un)Frozen Hearts: Wendigoes, Gothic Tropes, and Indigenous Knowledge in Drew Hayden Taylor's *The Night Wanderer: A Graphic Novel*

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Drew Hayden Taylor's *The Night Wanderer: A Graphic Novel* is the third edition of Taylor's Gothic story featuring Pierre L'Errant, a wandering Native vampire, and Tiffany, an Indigenous teenager. The graphic novel presents the reader with a coming-of-age story that specifically explores Canadian colonial legacies and subsequent challenges faced by Canada's Aboriginal youth. Just as colonialism continues to haunt Indigenous people, the Gothic literary tradition haunts Taylor's story. Literary critics have remained critical of analyzing Indigenous writing within western literary frameworks, particularly in respects to the Gothic. Cynthia Sugars argues that when discussing Indigenous literature: "'Gothic', like the term 'postcolonialism,' has been subject to much criticism in its application to Indigenous literatures in Canada."[1] Sugars' argument is founded on the idea that Indigenous writing should be analyzed as its own literary form, or more importantly, within the Oral Tradition. Although this notion is true when exploring Indigenous writing, Taylor undermines this idea through the text's original title: *A Contemporary Gothic Indian Vampire Story.* By employing Gothic tropes, Taylor refashions the role of the Windigo[2] in Native Gothic writing; he reshapes the mythical being from its appropriated use in Canadian fiction. Despite the Gothic haunting in Taylor's narrative, Pierre's story is one of redemption. By sharing knowledge, Pierre and

[1] Cynthia Sugars, Canadian Gothic: Literature, History, and the Specter of Self-Invention (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2014), 214.

[2]The name Windigo has a plethora of spellings, including: Windigo, Wendigo, Chenoo and Wétiko. Spelling deviates intentionally throughout this essay as there is no 'correct' way to spell the name.

Tiffany create a narrative that disrupts the colonial construction of Indigenous history. More specifically, Taylor uses a Gothic setting, subtle historical references, Vampirism, and double meanings, to shift the narrative away from the representation of the Windigo as the colonizer. Rather, it is the western literary figure, the vampire, that embodies the colonizer.

The Windigo is a mythological being found in a variety of interpretations across the Algonquian language group. The Algonquian people encompass numerous Indigenous nations across the North American continent from the Atlantic coast, to the Great Lakes, to the edge of the Rockies. Just as there is a wide variety of Nations across the Algonquian language group, Windigo narratives exist in a plethora of interpretations. John Robert Colombo, in his edited volume *Windigo: An Anthology of Fact and Fantastic Fiction* states, "The word used for this creature is not a proper name, for the creature has no name. No one may know it and live to tell about it, so the Windigo must remain nameless."[3] As a result, there are no definitive features of the Windigo. Windigoes are frequently depicted as humanoid beasts, found in the North, endlessly trying to satisfy their hunger for human flesh. To become a Windigo, a human must feed to the flesh of another human, turning their heart to ice. Once someone becomes a Windigo, there is no turning back. Taylor employs the unknowability of Windigoes in his narrative, more importantly, Taylor challenges the use of Windigoes as a metaphorical representation of capitalism.

Cynthia Sugars suggests that Windigoes are utilized to represent colonialism in both Indigenous and Western literature; colonialism is a "'Wétiko sickness' that plagues Western society, a condition marked by greed, excessive consumption, violence, and egotism, and which was visited upon Native peoples at the time of colonization, infecting and steadily debilitating their descendants."[4] Like the Windigo, capitalism consumes endlessly; wandering the land unable to control its hunger. Despite the use of the Windigo as a representation of incurable hunger, Taylor resists the use of an Indigenous monster as the capitalist force. Rather he uses the Vampire, a western literary figure to represent the incurable hunger for human flesh and excessive consumption: "Drew

[3] John R. Colombo, Windigo, an Anthology of Fact and Fantastic Fiction (Saskatoon, Sask: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1982), 2

[4] Cynthia Sugars, "Strategic Abjection: Windigo Psychosis and the 'postindian' Subject in Eden Robinson's 'dogs in Winter,'" Canadian Literature 181 (2004): 80.

Hayden Taylor sought to 'culturally appropriate a European legend and Indigenize it.'"[5] By sneaking away in the night, Pierre rejected his community to seek out adventures in Europe. As a consequence of his decision to leave, he is denied the right to participate with his own cultural monsters, forcing Pierre to wander for eternity.

As the character Granny Ruth suggests, the Wendigo figure is doomed to wander for all eternity. Thus, as his French name 'L'Errant' (the French word for *the wanderer*) implies, Pierre attempts to reconnect to his myths through the act of wandering, much like his ancestral monsters. Pierre's character is unique to the narrative: "The role of Taylor's Gothic villain-hero in the *Night Wanderer* is pivotal. L'Errant is literally a ghost-from-the-past – a ghost from Canada's Aboriginal past."[6] Pierre, "represents a link to the precolonial past as – he is the only living Anishinaabe person to remember life before Europeans – and the ways in which colonial history has ossified Indigenous cultures, since he is an undead and unchanging vampire."[7] Thus, Taylor is able to construct a ghost that represents the Indigenous past and, with the help of Tiffany, the Indigenous future. Analyzing Pierre by comparing him to other literary vampires would seem logical, however, this would push the discussion into the realm of western literary tradition. Despite Pierre's Vampiric nature, his characterization should be analyzed within a framework of Indigeneity; Pierre should be and is cast within the framework of Windigo narratives. Taylor further enforces the connection to Windigoes through both the modern and historical setting of the graphic novel.

The graphic novel is primarily set in both modern day Ontario and a pre-contact Anishinaabe village. Despite the dislocation of time, the story is set in the same location, Otter Lake, creating not only an historical connection between the two protagonists, but an ancestral one

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[5]Sarah Henzi, "Indigenous Uncanniness: Windigo Revisited and Popular Culture," in The Routledge Companion to Native American Literature, ed. Deborah L Madsen (New York: Routledge, 2016), 470.

[6]Donna Ellwood Flett, "Deepening the Reading Experience of Drew Hayden Taylor's Vampire Novel for Adolescents," in Knowing Their Place?: Identity and Space in Children's Literature, ed. Terri Doughty and Dawn Thompson (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Pub, 2011), 27.

[7]Kristin Burnett and Judith Leggatt, "Bloodsucking Colonizers and the Undead Anishinaabe: History, Cultural Continuity, and Identity in Drew Hayden Taylor's the Night Wanderer," in Native American and Indigenous Studies 3, no.1 (2016): 1.

as well. Taylor constructs the postcolonial[8] reserve as a Gothic space through his use of colour and Gothic tropes. The graphic novel is primarily stylized in Windigo colours, yet the use of grey highlights disrupts the stark contrast between white, black and red, and by extension, undercuts a distinctly Windigo narrative. This is accomplished in two ways: the flooding of the land and the winding passages of the reserve.

As Maureen Clark states: "The reservation, which is surrounded by swamp, is garrison-like. The forbidding nature of the terrain renders it decidedly Gothic: it is dark and isolated as a consequence of government interference with the river system."[9] As Clark suggests, the Gothic setting is imposed upon the reserve through the government's attempt to conquer and colonize the natural world. The manipulation of the lake floods the land, rendering it Gothic. By turning the land into a swamp, the government destroyed the once vibrant and fertile land where Pierre grew up. Although this could appear as a purely literary trope, it is reminiscent of the modern Anishinaabe experience. Leo Waisberg and Tim Holzkamm, both of whom have written extensively on the Indigenous use of sturgeon,[10] state: "Flooding of Native lands for hydro power has been a common practice in Canada during the 20th century."[11] The Anishinaabe lands are no exception; in 1887, a hydro dam was built flooding an Anishinaabe community, destroying their food sources, fur bearing habitat, and homes. Taylor's use of Otter Lake is a direct historical reference to colonial destruction of the natural environment, rendering the Anishinaabe territory a water-logged swamp.

The swampy land is not the only Gothic feature of the reserve; the surrounding woods contain their own ghosts:

> There were also stories of monsters and demons of the forest, prowling just beyond the roadside ditch. . . the

[8] In this instance, postcolonial does not refer to a time after colonialism, but rather it is used to distinguish from the precolonial setting in parts of the graphic novel.

[9] Maureen Clark, "Postcolonial Vampires in the Indigenous Imagination: Philip McLaren and Drew Hayden Taylor," in Transnational and Postcolonial Vampires: Dark Blood, ed. TabishKhair, and Johan A. Hŏglund, (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), 133.

[10] A Sturgeon is a type of bony fish, found across North America.

[11] Leo Waisberg and Tim Holzkamm, "From Ojibway homeland to reservoir: flooding the Lake of the Woods Anishinaabeg," in Sacred Lands: Aboriginal World Views, Claims, and Conflicts, ed. Jill E.Oakes (Edmonton: Canadian Circumpolar Institute Press, 1998), 117.

> swamp-like terrain and the forbidding nature of the forest didn't make too many people want to challenge the legends. Tiffany had heard tales of murders, evil spirits, witch lights, and other assorted stories of supernatural mischief happening out here.[12]

Forests as a Gothic space are frequently employed in Canadian literature. The woods represent the untamed Canadian wilderness that needs to be controlled by the colonizer. The depictions of forests represent a contradiction in Canadian literature; the forest is both home to the threatening nature and perceived as empty. This inaccurate depiction of Canada as an unpopulated wilderness has persisted throughout Canadian history.[13] Gerry Turcotte and Cynthia Sugars encapsulate this notion: "European explorers' encounters with the vast and seemingly uninhabited landscapes of North America were often marked by an aggressive and resistant response to Canadian Indigenous peoples."[14] Taylor challenges the historical notion of empty wilderness by portraying the woods as occupied by spirits. Similarly, Earle Birney, in his 1962 poem posits that, "it's only by our lack of ghosts that we're are haunted." Although many would argue that this quote has been widely misunderstood, it implies that Canada "lacks an adequately substantive history or culture."[15] Taylor's description dislocates our understanding of "supernatural mischief," preventing the reader from placing the haunting within a distinct nationality; we remain ignorant of who is doing the haunting. Nonetheless, Taylor asserts that there are ghosts, and by extension, a history, distinct from the castle-filled European Gothic tradition.

The reserve functions like the winding passages of a Gothic castle[16]. As with the gothic castle, the reserve requires a high level of familiarity to navigate its passages; it helps to protect the community from outside threat and creates a vivid picture of tight passageways for the reader.

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[12] Drew Hayden Taylor, The Night Wanderer: A Native Gothic Novel (Toronto: Annick Press, 2007), 16.

[13] Jessup, Lynda, "The Group of Seven and the Tourist Landscape in Western Canada, or The More Things Change..." in Journal of Canadian Studies 37, no. 1 (2002): 147.

[14] Cynthia C. Sugars and Gerry Turcotte, Unsettled Remains: Canadian Literature and the Postcolonial Gothic (Waterloo, Ont: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2009), xi.

[15] Cynthia Sugars, Canadian Gothic: Literature, History, and the Specter of Self-Invention (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2014), 10.

[16] For further reading on the concept of the Gothic Castle see: Punter, David. 2000. A companion to the Gothic, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000).

Northrop Frye, positioned Canada within the Gothic tradition by adapting the Gothic castle to match the castle-less Canadian landscape through the concept of the 'garrison mentality.' Frye posited that, "[in] early Canadian literature, a defensive measure in which 'isolated communities surrounded with a physical or psychological "frontier" cling to one another when "confronted with a huge, unthinking, menacing, and formidable physical setting."[17] The term was used to describe fictional garrisons – or the Forts – that dotted the Canadian landscape during early colonialism. These Forts, created both psychological and physical walls between European settlers and the natural world. The 'walls' of Otter Lake Reserve are the dense haunted forest that surrounds the tight passageways. As Tiffany and Granny Ruth move through the reserve, Taylor employs the concept of the garrison mentality: ". . . by keeping her eyes shut and describing in amazingly timed detail all the familiar landmarks on the road as they passed them. She knew every pothole, every bee nest, and every dead tree."[18] The flooding of the land, narrow passageways and colonial attitudes construct a garrison-like mentality in the reserve. Due to the Canadian Reservation system,[19] Indigenous communities are forced into garrisons, bracing against the uncertain influence of the western world.

As a result of this colonial legacy, the reserve acts as a form of 'garrison' against the neighboring Canadian town. Despite their proximity, Tiffany describes relationships between the town and the reserve in the following terms: "For decades, both places had lived side by side, comfortably ignorant of each other."[20] This element is particularly threatening to Tiffany's father, following the departure of his wife. Similarly, Tony, Tiffany's new white boyfriend, represents the crossing of the border between reserve and the town, a menacing external force that threatens to disrupt the protective passages of the garrison. Keith, Tiffany's father, is not the only one that perceives the crossing of borders as a threat; Tony's father and friends consider the presence of Tiffany off-reserve to be equally threatening.[21] The fundamental

[17] Sugars, Canadian Gothic, 32.

[18] Taylor, The Night Wanderer, 14.

[19] For further reading on the Canadian Reserve System, see James S. Frideres, First Nations in the Twenty-First Century.(Don Mills, Ont: Oxford University Press, 2011), 11.

[20] Taylor, The Night Wanderer, 111.

[21] Taylor and Alison Kooistra. The Night Wanderer:, 16-19, 48-51.

misunderstanding between the communities is highlighted by Tony's "astonishment" by her status card, and subsequent pressuring of Tiffany to pay for material goods.[22] The status card draws to attention to the fundamental historical misunderstanding between the two communities. Justin Edwards writes in reference to the garrison in *Wacousta*: "the crossing of geographical borders engenders the crossing of other boundaries."[23] It is not only the physical and mental crossing of boundaries that challenges the communities, but the uncertainty of what it could mean. These communities are in a state of competing histories; there is the settler-constructed historical narrative and the existence of Pierre, a walking contradiction of settler-oriented history. This is particularly highlighted through Tiffany's rejection of "history taught in settler-dominated schools."[24] It is the failure to understand or relate to each other that threatens the community coupled with the uncertainty of what such a relationship would entail. The neighbouring town is not the only threat; Pierre is simultaneously positioned as the villain and the hero.

Pierre, occupies a contradictory place in the narrative, he is both a "cultural insider and cultural outsider."[25] Although he is from a precolonial Anishinaabe community, he remains an outsider because he has been absent for the past three hundred years wandering through European history. In Taylor's graphic novel, there is always the looming threat of what is hiding in the natural – more specifically – the nocturnal world. Pierre embodies nature, lurking in the forested walls, threatening to expose settler dominated history. In the novel Pierre states, "there had been many stories and legends told of the time animal and man spoke the same language."[26] Several pages prior to this, through the perspective of an owl, "the human pursed his lips and emitted a note-perfect owl call… it was so perfect, even the owl did a double take. The two-legged creature could see and talk like him. This was too much for the simple country owl."[27] Pierre represents the possibility of a "historical… act of

[22] Taylor, The Night Wanderer:, 29.
[23] Justin Edwards, Gothic Canada: Reading the Spectre of a National Literature (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2005), 8.
[24] Burnett and Leggatt, "Bloodsucking Colonizers and the Undead Anishinaabe" 2.
[25] Ibid., 5.
[26] Taylor, The Night Wanderer, 60.
[27] Ibid., 59.

decolonization" and the monster that hunts in the night, isolating his prey.[28]

The setting is further rendered uncanny through the protagonist's sense of isolation. Both Pierre and Tiffany are emotionally and often physically isolated in the text: "Pierre and Tiffany feel and live with a great sense of isolation and loss; Tiffany is at odds with her family, friends and former boyfriend, and was - in a way - abandoned by her mother, while Pierre, due to his 'condition,' mourns the loss of his family but also the loss of his humanity."[29] Although Taylor creates a parallel experience of isolation between Pierre and Tiffany, it is Pierre's pre-Vampire self, Owl, that is Tiffany's reflection. By positioning Owl and Tiffany as reflections, it allows for a unique relationship to develop between them (see Fig. 1).


Fig. 1. Tiffany and Pierre with the memory of Owl, Drew Hayden Taylor, Michael Wyatt and Alison Kooistra's *The Night Wanderer: A Graphic Novel* (Toronto: Annick Press, 2007; Print; 76).

One of the most prominent features that joins Pierre and Tiffany is their connection to Windigo narratives. He is primarily connected to the Windigo through his name, his monstrous 'condition,' and the act of wandering. Similarly, Tiffany is linked to postcolonial water-spirit

[28] Burnett and Leggatt, "Bloodsucking Colonizers and the Undead Anishinaabe", 1.
[29] Henzi, "Indigenous Uncanniness," 471.

representations of Windigo narratives. By aligning the characters with Windigo spirits, Taylor resists the characterization of the Windigo as a representation of western colonialism and capitalism.

The Windigo is introduced in the young adult edition of the story, *The Night Wanderer: A Native Gothic Novel,* through a conversation between Granny Ruth and Pierre:

> 'Demons. Or monsters. Cannibals whose souls were lost. They eat and eat, anything and everything. And everybody. They never get satisfied. In fact, the more they eat, the bigger they get, and the bigger their appetite becomes. It's a never-ending circle. They become giant, ravenous monster marauding across the countryside, laying waste to it. They come in winter time, from the north.' 'That's one story. Another says they were once humans who, during winter when food was scarce, had resorted to cannibalism. By eating the flesh of humans, they condemned themselves to aimless wandering, trying to feed a hunger that will not be satisfied.'[30]

The conversation between Pierre and Granny highlights the diversity of Windigo narratives. Not only do the narratives vary across Nations, but they vary within communities as well. All stories contain a similar understanding of the Windigo as a cannibalistic spirit, with a heart of ice. Although there are variations in their physical form, the Wendigo maintains some features in common: they have lost their humanity, as a result few who meet a Windigo live to tell the tale.

Unlike the Windigo spirit, Pierre is conflicted with respect to his humanity. On one hand, we see violent outbursts and the desire to consume Tiffany's blood, as well as the possible murder of two local men. On the other, the reader is presented with the guardian of a lost teenager, a lost culture and a man who whispers lost words to an elderly grandmother. Pierre remains trapped between two identities; that of an Indigenous man and European-derived monster. Sara Henzi asserts that, "Through Pierre L'Errant, Taylor characterizes the traditional beastly creature of the Windigo within a contemporary setting as a vampire; vampirism with which Pierre is infected is represented as the European

[30] Taylor, The Night Wanderer, 169-170.

version of 'savagery.'"[31] Unlike other Indigenous writing, Taylor reverses the use of the Windigo; it is the European monster that acts as the metaphor for the colonizer. Through the vampire infection, Owl/Pierre is denied his place within his own cultural myths, as that of a Windigo. The act of turning him into a vampire, a western literary figure frequently used as a site of resistance, he is denied his ability to engage with his own cultural monsters. As Granny Ruth suggests, the Wendigo figure is doomed to wander for all eternity. Thus, as his French name 'L'Errant' (the French word for *the wanderer*) implies, Pierre attempts to reconnect to his myths through the act of wandering, much like his ancestral monsters. The arrival of a wandering Windigo foreshadows a change in family dynamics, especially in relation to gender roles.

According to Shawn Smallman, "Family issues, such as marriage, fertility, food production, and gender roles, are common in many traditional oral narratives of the Windigo."[32] Throughout the graphic novel there are examples of disrupted family structures, most notably rendered through Pierre's sudden departure from his family and the departure of Tiffany's mother. European colonialism resulted in a massive disruption of the cultural and family structure of Indigenous people.[33] Shifts in family structures recurred numerous times throughout history: the fur trade changed the family migration patterns, Residential Schools removed children from their families and intergenerational trauma continues to current generations.

Shawn Smallman in his text, *Dangerous Spirits: The Windigo in Myth and History*, recounts the story of the "Friendly Visitor," an oral narrative frequently found in Mi'kmaq, Anishinaabe, and Passamaquoddy cultures.[34] The *Friendly Visitor* describes the story of a family who was visited by a Windigo or Cheeno. The Cheeno was in the form of an old man who wandered near their home, "stark naked and with a hideous countenance; his lips and shoulders seem to have been gnawed away."[35]

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[31] Henzi, "Indigenous Uncanniness", 470.

[32] Shawn Smallman, Dangerous Spirits: The Windigo in Myth and History (Victoria: Heritage House Publishing, 2015), 34.

[33] For further reading please see: James S. Frideres, First Nations in the Twenty-First Century. (Don Mills, Ont: Oxford University Press, 2011), or Regan, Paulette. 2010. Unsettling the settler within: Indian residential schools, truth telling, and reconciliation in Canada, (Vancouver : UBC Press, 2010).

[34] Ibid., 58-61.

[35]Silas T. Rand, Legends of the Micmacs (New York: Johnson Reprint Corp, 1971), 190.

To protect her family, the mother treated the Windigo as though he was her long lost father, welcoming him into her home. When her husband returned from hunting, she greeted him at the door and shared her plan. They welcomed the elderly Windigo into their family, clothing and feeding him. The elderly Cheeno informed them that another Cheeno would arrive in three days to engage him in a fight: "He told the woman to bring him a bundle, after throwing away anything in it that scared her. She threw out a pair of human heels and legs but kept a pair of dragon horns."[36] During the battle with the second Cheeno, the first Cheeno called to his son-in-law for help, the son-in-law slays the second Cheeno with the dragon horn. In this case, "even the Windigo needed his adopted family to overcome another monster."[37] There is a clear reflection of Pierre and the Hunter family in this narrative. Pierre is the monster, or Windigo, that must use his adoptive family to overcome another monster, the Vampire. The Hunter family welcomed Pierre into their home, albeit for the cost of rent, they welcomed Pierre emotionally. More specifically, it is the interactions with Granny Ruth and her pickles that highlight Pierre's acceptance into the family (see Fig. 2), aligning Ruth with the mother in the story of the *Friendly Visitor*. Granny Ruth is the first to see that Pierre is not as he appears, recognizing that he is "haunted" and "wandering."[38] Similarly, Granny Ruth tells Pierre: "I get the impression that you think you can get rid of whatever it is [haunting you] by coming here."[39] In this instance, Granny Ruth is incorrect; Pierre is not running from what haunts him, but towards it.

[36] Smallman, Dangerous Spirits, 59.
[37] Ibid., 59.
[38] Taylor and Kooistra. The Night Wanderer, 77, 80.
[39] Ibid., 77.


Fig. 2. Granny Ruth handing Pierre a plate of pickles from Drew Hayden Taylor, Michael Wyatt and Alison Kooistra's*The Night Wanderer: A Graphic Novel* (Toronto: Annick Press, 2007; Print; 76).

Unlike the Friendly Visitor, it is Tiffany that comes to Pierre's aid to destroy the other monster, through the gift of the weekah root (see Fig. 3), which allows Pierre to defeat "what ails him."[40] Like the son-in-law in the Friendly Visitor, Tiffany is the last to be informed of the arrival of the family's guest, yet she is pivotal in helping Pierre to defeat the Vampire. More importantly, she does so through the transference and receiving of Indigenous knowledge, both through Pierre and through Granny Ruth.

[40] Ibid., 101.


Fig. 3. Tiffany giving the weekah root to Pierre, inDrew Hayden Taylor, Michael Wyatt and Alison Kooistra's*The Night Wanderer: A Graphic Novel* (Toronto: Annick Press, 2007; Print; 101).

Tiffany is similarly aligned with Wendigo narratives. According to Smallman: "As the Canadian state undermined Indigenous independence, depictions of the Windigo in Algonquian communities became increasingly diverse, and they often reflected older traditions regarding water spirits."[41] Smallman furthers this by relaying the story written by a Canadian nurse working in a northern Cree community. The woman was called to the home of a distressed nineteen-year-old Cree woman named Christina. While retrieving water at the lake, she witnessed a Windigo standing in the water. The Windigo took the form of a young woman with long black hair, who beckoned her to come further into the water. Christina's screams alerted her mother who forcibly dragged her away from the shore. Several months later, Christina was visited by a suitor on his way to skate on the same body of water. While skating, the ice broke and the suitor drowned. It was later determined that he drowned in the place where Christina had seen the

[41] Smallman, Dangerous Spirits, 35.

Windigo. Similarly, in times of distress Tiffany is frequently aligned with water spirits. Following an argument with her friends, Tiffany is startled by Pierre, which causes her to fall into the river (see Fig. 4). Both times, Pierre is both the rescuer and the monstrous force that drives her into the water. After a fight with her father and her threat of suicide, Tiffany is depicted as looking out across the water, perhaps observing her own Windigo calling her to come closer (see Fig. 5). It is unclear whether Tiffany is fighting the Windigo trying to consume her or at risk of becoming one herself. Like Pierre/Owl, Tiffany is at risk of denying her father and community. By aligning Tiffany with Windigoes, Taylor highlights the potentially disastrous consequences of leaving one's community.


Fig. 4. Tiffany falling into the water, Drew Hayden Taylor, Michael Wyatt and Alison Kooistra's *The Night Wanderer: A Graphic Novel* (Toronto: Annick Press, 2007; Print; 76).

Fig. 5. Tiffany staring across the lake, in Drew Hayden Taylor, Michael Wyatt and Alison Kooistra's *The Night Wanderer: A Graphic Novel* (Toronto: Annick Press, 2007; Print; 76).

The disruption of Tiffany's home and culture has lead her down a dangerous path, one where she is at risk of, "becoming one more statistic in the epidemic of Indigenous teenage suicides."[42] As previously stated, Taylor aligns Owl and Tiffany because: "both are curious about life outside of the community and have the restlessness of youth, not appreciating what their community has to offer."[43] Like Owl, Tiffany is anxious to enter the rest of the world, yet is at risk of becoming a Windigo. It is through Pierre's guidance that Tiffany avoids disastrous consequences. Pierre occupies a unique position as a walking relic of the Indigenous past, both before and during European contact. Nonetheless, he presents the possibility of a culture grounded in both Indigenous and Western knowledge. The graphic novel is a story of redemption. Pierre and Tiffany face a new type of frontier, by breaking through the physiological barrier of the garrison they are entering the possibility of a brighter future for their people. The use of graphic novels has proved pivotal in the modern transfer of knowledge to the next generation of Indigenous youth.

Taylor's choice of a young female protagonist in the case of this graphic novel is highly symbolic. Prior to colonization, women were the keepers of cultural knowledge. With the arrival of patriarchal colonizers, gender roles shifted within most Indigenous communities. According to Flett:

> Tiffany becomes the novel's young Aboriginal matriarch and Elder, the new carrier of culture. Through this transformation, contemporary cultural power comes to rest in the hands of young women… She is emerging from adolescence to young adulthood, beginning to look for her place in her community and to accept necessary responsibilities in order to fulfill her role first as Elder-in-training and then as the new Elder.[44]

Therefore, in the graphic novel, we witness the transfer of knowledge back to the woman, a change foreshadowed by the use of Windigo narratives. The Windigo does not discriminate: it is present at all shifts

[42] Burnett and Leggatt, "Bloodsucking Colonizers and the Undead Anishinaabe", 40.
[43] Ibid., 40.
[44] Ibid., 30-31.

in gender roles, regardless of what direction they shift. It is partially through Tiffany's rejection of colonial history that she can accept the role as the new elder, allowing for the return knowledge to the feminine realm. Tiffany does not ascribe to the static portrayal of Indigenous people: "She thought of herself in a buckskin dress, skinning a beaver, [it] almost made her laugh and throw up at the same time."[45] It is this rejection of colonial history that allows Tiffany to function within both the western and Indigenous worlds. By actively rejecting traditional historical structures, it allows for a new form of literature to become central in Indigenous writing, especially through the medium of Graphic novels.

Graphic novels help to create a highly accessible medium through which cultural knowledge is shared. Graphic novels can introduce Indigenous stories to individuals whose family structures, and therefore their access to Oral History, were destroyed by Indian Residential schools. Graphic novels allow a few elders to transmit their stories to a larger population. Margaret Noori explores the strengths of Indigenous graphic novels: "Blending ancient and modern ideas, writers, pencillers, inkers, and colorists offer lessons in history, philosophy, language, and culture."[46] In addition, graphic novels adapt to a variety of reading levels, and appeal to youth. Finally, graphic novels remain a relatively new field, with a less distinct root in colonial history (if we separate comic books and graphic novels as distinct genres), further removing the texts from the colonial association of western literary conventions.

Graphic novels, allowed for the operationalization of concepts like Two-eyed seeing: "Two-eyed seeing draws together the strengths of mainstream, or Western, and Mi'kmaq knowledge."[47] Like the concept of Two-eyed seeing, Taylor's novel introduces youth into Indigenous knowledge through a western medium: the graphic novel. *The Night Wanderer, 7 Generations,* and *Moonshot,* helps youth to see with two eyes; the graphic novel transmits traditional knowledge, while illustrating the need to survive in the contemporary Western world. Graphic novels do

[45] Taylor, The Night Wanderer, 29.

[46] Margaret Noori, "Native American Narratives from Early Art to Graphic Novels," in Multicultural Comics: From Zap to Blue Beetle, ed. by Frederick Aldama(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010), 56.

[47] Marilyn Iwama, Murdena Marshall, Albert Marshall, and Cheryl Bartlett. "Two-eyed Seeing the Language of Healing in Community-Based Research," Canadian Journal of Native Education 32, no. 2 (2009): 49.

not portray Indigenous communities as static cultures, rather, as vibrant dynamic Nations. By adapting Oral History to a modern audience, for example using space-aged snakes, authors cement an understanding that Indigenous people are not relics of the past.[48]

By appropriating Gothic tropes, hidden meanings, vampires and a Gothic setting, the use of the Gothic provides an important function in Taylor's narrative: it allows for the transference of knowledge and a deconstruction of colonial history. Pierre's end is one of redemption, "the preparation for his purifying death ritual is now complete."[49] By meeting the sun,[50] "L'Errant finally dies in the cleansing light of a sunrise that symbolically washes away the sins of the past."[51] In the same way the sun washes away Pierre's past, it also washes away the sins of the colonial past, enabling Tiffany to be an Elder with a 'bright future.'[52] It is a future where Indigenous knowledge is not only re-claimed, but reborn. It is not the act of wandering that enables Pierre to reclaim his ancestry, but through the transfer of knowledge to Tiffany.

[48] A reference to the story of UE-Pucase, the younger brother is turned into a snake, begging his older brother to leave him on earth, by Arigon Starr, ed. by Nicholson, Hope. Moonshot: The Indigenous Comics Collection (Toronto: Alternate History Comics, 2015), 67.

[49] Flett, "Deepening the Reading Experience of Drew Hayden Taylor's Vampire Novel for Adolescents," 34.

[50] "Meeting the Sun" is a term used frequently in Vampire narratives; it refers to when a Vampire willing terminates their existence by watching the sun rise.

[51] Flett, "Deepening the Reading Experience of Drew Hayden Taylor's Vampire Novel for Adolescents,", 30.

[52] Ibid., 35.

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# Memories in Kazuo Ishiguro's *Never Let Me Go*: A Clone's Humanity

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Kazuo Ishiguro's *Never Let Me Go* (2005) is an account of the lives and feelings experienced by three clones 'created' as organ donors for humans, Kathy, Ruth, and Tommy. Initially the three attend the fictional boarding school for clones, Hailsham. The school presented itself as a needed experiment at a time in which people wanted to believe that clones were less than human. The experiment was a way to prove that if clones were exposed to a certain education and stimuli, they could grow to be like humans. Subsequently, the three friends are allowed to explore the 'outside' world and move to a residential complex named 'the Cottages.' While Tommy and Ruth become donors right away, Kathy works as a 'carer' of other clones before she starts donating her own organs. Several years after they have lost touch, Kathy becomes Ruth's carer. Before dying, Ruth shares Madame's address with Kathy, encouraging her to ask for a 'deferral' so that Kathy can spend more time with her true love, Tommy. Madame is a lady who periodically visited Hailsham when the three friends were children, and who chose their best artwork. Tommy's theory is that Madame collected their art to read their souls and see which clones were in love. A visit from Madame could also be a chance to ask for a deferral of his last donation. Unfortunately, Tommy and Kathy discover that Madame and Hailsham's headmistress Miss Emily, never had the power to defer clones' donations, and that the artwork had been used as a way to collect funding for the school.

This paper explores the role played by memory in Ishiguro's novel and demonstrates how the process of remembering proves the humanity of the narrator, Kathy, and allows her to regain control over her life as her first organ donation gets closer. First, the paper will analyse how Kathy's storytelling and recollection of her memories aims to discover the meaning of her life as a Hailsham student, 'carer,' and future donor. Second, it will concentrate on how Hailsham contributes to the identity formation of the clones. Third, it will explore the clones' humanity and the society's perception of them. Finally, it will investigate the

connection between the psychology of memory and geographical space in order to demonstrate that the empty fields and the shipwreck presented in the novel are metaphors of the clones' lives.

Narration plays a large role in how memories are communicated in the book; it is the medium through which memories are shared, and it incites a dialogue with the reader. Critics have largely concentrated on the figure of Kathy as the narrator of *Never Let Me Go*. She has been defined as "impeccably lucid even when –especially when– confronting the cryptic."[1] Throughout the novel, Kathy addresses an unidentified 'you,' to whom she relates the account of her own life. Anne Whitehead points out how the narrator's address of a second-person reader is a "device commonly used in Victorian fiction to enhance sympathetic connection."[2] However, Whitehead recognises that, in *Never Let Me Go*, the device becomes a way to unsettle and question the position of the reader in relation to the narrator.[3] In fact, Victorian Literature could be considered Kathy's area of specialization, since it is the field Kathy chooses when she has to decide on the topic she wants to investigate in the essay to be completed at the Cottages. Kathy's narrative style might therefore have been influenced by her academic study of Victorian Literature. In any event, the direct address explicitly engages the reader, and Ishiguro aims at activating his readers' attention. In fact, the author states that a reader should not passively follow the events recounted by the narrator, but also consider questions such as "why has she remembered this event just at this point? How does she feel about it? And when she says she can't remember very precisely what happened, but she'll tell us anyway, well, how much do we trust her?"[4] Ishiguro wants his readers to reflect on the process of storytelling and on what brought the narrator to relate a certain event in a specific way. Through the narrator's dialogue with her listener, Ishiguro establishes a dialogue with his own readers.

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[1] Peter Kemp, "*Never Let Me Go* by Kazuo Ishiguro," Review of *Never Let Me Go*, by Kazuo Ishiguro, *Sunday Times*, February 20, 2005. www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/culture/books/article131612.ece

[2] Anne Whitehead. "Writing with Care: Kazuo Ishiguro's *Never Let Me Go*," *Contemporary Literature* 52, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 58.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Kazuo Ishiguro, "An Interview with Kazuo Ishiguro: A Conversation with Kazuo Ishiguro about *Never Let Me Go*." Interview. BookBrowse. https://www.bookbrowse.com/author_interviews/full/index.cfm/author_number/477/kazuo-ishiguro.

In order to understand the process of remembering that Kathy embarks upon, not only is it important to focus on her voice as narrator, but also examine the figure to whom she addresses her account. Whitehead reports Mullan's interpretation of the 'you' with whom Kathy shares her memories, identifying him/her with another clone–but not necessarily one who attended Hailsham. According to Whitehead, Kathy's assumptions that her listener is a fellow clone "speaks of her paucity of imagination and also of the insularity of her life."[5] However, Kathy does not explicitly refer to another 'carer' or to a donor, even if she does mention that, in the past, she has discussed with one of her patients many of the same events related in her account. At first, thinking back to the way she felt when she had even less experience of the world, Kathy says to her addressee that she is "sure somewhere in your childhood, you too had an experience like ours that day; similar if not in the actual details, then inside, in the feelings."[6] She also repeatedly asks her listener to remember what she has already told him/her. Kathy's words are revealing: "you have to remember that to us, at that stage in our lives, any place beyond Hailsham was like a fantasy land; we had only the haziest notions of the world outside and about what was and wasn't possible there."[7] Her statement suggests that she might not be talking to a donor. In fact, one of her patients would probably have shared the same experience of being a confused student in his/her early days as a clone. When Kathy asks her listener to remember, she does not refer to the reminiscence of a shared experience, but she is requesting her listener's attention and focus. Knowing that her addressee is following her account is a motivation for Kathy to continue with the recollection of her memories, a process that helps her discover the meaning of her life. More specifically, narration becomes the mirror through which Kathy sees the reflection of her own life and helps her make sense of it.

According to the way in which Kathy chooses to reconstruct her past, her addressee may also be a donor, someone who attended an institution where clones were allowed to come in contact with the outside world. This option would explain why the listener needs to be provided with explanations of how things worked at Hailsham. In fact, when Tommy and Kathy visit Madame's dwelling and discuss their early days at Hailsham, they learn about aspects that were still unclear to them during

[5] Whitehead, "Writing with Care,"107.

[6] Kazuo Ishiguro. *Never Let Me Go*. (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2010), 36.

[7] Ibid., 66.

their days at the Cottages. In spite of having been repeatedly told, while at Hailsham, that they were "special" students, they were not able to understand the reason why the clones coming from other schools were so interested in learning about theirs. Thanks to Miss Emily, they learn that not all schools are like Hailsham. In fact, Miss Emily says that "When Marie-Claude [Madame] and I started out, there were no places like Hailsham in existence."[8] Hailsham is perceived by Kathy, Ruth and Tommy as a safe environment, and considered a special place. Ruth affirms that "It's all part of what made Hailsham so special … The way we were encouraged to value each other's work."[9] Her statement proves that they did enjoy their formative years in the school and do not think of that time as the beginning of their exploitation. Narrating her experience at Hailsham to a donor would therefore be a process that allows Kathy to better understand her existence.

While the donors' bodies are disassembled because of the donations, Kathy's continual remembrance allows her to assemble her own identity. Through the recollection of memories, Kathy attempts to re-assemble the body–if not physically, creating a corpus of memories that attests to her existence, in the face of an activity that repeatedly dismantles the body and the self. Not only is this process therapeutic for Kathy, in the sense that it helps her go through the difficulties of being a 'carer,' but it also helps her patients. By listening to Kathy's stories--or to Kathy, Tommy and Ruth's accounts at the Cottage--her patients attempt to replace uneasy memories with ones that could be more reassuring and comforting. Even donors who attended Hailsham are longing to talk about the past. Specifically, they enjoy remembering the days at the school, when they were not entirely aware of their future of loss. Operating on one's memories is a way to heal–both physically, as the patient is recovering from a donation - and psychologically, as the feelings attached to the event are causing pain. Kathy's words are revealing:

there have been times over the years where I've tried to leave Hailsham behind, when I've told myself I shouldn't look back so much. But then came a point when I just stopped resisting. It had to do with this particular donor I had once … it was his reaction when I mentioned I was from Hailsham … I realised then how desperately he didn't want reminding. Instead, he wanted to hear about Hailsham."[10]

[8] Ibid., 261.
[9] Ibid., 17.
[10] Ibid., 5.

Kathy's donor wants her to talk about Hailsham because hearing about that "beautiful place"[11] is a way to distract his attention from the fact that he knows he is not going to make it out alive of his third donation. Moreover, operating on her own memories is a process that allows Kathy to regain control over her life, just a few months before she starts undergoing donations herself.

Spending their formative years at Hailsham allows Kathy, Ruth and Tommy to develop a strong bond with one another, which contributes to their identity formation. Deborah Britzman offers an interesting study of the name that Ishiguro chooses for Kathy, Ruth and Tommy's school. The critic says that "Its name [Hailsham] means what it says: the children, with no parents, are greeted by a sham that they can't quite figure but that manages to hail them."[12] The school has a strong influence on their perception of the outside world. Growing up at Hailsham, being exposed to the routine of the school, and meeting different guardians, are all experiences that nourish their minds and allow them to develop as individuals. It is through these experiences that they realise that they are "really different from them; that there are people out there, like Madame, who don't hate you or wish you any harm, but who nevertheless shudder at the very thought of you–of how you were brought into the world and why–and who dread the idea of your hand brushing against theirs." This "cold moment … troubling and strange" is the first step toward their full development as individuals, which culminates when Kathy tells Miss Emily that the Hailsham experience "might be just some trend that came and went [for the guardians] … But for us, it's our life."[13]

In spite of not having grown up in the 'real world', clones learn about it and are trained to act 'like humans' thanks to Hailsham. Keith McDonald points out that Hailsham's students have not experienced infancy–an aspect that differentiates *Never Let Me Go* from the "fictive autobiographies [that] usually include some information about the birth and parentage of the subject."[14] The clones learn about the notion of family and what it represents, while being aware that they do not have

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[11] Ibid.

[12] Deborah P. Britzman "On Being a Slow Reader: Psychoanalytic Reading Problems in Ishiguro's *Never Let Me Go*," *Changing English* 13, no. 3 (December 2006): 313.

[13] Ishiguro, *Never Let Me Go*, 266.

[14] Keith McDonald. "Days of Past Futures: Kazuo Ishiguro's *Never Let Me Go* as "Speculative Memoir,"" *Biography* 30, no. 1 (2007): 78.

parents. Their first contact with this concept is constituted by the role-play activities practiced at Hailsham during which students learn about the social conventions of the outside world. Kathy states that, when they are children, "any place beyond Hailsham was like a fantasy land."[15] However, they attend classes where they "had to role play various people we'd find out there – waiters in cafés, policemen and so on."[16] These sessions "get [them] excited and worried all at the same time",[17] because they are an occasion to get familiar with the 'fantasy land' that is the world outside of Hailsham. Moreover, the clones gain knowledge of the world 'out there' when they are at the Cottages. There they are both able to access media and are allowed to go on day-trips. Kathy notices that veteran couples copy "mannerisms … from the television"[18] and reprimands Ruth for hitting Tommy on the arm, as it is "not how it works in real families."[19] Kathy seems therefore able to discern which attitudes belong to the 'real' world and which are simply fictional.

Since clones do not have memories of their parents, they are fascinated by the idea of meeting their 'possibles', the individuals after which they have been modelled. This gives them a confirmation of their humanity. Specifically, Kathy is hoping to recognise her 'possible' from the pictures of the porn magazines that she finds at the Cottages–as having been modelled on a porn star would explain her sexual needs, which make her uncomfortable and worried. In the same way, Ruth is hoping to find her 'possible' working in an office in Norfolk, as clones believe that the lives of their 'possibles' would give them an idea of what their future might have been, if they did not have to 'complete' – which is to pass away after their final donation. Clones believe that, by seeing their 'possibles,' they would "get some insight into who [they] were deep down, and maybe too, [they]'d see something of what [their] life held in store."[20] Finding their 'possibles' would reassure clones that the sensations they feel are human. Moreover, it would give them the impression that there is someone out there who looks exactly like them and functions as an 'ancestor' that legitimates their existence.

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[15] Ishiguro, *Never Let Me Go*, 66.

[16] Ibid., 110.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid., 120.

[19] Ibid., 124.

[20] Ibid., 140.

Through the recollection and interpretation of past memories, Kathy gains a fuller sense of her self before she begins the process of taking her self apart more literally, through donation. More specifically, Kathy's phrasing measures the present perception against the past perception. In fact, the analysis and re-examination of what happened in the past is constant in the novel, and made evident by the vocabulary chosen by Ishiguro. Phrases frequently used are "Thinking back now,"[21] "I realize now,"[22] "When I think about this now, it seems to me,"[23] "now I think about it, I'd say,"[24] "Looking back now,"[25] and "Looking at it now."[26] During the recollection process, Kathy feels the need to provide her listener with a series of explanations. First, sentences such as "I should explain why I got so bothered by Ruth saying what she did"[27] are an attempt to justify her selection of events. Second, Kathy's digressions and elaborations function to order and explain the events that she intends to present. Throughout the course of the novel, Kathy analyses the past, looking back from her present perspective. Her goal is to find reasons and explanations, re-evaluating previous events from her thirty-one-year-old-'carer' perspective. Memories, however, are important not only to Kathy talking from the present. When they were kids, Kathy and her classmates actually used to get excited at the memory of past purchases during the sales and exchanges. The adult 'carer'/donor clones can better understand from their present perspective all the mechanisms that were not comprehensible to them during their early days as students. For example, they realise that they could have known more about their condition from Miss Lucy: "I'm sure now, in the light of what happened later, that we only needed to ask and Miss Lucy would have told us all kinds of things."[28] In that particular moment of their life, they already knew that they were different from the guardians and all the 'normals,' but their memories are blurred. While certain memories are indistinct, others are very clear – Kathy, in fact, stores "pictures"[29] of past moments

[21] Ibid., 36.
[22] Ibid., 37.
[23] Ibid., 72.
[24] Ibid., 88.
[25] Ibid., 95.
[26] Ibid., 102.
[27] Ibid., 126.
[28] Ibid., 69.
[29] As Kathy keeps 'pictures' of past moments, the reader needs to assemble the clues provided by her narrative in order to "get a picture of what really happened and why"

in her mind. Looking back, things start to make sense and/or take on a different meaning. Therefore, when the clones become adolescents, start wondering about things, and try to find answers, they find that re-living past events becomes particularly significant. By examining and figuring the real meaning of those events, Kathy and her friends aim at giving a sense to their lives. Kathy states that her conversation with Tommy by the pond is "a turning point. I definitely started to look at everything differently. Where before I'd have backed away from awkward stuff, I began instead, more and more, to ask questions, if not out loud, at least within myself."[30] Time alters the perception of events and helps Kathy in attaching meaning to what happened in the past. As a result, her evaluation of memories facilitates the process of assembling her own self.

The subjectivity of memories is another indication in the novel of how memory is changeable, not only when it comes to temporal distance, but also to perspective, and contributes to making the clones human. Tommy, Kathy and Ruth, in fact, have contrasting memories of the same events. Kathy not only embarks upon a process of self-formation, in order to construct her own personal history, but also learns how to see other points of view. Looking back at Tommy's temper tantrums, Kathy mentions that she is not sure when they started. She admits: "My own memory of it is that Tommy was always known for his temper, even in the Infants, but he claimed to me they only began after the teasing got bad."[31] Similarly, Ruth and Kathy's memories of an episode differ: "When I was discussing it with Ruth a few years ago at the centre in Dover, she claimed Miss Lucy had told us a lot more; … I'm pretty sure she didn't."[32] Even when she is working as Ruth's 'carer,' Kathy still gets angry at her when she pretends not to remember past occurrences. In particular, Kathy cannot accept Ruth's pretending to have forgotten things about Hailsham–which she values as some of her most important memories. Tommy recognises that Ruth had always had a different approach to memories and life, and reminds Kathy that "what [she's] got to remember about Ruth … [is that] she was always different to us. You and me, right from the start, even when we were little, we were always

(Michiko Kakutani, "Sealed in a World That's Not as It Seems." Review of *Never Let Me Go*, by Kazuo Ishiguro, *New York Times*, April 4, 2005. www.nytimes.com/2005/04/04/books/sealed-in-a-world-thats-not-as-it-seems.html)

[30] Ibid., 77.

[31] Ibid., 21.

[32] Ibid., 82.

trying to find things out."[33] While Kathy is interested in recollecting her memories, Ruth deliberately alters or pretends to forget the past. Ruth does not want to embark upon the search for the meaning of their lives because it is a painful process. The analysis and re-interpretation of past events help Kathy understand Ruth's perspective and her effort "to move on, to grow up and leave Hailsham behind."[34] It is only from a present perspective and thanks to the experience she has accumulated that Kathy can understand how Ruth really felt.

Ruth might have a different approach to memories than Kathy's, but 'normals' have memories as well–and these memories acknowledge the clones' identities. When Kathy and Tommy enter Madame's house, they are not sure whether she remembers them or not. As soon as Miss Emily joins them, she immediately talks about remembering them and being remembered: "I remember, you see. I dare say I can remember you all … I recognised you, but you may well not have recognized me. In fact, Kathy H., once not so long ago, I passed you sitting on that bench out there, and you certainly didn't recognize me then."[35] In the same way, Madame finally admits to remembering the day in which she witnessed Kathy's dancing with her pillow to her tape of Judy Bridgewater's *Songs After Dark*: "Kathy H. I remember you. Yes, I remember … A mind-reader … I only recognised you just now. But yes, I remember that occasion. I still think about it from time to time."[36] Not only do the clones look back at the past, but Madame does as well. The Gallery, Madame's collection, is what remains to remind Miss Emily and Madame of the Hailsham experience. The keepsakes guardians used to collect and preserve the memories they have of their students, as well as the knowledge that they allowed them to have "better lives than [they] would have had otherwise."[37] Moreover, the students' artworks symbolically represent their souls, separated from their bodies. Daniel Vorhaus believes that Miss Emily's revelation of the purpose of the Gallery is Ishiguro's way to declare the true aim of his novel, which is "to demonstrate that the reign of the nameless, faceless clone is drawing to a

[33] Ibid., 284.
[34] Ibid., 130.
[35] Ibid., 258.
[36] Ibid., 270.
[37] Ibid., 265.

close."[38] Vorhaus actually points out that, in the novel, the depiction of clones moves away from the traditional portrayal of these entities, providing them with "unique names, faces, and personalities,"[39] that allow the reader to see clones as "anything other than remarkably *normal*."[40] Therefore, not only is the Gallery a legitimization and justification of the Hailsham experiment, but it is also a device to recognise the clones' identities.

The scholarship has investigated the morality of cloning for decades. Patrick D. Hopkins, for example, has identified three facets of cloning as an ethical problem: the loss of human uniqueness which follows the creation of clones, the motives behind the decision to clone, and the "fear of 'out of control' science creating a 'brave new world.'"[41] In *Never Let Me Go*, by setting up the Gallery, the guardians wanted to prove that their students had souls, in order to demonstrate the students' humanity and in opposition to the general belief that cloning was morally acceptable simply because the students were inhuman. What makes the clones human is not only their ability to mime the behaviour of the 'normals' and produce artworks, their humanity is actually intrinsic in their capability to have emotions and feelings. Moreover, the nostalgia experienced by Kathy is another proof of her humanity, whether it is the nostalgia of the days at the Cottages, the wish to start working on her essay again, or her desire to "stop, think and remember,"[42] which urges her to re-organize her memories. Thinking back about the Gallery, Kathy remembers "the excitement and pride"[43] they would feel when one of their works had been selected. Furthermore, she mentions their "mixed emotions"[44] and a "strong mix of emotions" that overwhelmed her.[45] At times, she would not remember the exact words she said on a specific occasion, but the feelings she felt. Looking back at the days at the Cottages, Kathy says that she "can't remember exactly what I said to

[38] Daniel Vorhaus. "Review of Kazuo Ishiguro, *Never Let Me Go*." *The American Journal of Bioethics* 7, no. 2 (2007): 99.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Patrick D. Hopkins "How Popular Media Represent Cloning as an Ethical Problem." *The Hastings Center Report* 28, no. 2 (1998): 6.
[42] Ishiguro, *Never Let Me Go*, 37.
[43] Ibid., 31.
[44] Ibid., 40.
[45] Ibid., 241.

her [Ruth] that night, but I was at that point pretty sceptical."[46] This insistence on feelings and emotions shows how the characters are as human as the 'normals.' Kathy's memories are likely to fade away, or at least to be altered. However, while Kathy's patients may actually want to forget their own memories and let them vanish, Kathy makes it clear that she is not willing to forget hers: "I was talking to one of my donors a few days ago who was complaining about how memories, even your most precious ones, fade surprisingly quickly. But I don't go along with that. The memories I value most, I don't see them ever fading. I lost Ruth, then I lost Tommy, but I won't lose my memories of them."[47] Thus, Kathy's memories may differ slightly from what really happened, but they stay with her. The inconsistency of those memories is actually an additional proof of her humanity, seeing as human memory is highly susceptible to change.[48] Her statement is a way to legitimatize the importance of the clones' feelings and what they all went through, and fill a future of loss with significance.

Especially after the Morningdale scandal,[49] society wants to avoid any contact with the clones so that they cannot perceive their potential humanity. In fact, if the clones started to be regarded as humans, the ethics of their existence and treatment would become an issue. Vorhaus attributes inhumanity not to the clones, but to the society that surrounds them: "It is the fear of the unknown, shadowy clones, in addition to the instrumental treatment of those clones, that is both cause and effect of society's fear, and that represent all that is inhuman in Ishiguro's story. None of that inhumanity belongs inherently to the clones themselves."[50] When science offers new possibilities to cure previously fatal illnesses, people prefer "to believe these organs appeared from nowhere, or at most

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[46] Ibid., 141.

[47] Ibid., 286.

[48] Nina Wang, "The Inconsistencies of Memory" *The Huffington Post*, 22 June, 2016: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nina-wang/the-inconsistencies-of-me_b_10579052.html.

[49] Miss Emily explains to Kathy and Tommy that the Morningdale scandal concerned a scientist named James Morningdale, who wanted to "offer people the possibility of having children with enhanced characteristics. Superior intelligence, superior athleticism, that sort of thing" (263-4). When Morningdale's research is discovered, institutions put an end to his work. The scandal creates an atmosphere of fear, as people are reminded of the donation program. As a result, corporations and politicians stop supporting Hailsham and the school needs to be closed.

[50] Vorhaus, "Review," 99.

that they grew in a kind of vacuum."[51] Madame is representative of the fear experienced by society since the moment in which she witnesses Kathy's dancing to the Judy Bridgewater tape. Madame has a strong reaction:

> I saw a new world coming rapidly. More scientific, efficient, yes. More cures for the old sicknesses. Very good. But a harsh, cruel world. And I saw a little girl, her eyes tightly closed, holding to her breast the old kind world, one that she knew in her heart could not remain, and she was holding it and pleading, never to let her go. That is what I saw. It wasn't really you, what you were doing, I know that. But I saw you and it broke my heart. And I've never forgotten.[52]

As the guardians start to realise how human the clones are, they realize that an institution like Hailsham, "experimental in attempting to prove to the wider world that clones are more than the sum of their bodily parts,"[53] needs to be closed. Gabriele Griffin asserts that "the renaming –students, instead of clones– functions to (re-)humanise the clones, to make them 'like us.'"[54] Miss Emily explains to Kathy and Tommy that "people tried to convince themselves [that clones] weren't like [them]. That [clones] were less than human."[55] Moreover, Miss Emily asserts that the world's request of organs was the "barrier against seeing [clones] as properly human."[56] The founders of Hailsham fight to get "many improvements" for their students.[57] Such a demonstration of the guardians' willingness to acknowledge the clones' similarity to humans cannot be contemplated by society and the Hailsham experiment needs to be brought to an end.

Arguably, one characteristic that does not make the clones completely human is their acceptance of their future. From the reader's perspective, "the breeding of a class of humans for use as a source of organ transplants

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[51] Ishiguro, *Never Let Me Go*, 262.
[52] Ibid., 272.
[53] Ruth Scurr, "The Facts of Life," Review of *Never Let Me Go*, by Kazuo Ishiguro. *Times Literary Supplement*, March 13, 2005.
[54] Gabriele Griffin. "Science and the Cultural Imaginary: The Case of Kazuo Ishiguro's *Never Let Me Go*," *Textual Practice* 23, no. 4 (2009): 654.
[55] Ishiguro, *Never Let Me Go*, 263.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Ibid.

must be seen as a socially organized and approved system of murder,"[58] but the clones do not seem to worry about being exploited by the 'normals'. Clones completely accept that they have been created only for organ transplantation. Even if 'carers' have a car at their disposal, they never try to escape from their destiny. Their only attempt is to obtain a deferral, even if deep inside they know that the rumours about the possibility of getting one are likely to be untrue. Their conception of the future relates to their treatment of the past in the fact that their memories show how they have never been exposed to rebellious examples. Therefore, as clones are not familiar with this conduct, they do not consider insurgence an option and their acceptance of their destiny is the only trait that makes them appear inhuman.

What it means to be human is one of the main questions raised by Ishiguro's novel. Love is not the only feeling involved. More broadly, one needs to consider how feelings and emotions are produced, and what their effect is on characters. The reactions the characters have to their friends' behaviours prove that feelings influence their lives. Kathy, for instance, talks about her "emotional flurry," that "in [her] usual way," she's not able to let "just pass."[59] The clones portrayed in the novel have an 'expiry date' and are aware of it–as in the case of Tommy and Kathy, who know that they cannot share a future together. Tommy perfectly captures the impossibility of having a traditional future together when he says:

> I keep thinking about this river somewhere, with the water moving really fast. And these two people in the water, trying to hold onto each other, holding on as hard as they can, but in the end it's just too much. The current's too strong. They've got to let go, drift apart. That's how I think it is with us. It's a shame, Kath, because we've loved each other all our lives. But in the end, we can't stay together forever.[60]

Tommy and Kathy know that they will be unable to spend the rest of their lives together, and they knew it even before they found out that the

[58] Marvin Mirsky, "Notes on Reading Kazuo Ishiguro's *Never Let Me Go*," *Perspectives in Biology and Medicine* 49, no. 4 (Autumn 2006): 630.
[59] Ishiguro, *Never Let Me Go*, 58.
[60] Ibid., 282.

deferrals were no more than a rumour. However, they tried, and they cared–and this is what makes them human above all else.

Significantly, the psychology of memory is connected to the geographical space explored in the novel: both the fields Kathy observes while driving and the boat function as metaphors of the clones' lives. Whitehead suggests that the "Norfolk field seems, powerfully, to designate the novel itself,"[61] as Kathy's narrative has "caught and held all of the things that she has lost in the course of her life."[62] McDonald offers a similar interpretation, of the novel representing a "symbolic field, where past things surface,"[63] with the narrator and the reader "looking for traces of lives lost."[64] The novel closes with Kathy standing by a field and starting to imagine

> just a little fantasy thing, because this was Norfolk after all, and it was only a couple of weeks since I'd lost him … I half-closed my eyes and imagined this was the spot where everything I'd ever lost since my childhood has washed up, and I was now standing here in front of it, and if I waited long enough, a tiny figure would appear on the horizon across the field, and gradually get larger until I'd see it was Tommy, and he'd wave, maybe even call.[65]

In the novel, Norfolk is presented as the place where all lost things end up. Kathy stares at fields that not only collect all the people and things she lost, but also represent the memories she has been recollecting. Ishiguro's characters need to re-experience past events because they are afraid of perceiving their lives as empty. The empty fields Kathy observes while driving from one centre to the other represent their lives, as well as their non-existent future–which does not exist because the clones have already passed away or know that, eventually, they will. Not only the fields, but also the boat that all donors are longing to see and that Kathy, Ruth and Tommy visit when they reunite, can be read as a metaphor of the clones' lives. All donors know about the fishing boat "stranded in the marshes,"[66] even if it is not clear where it came from. Ruth guesses that

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[61] Whitehead, "Writing with Care,"80.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid., 82.
[64] Ibid.
[65] Ishiguro, *Never Let Me Go*, 288.
[66] Ibid., 216.

"Maybe they wanted to dump it, whoever owned it. Or maybe sometime, when everything was flooded, it just drifted in and got itself beached."[67] The shipwreck is on the border of land and sea, as the clones are on the border of human and inhuman. Moreover, just as the boat is immovable, the clones must live a life that has already been planned for them and which they cannot escape.

At the point when her body is about to be taken apart due to her first donation, Kathy is able to better understand her existence thanks to the process of storytelling she embarks upon. Operating on her own memories allows Kathy to fully develop as an individual and demonstrate her humanity. What makes the clones human is their capability to have feelings and emotions, and the subjectivity of their memory, debatably a distinctly human faculty, which belongs to the clones as well. The recollection of past memories allows Kathy and her fellow clones to escape the sense of emptiness that a future of loss would otherwise entail, and gives a sense to their existence.

[67] Ibid.

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# Data Doppelgangers and the Search for Immortality

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*"And who knows what lies in wait for the Internet's next Great Leap Forward?"*
—Douglas Coupland, *Shopping in Jail*

The prospect of immortality has been alluring and fascinating since man has been able to conceive of his own death. Myths and fantastic tales immediately spring to mind: the Holy Grail, for instance, or the portrait of Dorian Grey, or Elizabeth Bathory, better known as the Blood Countess, who earned her title by famously bathing in the blood of virgins in the quest for everlasting youth. Although these tales are dubious at best and ghastly at worst, the tantalizing promise of immortality continues to hold power in contemporary imagination. Anti-aging science and the ever-evolving landscape of technology make the idea of living forever more plausible than ever before; while it remains impossible, immortality continues to be researched in labs and dissected in the narratives of pop culture. Take, for instance, the posthuman theory that individuals may one day be made immortal through "upload"; the cloud, has the capacity to store a staggering amount of data, so why not overcome the frighteningly impermanent nature of physical consciousness by digitizing it? The digital world already records and preserves personal data in what Gordon Bell and Jim Grey refer to as one-way immortality: a monument, a static arrangement of information, a great work that can be linked to an individual and preserve their memory for generations to come.[1] Upload more and better information to the cloud, activate it like an app, and the result could be two-way immortality: a preserved and sentient digital self which is able to grow, evolve, and interact with the world in much the same way it did in its biological shell.

[1] Gordon Bell and Jim Gray. "Digital Immortality." Microsoft Research Technical Report MSR-TR-2000-101 (200): 1-4. Web.

Certain sects of posthumanism suggest that this "upload" will prove to be the next evolutionary step for humankind, and that "the relation between carbon man and the silicon devices he is creating is similar to the relation between caterpillar and the iridescent, winged creature that the caterpillar unconsciously prepares to become."[2] Physical consciousness is inherently fragile and frighteningly impermanent—subject to bumps, knocks, hijacks, amnesias, and a host of other errors and erasures. It's no surprise that critics are eager to frame technology-founded, digital two-way immortality as the next logical step in human evolution. Yet this view of digital immortality is idealistic, as well as problematic. It callously abandons the biological body, for example, and assumes that information can be translated from brain to digital host without losing something in the process. Even as technology brings digital immortality closer than ever before the concept itself remains rife with issues, some of which this paper seeks to catalogue and interrogate. What are the consequences of abandoning a physical, biological form? How accurately and completely can digital information represent an individual? And even assuming the translation from biological to digital self is both possible and desirable, would a digital individual still face threats and obstacles which make immortality an impossibility?

## The Meaning of Life and The History Of Life After Death

Discussing the possibility of life after biological death requires a definition of life before biological death; discussing the possibility of life existing purely in a digital context requires a discussion of life in a physical context. This is as slippery as immortality itself; as Eugene Thacker puts it, "[t]he moment [that life] is examined it recedes beyond a fog of intelligibility - either a *reducto ad absurdum* (e.g. does a cell have a right to life?) or a sublimation into an abstraction (the 'good life', the life worth living)."[3] The most common conception of "life" depends on a biological body, which is unsatisfactorily oversimplified here. A better foundation might be Thacker's explanation of life as more than an "ambivalent conjunction of biology and politics," something "being extended across broad swathes of social, economic and cultural existence,"[4] a description

[2] O. B Hardison. Poetics and Praxis, Understanding and Imagination: The Collected Essays of O.B. Hardison, Jr. (Athens: U of Georgia, 1997), 383.

[3] Eugene Thacker. "After Life: De Anima and Unhuman Politics." in Radical Philosophy 155:31 (2009). 31.

[4] Ibid., 32.

echoed in Karin Knorr Cetina's explanation that life is "an open-ended series of biological, psychological, economic and even phenomenological significations and processes."[5] Biology is an important part of the definition, but digital life could easily fulfil the other qualifications, creating or supporting an individual whose interactions with the world continue to spark psychological, economic, social, and cultural effects in the individual and the world around them. The discontinuation of biological life does not have to mean the discontinuation of knowledge or humanity; society could well continue purely as a collection of digital entities, assuming the technology exists to port the world's citizens to the cloud.

While Knorr Cetina admits that "with the certainty of [biological] death is in some sense central to what it means to be human," she positions death as a motivating force for creation and betterment; in a way, individual death can be overcome "by collective rationality and the reproductive success of populations."[6] Traditionally, this motivation results in the pursuit of one-way immortality and the creation of something lasting, useful, or necessary for the next generations. Individuals seek to outlast their biological lives by living on in long-lasting and/or public effects: creating works (of art, literature, science, research) which will outlast the individual, or else creating children, which serves as a form of biological immortality. Life has long extended past its individual biological boundaries; digital immortality, in which the individual would be preserved past the death of their biological bodies, is simply a new (and more interactive) extension.

## The Alluring Possibilities of Technology

Douglas Coupland notes "some people believe the Internet now occupies the slots in your brain once occupied by politics and religion."[7] The online world – seven billion people and counting – is a new conduit for conversation, connection, and community. This community is able to inspire feelings of awe in a similar way religion inspires awe: the awe of being simultaneously dwarfed by and accepted by something larger and better than yourself – a technological sublime. The Internet won't replace

[5] Karin Knorr Cetina. "The rise of a culture of life." in EMBO reports. Volume 6, Issue S1 (July 2005). N.p.

[6] Ibid., N.p.

[7] Douglas Coupland. Shopping in Jail: Ideas, Essays, and Stories for the Increasingly Real Twenty-first Century. (Berlin: Sternberg, 2013), 60.

religion but it can affect some of its users in similar ways. And as William Sims Bainbridge notes, the language used to describe a user's presence online denotes another connection between the digital world and the immortal soul. Early in the history of computer science, programmers adopted use of the word "avatar" to refer to the user's on-screen counterpart; the fact that this term originates in Hinduism "hints at the possibility that information technology offers a form of transcendence."[8] Religion aside, the most promising feature of current, contemporary, common technology is its immense storage space and its ability to catalogue and access data quickly. "Data storage has become so cheap that it's feasible to save a quantity of information that would have been previously unimaginable," writes Nora Young.[9] It is no longer expensive and arduous to store or access great amounts of data; it has become so easy to create and store data that nearly every online move results in a corresponding data trail, resulting in an era of passive data generation. Science fiction author William Gibson described this effect as early as 1986. He writes, "We're in an information economy. They teach you that in school, what they don't tell you is that it's impossible to move, to live, to operate at any level without leaving traces, bits, seemingly meaningless fragments of personal information. Fragments that can be retrieved, amplified."[10] This information can be used to predict preferences, manipulate reactions, and feed personalized content to consumers. This cache of data simultaneously works for the individual, as a sort of personal assistant, and for corporations and other collectors "start linking up and connecting the breadcrumb trails we leave behind" in order to track and monetize consumer preferences – taking advantage of a user's digital data in a way that does not necessarily serve their best interests.[11]

However, this data may be used to achieve one-way immortality: an archive of personal data that can be used to memorialize a deceased individual. In an example already present in today's digital world, the

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[8] Bainbridge, William Sims. An Information Technology Surrogate for Religion: The Veneration of Deceased Family in Online Games. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014) vii.

[9] Nora Young. The Virtual Self: How Our Digital Lives Are Altering the World around Us. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2012) 88.

[10] William Gibson. Burning Chrome. (New York: HarperCollins, 2003) 22.

[11] Steve Smith. "My Internet, My Self." Econtentmag. N.p., 5 June 2007. Web. 30 Nov. 2015.

Facebook walls of deceased users are commonly used as a platform for mourning. "I know he's dead, no longer physically able to read his wall posts or check his messages," Facebook user Rebecca Barlow told a reporter regarding a deceased childhood friend. "But like a gravestone covered in flowers or notes, Facebook is letting some of us grieve without having to be there."[12] In another interpretation of digital one-way immortality, Bainbridge explores the effectiveness of technology-based memorialization by recreating a selection of his dead relatives as characters within massive multiplayer role-playing games (MMORPGs). Many of the obstacles he encountered during the project sprang from the fact that his relatives lived and died in a non-digital era, and subsequently recorded little information about their lives that remained easily accessible. [13] Contemporary digital memorialization has fewer issues, since the data available to digital-era memorialists is exponentially larger than would have been twenty or even ten years ago. As Nora Young writes in *The Virtual Self*, the digital self "is the sum of all these status updates about how you are feeling, what you did, how you moved, how long you spent reading PerezHilton.com compared to The New Yorker online."[14] This digital self, while static, remains accessible after the death of the individual it reflects, allowing for a more detailed portrait of the deceased – and a more complete form of one-way immortality.

However, while data can and will be preserved, a set of data in and of itself is not capable of experiencing "life": not biologically, not economically, not politically, not culturally, and not socially. Furthermore, while more data per individual is preserved than ever before, this archive of data does not necessarily accurately reflect the individual who created it. Bainbridge charts his struggles working with physical documents and the fallible memories of others, noting that these archival limitations likely led him to idealized versions of his dead relatives rather than necessarily accurate ones.[15] Memory's tendency to fail or idealise extends to memories housed in digital data. Young recognizes a disparity between objective and subjective data, and

[12] Kristina Kelleher. "Facebook Profiles Become Makeshift Memorials." New York Times. N.p., 22 February 2007. Web. 30 Nov. 2015.

[13] Bainbridge, An Information Technology Surrogate for Religion.

[14] Young, The Virtual Self, 76.

[15] William Sims Bainbridge. An Information Technology Surrogate for Religion: The Veneration of Deceased Family in Online Games. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 4.

identifies the importance of separating the facts of an individual from the identity they actively cultivate and present to those around them. "Human beings create narratives about who we are in order to communicate to ourselves, and to others, what matters to us," she writes. The digital memorialist must recognize a difference between hard facts and "the subjective stories we tell."[16] It proves impossible to completely and accurately recreate an individual purely from the data trail they leave behind, even if that data trail has increased drastically in the time between Bainbridge's project and Young's examination of self-tracking. The only way to create or preserve a complete and accurate individual would be by somehow uploading every single piece of their identity to a digital platform – a concept which circles back to two-way immortality and the allure of continued consciousness and life.

## What to Do with the Parts of the Body?

Even assuming data from an individual can be recorded or copied accurately and completely enough, could it be possible to recreate an indistinguishable digital version of that individual from the data? The temptation to see this as an obvious stage in human evolution is what Eugene Thacker calls the "extropian approach" in posthumanism. This theory relies (not unproblematically) on the idea that "technological progress will necessarily mean a progress in 'the human' as a species and as a society; that is, just as the human will be transformed through these technologies, it will also maintain, assumedly, something essential of itself."[17] The opposing argument is that either none or not enough of this "something essential" will be saved: instead of extending or transforming life, this approach could exclude or destroy some important aspect of the individual during upload.

This possible issue stems from the foundational extropian view of the world as something that can be reduced to information; as Thacker notes, "the extropian concept of uploading … takes the material world as information"[18] without acknowledging this view of the material world as purely informational ignores anything that may be "filtered or transformed in that process—such as a notion of the phenomenological,

[16] Young, The Virtual Self, 77.

[17] Eugene Thacker. "Data Made Flesh: Biotechnology and the Discourse of the Posthuman." Cultural Critique, No. 53. Winter 2003. 75.

[18] Ibid., 80.

experiential body."[19] As McLuhan famously states, the medium is the message; it's impossible to transform the format without transforming the content as well. Translating an individual from physical, biological existence to purely digital, informatic existence is not a balanced equation, and this is the flaw in the extropian assumption that an individual can be reduced to a string of ones and zeroes without losing what it means to be human. "Just as the quantity "information" is assumed to unproblematically signify the message, so is the medium assumed to unproblematically mediate information," as Thacker explains. In reality, both message and medium would be altered in the transformation from physical to digital form, although in what way and to what extent remains unclear. Hayles warns against the assumption (central to both extropian posthumanism and first-wave cybernetics) that information remains constant as it moves from one place to another. "Shannon and Weiner wanted information to have a stable value as it moved from one context to another," [20] she writes of early cybernetic theorists. "Even assuming such a separation was possible," she continues, "how could anyone think that consciousness in an entirely different medium would remain unchanged, as if it had no connection with embodiment?"[21]

This issue is commonly glossed over by the exultant optimism of extropian thinking and the drive towards immortality through digital upload. Hayles quotes and critiques a 1996 lecture delivered by Marvin Minsky in Japan, hyperbolically titled "Why Computer Science is the Most Important Thing That Has Happened to the Humanities in 5,000 Years," to illustrate this point:

> The most important thing about each person is the data, and the programs in the data that are in the brain. And some day you will be able to take all that data, and put it on a little disk, and store it for a thousand years, and then turn it on again and you will be alive in the fourth millennium or the fifth millennium.[22]

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[19] Ibid. 80.

[20] N. Katherine Hayles. How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics. (Chicago: U of Chicago, 1999) 43.

[21] Ibid., 1.

[22] Marvin Minksy. "Why Computer Science is the Most Important Thing That Has Happened to the Humanities in 5,000 Years," Nara, Japan, May 15, 1996.

It is possible to forgive the oversimplified assertion that a mind-to-computational-data transfer will one day be possible; Minksy's foundational point is more suspect. Is "the most important thing about each person is the data, and the programs in the data that are in the brain"? Why does he so easily assume the biological, physical body can be abandoned as easily as stepping out of a set of clothes? Hayles sees this separation of body and consciousness as particularly nightmarish, describing this theoretical upload as "a kind of cranial liposuction."[23] Young takes up this view in a similar tone, even if her argument is more sentimental. "Knowledge doesn't live simply in data or simply in our heads," she writes. "We know the world around us not by what the pedometer count says but by how it feels to be in this body right now."[24]

## The Play and Process of Digital Immortality in Literature

Since upload and two-way digital immortality remain impossible, one of the best ways to consider its product and effects is through its role in literature and other pop culture narratives. "Literary texts are not, of course, merely passive conduits," as Hayles states. "They actively shape what technologies mean and what scientific theories signify in cultural contexts."[25] A good example is the way William Gibson's imagining of cyberspace subsequently shaped real-life three-dimensional virtual reality; another can be spotted in the way Isaac Asimov accurately "predicted" the colour of the first calculator's digits—which, of course, engineers modelled after his description. The ways we consider and critique the extropian "upload" in literature today may well describe its operation and appearance in the future.

Unsurprisingly, many examples of digital immortality in contemporary narratives draw on the same optimism found in Minsky's assertion that individuals will one day live for centuries on a disk drive. Many narratives frame the transition from biological to digital as a natural progression of technology, but simultaneously back away framing it as the next step in human evolution. Assuming that the technology exists, the most formidable obstacle of two-way digital immortality is its unsettling ramifications for those who interact with the digitized individual. Prominent examples in contemporary narratives portray the

[23] Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, 1.
[24] Young, The Virtual Self, 95-6.
[25] Ibid., 21.

upload as deeply uncanny, echoing Hayles' horrifying description of "cranial liposuction."

The portrayal of a character struggling to relate to a recently digitized friend in Gibson's short story "The Winter Market" serves as a specific example of this unsettling feeling. He is put off by "a program that pretends to be Lise to the extent that it believe it's her," and is ultimately unable to come to grips with the idea of consciousness without a body.[26] Despite this digital doppelgänger's ability to call, speak, think, and even create art in the same way as the individual it represents, the other characters in the story are uneasy to equate the two:

> "Rubin, if she calls me, is it *her?*"
> He looks at me a long time. "God only knows." His cup clicks on the table. "I mean, Casey, the technology is there, so who, man, really who, is to say?"[27]

In "The Winter Market," Gibson posits that the separation springs purely from a perception of fraud rather than the fraud itself. While the feeling of the uncanny persists in the face of otherwise perfect replication, the difference remains because others are aware of it. "Perhaps the most important question will be whether or not an uploaded human brain is really you," Ray Kurzweil muses. "Even if the upload passes a personalized Turing test and is deemed indistinguishable from you, one could still reasonably ask whether the upload is the same person or a different person"— returning the discussion to the question of how information is changed by its medium and its context.[28]

Another example of two-way immortality appears in the 2015 film *Chappie*, which climaxes with the transference of a human character's consciousness into a robot body. This particular example is optimistic and is not perceived as uncanny or unsettling by the other characters in the film. This lack of unsettled sentiment could be due to several reasons. For instance, the upload is very nearly the last thing to happen in the film, and the audience is not shown how others react to the idea of human consciousness in a robot body. The film also positions the viewer to be sympathetic of the upload, subsequently glossing over and ignoring the existential issues that might arise from such a procedure. "If it fails, the

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[26] Gibson, Burning Chrome, 148.

[27] Ibid., 149.

[28] Ray Kurzweil. The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology. (New York: Viking, 2005), 201.

only two quasi-likable characters in the film are going to die," critic Jeff Saporito writes. "So yeah, it works."[29] The film guides the viewer into an uncomplicated, unproblematic view of the upload as the simple transfer of information from one place to another – a simplified view of digitization keeping with extropian optimism.

As Eric Thurm notes, however, the protagonist's digitization would not be easy for him to adapt to and accept, and nor would it be easy for those around him. The film's optimistic climax succeeds only by ignoring key issues with the upload.

> The movie places humanity at the brink of transcendence, but it does so seemingly without considering what might happen when a mind is divorced from its bodily vessel, or how it would change the way we consider ourselves human. At one point, human characters find themselves in such a situation—yet they don't remark on their inability to smell, taste, or touch.[30]

*Chappie*'s climax entirely ignores what must be a shocking caesura of sensation; while retaining his ability to speak, see, and hear, this newly post-human character has completely lost the abilities of taste, smell, and touch. Rather than proving problematic, consciousness is well able to continue on without its meaty shell. The mind is saved and therefore immortality is achieved, even if it is literally "sans teeth, sans eyes, sans taste, sans everything,"—to echo Shakespeare's description of death.[31]

## The Concluding Flaws of Digital Immortality

This catalogue of digital immortality's theories and flaws returns, sooner or later, to what Hayles refers to as a fundamental question: "Is the change from human to post-human an evolutionary advance or a catastrophe of unprecedented scope?"[32] The answer is both, or else neither. Extropian theory ignores the subtleties and difficulties in accurately moving information from a biological host to a digital

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[29] Jeff Saporito. "Does Chappie Cast a Positive or Negative Light on Potential for Immortality through Technology." in Screenprism (Web: 1 June 2015), n.p.

[30] Eric Thurm. "Chappie Is Loud, Messy, and Surprisingly Radical" on Wired.com. (Web: 03 Apr. 2015) n.p.

[31] William Shakespeare. As You Like It. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2000), II.vii.

[32] Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, 280.

platform, which seems to suggest catastrophe; treating digital preservation as useless or catastrophic ignores the successful use of digital information for memorialisation, which, after all, is a subset of one-way immortality.

And all sides seem to ignore the fact that digitizing information of any sort does not ensure it will last forever. Information is inherently fallible; in its own way, it is as fragile as a biological, physical consciousness. "If we are diligent in maintaining our mind file, making frequent backups and porting to current formats and mediums, a form of immortality can be attained, at least for software-based humans," Kurzweil says.[33] But simply because information is preserved does not mean it will be accessible, and this is a death of another kind: to have information lying dormant behind a broken link. Kurzweil laments the inaccessibility of the disorganized physical archive he inherited from his parents; even as he expands it with his own boxes of documents, he has given up on the idea of retrieving data from the papers. This issue remains inherent in any archive, digital or physical; information becomes useless if disorganized. "The answer is simply this: *Information lasts only so long as someone cares about it*," Kurzweil asserts, emphasis his own.[34] "By extension, we can only live for as long as we care about ourselves."[35] The implication puts the onus of upkeep on the digital self – but even the most diligently maintained technology has been known to fail. The digital form is just as susceptible to viruses as a physical one. No matter the angle of approach, the conversation surrounding upload ends in the same place: it remains impossible. Optimistic? Yes. Alluring? Yes. But true, two-way, digital immortality has myriad issues which require addressing before it can become anything close to a reality – if it ever does.

[33] Kurzweil, The Singularity is Near, 325.
[34] Ibid., 330.
[35] Ibid., 325.

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# Can There Be a Beauty Without a Beast? On Re-Writing Predominant Constructions of Selfhood

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## Introduction: 'Self & Other' as 'Beauty & Beast'

The present paper employs the fairy tale figures of the 'beauty' and the 'beast' as a metaphor for how we approach the constructions of 'self' and 'other', be it in the philosophical discourses of academia or the political discourses of activist endeavours. The beauty and the beast are portrayed as two unified, opposing sides of the same coin: the beauty gains its definition as beautiful in contrast to the beast, while the beast is viewed as beastly in opposition to the beauty. In essence, the two figures mutually constitute each other in a Hegelian dialectic characterized by its signature totalizability. In a similar fashion, self and other tend to be construed as mutually constitutive yet oppositional categories—the self comes to be constructed as the beauty against which the beastly other is construed, resulting in the dichotomy of sameness vs. difference, or us vs. them. In this regard, the main purpose of the present paper is to attempt to hone in on the root of such a construction—that is, what foundational concepts constitute the framework(s) responsible for understanding self and other in this way. Subsequently, I ask what other ways might be available for us to re-imagine the relationship between self and other that may allow us to move beyond construing the other as beast. Moreover, if the other ceases to be bestial, then must the self cease to be beautiful? In other words, if we give up one side of the coin, must we also give up the other side—or can there be a beauty without a beast?

## Part I: Un-Beautifying the Self

In the current context of rampant globalization, which largely entails the transnational movement of identities across borders, the binary of self vs. other becomes ever more pertinent. In such a context, the construction of self and other reaches a point of "upheaval", requiring *re-*

*visitation* and, consequently, *re-construction.* [1] Moreover, this re-construction is not just a re-construction of "the terminology or metaphorical representation of subjects, but the very structure of subjectivity, social relations and the social imaginary that support it."[2] According to Rosi Braidotti in *Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming*, what this entails is a *dislocation* of the positions and the prerogatives of both the self and the other, rather than a mere re-construction of the position of the other in relation to the dominant self.[3] As such, I endeavour to engage in a critical analysis of relationality where not only the other is deconstructed, but where the analysis begins with a *re-examination of the self*—specifically, with a re-examination of the humanist notion of the unified, totalizable self. In other words, Braidotti implores us to reconsider whether we can un-bestialize the other without also un-beautifying the self.

In *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes: Theorizing Coalition Against Multiple Oppressions*, Maria Lugones delves into the *ahistorical* assumption of unity, specifically in terms of our understandings of selfhood. Lugones argues that the presupposition of the self whose multiple parts can be unified into one whole "generates the fictional construction of a vantage point from which unified wholes, totalities, can be captured"[4] and therefore further "generates the construction of a subject who can occupy such a vantage point."[5] Consequently, such an assumption or presupposition enables the production of the unified and oppositional, binary other. Lugones urges us to reject the assumption of unity and to consider "a different logic", one which recognizes multiplicity as non-unifiable and non-totalizable; thus, one which undermines the notion of the unified self. [6] As such, Lugones is seemingly critical of the clear-cut, simplistic boundedness of the categorization process in which self and other come to mirror the categorical figures of beauty and beast.

Lugones locates the conception of the unified self in the psychoanalytic theory of abjection, stating that the desire for, and illusory

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[1] Rosi Braidotti, *Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 2002), 14.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Maria Lugones, *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes: Theorizing Coalition Against Multiple Oppressions* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 128.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

achievement of, unity is premised upon the colonial construction of the self that excises whatever it considers to be tainted in order to achieve purification and wholeness. In this respect, Lugones views both the tainted and the pure as fictional sides of a false dichotomy: "To the extent that he is fictional, the tainting is fictional: seeing us as tainted depends on a need for purity that requires that we become 'parts', 'addenda' of the bodies of modern subjects – Christian white bourgeois men – and make their purity possible. We become sides of fictitious dichotomies."[7] Such a fictitious construction is necessary for the upholding of a boundary which clearly demarcates self from other in an understanding of the two terms as binary, oppositional, and unified.

Lugones, citing Elizabeth Spelman, argues instead for a selfhood where the dominant self sees "us,"[8] the other, "without boomerang perception."[9] That is, Lugones argues for a reconception of the self wherein the self is not constructed *narcissistically* by perceiving the other as its oppositional referent, thereby *producing* a self that is unified through its opposition to the other, through clear boundaries that separate the self from the other—the beauty from the beast. In this narrative, the self comes to be beautiful by excising what it finds as beastly within itself and projecting it onto an other that becomes the receptacle of beastliness, thereby assuming the figure of the beast. According to Lugones, a more ethical way of construing the other, one that does not rely on the colonial construction of the other as that which is opposite and alien from the self, would reveal to the colonizer that he or she is *many*.[10] At the same time, however, "the self we reveal to you is also one that you are not eager to know, for reasons that one may conjecture. You block identification with that self because it is not quite consistent with your image of your self."[11] In other words, the colonizer, in order to maintain their position of power, privilege, and dominance, must uphold the illusion of a unified and oppositional self. If the colonizer were to recognize themselves as multiplicitous and constantly in-flux, their position of power would be threatened into *dissolution*: "knowing your self in our mirror frightens you with losing your center, your integrity, your oneness."[12] Additionally, a

[7] Ibid., 131.
[8] Ibid., 72.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid., 73.

more ethical mode of encountering the other would not only force the colonizer to recognize their multiplicitous, non-unified selfhood, but it would also force them to acknowledge that the other is also *many*[13]—that is, to acknowledge that the other cannot be homogenized into one unified, oppositional group or category, and that there are *other others*.[14] For these reasons, the colonizer is more apt to reject an ethical encounter with the other; doing so would not only require the colonizer to un-bestialize the other, but it would also necessitate un-beautifying the self.

## Part II: Un-Bestializing the Other

The construction of self and other occurs within specific politically and historically situated contexts. Seyla Benhabib argues that the current context of global capitalism and transient transnational mobility, which is characterized by the fluidity, unpredictability and opaqueness of the environment in which we encounter the other(s), leads to a "retreat into the walls of our certainties, into the markers of the familiar. Hence globalization is accompanied by demands for isolationism, for protectionism, for raising even higher and making even sturdier the walls that divide *us* and *them*."[15] If one were to conceive of oneself as unified and static, then it would make sense that the self would become increasingly more vulnerable to *becoming* with the other(s) the more others there are to encounter in one's environment, threatening to undo the static self's illusory presumption of unification.[16] Due to the mobility of bodies and cultures that accompanies transnationalism in the current context of globalization, the self becomes ever more open to uncertainty and risk vis-à-vis its very construction as bounded selfhood. In other words, there is a heightened sense of the uncertainty and risk that are associated with constantly un-knowing and re-knowing the self through increased encounters with the multiple others who are implicated in the self's *webs of interlocution*.[17] According to Benhabib, the consequence of such a 'risky' environment is that it leads to stricter strategies for

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[13] Ibid.

[14] Sara Ahmed, *Strange Encounters* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2000).

[15] Seyla Benhabib, "Sexual Difference and Collective Identities: The New Global Constellation," *Signs* 24, (1999): 355 (emphasis added).

[16] Donna Haraway, *When Species Meet* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2008).

[17] Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989).

demarcating and differentiating the other from the self. Thus, under the condition of an a priori ontology of the self understood through the dialectical figures of beauty and beast, events of permeability such as those exemplified by the context of globalization invite a reactionary strengthening of defences to protect the boundaries of the self—i.e. to protect the beauty from being permeated by the beast. Returning to psychoanalysis, the complex nature of this threat is that it does not simply emerge from the exteriority of a beastly other coming close to and thereby threatening to contaminate the pure self; rather, the threat is locatable in the interiority of the self itself, one that has projected its own abjection onto a distant and alien other, and whose movement closer to the self threatens the self with seeing its own abjection mirrored in an other who can no longer be ignored across the safe distance of borders and oceans.

Similarly, in *Strange Encounters*, Sara Ahmed examines the processes of construction—or *production*, as she refers to it—of the other. Ahmed discusses the effects of globalization and multiculturalism on the *modes of production of the other*, explaining that our proximity to the other "requires that we invent new ways of telling the difference, new forms of detection, better practices of surveillance."[18] Ahmed considers the *spatial* aspect of producing the other in the context of transnational proximity. She describes the other as "the outsider inside"[19] and as "the alien [who] takes on a spatial function, establishing relations of proximity and distance within the home(land)."[20] Ahmed clarifies that the alien other does not exist prior to his or her border crossing into the homeland; rather, the alien other is *produced* in that very process of border crossing, to "[allow] the familiar to be established as the familial."[21] In fact, Ahmed asserts that *Strange Encounters* is precisely that: a book which is not *about* strangers or aliens, but one which questions the very assumption that "an ontology of strangers"[22] actually exists, "that it is possible to simply *be a stranger*, or *to face a stranger* in the street."[23] Ahmed cautions us against taking for granted the assumption that a strange other *is*, ontologically; instead, she urges us to examine the processes by which the strange other *comes to be* as such. In other words, Ahmed does away with the a priori

[18] Ahmed, Strange Encounters, 2.
[19] Ibid., 3.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid. (emphasis in original).

ontology of the self understood as beauty, and against which the beast must be identified and cast away. Instead, Ahmed shines a self-examining light on the processes that we engage in that are responsible for manufacturing the illusory portrayal of self and other as beauty and beast.

Ahmed highlights the role that *multiculturalism* plays in the production of the other. In this respect, she challenges the turn that postmodern theory has taken from modernity's notions of sameness and totality to a pluralist acceptance, even celebration, of difference. Ahmed disagrees with the humanist politics of pluralism and cultural relativism, stating that such conceptions of the other support an ontology of the other than rests on the presumption that the other is *pre-determined*, prior to *the encounter*. According to Ahmed, such an ontology keeps invisible the processes by which *the other is produced* in the first place. Specifically, she argues that the move in multiculturalism which supports the welcoming of the stranger and of his or her ontologized stranger-ness, although it no longer portrays the stranger as dangerous, "still takes for granted the status of the stranger as a figure with both linguistic and bodily integrity," thereby concealing the histories of its determination.[24] Since the discourse and political environment of multiculturalism contribute to the production and maintenance of the figure of the stranger, Ahmed argues against the notion of loving the stranger on the grounds of "an ethics of alterity," viewing this as inadequate with respect to an ethical relationality.[25] Thus, instead of teaching ourselves how to love the beast, Ahmed wants us to question how the beast came to be known as beast in the first place.

According to Ahmed, the detection of the strange other is a mechanism for the reassertion of the self, "of a most human 'we'."[26] This mechanism functions by already identifying the strange other before the moment of the encounter, by pre-determining what the strange other must look like, so as to differentiate him or her from the boundaries of the self. In this way, "the alien recuperates all that is beyond the human into the singularity of a given form," such that this form or figure comes to embody and represent all that is strange, unfamiliar and non-self.[27] Ahmed applies a Marxist analysis to such a production of the strange

[24] Ibid., 4.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid., 2.
[27] Ibid.

other as a pre-determined form or figure; she describes this other as "a fetish: it becomes abstracted from the relations which allow it to appear in the present and hence reappears no matter where we look."[28] Ahmed argues that one function of the figure of the stranger which is determined prior to the encounter is to recuperate what is *unknown* about the other into a singular *pre-known* figure so as to diffuse the fear or danger that is associated with the unknown. In this way, the strange other can be "contained within a figure we imagine we have already faced;" recalling Benhabib on the notions of uncertainty and vulnerability, one can state that what is contained is knowable and therefore controllable, and hence avoids the possibility of 'risk'.[29]

In contrast, Ahmed conceptualizes the encounter as "a meeting which involves surprise and conflict."[30] In doing so, Ahmed rejects the idea that whoever is encountered can be pre-determined and contained within the boundaries of a representational figure prior to the time and place of the encounter; thus, neither the event which characterizes the encounter, nor how the self is changed in the encounter, can be pre-determined. In this respect. Ahmed asks: "[H]ow does identity itself become instituted through encounters with others that surprise, that shift the boundaries of the familiar, of what we assume that we know?"[31] In other words, Ahmed recognizes that the identity of the self is constantly made and re-made through the process of encountering others. Given this, Ahmed attempts to differentiate between encounters in which the other is assumed prior to the encounter, and encounters in which the self is open to being surprised in its encounter with the non-pre-determined other.

By examining the socio-political environments that affect the *modes of production* of the other, namely the current context of globalization and transnationalism, Ahmed enables a deconstruction of the other that takes us beyond the presumed ontology of the 'different' or 'strange' other, of the other as 'beast'. In doing so, Ahmed not only rejects the notion of a unified and homogenized other, but she simultaneously un-does the notion of a unified and pure self, of the self as 'beauty'. By arguing instead for the need to approach the other without pre-determination, but rather with an openness to surprise and risk in the encounter, Ahmed calls for a reconstruction of both self and other, specifically in terms of identity:

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[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid., 6.
[31] Ibid., 7.

"This book will pose the question: how can we understand the relationship between *identity* and *strangerness* in lived embodiment without creating a new 'community of strangers'?"[32] In taking up this question, Ahmed urges us to consider a kind of relationality which does not take for granted either the self or the other, but one which is more open to the possibility of *becoming with*—that is, an *ethical relationality*. In such a reconceptualization of identity via the encounter, what happens to the figures of beauty and beast as representative of self and other?

Ahmed, Benhabib and Lugones together take us past the notion of the self and the other as unified, oppositional and separable; they take us past the humanist construction of the self vs. other binary that is grounded in the dichotomy of sameness vs. difference. In this way, Ahmed, Benhabib and Lugones enable a construction of self and other that can be more ethically relational, one that does not succumb to the reductive and oppressive beauty and beast dialectic. Armed with an understanding of self and other who can encounter each other ethically, one can then ask: What *is* an ethical relationality? In what follows, I focus in more detail on what an ethical relationality entails, particularly in terms of identity, community, and politics.

## Part III: On Ethical Encounters

I concluded Part II with Sara Ahmed's consideration of the ethical encounter, specifically with respect to deconstructing the other within the social and political context of multiculturalism. In the following section, I continue this discussion by focusing on Ahmed's conceptualization of the ethical encounter. Ahmed refuses the effects of the multiculturalist environment in terms of how it affects the ethical encounter. She argues that when the other is pre-figured in advance of the encounter, this results in the *objectification* of the other, in the sense that the other "becomes fixed as an object and sign precisely by a refusal to get closer."[33] For Ahmed, this refusal to get closer is "a refusal to recognize the multiplicity of the [other's] subjectivity . . . or to face that which cannot be assimilated into one's model of self or other."[34] In the pluralist context of multiculturalism, where the relationship between self and other is seen through the lens of sameness vs. difference, the (un)ethical encounter

[32] Ibid., 6 (emphasis added).
[33] Ibid., 166.
[34] Ibid.

takes on the following profile: (i) the other is contained within the closed boundaries of a representational figure in order to contain the self's fear of the unknown and 'different' or 'strange' other; (ii) the other occupies a certain place in the pluralist individual's model of self vs. other, where the two are read as unified, oppositional and separable; (iii) the self need not engage in an open or risky encounter with the other wherein which the self might be forced to recognize that the other is multiple and non-unified, and thus that the self itself is multiple and non-unified—coming to this conclusion would threaten the self's dissolution into non-unification, and hence non-coherence.

Ahmed views such a culturally relativist approach to the encounter as unethical; in this respect, she asserts that "[c]ultural relativism assumes distance and difference in order precisely not to take *responsibility* for that distance and difference. By assuming the one already knows the difference, the self and other relation is held in place."[35] In other words, when the encounter is approached from within the model of self vs. other, or sameness vs. difference, the notion of difference takes on the status of an ontological assumption, in which case it need not be questioned. The model of self vs. other as 'the beauty and the beast' becomes simply the natural order of things. The danger that incurs from such an assumption is that it results in the belief that "*it is possible not to encounter those who are already recognized as strangers in the first place*," which is a paradoxical, if not only absurd, idea to believe in when one is embedded in a society full of 'strangers'.[36] In attempting to conceptualize the ethical encounter, Ahmed critiques the philosophical ethics of Immanuel Levinas, which are based on the pluralist notion of protecting or preserving *the otherness of the other*. Ahmed questions whether preserving the otherness of the other is necessarily a good thing—in my own interpretation, whether or not it is a good thing with respect to the ethical encounter. The question for Ahmed then becomes: *How* does one ethically encounter? In Ahmed's words, "[w]omen in different nation spaces, within a globalized economy of difference, cannot not encounter each other, what is at stake is *how*, rather than *whether*, the encounters take place."[37] If the dialectic of beauty and beast is premised upon the self's refusing to encounter the other, then what is at stake in Ahmed's refusal to refuse? Is this not an imposition to re-write old narratives?

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[35] Ibid., 167 (emphasis added).

[36] Ibid. (emphasis in original).

[37] Ibid. (emphasis in original).

For Ahmed, the answer to this question begins with understanding the particularity of the encounter not in terms of the particularity of the other with whom the self is engaged in the moment of encountering, but instead to locate the notion of particularity in the "*modes of encounter* through which others are faced."[38] By adopting this conceptual shift in her approach, Ahmed wants us to do away with a notion of particularity that locates the situatedness of the particular encounter on the face or the body of the other who is encountered: "To name her as particular in the face-to-face encounter is in danger of reifying the very moment of the face to face: it locates the particular in a present moment (or present body), and hence associates the particular with the here and now."[39] By dislocating the encounter from the particularity of its *temporal* and *spatial* locations, Ahmed is trying to turn our attention to the aspects of the encounter that are *not present* in the *present tense* of the encounter. According to Ahmed, there is much more to the encounter than the time and place of its occurrence, which she refers to as "the *temporal and spatial dislocations* that are implicated in the very possibility of being faced by this other."[40] In other words, Ahmed is highlighting the question, "*what are the conditions of possibility for us meeting here and now?*"[41]

By posing this question, Ahmed urges us to be attentive to the broader social processes that make up the driving forces behind the possibility of the encounter occurring in the first place, but which also appear to be invisible in the particular moment—i.e. time and place—of the encounter. Ahmed considers these broader social forces to be the *generality* that is bound up with the *particularity* of the encounter; since the encounter is inextricably tied up with these broader processes, Ahmed calls for an approach to conceptualizing the ethical encounter that is mindful of their effects. Locating the particularity of the encounter in the *mode of encountering* is such an approach, since it leaves the encounter open to recognizing the broader social processes that are implicated in it, instead of closing off the encounter's openness to *generality* by locating its *particularity* in the specific other who is faced. Thus, an ethical encounter is one which "account[s] for the *conditions of possibility* of being faced by her in such a way that she ceases to be fully present in this very moment of the face to face, a non-present-ness which, at one and the

[38] Ibid., 144 (emphasis added).
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid. (emphasis added).
[41] Ibid., 144-145 (emphasis in original).

same time, opens out the possibility of facing something *other than this other*, of something that may surprise the one who faces, and the one who is faced (the not yet and the elsewhere)."[42] Attending to how the *generality* and the *particularity* of the encounter are interrelated in this way is important for Ahmed because it is precisely by focusing on the *modes of encountering*, rather than the *particular other* who is encountered, that we take one step closer toward theorizing an ethical relationality. In the next section, I extend Ahmed's notion of *modes of encountering* by looking at Lugones' concept of *world-traveling* in order to address the question that Ahmed brings forth: What is an *ethical mode of encountering*?

## Part IV: On 'World-Traveling'

Maria Lugones takes on the notion of the ethical encounter in *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes: Theorizing Coalition Against Multiple Oppressions* with her notion of *world-traveling*. As I have discussed earlier, Lugones views the self in terms of its plurality, rejecting any colonialist attempts at the illusion of unification or purification. In discussing the plural self, Lugones describes this experience as "a kind of ontological confusion about myself"[43]—i.e. because the self is non-coherent with respect to its plurality, while at the same time seeking a coherent narrative of itself, then the experience of selfhood becomes problematic, since the 'I' of selfhood is experienced as both singular and plural.[44] The challenge for Lugones is then how to make sense of this simultaneous singularity and plurality of the self.

As a Latina and a queer woman who is a U.S. immigrant, Lugones theorizes the plurality of the self in terms of inhabiting different 'worlds', an experience which she refers to as 'world-traveling'. This metaphor not only captures Lugones' experience of crossing physical borders, but it also parallels the crossings that we enact when we inhabit the different spaces of our plural selves. Providing an insight from her own experience of 'world-traveling-selfhood', she states that "[b]eing stereotypically Latina and being simply Latina are different simultaneous constructions of persons who are part of different 'worlds'. One animates one or the other

[42] Ibid., 145 (emphasis added).

[43] Lugones, *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*, 86.

[44] Seyla Benhabib, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 5.

or both at the same time."[45] Similarly to Benhabib, Lugones theorizes the plural self's attempt at coherence through the concepts of inhabiting or enacting *narrative identity* or, in Lugones' conceptualization, of inhabiting *self-worlds* which allow the self to make sense of itself. However, while Benhabib conceives of one coherent narrative that constructs the life story of the self, Lugones is more attentive to the plurality of selfhood, conceiving instead of multiple worlds or narratives, which may or may not intersect at any one moment in time or another, in the process of being fluidly inhabited or enacted by the self. This begs the question: Does ethical relationality come at the expense of the coherence of the self? That is, does the prerequisite openness to risk and surprise that Ahmed advocates for limit the possibility for self-coherence, or does world-traveling across multiple self-worlds constitute a different kind of coherent narrative of the self which does not imagine coherence as limited by static, pre-fixed boundaries? In other words, can the self be coherent beyond its conceptualization as 'beauty', or does the self lose any chance at being 'beautiful' outside of the dialectic of beauty and beast?

In order to address the question of the coherence of the world-traveling-self, it would be useful to first look at *what kind of encounter* Lugones' model generates. Lugones' take on world-traveling suggests that just as the self may travel across and between the self-worlds that it enacts in the process of selfhood, it may also travel across and between the worlds of others—specifically with respect to the ethical encounter, since "we have to know the other's 'world' to know the other."[46] In attempting to construct an ethical model of world-traveling, Lugones distinguishes between the *agonistic traveler* and the *playful traveler*. In making this distinction, Lugones extends the metaphor of traveling to the notion of the colonizing traveler, whose act of traveling is agonistic: "Their traveling is always a trying that is tied to conquest, domination, reduction of what they meet to their own sense of order, and erasure of the other 'world'. That is what assimilation is all about. Assimilation is an agonistic project of destruction of other people's 'worlds' [...] Given the agonistic attitude, one cannot travel across 'worlds', though one can kill other 'worlds' with it."[47] The agonistic world-traveler does not inhabit the other's world ethically; rather, they inhabit it in such a way as to consume it, to assimilate it into their own version of what this world

[45] Lugones, Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes, 89.
[46] Ibid., 97.
[47] Ibid., 95.

should be like. This is because the agonistic traveler approaches the other's world not with openness and vulnerability to surprise and becoming, but with an attitude of conquest. Theirs is a *singular world*, not *multiple worlds*, since the singular world into which the agonistic traveler consumes the others' worlds is what they believe themselves to be: unified, whole, pure . Lugones refuses this mode of agonistic world-traveling because it is incompatible with a kind of world-travel that promotes *coalition* between all world-travelers. Hence, in my analysis, *agonistic traveling* is considered to promote an (un)ethical relationality.

Lugones takes up Marilyn Frye's notion of *arrogant perception* vs. *loving perception* to extend her relational model of world-traveling.[48] According to Lugones, agonistic world-traveling leads to an arrogant perception of the other. That is, when we fail to world-travel into the other's world in an ethical manner, we fail to identify with them, since our mode of world-traveling leads to assimilating their world, and therefore to assimilating their selfhood. Because we fail to identify with them, we fail to love them. Lugones shares her experience of not-loving her mother in this way. Lugones' mother was an immigrant to the U.S. who worked as a servant, and "[i]t was clear to me that I was not supposed to love servants: I could abuse them without identifying with them, without seeing myself in them."[49] In other words, Lugones was taught to travel to her mother's world agonistically, since her mother embodied the servant other who was meant to be assimilated into the self-world, rather than to be loved or identified with.

Lugones recalls this experience in order to connect the act of *agonistic traveling* to her mother's world with the broader socio-political environment in the U.S.: "When I came to the United States I learned that part of racism is the internalization of the propriety of abuse without identification. I learned that I could be seen as a being to be used by white/Anglo men and women without the possibility of identification [...] They could remain untouched."[50] As discussed previously, Lugones argues that the colonizer's understanding of themselves requires the illusion of unification and purity in order to remain intact and avoid dissolution into multiplicity. In this section, it now becomes clear how the colonizer achieves the illusion of wholeness or unity—that is, by

[48] Marilyn Frye, *The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory* (Trumansburg, New York: Crossing Press, 1983).
[49] Ibid., 80.
[50] Ibid.

world-traveling agonistically, perceiving the other arrogantly, dis-identifying with the other, and hence refusing to love the other, the colonizer can "remain untouched" at the cost of abusing the other, and at the expense of an ethical relationality.[51]

Lugones comments that her failure to love her mother was in part due to the fact that "given what I was taught, 'love' could not be the right word for what I longed for [...] It has to be *rethought*, made anew."[52] Consequently, Lugones' aim is to approach the issue of (un)ethical relationality "so as to understand a loving way out of it"[53] so that each person can exercise him- or herself in the encounter in such a way that is not "doomed to oppress others."[54] In theorizing a model of world-traveling for the purpose of achieving an ethical relationality, this is precisely what Lugones accomplishes: "[O]nly then could I see at all how meaning could arise fully between us. We are fully dependent on each other for the possibility of being understood and without this understanding we are not intelligible, we do not make sense, we are not solid, visible, integrated; we are lacking. So traveling to each other's 'worlds' would enable us to *be* through loving each other."[55] Thus, through her conceptual model of world-traveling, specifically *playful traveling* which leads to *loving perception*, Lugones arrives at an ethical relationality.

Having arrived at Lugones' conceptualization of ethical relationality in the encounter with the other, one can return to the question of coherence that was posed previously: 'Can the self be coherent beyond its conceptualization as 'beauty', or does the self lose any chance at being 'beautiful' outside of the dialectic of beauty and beast?' An examination of Lugones' model makes it clear that the definition of 'beauty' that we have been working with rests on the presumption that beauty is defined as being pure, impenetrable, agonistic, and assimilationist. The question must then be re-posed: Is the 'beauty' vis-à-vis 'the beauty and the beast' beautiful to begin with, or have we rushed to an illusory conclusion? For, if we were to take Ahmed's and Lugones' models of ethical relationality seriously, then what is beautiful must be re-defined as multiple,

[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid., 82 (emphasis added).
[53] Ibid., 81.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid., 86 (emphasis in original).

permeable, vulnerable and, perhaps most importantly, *unknowable* prior to the surprise that is the (ethical) encounter.

Lugones' conceptual models of *playful world-traveling* and *loving perception* have certain political implications in terms of identity, community, and coalitions. Firstly, Lugones views the recognition of the self's plurality as a form of resistance, since the idea of a self with multiple identities that can be inhabited or enacted either separately or simultaneously in different times and spaces is "oppositional to the very logic of subjection."[56] This is because the colonizer's position rests on the illusion of purity, as discussed previously, and therefore an active celebration and embracing of the self's multiplicity is a form of empowerment and liberation which can be enacted through the *intentional practice* of ethical relationality. In Lugones' own words, "[i]t is this intercommunalism that I see as what is revealed as necessary and also as possible once we stand among people and cultivate a perception that rejects the fragmenting/homogenizing perception of the lover of purity."[57] Through her notion of world-traveling, Lugones urges us to reject the essentialized and unified identity categories that we have been made to believe we singularly belong to, and that undermine each of our selves' experiences as plural and multiple. If we affirm the illusory unification of our identities, we would be fueling the fire of our own subjection.

Lugones further calls for us to recognize that our selves, our identities and our histories are interconnected. There is no binary of self vs. other. Referring to Robert Stam and Ella Shohat's notion of *polycentric multiculturalism*,[58] Lugones repeats that we are "active, generative participants at the very core of a shared, conflictual history."[59] Lugones argues that recognizing that the history of different groups of people is shared and conflictual reveals that both the notions and acts of social fragmentation are historical products rather than essentialized facts. The danger of the seeming inherence of social fragmentation is that it results in isolated or bounded groups that create "a barrier to the possibility of heterogeneous communities."[60] Thus, Lugones' answer is for us to resist

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[56] Ibid., 197.

[57] Ibid., 198.

[58] Robert Stam and Ella Shohat, "From Eurocentrism to Polycentrism," *Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the Media* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1994).

[59] Ibid.

[60] Ibid., 199.

the purity inherent in social fragmentation by actively forging *impure communities* that affirm the reality of the multiplicity of selfhood.

## Conclusion: On How to Re-Write Old Narratives

The present paper begins by posing the question: can there be a beauty without a beast? More specifically, I address the issue of whether, if writing the story of the self depends on the oppositional binary of 'self and other' as 'beauty and beast', un-bestializing the other automatically necessitates un-beautifying the self. I hope to have shown, through the works of three prominent feminist political theorists on the issue of identity, that in order to do justice to an ethical relationality, one must abandon the notion of beauty as portrayed through the 'beauty and beast' dialectic. Upon examination of traditional dichotomous constructions of self and other through the narrative figures of the beauty and the beast, one finds that each figure upholds the other in a reductive and totalizing manner, fueled by pre-determination and the illusion of knowability. The pertinent question thus becomes: How does one re-write old narratives? Does one even bother with a re-write, or does the act of re-writing itself commit the crime of pre-determination that Ahmed cautions against? Perhaps the lesson to be learned is not in re-writing the content of the story of the self, but in re-considering how it is that one approaches the act of writing in the first place. That is, to consider whether, in the act of writing the self, one approaches the act having already outlined the story, or whether one allows the story to unfold on its own accord, allowing unexpected characters to weave themselves in and out of the narrative, staying momentarily or staying awhile, affecting the storyline for a paragraph or for a chapter—but always affecting it by surprise. In concluding this piece, I implore you to ask *yourself*: In what ways is your pen vulnerable to the story of *your self*?

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# The Characterization of Catiline as a Monstrum in Cicero's *Pro Caelio*

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In 63 BCE, the Roman senator Lucius Sergius Catalina rallied a disaffected mob, who felt either disenfranchised or and else burdened by insurmountable debts, and conspired to overthrow the Senate and the Roman Republic as a whole. The plot was eventually exposed by the Roman consul Marcus Tullius Cicero, who delivered numerous orations which aimed to demonize Catiline.[1] On two occasions, Cicero refers to Catiline as a *monstrum* – as a "wonder," a "portent," or even a "monster" – but the overall characterization of his political opponent as a *monstrum* in these two instances could not be more diverse.[2] Overall, I argue that Cicero brands Catiline as a *monstrum* in both instances to justify the extermination of his political opponent, but necessarily draws on diverse conceptions of a *monstrum* to suit the occasion. In the *Orationes in Catilinam*, delivered in 63 BCE in order to convince the Senate that Catiline poses an imminent threat, the *monstrum* and his followers are characterized as thoroughly wicked and debauched. In the *Pro Caelio*, however, later delivered in 56 BCE in defense Marcus Caelius Rufus, a former follower of Catiline, the *monstrum* is suddenly transformed into a strange mixture of virtue and vice. It seems to me that in the *Pro Caelio*, to demonize Catiline Cicero evokes the same threat embodied by the hermaphrodite, since the nature of this *monstrum* enables the orator to exculpate both the defendant Caelius and other former supporters of Catiline at the trial.

[1] For an overview of Cicero and the Catalinarian Conspiracy, cf. Charles Matson Odahl, *Cicero and the Catilinarian Conspiracy* (New York: Routledge, 2010).

[2] Cf. Cicero, *Orationes in Catilinam* 2.1; Cicero, *Pro Caelio* 12. Although Sallust's *Bellum Catilinae* also addresses the Catilinarian Conspiracy, the text will not be considered here.

## Cicero's Branding of Political Opponents as *Monstra*

It is not unusual for Cicero to refer to his political opponents as *monstra* and there was considerable motive for him to do so.[3] According to Cicero's *De divinatione* 1.93, the term *monstrum* derives from *monstrare* – "to show" – and is therefore some notable disruption in the natural order which serves to indicate a breakdown in the *pax deorum*, that is, the proper relationship between humanity and the divine.[4] Upon recognizing such a portent, the Roman Senate – in consultation with the various religious colleges – would attempt to restore the *pax deorum* by ordering various religious and expiatory rituals, often including the isolation and expulsion of the *monstrum* itself from the community.[5] According to Anthony Corbeill, Cicero's branding of his enemies as *monstra* goes beyond mere invective. The orator, he argues, "wishes the Roman audience to conceive of his opponents as actual prodigies, as unnatural beings whose very existence threatens the safety of the Republic."[6] To cast Catiline as a *monstrum*, then, not only justifies his exile or execution, but even designates such measures as the prerogative of the Senate, whose support for Catiline certainly waned over time.[7] Although belonging to the patrician class, Catiline's direct appeal to the masses and radical policies, such as debt cancellation, increasingly jeopardized conservative values.[8]

There seems to be, however, much more to Catiline's characterization as a *monstrum* in the *Pro Caelio.* Here, Cicero claims that Catiline is a *monstrum* which is unprecedented, and so all the more sinister and enigmatic. As the orator states, "I do not believe that there has ever

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[3] Cicero often labels politicians with popular support (such as Catiline, Piso, Gabinius, Clodius and Marcus Antonius) as *prodigium*, which is more or less a synonym for *monstrum*, cf. Anthony Corbeill, "O singular prodigium! Ciceronian Invective as Religious Expiation," *Prudentia* 37 (2005): 253.

[4] Matthew B. Roller, "Demolished Houses, Monumentality, and Memory in Roman Culture," *Classical Antiquity* 29.1 (2010): 127.

[5] Roller, "Demolished Houses," 127.

[6] Corbeill, "O singular prodigium!", 240.

[7] The Senate was constantly involved in the process of dealing with prodigies, and two of the three priestly bodies consulted tended to belong to the senatorial order, cf. Corbeill, "O singular prodigium!" 245-246.

[8] For an overview of the political careers of Cicero and Catiline, cf. Odahl, *Cicero and the Catilinarian Conspiracy.*

existed on earth so strange a portent [*monstrum*]..."[9] Nevertheless, I would like to argue that in order to make the threat comprehensible to the audience, Cicero draws on the cultural conception of a *monstrum* which would have been familiar to the Romans: the hermaphrodite, or a sexually indeterminate being. Cicero himself refers to the birth of an androgyne as a *monstrum*, and the hermaphrodite is – moreover – one of the most common prodigies from the Republican era recorded in the extant sources.[10] There is evidence for the ritual expiation of hermaphrodites occurring between 209 and 92 BCE, most commonly by being set adrift at sea, and more rarely by immolation.[11] Such expiations certainly occurred within the lifetime of at least some of the Cicero's audience, and – despite whatever rationalist explanations for hermaphrodites' condition were being forwarded during the late Republic – Diodorus Siculus notes that superstitious attitudes towards hermaphrodites were still the norm at this time.[12] It seems that the popular conception of these *monstra* among the Romans had little if any basis in reality, and would have instead been informed by written and oral accounts, and also by images of hermaphrodites.[13] Such representations

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[9] Cicero, *Pro Caelio* 12: "neque ego umquam fuisse tale monstrum in terris ullam puto." English translation by R. Gardner, *Cicero: The Speeches: Pro Caelio – De Provinciis Consularibus – Pro Balbo*. The Loeb Classical Library, ed. T.E. Page et al. (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press and: William Heinemann Ltd, 1965), 421.

[10] Cicero, *De divinatione* 1.98; cf. Corbeill, "O singular prodigium!" 252-253.

[11] Bruce McBain, *Prodigy and Expiation: A Study in Religion and Politics in Republican Rome* (Brussels: Latomus, 1982), 127ff.

[12] For superstitious attitudes towards hermaphrodites in the first century BCE, see Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliotheca historia* 32.12.1. Diodorus Siculus himself (*Bibliotheca historica* 32.10.2 & 32.11) interprets hermaphrodites as an error of nature which can be resolved through surgery, such as in the cases of Herais and Callo: following their sex-change from sexually indeterminate beings to biological males, both were able to reintegrate themselves into society as social males. For more about rationalist explanations for hermaphrodites, see Luc Brisson, *Sexual Ambivalence: Androgyny and Hermaphroditism in Graeco-Roman Antiquity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 31-36.

[13] Although the hermaphrodites ritually expiated by the Romans were certainly of indeterminate sex, the exact nature of their condition remains unknown, and it cannot be assumed that the Roman's conception of Hermaphroditos necessarily served as criteria for their identification in nature; see Aileen Ajootan, "Monstrum or Daimon? Hermaphrodites in Ancient Art and Culture," in *Greece and Gender*, eds. Brit Berggreen and Nanno Marinatos (Athens: Norwegian Institute of Athens, 1995), 102-103. While Pliny (*Historis Naturalis*, 7.34) later suggests that hermaphrodites were included as physiological oddities in sideshows, it seems doubtful that actual hermaphrodites would

seem to have emerged in fourth-century Greece, but, with the Hellenization of the Romans during the Republican period, were certainly being produced in Italy by the time of the androgyne expiations.[14]

## The Hermaphrodite as a Threat to the Stability of Roman Social Organization

Before turning to Cicero's characterization of Catiline as a "hermaphroditic" *monstrum*, the reasons why the Romans perceived hermaphrodites as threatening prodigies ought to be clarified. At the heart of the issue is the fact that androgynes, on account of their incongruous sexual features, transcend categorization. As noted by Gottfried Mader, "in a social system which structures and defines itself around standardized values and patterns of classification, anything that resists categorization – imperfect members, borderline cases, the anomalous or aberrational – threatens to confound the general scheme."[15] The notion that the hermaphrodite confounds a dichotomous organization of reality receives much emphasis in the ancient sources. Most notably, the hermaphrodites ritually expiated by the Romans are referred to as *incertus* and *ambiguus*, and even the use of the compound Greek term *androgynus* (or "man-woman") draws attention to the Romans' inability to categorize these *monstra*.[16] The same dilemma is accentuated in other late Republican and Augustan texts. Lucretius, for instance, describes an androgyne as "between [man and woman] yet neither, different from both", and Ovid states that Hermaphroditos seems to be "neither [man or woman] and yet both".[17]

The hermaphrodite's resistance to sexual categorization is seen to threaten the stability of Roman social organization as a whole. In this

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have been a regular part of "lived experience" for the Romans, and so the popular conception of hermaphrodites was more likely to have been informed by texts, oral accounts and images of hermaphrodites especially.

[14] Ajootan, "Monstrum or Daimon?" 102-103.

[15] Gottfried Mader, "Nec Sepultis Mixtus et Vivis Tamen/Exemptus: Rationale and Aesthetics of the 'Fitting Punishment' in Seneca's Oedipus," *Hermes* 123 (1995): 313.

[16] Livy (*Ab urbe condita libri*, 27.11.5) claims that the Romans adopted the term *androgynus* to describe someone of indeterminate sex, since the Greeks were more adept at combining words.

[17] Lucretius, *De rerum natura* 5.839: "interutras necutrumque utrimque remotum"; Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 4.379: "neutrumque et utrumque."

patriarchal society, it was the prerogative of the (adult freeborn) man to maintain control, both over himself and his social inferiors, including women.[18] As a justification for this superiority, virtues seen as necessary for ruling in Roman culture were gendered male, whereas vices in need of policing were gendered female, thus aligning the masculine/feminine dichotomy with various other binarisms: reason/emotion, moderation/excess, justice/corruption, courage/timidity, and so on. Women, seen as innately weak in mind and body, were therefore more or less excluded from positions of power. While Roman men evidently sought comfort in the notion that gender was predicated on anatomy (i.e. biological essentialism), in the final analysis, gender in the Roman conception was a much more slippery construction (i.e. social constructivism).

The hermaphrodite is but one manifestation of this fear of gender slippage, which tended to reveal itself in Roman visual culture through the assumption of an ambivalent sexual role, with the hermaphrodite oscillating between an aggressive and passive role.[19] According to Foucault, for the Romans there was indeed a dichotomous relationship between male/female gender and active/passive sexual roles: "Graeco-Roman sexual relations are organized as patterns of dominance-submission behaviours that ideally replicate and even confirm social

[18] For a general discussion about control being the prime-directive of masculinity in Roman society, cf. Williams, *Roman Homosexuality: Ideologies of Masculinity in Classical Antiquity* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 125-159.

[19] For a discussion on sexual roles as gendered, cf. Williams, *Roman Homosexuality*, 160-224. For images of Hermaphroditos in passive and active sexual roles, cf. Aileen Ajootan, "Hermaphroditos," in *Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae*, V.1 & 2 (Zürich & München: Artemis Verlag, 1990), nos. 63 a-w "Satyr as Aggressor" & 64 a-j "Hermphroditos as Aggressor". The effeminate nature of the androgyne also features in Greek and Roman literature. The earliest evidence for Hermaphroditos assuming a pathic role comes from the anonymous Hellenistic epigram A.P. 9.317, in which an unidentified figure – possibly Priapus or Silenus – boasts about sodomizing Hermaphroditos; a fragment from Titinius' *Setina* portrays Hermaphroditos in a similar manner, cf. M. Robinson, "Salmacis and Hermaphroditus: When Two Become One: (Ovid, Met. 4.285-388)," *The Classical Quarterly* 49.1 (1999): 216. Ovid *Metamorphoses* 4.285-388 uniquely represents Hermaphroditos as a biological male, whose transformation into an effeminate figure (described as "emasculated", "softened" and a "half-man") results from the inversion of normative sexual roles: the active role is most unexpectedly assumed by the nymph Salmacis, who seizes upon Hermaphroditos and entreats the gods to permanently unite their bodies, cf. Robinson, "Salmacis and Hermaphroditus," 221-223.

superiority or inferiority. True masculinity [entails] the sexual posture of the dominant erotic agent or penetrator…", while true femininity entails the sexual posture of the submissive erotic object or penetree.[20] By rapidly oscillating between both poles, the hermaphrodite exposes the instability of gender, and so calls into question a traditional division of roles based on clear anatomical difference.[21]

Overall, the reinforcement of established systems of classification necessitated the symbolic neutralization of such aberrations by the Romans, whether through marginalization, extermination or reclassification. This is evident in the ritual isolation and expiation of the hermaphrodites in the Republican period, and then the rationalist attempts at reclassification towards the end of this era.[22] According to Diodorus Siculus, for instance, surgical procedures could "cure" sexually indeterminate beings by transforming them into biological males, who would afterwards inevitably assume the masculine garb and military roles appropriate to their sex.[23]

## The Characterization of Catiline as a Hermaphroditic *Monstrum*

Now to turn to Catiline, and the reasons this *monstrum* embodies the same threat as the androgyne. It seems hardly a coincidence that when Cicero refers to Catiline as a *monstrum*, in the same breath the orator claims that Catiline was *born* cobbled together from a series of opposites: "such a fusion of natural tastes and desires that were contradictory, divergent and at war amongst themselves."[24] Just like the hermaphrodite,

[20] Marilyn B Skinner, "*Ego Mulier*: The Construction of Male Sexuality in Catullus," in *Roman Sexualities*, eds. Judith P. Hallett and M.B. Skinner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997): 134-135. For a discussion on impenetrability as a masculine characteristic, cf. Jonathan Walters, "Invading the Roman Body: Manliness and Impenetrability in Roman Thought," in *Roman Sexualities*, eds. J.P. Hallett & M.B. Skinner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

[21] On the other hand, since the hermaphrodite's assumption of both active and passive sexual roles is seen to emerge from its anatomically indeterminate nature, one could also argue that these images ultimately confirm biological essentialist principles.

[22] Mader, "Nec Sepultis Mixtus et Vivis Tamen/Exemptus," 313.

[23] Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliotheca historica* 32.10.2 & 32.11; cf. Brisson, *Sexual Ambivalence*, 31-36.

[24] Cicero, *Pro Caelio* 12: "tam ex contrariis diversisque et inter se pugnantibus naturae studiis cupiditatibusque conflatum." English translation by Gardner, *Cicero: The Speeches*, 421.

Catiline is a *monstrum* which is seen to innately resist categorization. Like the androgyne, Catiline is seen to transcend gender categories in particular. Cicero even commences the entire characterization of Catiline by subtly intimating to the audience that Catiline somehow falls short of being a proper *vir*, or true man: "For this Catiline, as I think you remember, showed in himself numerous features of excellence [*virtus*], if not firmly modelled, at least drawn in outline."[25] It must be kept in mind that *virtus*, as "the sum of all the corporeal or mental excellences of man, strength, vigor; bravery, courage; aptness, capacity; worth, excellence, virtue, etc.", is an inherently masculine characteristic.[26]

As is often seen, "*virtus* is so intimately linked to maleness in the Roman universe that it is impossible to separate Roman definitions of masculinity from more general notions of ideal human behaviour, [whereas] women [usually] lacked *virtus* [...] and were [therefore] generally believed to suffer from the corresponding vices": weakness, cowardliness, recklessness, foolishness, capriciousness and so forth.[27] To indicate from the outset that the *virtus* of Catiline is not distinct but merely outlined immediately calls Catiline's masculinity into question. This is certainly not the first time that Catiline's masculinity is impugned by Cicero. In the *Orationes in Catilinam*, for instance, Catiline is seen to assume both an active and passive role in sexual relations. Here, "Cicero dismisses Catiline's followers *en masse* as luxurious and effeminate," given that this mob has likewise learned "to both love and be loved".[28] The

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[25] Ibid.: "habuit enim ille, sicuti meminisse vos arbitror, permulta maximarum non expressa signa sed adumbrata virtutum." English translation by Gardner, *Cicero: The Speeches*, 419.

[26] Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, "Virtus," in *A Latin Dictionary; Founded on Andrew's Edition of Freund's Latin Dictionary* (Oxford: Trustees of Tufts University, 1879).

[27] Matthew Kuefler, *The Manly Eunuch: Masculinity, Gender Ambiguity, and Christian Ideology in Late Antiquity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 20. This is not to claim that *virtus* was never attributed to women, but that women were typically seen as 'honourary men' in such instances, so that all exceptions could be incorporated into the norm and the *status quo* ultimately reinforced; see Williams, *Roman Homosexuality*, 133; Jeremy McInerney, "Plutarch's Manly Women," in *Andreia: Studies in Manliness and Courage in Classical Antiquity*, edited by Ralph Mark Rosen and Ineke Sluiter (Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill, 2003).

[28] Williams, *Roman Homosexuality*, 149-150. Cf. Cicero *Orationes in Catilinam* 2.5 & 2.23. For more discussion about Catiline and his followers being characterized as effeminate in Cicero's *Orationes in Catilinam*, see Rebecca Langlands, *Sexual Morality in Ancient Rome* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 282-285 & 288-289.

subtle feminization of Catiline in the *Pro Caelio* colours the remainder of the characterization. Throughout, the *monstrum* is to be envisioned as composed of both masculine virtues and feminine vices, which is reinforced by the manner in which Cicero enumerates these characteristics.

Cicero's overall characterization of Catiline is "an inventory of [...] qualities, organized like a ledger with a positive and negative aspect held in balance under each." [29] Through this dichotomization – each characteristic becomes inherently gendered. Catiline dedicated himself not only to *optimi viri* ("most noble men"), but also to *homines improbi* ("shameless humans").[30] The distinction between the masculine term *vir* as "most noble" and the more neutral term *homo* as "shameless" is revealing: notions of moral character, of virtue and vice, are intricately linked to gender.[31] Continuing with this dichotomization, Cicero claims that Catiline devoted himself to not only to work and labour, but also to enticements and passions; not only to military pursuits, but also to vices of lust.[32] He was simultaneously a citizen belonging to the noble factions and a vicious enemy of the state; both persistent in his labours and tainted by his debaucheries; both generous as a benefactor and avaricious as a plunderer.[33] Overall, Cicero outlines a series of Catiline's contradictory behaviours, and then, quite significantly, concludes that these must proceed from the diverse and contradictory nature of the *monstrum*. As Cicero claims, it was on account of a *varia multiplexque natura* – that is, a varied and manifold nature – that Catiline was inclined to exhibit the behaviours of both "most noble men" and "shameless humans."[34]

It is not merely Catiline's innate transcendence of categorization – or the impossibility of being defined as inherently virtuous or vicious, as rational or emotional, or ultimately, as masculine or feminine – which makes the *monstrum* so threatening. It is also the ability of Catiline to give the illusion that there is no contradiction in either his nature or behaviour and therefore to deceive others. Indeed, due to a "varied and

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[29] Andrew R. Dyck, *Cicero: Pro Marco Caelio* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 77.

[30] Cicero, *Pro Caelio* 12.

[31] Note that *vir* is a masculine noun and refers to a man with *virtus*, while *homo* is either masculine or feminine, and refers to a person in either a positive or a negative sense.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid., 14.

manifold nature," Catiline is able "to guide and rule his natural disposition as occasion required, and to bend and turn it this way and that."[35] Such deception was a notable feature of hermaphrodites in Roman visual culture. In stark contrast to the frontal *anasyromenos* ("revealing") type , whose incongruous sexual features are immediately apparent in a single glance, viewing angles were also exploited in torsional sculptures of hermaphrodites in order to deceive the viewer.[36] The torsional Sleeping and Dresden types, for instance, were intended to be viewed from an angle which initially gives the illusion of femininity, but then, much to the shock and amazement of the unsuspecting viewer, male genitals are revealed on the other side.[37] Catiline's metaphorical "twisting and turning" to showcase the various sides of his nature, with the intent to deceive, evokes a physicality which seems too idiosyncratic of the androgyne to be a coincidence, and furthers Cicero's characterization of Catiline as a threatening hermaphroditic *monstrum* in particular.

The vocabulary of deception pervades Cicero's characterization of Catiline.[38] It was this power to deceive, to offer the illusion of an unambiguous and stable identity, which enabled Catiline to identify with diverse groups. As Cicero states, Catiline could adapt his nature at will in order to behave gravely with the mournful, pleasantly with the leisurely, seriously with the elderly, sociably with the youthful, recklessly with the villainous, lasciviously with the luxurious, and so forth.[39] In short, Catiline due to his "varied and manifold nature" was not only able to rally together shameless and reckless humans, but also to retain brave and noble men through a *species virtutis assimulatae*, or "appearance of feigned *virtus*."[40] Once again, Cicero emphasizes that Catiline somehow falls short of bring a proper *vir*, and yet could convince actual excellent

[35] Ibid. 13: "versare suam naturam et regere ad tempus atque huc et illuc torquere ac flectere." English translation by Gardner, *Cicero: The Speeches*, 421.

[36] For commentary on these two distinct compositional groups, cf. Ajootan, "Hermaphroditos," 284.

[37] Aileen Ajootan, "The Only Happy Couple: Hermaphrodites and Gender," in *Naked Truths: Women, Sexuality and Gender in Classical Art and Archaeology*, edited by Olga Koloski-Ostrow and Claire L. Lyons (London: Routledge, 1997), 235. For examples of these types, cf. Ajootan, "Hermaphroditos," no. 56a-j ("Sleeping Type") and no. 63a-w ("Dresden Type").

[38] Cf. Cicero, *Pro Caelio* 12 & 14.

[39] Ibid., 13.

[40] Ibid., 14.

and courageous men that there was no distinction between them in either their nature or behaviour.

It was this need to foreground the deceptive nature of Catiline which motivated Cicero's molding of Catiline not just into any *monstrum* in the *Pro Caelio*, but into a hermaphroditic *monstum*. First and foremost, the orator needed to somehow reconcile the defendant Caelius's former association with Catiline with his *virtus* and also ensure that the jury members did not become alienated by the speech, given the likelihood that these men had once been supporters of Catiline, too. Cicero reassures the audience that when he believed that Catiline was an excellent citizen, eager to associate with the best men as their true and loyal friend, Catiline almost deceived even himself.[41]

Cicero's artful molding of Catiline into a hermaphroditic *monstum* in the *Pro Caelio* of 56 BCE becomes all the more transparent when compared to the orator's demonization of Catiline in the *Orationes in Catilinam* of 63 BCE. In these earlier speeches, Cicero exposes Catiline's conspiracy to overthrow the government to the Roman Senate and so forces the traitor into exile. Here, Cicero likewise demonizes the traitor by branding him a *monstrum*: "Now that misbegotten monster [*monstrum*] from within our walls will plot no destruction against them."[42] Throughout these orations, however, the characterization of the *monstrum* has little resemblance to that of the *Pro Caelio*, and Catiline is instead seen as the embodiment of unalloyed evil.[43] As Cicero declares, the war between "us" – that is, between Cicero, the Roman Senate and the people – and "them" – Catiline and his followers – is, at the root, a contest between virtue and vice:

> For on this side fights modesty, on that shamelessness; on this chastity, on that wantonness; on this honour, on that fraud; on this righteousness, on that crime; on this steadfastness, on that madness; on this honesty, on that deceit; on this self-restraint, on that lust; and finally justice, temperance, fortitude, prudence, all the

[41] Ibid.

[42] Cicero, *Orationes in Catilinam* 2.1: "nulla iam pernicies a monstro illo atque prodigio moenibus ipsis intra moenia comparabitur." English translation by Louis E. Lord, *Cicero: The Speeches with an English Translation. In Catilinam I-IV – Pro Murena – Pro Sulla – Pro Flacco.* The Loeb Classical Library, edited by T.E. Page et al. (London and Cambridge: William Heinemann Ltd. and Harvard University Press, 1937), 49.

[43] Cicero, *Orationes in Catilinam* 2.1.

> virtues, contend with injustice, extravagance, cowardice, recklessness, all the vices; finally, abundance with poverty, good reason with bad, sanity with insanity, and finally fair hope fights against deepest despair. In a contest and battle of this kind, even if the hearts of men fail them, would not the immortal gods themselves compel these many great vices to be overwhelmed by these most notable virtues?[44]

This explicit dichotomization genders Cicero and the others as masculine, and Catiline and followers as feminine. The categorization is black and white, leaving no room for uncertainty. It seems that in an oration where Cicero's main objective is to convince the audience that Catiline is an imminent threat, it suited Cicero's agenda to characterize the *monstrum* as the unequivocal embodiment of evil.[45] In the *Pro Caelio*, on the other hand, Catiline is transformed into a remarkable conflation of virtue and vice, with all dichotomies suddenly encompassed into the *monstrum*'s nature.

Overall, the contrast in the characterization of Catiline as a *monstrum* in the *Orationes in Catiliam* and the *Pro Caelio* could not be more striking, but stems from the diverse motives for delivering these speeches: Cicero needs to demonize Catiline and his followers as much as possible in the former, but to exculpate the traitor's supporters in the latter. With these objectives in mind, the "truth" of Catiline's nature becomes irrelevant. In either case, Catiline is a *monstrum* which needs to be expelled from the community, but the precise type of *monstrum* evoked by Cicero needs to suit the occasion. Evidently, the threat evoked by a hermaphrodite – with an indeterminate, but deceptive nature – served Cicero's purposes in the

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[44] Ibid., 2.25: "ex hac enim parte pudor pugnat, illinc petulantia; hinc pudicitia, illinc stuprum; hinc fides, illinc fraudatio; hinc pietas, illinc scelus; hinc constantia, illinc furor; hinc honestas, illinc turpitudo; hinc continentia, illinc libido; hinc denique aequitas, temperantia, fortitudo, prudentia, virtutes omnes certant cum iniquitate, luxuria, ignavia, temeritate, cum vitiis omnibus; postremo copia cum egestate, bona ratio cum perdita, mens sana cum amentia, bona denique spes cum omnium rerum desperatione confligit. in eius modi certamine ac proelio nonne, si hominum studia deficiant, di ipsi immortales cogant ab his praeclarissimis virtutibus tot et tanta vitia superari?" English translation by Lord, *Cicero: The Speeches with an English Translation*, 73-75.

[45] Catiline here is pure evil, or something like the vicious *monstrum* described by Cicero from Hannibal's dream: a monstrous creature entwined with snakes, recklessly uprooting trees and destroying houses, as the manifestation of the desolation of Italia, cf. Cicero, *De divinatione* 1.49.

*Pro Caelio*, and at the same time presented an opportunity to subtly impugn Catiline's masculinity. Cicero moreover draws attention to the escalated threat posed by someone with feminine passions, but certain masculine capabilities: "nor would that abominable impulse to destroy this Empire ever have broken out from him, had not all those monstrous vices of his been rooted and grounded in certain qualities of ability and endurance."[46] Note that in the *Orationes in Catilinam*, Catiline is certainly filled with *vitium*, but is too reckless and senseless to possibly be successful in bringing his plans to destroy the Roman Republic to fruition.[47]

In arguing that Catiline is a hermaphroditic *monstrum*, I do not mean to say that Cicero intended the audience to imagine Catiline as a literal androgyne with the breasts of a female and the genitals of a male.[48] As Cicero claims at the outset, Catiline is unprecedented as a *monstrum*, and the *multiplex* (many-sided) nature of Catiline certainly exceeds the cultural conception of the hermaphrodite as a *duplex* (two-sided) figure.[49] Catiline is, rather, cobbled together from both contrary *and diverse* characteristics, presumably making for a more complex nature than that of a hermaphrodite.[50] That being said, whatever uniqueness Cicero attributes to Catiline, the audience nevertheless requires some point of reference to make the *monstrum* comprehensible. The overall threat which Catiline embodies is really not so diverse from the hermaphrodite: in Roman thought, at least, all of Catiline's characteristics are reducible to a single dichotomy of masculine and feminine.[51] The orator was evidently aware of the conception of a hermaphrodite as a *monstrum*, and conceivably the idea had entered the popular consciousness of the Romans by the Republican era.

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[46] Cicero, *Pro Caelio* 14: "neque umquam ex illo delendi huius imperi tam conscleratus impetus exstitisset, nisi tot vitiorum tanta immanitas quisdam facilitates et patientiae radicibus niteretur." English translated by Gardner, Cicero: The Speeches, 421-423.

[47] Cicero, *Orationes in Catilinam* 2.25.

[48] This was the standard representation of Hermaphroditos, cf. Ajootan, "Hermaphroditos," 283.

[49] Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 4.378 & 387.

[50] Cicero, *Pro Caelio* 12.

[51] Brisson, *Sexual Ambivalence*, 5.

## Conclusion

We have seen that Cicero tended to brand his political opponents, especially those who attempted to bypass the senatorial elite by appealing to the masses, as *monstra*, in order to justify their exile or execution, and to place the religious obligation to enact these measures into the hands of the Senate.[52] However, the precise type of *monstrum* into which Cicero would mold his enemies was intended to suit the occasion, as seen in the diverse characterization of Catiline between 63 and 56 BCE, at the height of the Catilinarian Conspiracy and then after the traitor's execution. In the *Orationes in Catilinam*, both Catiline and his followers are characterized as unalloyed evil, seemingly because Cicero needed to emphasize the dire need for these conspirators to be exterminated. In the *Pro Caelio*, however, Cicero constructs the *monstrum* Catiline as an astonishing mixture of virtue and vice. In doing so, Cicero draws on the cultural conception of a hermaphrodite, one of the most common prodigies recorded in the Roman Republican era. Indeed, like the androgyne, Catiline is seen to innately transcend categorization, in particular gender, and therefore exhibit both masculine and feminine characteristics. Also like the hermaphrodite, Catiline can offer the illusion that there is no contradiction in either his nature or behaviour and therefore identify with the most diverse groups, including both the most noble men and shameless humans. It seems that Cicero's motive for constructing Catiline in the *Pro Caelio* as a hermaphroditic *monstrum* in particular was to exonerate the former supporters of the deceptive Catiline, or at least those followers said to possess *virtus,* such as the defendant Caelius and conceivably other members of the audience and jury. In either case, Catiline is a *monstrum*, in need of extermination, but the precise type of *monstrum* evoked by Cicero is designed to serve his political ends

[52] Cf. Corbeill, "O singular prodigium!" *passim*.

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# From Hercules and the Hydra to SYRIZA vs. Global Capitalism: Diffusion and Disappointment of the World Left

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*"Bon, il ne fallait pas exagérer: aucune de nos actions ne ressemblerait à un Évènement de ce genre* [...] *même si l'on parlait du moment où le Grand Soir arriverait, où l'Histoire se sacrifierait, sur l'autel qu'elle avait dressé pour ses Shoah, ses Holocaustes* [...] *partout où l'Homme était passé. Le Grand Soir ne viendrait pas, mais nos petites soirées, nos petites nuitées passées à jouer les grands prophètes où les petits sorciers l'appelaient de tous nos vœux, comme si une frasque après l'autre pouvait provoquer l'Action* [...] *comme une farce après une blague dans le recueil infini des* kōan *les plus insensés pouvait déclencher l'Illumination, l'Éblouissement."*[1]
—Pierre Ouellet, *Dans le temps*

## Iskra: "The Spark"

Every activist wants to make history, to participate and to belong in the teleological process. At every spark of their movement, they imagine that a gigantic fire will flare up.[2] In their projections, shared collectively by their ideological community, if David can beat Goliath in Greece or in Portugal, the situation will reproduce itself around the globe. After the knight slayed the monster, an army will rise. There is a mythological aspect to look at. My primary hypothesis is that the anticipation of leftist

[1] Pierre Ouellet, *Dans le Temps* (Montréal : Éditions Druide, 2016), 271; "Well, we should not assume that any of our actions looked like an Event like this... even if we spoke of the time when the *Grand Soir* will happen, where history would sacrifice on the altar that had prepared its Holocausts... everywhere where Man had happened. *Le Grand Soir* would not come, but our small parties, our little nights spent playing the great prophets or the little wizards, calling it with all our hearts, as if a prank after another could cause the *Action* ... as a farce after a joke in the infinite collection of the most foolish *kōan* could trigger the Enlightenment, the Brightness" (Translation by the author)

[2] "Из искры возгорится пламя" ("From a spark a fire will flare up"), a quote of Alexander Odoevsky that served as the motto of *Iskra* ("The Spark"), the journal of Lenin and the RSDLP from 1900 to 1905.

diffusion influences partisans and adversaries, to see *revolution* as a potentially globalizing institution through a *spill-over* logic.

In the 20th century, this anticipation towards the left was centered on revolution *per se*, with the different waves of socialist/communist uprisings. The first wave was mainly in Europe in the wake of the October Revolution in Russia (1917). The Bolsheviks seem to have inspired, among others, the militants in Germany, Hungary, Italy, and Finland. The subsequent waves of uprisings were in the context of the rise of Nazism and fascism, the formation of Popular Fronts, the Chinese Civil War, and the expansion of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe after the Second World War. Those waves inspired reactions from international actors, both on the domestic and the international level, such as episodes of "Red Scare" in the United States in the 1930s and again in the 1950s with McCarthyism. There is a large existing literature that examines the diffusion of revolution. Kurt Weyland treated the question of diffusion from multiple angles. He conceptualized the process of diffusion as follows: "Diffusion is usually defined in a straightforward way as the process by which influences from outside reasonably autonomous decision-making units significantly increase the likelihood that these polities will emulate an institutional or policy innovation developed elsewhere."[3] The diffusion of revolution follows an interesting process, as it is recognized by Colin Beck, "that revolutions come in waves, particularly those that are the most transformative."[4] This notion of waves is central to explaining how the anticipation will diffuse. This process of diffusion leads to the question of spillover (or *spill-over*). Spilling over, according to the Online Cambridge Dictionary, is "to reach or influence a larger area; [to] spread."[5] The 'spillover effect' has been defined by Leon Lindberg as "a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for more action and so forth."[6] When

[3] Kurt Weyland, Making Waves: Democratic Contention in Europe and Latin America since the Revolutions of 1848 (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 31.

[4] Colin J. Beck, "The World-Cultural Origins of Revolutionary Waves: Five Centuries of European Contention". Social Science History 35 (2011), no. 2, 391.

[5] Online Cambridge Dictionnary. Entry: Spillover http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/spill-over (Accessed May 17th, 2016)

[6] Leon Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics Of European Economic Integration* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 10.

studying regional integration in the development of the neofunctionalist theory, Ernst Haas used the expression 'spillover' in reference to regional bureaucrats' exploitation of the "inevitable 'unintended consequences' that occur when states agree to assign some degree of supranational responsibility for accomplishing a limited task and then discover that satisfying that function has external effects upon other of their interdependent activities."[7] Therefore, if states are the actors setting the initial terms they do not have exclusivity on the "direction, extent and pace of change." The interactions between different actors pushes national governments to enter a process of learning and to change their original positions.[8] In other words, starting with economic integration will gradually construct a sense of solidarity among the practitioners, a process that ultimately leads to more supranational institutionalization. As Philippe C. Schmitter says about Haas's theory of change:

> [...] integration is an intrinsically sporadic and conflictual process, but one in which, under conditions of democracy and pluralistic representation, national governments will find themselves increasingly entangled in regional pressures and end up resolving their conflicts by conceding a wider scope and devolving more authority to the regional organizations they have created. Eventually, their citizens will begin shifting more and more of their expectations to the region and satisfying them will increase the likelihood that economic-social integration will 'spill-over' into political integration.[9]

This explains the importance of two key aspects of diffusion discussed in this paper: the perspective of the pratictionners and the role of organizational structures in the diffusion of ideas and practices.

If revolutions come in waves, are they following a spillover logic? The notion of revolutionary waves was explained by Colin J. Beck as cultural events of an entire international system: "as such, revolutionary waves

[7] Philippe C. Schmitter. "Ernst B. Haas and the legacy of neofunctionalism". *Journal of European Public Policy,* 12:2 April 2005, 257.
[8] Schmitter, "Ernst B. Haas and the legacy of neofunctionalism", 257.
[9] Ibid.

correspond to the growth of world culture at a systemic level."[10] For his part, Henry E. Hale described the phenomenon as 'cascades' of regime changes, and states factors correlating with their emergence. According to his analysis, revolutionary cascades tend to occur when there is a "common frame of political reference," "unpopular leaderships [...] becoming lame ducks," a lack of "other focal points for coordinated defection" by the elites, and "structural conditions supporting a new regime type."[11]

Beck concludes that revolutionary waves are more likely to occur when there is a "relatively rapid expansion of world culture and hegemonic decline."[12] Not only does revolutionary contention erupt in reaction to domestic issues, it is also related to a "delegitimation of an international order," especially when the contours of an alternative political organization become clearer.[13] Beck's model might point to why, especially after the victory of Mao's Communist Party in China and Fidel Castro's Cuban Revolution, groups around the world embraced communism as an alternative. Moreover, theoretically, Marxist-Leninist and revolutionary guerrilla principles were not restricted to a specific country, ethnicity, or belief, and could be applied (diffused or translated) to any contentious situation. It is possible to describe the relationship examined by Beck as a *feedback* between domestic and international systems.

If the opponents of revolution anticipate the diffusion of leftist movements and ideas with anxiety, the partisans desire the spillover. Leftist discourse has built a mythology around the figure of the 'underdog', who faces enormous difficulty before reaching an undeniable victory. Hope grows not only from the modern political mythology, but also to the forms of beliefs and faith associated with spirituality and ancient myths.[14] It is possible to draw a parallel with the story of Hercules (or Heracles in the Greek mythology) slaying the Hydra, a task that

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[10] Beck, "The World-Cultural Origins of Revolutionary Waves: Five Centuries of European Contention", 193.

[11] Henry E. Hale. "Regime Change Cascades: What We Have Learned from the 1848 Revolutions to the 2011 Arab Uprisings". *Annual Review of Political Science*. 16 (2013), 331.

[12] Beck, "The World-Cultural Origins of Revolutionary Waves: Five Centuries of European Contention", 194.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Nikos Kalampalikis, "Mythes et Représentations Sociales", *Pensée mythique et représentations sociales* (Paris, L'Harmattan, Denise Jodelet, Eugenia Paredes), p. 63-84

became the symbol of the force of reason when facing difficulty and hopelessness.[15] Indeed, the multi-headed sea monster would regrow one or multiple heads for each that the hero chopped off. People grow up learning to sympathize and believe the moral of this victory. The paradox is that we are told to use a process of rationalization of beliefs, while resisting it at same time. Reason, resisting romanticism and seeking "cool-headed fairness in the representation of reasonable interests," is seen as stronger by liberalism.[16] Similarly, romanticism is seen belonging to old times: acts of resistance and revolution in the past (American Revolution, French Revolution, Second World War) are praised by popular history, but contemporary liberal society discourages political, social and economic disruption.

Similar to Hercules and the Hydra, the rhetoric of David and Goliath is now commonly used as a metaphor in a modernized form for social justice in mainstream media such as a single citizen fighting big corporations.[17] However some history scholars, such as Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh, see the metaphor of Hercules and the Hydra in the opposite direction. Rediker and Linebaugh apply the metaphor to the class conflict of the 15th to the 17th centuries when Hercules represented the ruling classes, Hydra the proletariat, in the process of colonization.[18] Analogously, Francis Bacon used the Hercules and Hydra myth to imply that the masters of the global market were performing their "labor of Hercules" against the "enemies of civilisation": indigenous, pirates, in summary, the "undesirables."[19]

Political engagement needs more elaboration than a face to face duel with a monster. Dimensions of plurality and community are involved. In an argument parallel to the one made by Haas, Beck examines the process of institutionalization in revolutionary waves. He argues that waves, in addition to being an expression of changing practices, are also events that

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[15]Robert Edward Francillon, *Gods and Heroes, Or, The Kingdom of Jupiter*, (London:Ginn, 1894), p. 221

[16] Sharon R. Krause, "The Liberalism of Love", *The University of Chicago D'Angelo Law Library*, 2014, p.833

[17] Carla Rivera, "David-and-Goliath Saga Brings Cable to Skid Row", *Los Angeles Times*, November 21, 2001, accessed May 17th, 2016, http://articles.latimes.com/2001/nov/21/news/mn-6603

[18] Peter Way, "Hercules, the Hydra and Historians". Sozial.Geschichte Online 3 (2010), S. http://www.stiftung-sozialgeschichte.de, p56–64

[19]Mark Lewis Taylor, *The Theological and the Political: On the Weight of the World*, (Minneapolis : Fortress Press, 2011), p63.

contribute to the "institutionalization of new models of governance."[20] This is in line with my claim that revolutions help us understand the phenomenon of diffusion. However, the process can be understood as the anticipation of something bigger to come that brings new alternatives together. In communist internationalism this anticipated moment has two versions, which are sometimes complementary. Both versions defined the diffusion of the ideology through revolution, but one follows the model of the '*Grand Soir*' (the event of the overthrow of capitalism) while the other privileges a more procedural diffusion, similar to the "domino effect." However, both models were abandoned gradually by most communist organizations and the USSR after the Second World War.

If a foreign event can "spark" the waves of contentious events, the process does not follow the "conventional" rationalist model. The spark does not necessarily lead to the fire. The critical masses overestimate the significance of this external precedent, and conclude that it is possible to replicate it in their own context.[21] This overestimation enhances the significance, in a way that was not predicted by its own actors. Kurt Weyland claims that this understanding agrees with cascade theories invoking cognitive heuristics. In cases of the revolutionary cascades, this explanation captures more elements than the traditional rationalist model does. In the dynamics of those revolutionary events, actors (including "common" people) are subject to distortion in their judgements, and face a lot of uncertainty.[22] In summary, a 'spark' can disseminate distortions and uncertainties in other countries.

## La Vie en Rouge: Organizational Concerns

The primary hypothesis of this paper is that the anticipation of leftist diffusion influences partisans and adversaries to see revolution as a potentially globalizing institution through a spill-over logic. However, this anticipation is not devoid of rationality. Weyland concluded that the wave of 1917-1919, which was triggered by the Russian Revolution, diffused differently compared to the wave of 1848 (the "Spring of Nations"). Indeed, the wave of 1917-1919 advanced more slowly than

[20] Beck, "The World-Cultural Origins of Revolutionary Waves: Five Centuries of European Contention", 194.
[21] Weyland, *Making Waves: Democratic Contention in Europe and Latin America since the Revolutions of 1848*, 14.
[22] Ibid., 15.

the one before. To explain this delay, Weyland proposed that recently-emerged large-scale organizations (unions, political parties, international movements) had reshaped the processing of political information, broadening the limits of rationality.[23] The leaders of the 1917-1919 movements were less hasty and more prepared than the inchoate masses of 1848. With the rise of these organizations, "a new level of decision-making about emulative regime contention" was introduced.[24] This allowed ordinary citizens to follow organized groups, parties and unions, as opposed to 1848 when citizens needed to individually decide on their response to an external triggering event. The leaders of those 1917-1919 groups became the true decision-makers, and also reacted to external impulses for regime contention, however, in a deliberate manner that was in conjunction with the domestic power constellation and political context.[25] The expansion was therefore slower, but more successful than the events of the last century. In other words, in 1848, *grandiose* foreign events unleashed rapid contagion and lead the masses to rush their movement without any preoccupations for the "prevailing power constellation." This lead to the ultimate failure of most of these movements. In comparison to these rushed and thus failed movements, the leadership of organizations like the social-democratic movement of Germany made better decisions because they had access to information and the chance to debate with other members of the group.[26] Instead of abruptly imitating other revolution, the organization provided a framework to study the opportunity structure of their domestic context and to launch their movement at the moment they perceived to be the most favourable.[27] Even if the people of Europe shared transnational problematics, the most effective response could differ internally from one country to another.

The phenomenon of diffusion in accordance to local particularities has been described as translation. Johanna Bockman and Gil Eyal use Bruno Latour's concepts of the actor-network and translation to demonstrate that the best analysis of the adoption of neoliberalism in Eastern Europe is not "an institutional form diffused along the nodes of a network, but [is] itself an actor-network based on a particular

[23] Ibid., 127.
[24] Ibid., 128.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid., 153.
[27] Ibid.

translation strategy that construes socialism as a laboratory of economic knowledge."[28] For Latour, ideas and innovations are not simply diffused, but rather are part of a transformation of a network of relations. Similarly, what we might see as "imitative of given institutional forms" should be understood, for Latour, as translation.[29] This process is defined as the capacity of network builders to conceive an interpretation that matches their interests with the newcomers to the network, whose support and resources are essential for the network's continuance.[30] The importance of the concept goes beyond semantic concerns: transnational influence has an element of feedback. To use the vocabulary of Bockman and Eyal, it is not possible to divide the dialogue into an active author of the ideas and policies, and a passive recipient. In the example of the waves of revolution, the networks that made the diffusion/translation possible were the organizations described by Weyland. In the 20th century, politics had become more complex. In addition to what Weyland refers as micro-foundations, there were now macro-structures, and interactions between these two elements.[31] In terms of anticipation, it affected both adversaries and partisans. World leaders opposed to socialist ideas perceived the emergence of organized political movements as a threat, while socialist partisans found these political structures to be a vehicle for revolution. Activists from all of Europe meeting through the First International, which formed after the events of 1848, and then also through the Second International and the Comintern. Almost every country also saw the creation of socialist, social-democratic or communist parties to organize the movement. The party of Lenin, with sustained of the revolution in Russia, became the guiding light and the embodiment of success, which was ready to assist others in joining the union.

Other examples can be found to support Weyland's theory that the presence of organizational frameworks leads to better success in the diffusion of political movement. Indeed, a certain branch of revolutionaries did not believe that organizations were reflecting the true

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[28] Johanna Bockman and Gil Eyal, "Eastern Europe as a Laboratory for Economic Knowledge: The Transnational Roots of Neoliberalism". *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 108, No. 2 (September 2002), 310.

[29] Bockman and Eyal, "Eastern Europe as a Laboratory for Economic Knowledge: The Transnational Roots of Neoliberalism", 314.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Weyland, *Making Waves: Democratic Contention in Europe and Latin America since the Revolutions of 1848*, 153.

potential of the popular masses and tried a more 'organic' form of uprisings. This branch formulated a rejection of the 'analysis process' and the concept of *structurality*; however, as was the case in 1848, those who adopted spontaneity, from the Spartacist uprising of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg to the Taksim Gezi Park protests in Turkey, faced failure most of the time.

The historical analysis by Weyland shows that organization seems to be necessary for the overall success of a movement. However, fear that the social movement will be coopted and distorted by a certain power leads to mistrust for the organizational approach. As a movement becomes organized it gains members, but it loses its initial identity of subversive radicalism and being avant-garde. Movements must find an equilibrium between organization and cooptation, although some theorists and practitioners (from Rosa Luxemburg to Michel Foucault) felt that spontaneity was a better approach *normatively*. For example, there is a debate about Foucault's praise of the Iranian Revolution. His trust in spontaneous movement is present in his analytical account of the situation. Rejecting established theoretical labels, such as 'pure' Marxism or Maoism, Foucault felt that people were not hijacked in Iran. In contrast with movements in China, Cuba or Vietnam, the Iranian movement was "a tidal wave without a military leadership, without a vanguard, without a party."[32] The revolution needed to rely on the masses in order to avoid becoming a single-party dictatorship or another form of distorted regime. The personal sovereignty attached to the rulers of the *Ancien Régime* was weaker than nowadays. For Foucault the events of Iran were a sign of the end of the 'organizational' way of overthrowing regimes, the method that had emerged with modernity in the 20th century.[33] After the rationalization of the modern polity, emotions and the power of the crowd regained their effect on the state structures this affection for the Iranian movement a reproduction of what Jean-Claude Milner describe as being characteristic of the *Gauche Prolétarienne* (an attractive group for counter-culture intellectuals because of its mistrust of established intellectuals)? Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson trace the multiple uses of the expression *irreducible* to describe the uprising. They conclude that, "at least in part," the movement was so "elemental" that it was not possible to reduce it to smaller constituent elements, such as

[32] Michel Foucault, *Dits et Écrits, II, 1976-1988*, (Paris : Gallimard, 2001), 94
[33] Ibid., 701.

parties, tendencies, and factions, and that is why Foucault was so seduced by it[34] As opposed to the bureaucratic boredom and flip-flopping attitude of the French leftist politics, the spontaneity of the Iranian movement was just a collective rejection of the structures, including the revolutionary model itself.

## A Sense of Community

How can the particularity of each community, protected and symbolized by the monstrous Leviathan, accept the diffusion of ideas, practices and institutions coming from elsewhere? Internationalism and nationalism are both products of modernity, and appeared in Europe at around the same time. However, diffusion seems to be a true global issue, encompassing all nations into one community. Diffusion therefore operates transnationally. The relationship between revolution and leftism, and concepts of nation and nationalism is interesting, as their history is intertwined and followed paterns of diffusion in the 19th and 20th century

In his 1983 book, *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson offered what has become the widely accepted definition of nation and the associated sentiment of nationalism. A nation "is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is *imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in minds of each lives the image of their communion."[35] This definition of nation may seem to contradict Marxist principles of *species-being* inspiring revolutionaries, especially given the other label given by Anderson: "the nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them [...] has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind. The most messianic nationalists do not dream of a day when all the members of the human race will join their nation."[36]

Is it indeed contradictory that national movements expressed themselves through revolutionary communism? Furthermore, is it only for practical strategic reasons that Lenin advocated the right of self-

[34] Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson, *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution. Gender and the Seductions of Islamism* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 130.

[35] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006), 6.

[36] Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, 7.

determination of oppressed nations? On one hand, Lenin connected the class struggle to the international system, in which the internationalism of the 'great' nations take the form of oppression and inequality. "Anybody who does not understand this has not grasped the real proletarian attitude to the national question, he is still essentially petty bourgeois in his point of view and is, therefore, sure to descend to the bourgeois point of view."[37] On the other, he argued that it should be "assured that the non-Russians place the greatest possible trust in the proletarian class struggle," because, in order to gain their support, the new Russian-based government needs to compensate "for the lack of trust, for the suspicion and the insults to which the government of the "dominant" nation subjected them in the past."[38] Therefore, it seems that, beyond the tendency of socialists movements to take the side of the oppressed, the connection between modern revolutionnary and nationalist ideals is the product of political calculation by the builders of Soviet union.[39]

The modern meaning of "nation" is said to have appeared at the Battle of Valmy in 1792, provoking the end of the monarchy during the French Revolution, during which the Commander of the Revolution, General Kellermann, exclaimed "Long live the Nation."[40] In this context, partisans were defending the land against the reactionary forces backed by the other European countries. Despite the differences between these two eras, one similarity is that, like the leaders before the Second World War, European monarchs feared the expansion of the French Revolution outside in Europe, which would threaten the established "social order" in which their interests are favoured. However, at the time of the interwar period (1919-1938), the diffusion of revolutionary ideas did not appear in the way it did in France at the end of the 18th century. Indeed, a number of historians now argue that those revolutionary ideas and their institutional expressions were diffused a few years later through

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[37] Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov "Lenin", "The Question of Nationalities or 'Autonomisation' " in "'Last Testament' Letters to the Congress'", from *Lenin Collected Works* (1963), Volume 36, 593-611. Available online at: http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1906/may/20c.htm (Accessed May 17th, 2016)

[38] "Lenin", "The Question of Nationalities or 'Autonomisation' " in "'Last Testament' Letters to the Congress'".

[39] "Ibid.

[40] Maurice Agulhon, *Les mots de la République*, (Toulouse : Presses Universitaires du Mirail, 2007), 81.

Napoleon's conquests in Europe.[41] This raises the question of the relationship between wars and revolution and the potential expansion of revolution through war: the 'War-Revolution Nexus'.[42]

If the motivations of actors can be understood through the lens of the classical realist notions of survival and struggle for interests, the interconnection between strategic concerns and ideational conceptions becomes clear, as ideology and beliefs (and even mythology) influenced the decisional process of the actors. Historically, it is necessary to remember that the period studied is marked by two pancontinental events (the rise of Fascism and the Russian Revolution) and an almost unseen transnational context, a characteristic of modernity.[43] Even with the distinct boundaries separating each countries, and the narrative dictated by the nation-state to their community, societies and movements shared a common experience, and sometimes even common aspirations.[44] This new proximity, the feeling of a certain "imagined" community made possible the spillover of revolution. The actors who wanted to learn from past experience tried to anticipate the results, which influenced the diffusion of the practice of revolution.

## What Is to Be Done?

With capitalism widely accepted as the "appropriate" system, Left politics tried for decades to ride the monster, with initiatives such as the Third Way or New Labour. However, social-democracy, forced to accept the neoliberal dogma, was only weakened by such efforts. It is within this context that a new radicalism emerged which proposed to slay the monster by processes of creation and destruction. Today, the framework of diffusion can still be applied to broader political manifestations. For example, the term 'political revolution' has recently entered in the rhetoric of the Western left. United States Democratic Party presidential candidate Bernie Sanders uses it as his main leitmotiv

[41] Marvin Perry, Myrna Chase, James Jacob, Margaret Jacob and Theodore H. Von Laue, *Western Civilization: Ideas, Politics, and Society*, (Scarborough: Nelson Education, 2012), 478.

[42] Michael Jabara Carley, *1939: The Alliance That Never Was and the Coming of World War II* (Chicago: Ivan R Dee, 1999), xv.

[43] Gerd-Rainer Horn and Padraic Kenney (Ed.), *Transnational Moments of Change: Europe 1945, 1968, 1989*. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), xi.

[44] Horn and Kenney (Ed.), *Transnational Moments of Change: Europe 1945, 1968, 1989*, xi.

for change.[45] The expression 'political revolution' was also revived by Pierre Laurent, the head of the French Communist Party (PCF), as well as Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the former Green European MP and emblematic figure of the May 68 protests.[46] It is also used as a call for a new political class. The reappearance of the terminology of revolution is one expression of the renewal of the left, not only in dealing with the right-wing and the neoliberal dogma, but also with its own past and heritage.

What are the roots of this evolution? In Marxist literature, the idea of political revolution is associated with the Trotskyist theory. For Trotsky, this situation occurs when a government, or its "form," is replaced or differed, "but so far as concerns property relations, the new power would not have to resort to revolutionary measures."[47] Thus, it differs from social revolutions: "after the political revolution – that is, the deposing of the bureaucracy – the proletariat would have to introduce in the economy a series of very important reforms, but not another social revolution."[48] The common sense of the term revived this opposition to the social, meaning a revolution into the political sphere, even, the orthodox political structure. This is why it has been associated with the reformist tradition of socialism (as opposed to the 'true' revolutionaries, such as Castro or Mao) and with the democratic socialism of Jean Jaurès (France), Salvador Allende (Chile) or Olof Palme (Sweden), which emphasize the electoral process.

The hope of the global left is concentrated on microsituations, with passive spectators who put all their hopes into those. The results can lead to the sentiment of failure, followed by the quick spread of disappointment amongst the former partisans that have now defected with disaffection.[49] This is what happened with SYRIZA in Greece. The tremendous success of the small party, with their major electoral victory in early 2015, drew global attention. The party opposed the

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[45] Pierre Laurent. *99%*. (Paris: Cherche Midi, 2016), 85.

[46] Hervé Algalarrondo and Daniel Cohn-Bendi. *Et si on arrêtait les conneries : Plaidoyer pour une révolution politique*. (Paris : Fayard, 2016); Laurent. *99%*, 85.

[47] Leon Trotsky, *The Revolution Betrayed* (1936) Available online at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1936/revbet/ch09.htm (Accessed May 17th, 2016)

[48] Ibid.

[49] Alex Andreou, "Alexis Tsipras: Hero, Traitor, Hero, Traitor, Hero", *Byline*, July 13th, 2015, accessed May 17th, 2016, https://www.byline.com/column/11/article/164

austerity measures applied by memorandum by the European troika (the European Commission, European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund). SYRIZA defeated the social-democratic PASOK and the conservative New Democracy to form a government with right-wing ANEL, with which it shares Eurosceptic concerns. In June 2015, Tsipras announced that he would submit the bailout proposition to the population in the first referendum to be held since the 1970s. Tsipras and his party campaigned for the 'No', and won with 61.31% of the vote. The day after, to facilitate negotiations with the "troïka", Yanis Yaroufakis, the Minister of Finance and architect of the economic agenda of SYRIZA resigned. His resignation, however, was insufficient to change the plans of Greece's creditors. With the threat of ejection from the Eurozone, Tsipras's government was forced to maintain the neoliberal path and install an austerity program in Greece.[50] Not only did a fraction of SYRIZA resign and vote against him in parliament, but around the world the honeymoon of admiration for the party abruptly ended.

Pierre Rimbert in *Le Monde Diplomatique* was critical of the attitude of the media towards the Greek Crisis which called for Tsipras to resign six months after his election. Rimbert perceived Tsipras as only guilty of wanting to keep his promises, considered the coverage of the media as taking the side of the creditors."[51] Considering the confrontation between Tsipras's colition and the creditors as ideological, Rimbert's summarized the vision of the creditors by the formula: *"Syriza deledna est* – Syriza must be destroyed".[52] Indeed, for European liberal leaders, "it was out of question for the conservative Europe to leave the possibility of an alternative, be it soberly social-democratic as the Syriza program." [53] They felt they had to slay the monster as quickly as possible, and eliminate a potential precedent.

Jean-Luc Mélenchon, 2017 presidential candidate and major voice of the French left, judged Tsipras harshly, saying that his decision and

[50] "Crise grecque : Hollande et Merkel attendent « des propositions précises et crédibles »", *Le Monde*. June 6th, 2015, accessed May 17th, 2016, http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/07/06/demission-reunions-reactions-le-jour-d-apres-le-non-grec_4672239_3214.html

[51] Pierre Rimbert, "« Syriza delenda est »", *Le Monde diplomatique*, July 2015, accessed May 17th, 2016, https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2015/07/RIMBERT/53219

[52] Ibid.

[53] Ibid.

negotiation tactics were weak.[54] Mélenchon's opinion, shared around the globe, found a response in a text by Alex Andreou. Covering the situation from a Greek perspective, Andreou wrote a piece that summarized the paradox of SYRIZA, addressing it to the leftists of the world who were disappointed and harshly criticizing Tsipras's decision: "We apologise to Marxists worldwide for Greece refusing to commit ritual suicide to further the cause. You have suffered from your sofas."[55] Not only has he highlighted how "easy it is to be ideologically pure when you are risking nothing," but he grasped the key element about the hope and the faith of diffusion towards the leftist ideal. Indeed, Andreou found the situation to be revealing of the political landscape in Europe and all-across the world, that partisans of socialism would put all their hopes and dreams on the leader of a small country. That means that those partisans are so in need for a model to follow, for a spark to light the fire, that "there seemed to be a fervent, irrational, almost evangelical belief that a tiny country, drowning in debt, gasping for liquidity, would somehow (and that somehow is never specified) defeat global capitalism, armed only with sticks and rocks." [56]

The Greek experience is not a total failure. The diffusion element is alive, and contributed to what seems to be a growing momentum. It opens the door to other 'monsters' threatening the economic order, from Podemos to *Nuit Debout* in France, not only using ideological or political tactics, but also social, aesthetic, and ethical elements.[57] Not to say that SYRIZA is directly responsible for the other 'monsters', but it participates to a broader, transnational context fueling these social and political movements across the national borders.

Normatively, for the success of progressive movement, anticipation of diffusion is a double-edged sword. Thus, the burning question of Lenin is still unresolved: What is to be done? The answer for Franco "Bifo" Berardi is that resistance is (almost) futile.[58] Even if revolution is still necessary, in our world of disappointment the battle is over and capitalist

[54] Conference of Jean-Luc Mélenchon in Montreal, on April 23th, 2016: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bWN6zhj7UN0

[55] Andreou, "Alexis Tsipras: Hero, Traitor, Hero, Traitor, Hero"

[56] Ibid.

[57] Email exchange with the author

[58] Franco "Bifo" Berardi (Trad. : Paulin Dardel), *TUERIES : Forcenés et suicidaires à l'ère du capitalisme absolu*, (Montréal : Lux Éditeur, 2016), 197.

absolutism has won, and hope will do us more harm than good.[59] The only thing that is left for us is ironic autonomy.[60]

However, what can we do if not keep hoping? Last year in the United States, the Bernie Sanders phenomenon took everyone from the public to political analysts by surprise. Even if he was not elected as the Democratic nominee, the Sanders phenomenon showed the force of the ideas of the left and their appeal to the new generations, even in the kingdom of capitalist absolutism. It is an occasion to send a clear message about the progressive cause itself, all around the world. For such we need to act and take position. We shall not wait. It is important to keep in mind that diffusion is active rather than a passive process.

[59] Berardi, TUERIES : Forcenés et suicidaires à l'ère du capitalisme absolu, 215.
[60] Ibid., 214.

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# We Are All Cannibals – and Other Essays

Claude Lévi-Strauss – Columbia University Press 2016

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Within the canon of critical theory and continental philosophy, Claude Lévi-Strauss has been pushed to the margins. Often, his work is only considered as a footnote to the work of Jacques Derrida. Too often are we told that Derrida's "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Human Sciences"[1] curbed Lévi-Strauss' (and structuralism as a whole) dominance over the French academy, and marked the beginning of post-structuralism. While there may be historical validity to this claim, other figures of the structuralist movement – such as Louis Althusser and Jacques Lacan – continue to be major figures within critical theory, the same is not true for Claude Lévi-Strauss, who once was the champion of a fledging school of thought.

*We Are All Cannibals: And Other Essays,* published by Columbia University Press in March 2016, is unlikely to change Lévi-Strauss' marginality. Though it complements the academy's current interest in the intersections of biology and politics, it lacks the overall strength of a text that would evoke newfound excitement for a thinker. Nonetheless, this is by all means a good book. It serves as a good entry point into the anthropologist's work, and reveals the continued relevancy and usefulness of it for contemporary social scientists and theorists. Comprised of articles written throughout his career, the anthology is divided into two sections: the first is a reflection on the burning of Santa Claus in effigy in front of a Dijon Cathedral published in *Les Temps Moderne* in 1952, and the second a series of sixteen articles on originally published in the Italian newspaper *La Repubblica* (though written in French) between 1989 and 2000 on current issues of the day. Taken together, they cover the scope of Claude Lévi-Strauss' lengthy academic career spanning five decades.

The uniting theme across the two sections is the motif of the myth and the ritual as constituting an underlying system within our social

[1]See Jacques Derrida, "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," in *Writing and Difference*, 2 edition (London: Routledge, 2001).

ontology. The first section seeks to understand "not [...] why children are fond of Santa Claus but rather why adults were impelled to invent him,"[2] arguing that the story of Santa Claus ought to be understood as a means of expressing "the differential status between small children on the one hand, adolescents and adults on the other."[3] In this sense, Santa Claus can be understood within the broader context of a sociology of initiation. Far from purely symbolic, Lévi-Strauss puts forward the argument that "rites and myths of initiation have a practical function in human societies: they help elders keep youngsters well-behaved and obedient."[4] It is a compelling argument; after all, implicit in the notion of Santa Claus is the distinction between those who are "naughty" and those who are "nice."

Despite its convincing argument, the first section of the collection is not without its problems. This section differs greatly from the remainder of the anthology. Indeed, unlike the rest of the book, the myth of Santa Claus has nothing to do with the trope of cannibalism for which the book is titled. One has to wonder why it was included in the same collection, given that it differs so greatly thematically and was written nearly 40 years earlier than the beginning of the latter half of the book.

With that said, it is this latter half of the book where Lévi-Strauss truly shines, and where it begins to relate to both its title and this issue of *TBD*'s* theme of "Monsters and Beasts." Admittedly, some of the chapters achieve this more effectively than others. The first two entries, for example, are concerned more with the development of civilization and the anthropological subject than issues of the body and cannibalism that permeate latter chapters. It is not until the third chapter, "Social Problems: Ritual Female Excision and Medically Assisted Reproduction," that the reader sees Lévi-Strauss become a highly useful tool to the scholar of biopolitics. Throughout the remainder of the book, the author traces he lineage of contemporary controversies of the body in a manner reminiscent Foucault's genealogical method, while also highlighting the ever-present connection between the biological and the social.

It is not surprising that cannibalism becomes the focal point of Lévi-Strauss' analysis, as for much of the time-span he is writing in the wake

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[2] Claude Lévi-Strauss, *We Are All Cannibals: And Other Essays*, trans. Jane Marie Todd (Columbia University Press, 2016), 3.

[3] Ibid., 9.

[4] Ibid., 10.

of a moral panic surrounding Creutzfeld-Jakob Disease and the outbreak of Mad Cow Disease. Implicit in the claim that "we have always been cannibals" is a definition of cannibalism that extends beyond common representations and conceptions of cannibalism to include medical procedures like brain grafts and blood transfusions. These chapters form a genealogy of the Mad Cow disease that provokes the reader to question the conditions that have led to cannibalism in the past and the reasons that have led to the stigma surrounding it. In essence, Lévi-Strauss notes that cannibalism – something deemed to be taboo in mainstream society – is not something that humanity has moved beyond, but rather something that continues to be a part of society and its intersections of society and biology through medicine. This series of essays represent Lévi-Strauss at his finest in the collection.

As is the case with many anthologies, the quality of the pieces vary. There are moments of great profundity, and the weaker moments are few and far between. However, at times the thematic link between essays is lost by virtue of including the vastly different article on the Santa Claus effigy that opens the collection. Nonetheless, the anthology serves as an exceptional introduction to both Lévi-Strauss' work and a structuralist mode of analysis. While many anthropologists are guilty of reinforcing colonialism through a fetishized fascination with the indigenous subject, Lévi-Strauss is able to avoid this crime himself and instead is able to highlight this tendency. The book thus brings an important contribution to the study of biopolitics that warrants attention. While this book is unlikely the reverse Lévi-Strauss' marginal position within the canon of critical theory, it nonetheless offers a convincing argument that his work ought to be taken seriously and is not out of date.

Claude Lévi-Strauss, *We Are All Cannibals: And Other Essays*, trans. Jane Marie Todd (Columbia University Press, 2016)

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